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GQESBIGHT DEPOSIT; 



THE CRIME 



"Never in the history of the world has a greater 
crime than this been committed. Never has a 
crime after its commission been denied with greater 
effrontery and hypocrisy. " 

"J'Accuse." 



THE CRIME 

(DAS VERBRECHEN) 



BY 

A GERMAN 

THE AUTHOR OF "I ACCUSE!',' 



TRANSLATED BY 

ALEXANDER GRAY 

VOLUME II 
ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 



NEW YORK 
GEORGE H. DORAN COMPANY 



^ 



.(k^ 



COPYRIGHT, 191 8, 
BY GEORGE H. DORAN COMPANY 



\ 



V 

*y. 



PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 



NOV 30 1918 



©C1.A506744 



MA \ 



NOTE 

In the course of publication it has been 
found necessary to publish in two volumes 
what had originally been intended to form 
the second volume of THE CRIME. The 
third volume will comprise the section on 
War-Aims, and references to the various chap- 
ters in that section must now be interpreted 
as referring to the third volume. 

Footnotes added in the course of translation 
are indicated in square brackets. 



CONTENTS 

CHAPTER I 
THE PREVENTIVE WAR) 



PAGE 



Preventive War or War of Conquest? — Honest and Dishonest 
" Preventive- Warriors " — Schiemann "The German Derou- 
lede" and other "Preventive- Warriors" — The True Traitors 
— Francis Delaisi — Schiemann and Greindl — The Entente 
an Aggressive Alliance? — The Aggressive Conspiracy of 
Reval (1908) and the Method of Snippets — The Bosnian 
Crisis, 1908-9 — The Tactics of Falsification of Schiemann 
and Co. — The German Military Law and the French Three 
Years Law — The Anglo-Russian Naval Consultations — The 
Entente Conspiracy Invented by Schiemann — Sir Edward 
Grey's Constant Disappointment — The Moroccan Agreement 
of 191 1 — The Venezuela Conflict — Italy's Role in the War — 
Lies have "Short Legs" — The Negotiations for an Anglo- 
German Understanding in the Light of Schiemann's His- 
torical Investigations. The Agadir Incident — Confession of a 
Preventive War and Other "Discrepancies" — Correspondence 
between Grey and Cambon, November, 191 2 — The Historical 
Antecedents and the History of the Crime . .^. . . . 13 



CHAPTER II 

THE THEORY AND THE PRACTICE OF THE 
PREVENTIVE WAR 

Bismarck and the Preventive War — Strategy and Diplomacy 
— Frederick the Great — When is War Inevitable? — The 
Three Presuppositions of a Preventive War — The Military- 
Preparations of the Triple Entente and the Triple Alliance 
— Which Side Made Greater Military Preparations before 
the War, the Triple Alliance or the Triple Entente? — Ef- 
fective Peace Strength of Army and Navy — The Fall of Del- 
casse (June, 1905)— The Jury Court of the World— Analogy 

vii 



viii CONTENTS 

PAGE 

of Criminal Procedure — The Historical Antecedents Furnish 
a Prima Facie Case for Germany's Will for War — That is 
War as We Love It no 

CHAPTER III 
GERMANY AND THE HAGUE CONFERENCES 

Those Guilty of the Past. Those Guilty of the Future. The 
First Hague Conference — Germany against Arbitration. 
White's Autobiography — International Commissions of In- 
quiry. "Good Services" and Mediation — Cour Permanente 
d' Arbitrage — The "Initiative" of the Hague Bureau — Pro- 
fessor Zorn and the Problems of The Hague — The Second 
Hague Conference — Obligatory Arbitration, World Treaty 
or Individual Treaty? — Hague Cause, Triple Entente Effect 
— German Anti-Pacifism in Theory and Practice — Taft's 
Treaties of Arbitration — The Bryan Treaties — Idealism or 
Egotism? — Schiemann and the Hague Conferences — The 
"Freedom of the Seas" — Between the First and Second 
Hague Conferences — One "Block," not "Blocks" in Europe . 165 

CHAPTER IV 
ENGLISH PACIFISM IN WORD AND DEED 

England's Action during the Bosnian Crisis and the Balkan Con- 
flict — Bethmann's Reasons for Refusing the Conference — 
The Russian Mobilisation as a Reason for Refusing the Con- 
ference — England's Behaviour during the Bosnian Crisis 
and the Balkan Conflicts — An Article in the Pester Lloyd, 
a New Self-accusation of Austria — A Falsification of the 
Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung — The Chancellor with the 
Iron Forehead 233 

CHAPTER V 

THE ANGLO-GERMAN NEGOTIATIONS FOR AN UNDER- 
STANDING (1909-1912) 

Course of the Negotiations — "A Couple of Dreadnoughts, More 
or Less" — Germany's Last Word: Retardation but not Re- 
duction of Naval Construction — England's Neutrality as an 
Equivalent — Why was Germany Unwilling to Restrict Her 
Naval Armaments? — An Anglo-German Agreement Would 
Have Prevented the War — Metternich's Reports of Feb- 
March, 19 12 — Haldane — Voluntary Reduction of Naval Con- 
struction; Naval Holiday 259 



CONTENTS ix 

CHAPTER VI 
THE SPOKESMEN OF MILITANT GERMANY 

PAGE 

Bernhardi — The Four Groups of the Defenders of Germany — 
Upholders of the Doctrine of Defence — Imperialists — Pre- 
ventionists — Preventive Imperialists — The German Chauvin- 
ists — The Crown Prince — The Other "August Personages" — 
Mercenary Armies; Universal Service — Policy of Brag — The 
Chauvinists and the German Nation — Otfried Nippold; 
"German Chauvinism" — The League for Promoting Inter- 
national Understanding — Pan-Germany; All Germany — 
Stages in the Policy of Force — Anthology from German Chau- 
vinistic Literature before the War — The Pan-German Union — 
Before the War — After the Outbreak of War — Herr von 
Bethmann and the Pan-Germans — Pan-German War Aims — 
Pan-Germans, Liberals, Social-Democrats — The Liberal Press 
before the War and the Chauvinists — "Spiritual Regenera- 
tion" — The Law of Adaptation — Heroes — Psychology of the 
Free-Lance — Houston Stewart Chamberlain — Germany, the 
only Shield of Peace — Who is Responsible for the War? — 
Chamberlain as Historian — Russia's Spirit of Compliance, a 
Question of Detail — Chamberlain on the German and English 
Peoples — Chamberlain's War-Aims — "Degenerate Sons" of 
the Fatherland — Preventive Imperialists — Gebsattel — Harden 
— Paul Rohrbach — The Agrarian Patriots — Prussian and 
Russian Reaction — Rohrbach on the War Path — War, the 
Father of All Things — The Fear of Peace — Germany's World- 
Domination — The Struggle for the "Place in the Sun" — The 
Three Prehminary Questions — The Main Question: Did We 
Stand in the Sun or the Shadow? — The "Standard of Life" 
in Germany — Concluding Observation 300 



THE CRIME 



THE CRIME 

CHAPTER I 
THE PREVENTIVE WAR 

Preventive War or War of Conquest? 

In J'accuse I have already pointed out with all possible em- 
phasis that of the three descriptions which may be applied 
to this war, namely, that it is a defensive war, a preventive 
war, or an imperialistic war of conquest, in my opinion, so 
far as Germany is concerned, the third only is in point. 

The first description, that it is a war of defence against 
attack, is the one which after two and a half years of war still 
dominates public opinion in Germany. It is the formula with 
which the war was begun, and with which it is still being 
carried on to-day. On August ist, 191 5, the first anniversary 
of the outbreak of war, the Emperor spoke, in almost the same 
terms as he had used a year earlier, of "the struggle in de- 
fence of the highest possessions of the nation, its life and 
its freedom." After the success of the third war loan, the 
Emperor emphasised in his congratulatory telegram to Dr. 
Helfferich, the Secretary to the Treasury, the immovable will 
of the German people to "continue to a victorious conclusion 
the war that had been forced upon us by a criminal attack." 
Until to-day the same formula has remained in force. But 
untruths are not converted into truths by frequent repetitions, 
and all the constantly renewed efforts of the German authori- 
ties to represent the war as a war of defence continue to 
be vain in the eyes of the world, and as may be hoped will 
in the end also be vain before the German people. Notwith- 

13 



14 THE CRIME 

standing all denials on the part of the guilty, History has 
already pronounced in favour of the persecuted, despised and 
reviled author of J' accuse, and has inscribed on her iron 
tablets in ineffaceable letters the judgment: 

Germany and Austria are guilty of having consciously 
and intentionally brought about the European war. 

As a result of the documentary evidence which I produced 
in my book and in this supplementary work, this question 
is, so far as I am concerned, disposed of, and I neither 
intend, nor do I see any occasion, to return to it in the near 
future. 

Among the more astute people in Germany in all ranks 
in society, from the highest diplomatists and ex-ambassa- 
dors, down through professors and writers on international 
law, merchants, manufacturers, "intellectuals" of all kinds 
(who in part have found a meeting place in the "Bund Neues 
Vaterland") down to the Socialists on the Left, out of whom 
the authorities endeavour to drive the recognition of the 
truth by imprisonment and by proceedings for high treason', 
everywhere, even among Kreuzzeitung people like Schiemann 
and Zukunf t-wnttrs like Harden, it is coming more and more 
to be, not merely recognised, but acknowledged (although the 
acknowledgment under the influence of the censorship is con- 
cealed and veiled) that the war is in reality not a defensive war 
but a preventive war, or as I have expressed it in my book: 
"It is true that we were not attacked, but we would have 
been attacked later on, at a time which, from a military 
point of view, would have been more unfavourable to us; we 
therefore anticipated the attack at the moment that was more 
favourable to us." 

This confession that it is a preventive war represents in 
itself a substantial gain for those of us whose diagnosis is 
that it is an imperialistic war of conquest. It is a half-way 
advance to our point of view. It involves a confession that 
all the resonant phrases which were used two and a half 
years ago to inspire the German people to war, and are still 



THE PREVENTIVE WAR 15 

incessantly repeated, rest on falsehood ; that neither the Rus- 
sians nor the French attacked us in the opening days of 
August, 1 914, that the sword was not pressed into our hands 
to "defend ourselves to the last breath of man and horse," 
that we were not called upon "to protect our holiest posses- 
sions, the Fatherland, our very hearth, against a ruthless 
attack." Whoever says that this is a preventive war, nec- 
essarily in so doing expresses the view that every sentence 
which was then spoken and written, and which is still being 
spoken and written, to induce in the nation a belief in a 
war of defence is an untruth; that the German people have 
been deceived, that they have been led to the slaughter-house 
and stirred to enthusiasm for something which was in fact 
non-existent, for a fancy, for a dream. 

So far as this negative aspect is concerned, the advocates 
of the preventive war and of the war of conquest are in 
agreement to the extent of denying that it is a war of de- 
fence. If they desire to be logical, the former group must 
also acknowledge that the German people have been deceived. 
No one, however, falsifies the truth out of mere pleasure, and 
since every deception must have a reason and an aim, these 
men must further admit that if the German people had known 
the truth, if they had known that they were not directly men- 
aced, that they had not been attacked, they would not have 
allowed themselves to be involved in the war, or at least to 
be involved in it with such unanimity and enthusiasm. Those 
who adhere to the view that the war is a preventive war are 
bound to admit the deception, and they could at most plead 
in its justification that the deception was necessary, because 
defence against a present attack was comprehensible to the 
simple and sound sense of the nation, whereas the prevention 
of a future attack would have appeared incomprehensible and 
inexcusable as a ground for war. Everyone who denies that 
this is strictly a war of defence must therefore pass the same 
moral judgment on the behaviour of the German Government 
towards their own people; he may justify in any way he 
chooses the German war of aggression, he may consider it as 
an aggressive war which was necessary to prevent future ag- 



16 THE CRIME 

gressive wars being waged by the opposite side, or he may 
consider it as an aggressive war arising out of purely imperi- 
alistic tendencies and designed to serve imperialistic ends — 
in any case he acknowledges that it is not a war of defence, 
and from this fact it follows that the Rulers and Govern- 
ments have deceived the people. 



As I have clearly indicated in my book, I myself am one 
of those who judge that the war may be appropriately de- 
scribed, not as a preventive war, but as an imperialistic war 
of conquest. I have endeavoured to prove the correctness 
of my view by citing a series of political facts and by col- 
lecting testimony of weight from the national imperialistic 
literature of Germany. These political facts have been de- 
scribed as insignificant, and the attempt has been made to 
discredit the literary evidence on the ground that it is not 
authoritative. My opponents have endeavoured to refute my 
account of the attitude of Germany at the Hague Confer- 
ences and in the ensuing negotiations for an understanding 
with England — a subject to which I shall return in a sep- 
arate chapter. Pains have been taken to free the German 
Government from all responsibility for General Bernhardi 
and those who share his views, but no mention has been made 
of my pointed references to the views, the actions, and the 
writings of the German Crown Prince. In a further chap- 
ter I shall produce a copious selection from our Pan-German, 
chauvinistic and imperialistic literature, and I shall then 
prove that the matter is not disposed of merely by shaking 
off Bernhardi, that the Bernhardians still remain, people like 
Deimling, Keim and his satellites, the Pan-German Union 
with its Generals and its Admirals, with its influential Press, 
which unscrupulously directed itself to war as its object, and 
that, like the great Bernhardi himself, all the insignificant and 
petty Bernhardians have with a steady purpose (and yet with 
an unsteady mind) kept in view and have pursued the end 
which is expressed with all desirable clarity in the titles of 
Bernhardi's chapters : "Germany's Historical Mission," 



THE PREVENTIVE WAR 17 

"World Power or Downfall," "The Right and the Duty to 
Make War." 

To this we shall return later. At the present moment we 
are speaking, not of the imperialistic, but of the preventive 
war. It is true that a rigid, infallibly certain line of differ- 
entiation cannot be drawn between the representatives of the 
two points of view. In Imperialistic literature also the idea 
of prevention against a hostile attack may frequently be 
heard. It is not every Imperialist who has the honesty and 
sincerity of the Prussian General, who expressly excludes an 
aggressive war on the part of the Triple Entente, and assigns 
to our diplomacy the task "so to shuffle the cards that we may 
be attacked by France. . . . Neither France nor Russia nor 
England need to attack in order to further their interests." 
It is not every Imperialist who is as candid as Bernhardi in 
expressing the view that Germany could arrive at the world- 
war which she desired and which was imperatively necessary 
for her future, only if she herself provoked the war. Many 
of our war-intriguers are more astute and prudent than the 
military plungers, and in addition to emphasising the neces- 
sity of a military ascent to world power, they also allow their 
writings to be coloured by the other motive, that of the "in- 
evitability" of the war, the motive that if we do not begin, 
the others will begin at a moment favourable to them. This, 
then, represents a fusion of the preventive and the imperial- 
istic motives, of which the latter are really decisive, whereas 
the former are hung round the naked brutality of war, like 
a mantle to conceal its shame. 

All these grounds for what was formerly the war of the 
future but is now the war of the present rest, as we have 
said, on the same negative basis that they stamp as a lie the 
assertion that we are waging a war of liberation and defence. 
The preventive war and the war of conquest are alike wars of 
aggression, and there exists only this difference between the 
two, that the war of conquest is purely a war of aggression, 
whereas the preventive war is, so to speak, an anticipatory 
war of defence. 



18 THE CRIME 



Honest and Dishonest "Preventive-Warriors" 

The necessary premise of the preventive war is an intended 
attack from the other side. It is not sufficient to maintain 
the existence of this aggressive intention on the other side; 
it must be proved. Amongst those who support the theory 
that this is a preventive war it is again necessary to distin- 
guish between two groups, between those who have really be- 
lieved in the aggressive attentions of the Entente Powers 
against the Central Powers, and those who have merely acted 
as if this were their belief, whereas in reality they were in no 
way apprehensive of such an attack, and merely considered 
that it would serve their imperialistic aims of conquest to 
induce the people to believe in it. The former are the hon- 
est, the latter are the dishonest, "preventive-warriors." 

The arguments of the two groups are exactly the same, 
and since real belief or the mere affectation of belief is essen- 
tially a product of what occurs within the mind and the un- 
derstanding, it is a matter of difficulty to distinguish in the 
case of each individual war intriguer whether he should be 
classed among the honest or the dishonest "preventive-war- 
riors." The more intelligent among them would probably 
concur with the politicians of the Bernhardi school, who are 
purely bent on conquest, that neither France nor Russia nor 
England had in any way the slightest interest in provoking a 
European war, which, waged against the strongest military 
Power in the world, could not but be regarded as extremely 
dangerous for themselves, and as one of the greatest of ca- 
lamities for Europe and the world. The less intelligent may 
really have believed the blood-curdling story: 

That the Liberal English Cabinet which for almost 
ten years had sought an understanding with Germany in 
every possible way, and had endeavoured to secure inter- 
national arbitration and a limitation of armaments, had 
contemplated the provocation of a European war with 



THE PREVENTIVE WAR 19 

a view to the destruction of their best purchaser and 
seller ; 

That the civil Government of the third French Re- 
public, which had to take into account the unqualified 
pacifist views of Jaures and his party as well as the sin- 
cere and universally recognised desire of the French 
people for peace, promised England, which was "envi- 
ous" of Germany, to share in the attack in order to cool 
in a European deluge her forty-year-old lust for re- 
venge ; 

That the Tsar, who was personally good-natured and 
peace-loving, the man who had suggested and promoted 
the Peace Conferences at The Hague, the ruler of a 
Russia which was already too great, internally unfree 
and permeated by revolutionary aspirations, supported 
his two accomplices in their plans for booty and revenge. 

The arguments of the honest and the dishonest preventive 
politicians are the same. The recipe out of which the poison- 
ous ragout of Germany's peril was and is concocted is as fol- 
lows: The historical calendars of the last fifteen years are 
opened and all the visits of Kings, Emperors and Presidents, 
all ministerial conferences, so far as they took place on the 
side of the Entente Powers, are carefully noted; mention is 
then made of the enthusiastic reception accorded to King 
Edward in Paris and to Fallieres and Poincare in Petrograd, 
of the meetings which took place in Reval and other maritime 
towns, of the imperial, royal and presidential toasts, of the 
jingoistic articles of the chauvinistic Press (known to exist 
in all countries, worst of all in Germany) ; the names of Del- 
casse, Clemenceau, Isvolsky, Northcliffe, Millerand and Poin- 
care are introduced as often as possible; the mixture is stirred 
and beaten together as may be required ; King Edward's pol- 
icy of "encirclement" is added as a sauce, and the dish is 
ready. It is served hot and steaming to the credulous German 
people, and appears in the menu as "The Entente Powers' 
Blutgericht for the German people." The bill presented for 
it takes the form of the approval of millions for new army 



20 THE CRIME 

proposals, new soldiers, new cannons and new ships, and 
finally for the preventive war which is to save us from hav- 
ing to swallow the witches' brew concocted by the others at 
the moment which appears favourable to them. 

Anyone who reads all the writings now being issued in vast 
quantities by the defenders of the German Government and 
of their angelic innocence, the works of men like Schiemann, 
Chamberlain, Helmolt, Rohrbach, the whole professorial lit- 
erature of men like Oncken, Bergstrasser, Meyer, and their 
fellows, will find in all the same prescription : Articles in the 
French, English and Russian Press of an inciting character, 
meetings between monarchs and ministers, increases of mili- 
tary and naval forces (on the other side), diplomatic actions, 
entente agreements between England and France, between 
England and Russia, etc. The dishonest device, which by 
general consent has been and is still being applied in our 
chauvinistic literature with greater or less assurance and skill 
in order to place in the limelight before the German people 
the dangers of war which threatened from the side of the 
Entente Powers, consists primarily in representing all such 
incidents on the other side as preparations for a warlike at- 
tack, whereas all similar incidents on the side of the Triple 
Alliance are described merely as prudent measures of defence. 
If the German and Austrian General Staff confer with each 
other, as has indeed regularly taken place, in order to discuss 
together the condition of the two armies, to exchange stra- 
tegical ideas, and to outline in consultation plans for any war 
that may arise, these are as a matter of course merely de- 
fensive measures to meet the contingency of an attack by the 
Entente Powers, and are void of any suggestion of offensive 
intentions. But if English and French generals act in the 
same way, or if a similar exchange of opinion takes place 
between English and Russian army or naval officers, the Ger- 
man imperialist and chauvinist Press at once cries "Mur- 
der!" depicts in the most alarming colours the aggressive in- 
tentions of the Entente Powers, and acts like the Gracchi 
lamenting insurrection. 

The visits of King Edward to Paris, of Fallieres and Poin- 



THE PREVENTIVE WAR 21 

care to Petrograd, the presence of the Grand Duke Nicolai 
Nicolaievitch at the French manoeuvres, English naval prac- 
tice in the North Sea and in the Baltic, the meeting between 
the Tsar and King Edward in the roadstead at Reval, even 
the harmless visit of courtesy paid by the "Einkreisung- 
King" to his old friend the Emperor Francis Joseph in 
Schonbrunn — all these events are emanations and symptoms 
of a devilish intention to attack Germany, which it was in- 
tended should in the first place be isolated and separated from 
her Austrian ally, and then strangled at leisure. 

In this process of reasoning the corresponding occurrences 
which took place between the rulers of Germany and of Rus- 
sia and between the rulers of England and of Germany are 
either discarded or represented as ceremonial visits without 
political significance or — a more effective course which is 
more frequently adopted — they are described as a cunning, 
lying manoeuvre, by which the poor Germans were to be lulled 
into security so that later on they might be all the more easily 
crushed. The meeting at Potsdam between the monarchs of 
Germany and Russia in the presence of their leading Minis- 
ters is described by the historian Helmolt as "the great Pots- 
dam lie"; according to the other historian, Schiemann, its 
only consequence "was the appearance of an improvement 
in the relations between Germany and Russia," notwithstand- 
ing the fact that Herr von Bethmann on December ioth, 
191 o, in summarising the result of the Potsdam interview 
was able to state that "the two Governments would not enter 
into any kind of combination which could be directed aggres- 
sively against the other party." According to Helmolt, the 
agreements bearing on Balkan policy and on Persia were cer- 
tainly honourably intended by Germany, but not by Russia. 
Sazonof's accounts of the Potsdam agreement are described 
by Schiemann as "conscienceless." The practical result, how- 
ever, by virtue of which Russia agreed to place no difficulty 
in the way of Germany's Baghdad Railway enterprise, but 
on the contrary expressed her readiness to encourage its con- 
nection with the Russian railway-net in North Persia, is 
passed over in silence by the Berlin Kreuzzeitung professor. 



22 THE CRIME 



SCHIEMANN "THE GERMAN DEROULEDE" AND OTHER 
"PREVENTIVE-WARRIORS " 

This Herr Schiemann, royal Prussian Privy Councillor, 
professor in the University of Berlin, Director of the Faculty 
of East European History and Geography, deserves a spe- 
cial chapter. He appears to be unable to sleep in peace unless 
he produces every month or two a new war pamphlet, pub- 
lished by the house of George Reimer, bearing the naked 
sword on the title page. He parcels out his great fourteen- 
volumed historical work, presumably because he has learned 
by experience that the parcelling business offers certain ad- 
vantages, that the sum of the individual component parts, 
when divided into convenient pamphlets, represents — in op- 
position to the laws of mathematics which elsewhere hold 
good — a greater value when measured in sales than would be 
possessed by a solid study of the sources, which would be 
accessible to only a few purses. He has therefore been care- 
ful not to lose the opportunity of publishing a pamphlet of 
sixty-eight pages concerning and against my book, under the 
attractive title A Slanderer, Notes on the Historical Ante- 
cedents of the War. Of these sixty-eight pages, however, 
scarcely four or five are devoted to my book of three hundred 
and seventy-eight pages, while all the rest is vapid talk round 
about and over the subject. The pamphlet devoted to the 
slanderer which has been written by the former editor of the 
Kreuzzeitung almost produces on the unprejudiced reader the 
impression that it had already been prepared without refer- 
ence to my book, and that then, to make it more attractive 
and piquant and with a view to a better sale, it had been 
adapted to my book by adding a few introductory and con- 
cluding words and the slanderer title. 

The central part of J'accuse, the essential proof of guilt 
(Chapter III, pages 146-315), is disposed of with the crush- 
ing words: 

We do not propose to enter into a polemic against 
his (the accuser's) exposition of the official publications 



THE PREVENTIVE WAR 23 

of documents dealing with the period which elapsed be- 
tween the murder of the Archduke and the outbreak of 
war (page 67). 

Thus the question of guilt is a matter of indifference. Who 
provoked the European war in the critical days between July 
23rd and August 4th, 1914; who on the other hand endeav- 
oured to prevent war and maintain peace — these are subsid- 
iary questions into which the Berlin professor of history does 
not enter. He refers to others who have already discussed 
these questions, and who have refuted the demonstrations of 
the accuser. Who and what these others are we have seen 
in the course of this treatise (volume I). It is impossible to 
reduce them all to absurdity, unless one is prepared to write 
countless volumes or rather libraries. Acting on the princi- 
ple: in majore et minus continetur it must suffice to refute 
Herr Helfferich, the most conspicuous and, as I gladly ad- 
mit, the most adroit and skilful, whose arguments are more 
or less repeated by all the others. Herr Schiemann, how- 
ever, who has the unprecedented audacity to bring at every 
step the charge of falsification, slander, malice and disloyalty 
against a book which deserves at least the recognition of hav- 
ing penetrated as a kind of pioneer with infinite industry and 
zeal into the difficult labyrinth of the immediate diplomatic 
antecedents of the war, was under an obligation to prove 
these charges in detail; he was under an obligation on this 
point not to stop at the less important chapter, "The Ante- 
cedents of the Crime," but to consider the chief and central 
chapter of my book, "The Crime." As he does not do this, 
but prefers to back out and conceal himself behind the shield 
of others, who, it is true, attack my arraignment but do not 
refute it, I throw back the charge of slander at Professor 
Dr. Theodor Schiemann, formerly editor of the Kreusseitung 
in Berlin, and declare that his pamphlet is a worthless scrib- 
ble, which cannot dispose of a single sentence or a single let- 
ter in the documentarily supported proof which I furnished. 

His insinuations as to the character of the accuser rebound 
ineffectively from the German who has neither a "past" to 



24 THE CRIME 

conceal, nor anything for which to take "revenge," and who 
is not a "being far removed from his native soil." If the 
accuser does not mention his name, this is due to the fact that, 
unlike the Schiemanns, he is not in the happy position of be- 
ing able to give free expression to his opinion under the dom- 
ination of the military authorities and of the censorship in 
Germany, without exposing himself to the most grievous per- 
secutions, without running the risk of being reduced to silence 
for the future — perhaps even the silence of death. For him 
the internal peace 1 would end in the peace of the dungeon, as 
in the case of the courageous Liebknecht, for whom in my 
first book I expressed my admiration — and to whom to-day, 
now that he has become a martyr for his conviction, I ex- 
claim, "Greetings, brave comrade — you have been condemned 
to silence; all the more loudly and more distinctly will we 
who are left speak out." 

The True Traitors 

The accuser conceals his name, because he desires to keep 
unimpaired the right and the freedom to continue to speak 
and to act. All the unclean deluge of calumniation and insin- 
uation he calmly allows to pass over him, in the sure con- 
sciousness that he is honourably and incorruptibly serving 
the cause of truth and the true weal of the German people, 
more than all the Schiemanns taken together. For this may 
well be said to those who attack me : If they dare to denounce 
me as one who stands outside the German people, I reply, 
"You are not justified in speaking in the name of the Ger- 
man people. The true friends of Germany stand where I 
and those who think with me are standing. The Chauvinists 
and the Imperialists, the Nationalists and the Pan-Germans 
with the Junkers of the Kreuzzeitung at their head — these are 
the true enemies of the German people, these are the true 
traitors to their country." 

The plan of procedure adopted by the instigators of war 
has on every side always been the same; they incite and pro- 

1 [Burgfrieden.] 



THE PREVENTIVE WAR 25 

voke by word and by writing, and when the counter-effect 
of their incitements becomes manifest in the other country 
they make use of what appears there in order to show it to 
their own people in as exaggerated a guise as possible and 
thus to inflame their passions anew more strongly than be- 
fore. And so the game goes on from one side to the other, 
conducted by a few hundred, in the extreme case by a few 
thousand, persons. Every insignificant incident or episode, 
every irresponsible newspaper article, is exaggerated and in- 
flated and used for the greater incitement of the nations, until 
in the end the witches' kettle, constantly overheated, reaches 
the bursting point and a fearful explosion destroys the life 
and the well-being of the nations. These few hundreds or 
thousands, journalists, generals, dealers in military stores, 
manufacturers of armaments, reactionaries and Junkers, who 
seek to smother in the blood and smoke of war the nations' 
impulse to freedom, men of ambition who thirst for the glory 
of battle, heroes of the pen who thirst for the laurels of 
patriotic bombastic phraseology — these are the people who 
are guilty of the war. These, Herr Schiemann, are the crim- 
inals; these are the traitors to their country from whom the 
reawakened nations will turn away with loathing and con- 
tempt, for whom, however, it may be hoped that another and 
more bitter destiny is also reserved, corresponding to the 
greatness of their unutterable misdeeds. We, however, who 
bring forward these accusations — and how few are we in 
this sabre-rattling time of bondage! — we do not fear your 
lightning. We know that our hour and yours will come, the 
hour when the nations from whom you now seal our word 
will nevertheless hear, comprehend, and obey it — the hour of 
accusation and of judgment. 

Francis Delaisi 

Among all the German inciters to war, Herr Theodor 
Schiemann, the spokesman of the Junkers of the Kreuzzei- 
tiing, is one of the worst. He rightly bears the honorary title 
of "the German Deroulede," which a Frenchman, Francis 



26 THE CRIME 

Delaisi, conferred upon him in his pamphlet La guerre qui 
vient. This pamphlet appeared in Paris in 191 1, and Herr 
Schiemann devotes to it no fewer than five pages in his 
Slanderer, that is to say, more space than he gives to the 
whole of J'accuse. This French brochure is extraordinarily 
adapted to the purposes of the German war-intriguers; they 
have dug it out, translated it and published it, because it con- 
tains a sharp attack on the policy of the Anglo-French En- 
tente, and represents a kind of f 'accuse pamphlet against the 
then French Government. This is, in fact, a general charac- 
teristic feature of the polemics of our chauvinists, that they 
praise for their higher insight those penetrating intellects who 
in other countries, in England, France and Russia, endeavour 
to combat certain political forces and to prove that they are 
possessed of dangerous nationalistic and imperialistic ten- 
dencies; and these men they set up as the type of true pa- 
triots — elsewhere, across the frontier! 

Francis Delaisi's pamphlet is called by Schiemann a sig- 
nificant essay, by which "too much dangerous truth . . . had 
been conveyed to the restricted understanding of the French 
people." He is for him "a man who has really something to 
say," etc. Exactly the same method of praising as truth and 
patriotism beyond the frontier what on this side is branded as 
slander and treachery is applied by all our war-intriguers, 
whenever they have occasion to speak of the Russian revolu- 
tionaries or of the English or French opponents of the war. 
The German Government bear the chief responsibility for the 
death of Roger Casement, since they supported his hopeless 
undertaking with arms, money and ships; yet Roger Case- 
ment, the revolutionary, is for our reactionary intriguers "the 
great Irish patriot." Bernard Shaw has even received the 
honour of being quoted by the Chancellor in his speech of 
August 19th, 19 1 5, when he referred to his very true expres- 
sion to the effect that the policy of the balance of power was 
an "incubator for wars ;" and, as is known, it is for this rea- 
son that Germany desires to substitute for the mistaken policy 
of the balance of power a policy of German preponderance. 
What would have been said in Germany if Mr. Asquith or 



THE PREVENTIVE WAR 27 

M. Viviani had quoted the author of J'accuae as a clear- 
sighted German patriot? "Venal traitor of his country, 
stone him!" is the exclamation that has already been heard. 
What increase in the insults would have been devised if in 
other countries the same honourable mention had been ac- 
corded to the German Accuser as has been given by us to 
the opponents of English policy. 

With what undisguised satisfaction and recognition are 
the English opponents of the war, the critics of Grey, men 
like Ramsay Macdonald, Trevelyan, Morel, Brails ford and 
Norman Angell, quoted even in the official German Press, 
although, as we have elsewhere seen, these English critics 
without exception ascribe to Germany the immediate respon- 
sibility for the European war. I am not aware that my book, 
which was widely circulated in belligerent and neutral coun- 
tries, has ever been mentioned, praised or recommended by 
any English, French or Russian Minister, or by any official 
newspaper or telegraphic agency in these countries. On the 
other hand, I am aware that neither in England nor in France 
nor in Russia has the laudatory mention in Germany of the 
opponents of war in other countries been made into a rod for 
their backs, that they have not been branded as traitors, and 
had stamped on their foreheads the shameful sign of venality, 
that the praise accorded to them in Germany has not been 
represented as a proof of their depravity and infamy. Like 
so much else, this method of fighting is a speciality of the 
German chauvinist Press, which in this respect has received 
the shameful inheritance of Prussian hidebound reactionaries 
of the Kreuzzeitung set, of police spies and manufacturers of 
high treason. In the period following the foundation of the 
German Empire, these back-stair politicians fought even 
against the Junker Bismarck, who was one of their own class, 
resorting to the most outrageous personal calumniations when 
for ten years, in spite of the opposition of priests and junk- 
ers, he dared to govern on liberal principles the new Ger- 
many which had been built on a democratic electoral basis. 
Were not streams of ink poured out for years in the foulest 
insinuations and slanders even against Bismarck, the greatest 



28 THE CRIME 

of all Prussian Junkers, who could not obtain forgiveness in 
the Kreuzzeitung camp for his apostasy — unfortunately only 
temporary — from the policy of Junkerdom and reaction? 

Schiemann and his companions are unable to refute the 
accuser, and therefore they abuse him. Schiemann turns 
away from him with "loathing" ; he purposes exposing him 
to "general contempt." The accuser, however, exclaims to 
his accuser : It is on your head and on the head of your com- 
rades that the curse of the German people will one day fall, 
when it shall have awakened from the numbing slumber into 
which it has been sunk by the asphyxiating gases of your 
lies, falsifications and perversions, when it shall have recog- 
nised that it is not from without but from within, that the 
menace of destruction came, that no foreign enemy desired to 
annihilate, to crush, or enervate Germany, but that it is the 
enemies within, the war-intriguers and the chauvinists, the 
men greedy of power, of glory and of booty, who by their 
cunning activity continued through many years, have engen- 
dered in the German people the delusion that they were per- 
secuted, in order in the end to convert those who passively 
imagined that they were persecuted into active persecutors 
and blind tools of their selfish endeavours. 

The German Deroulede has the glory of being one of the 
chief leaders of the German people on the path to war. The 
Frenchman, Francis Delaisi, the man "who really has some- 
thing to say," the clear-sighted analyst of the conditions then 
existing, the prophet of the conditions of to-day, accords to 
Herr Schiemann the following laudatory testimony: 

I am quite aware that the chauvinist newspapers across the 
Rhine (for they exist in Germany as well as among us) give 
utterance to terrible threats. Professor Schiemann, the German 
Deroulede, has said : "In the event of a war with England, we 
shall take France as a hostage." And Harden, the old disciple 
of Bismarck, has stated : "We shall fall upon France, and impose 
upon her a war-contribution of 20 milliards, and with this money 
we shall defray the cost of our war against England." But these 
are all rodomontades which are now enthusiastically used by our 



THE PREVENTIVE WAR 29 

nationalists, but will not bear the slightest scrutiny." La Guerre 
qui vient, Germ, trans., page 34). 

In his pamphlet on the Slanderer Herr Schiemann is of 
course silent as to this testimony; but as in other matters he 
praises the Frenchman for his absolute trustworthiness, he is 
bound to accept from him the honorary designation of "the 
German Deroulede," and he will be unable to clear himself 
of the charge of having inflamed the French chauvinists, by 
means of his German chauvinistic rodomontades, and thus of 
having added fuel to the fire on both sides. 

Schiemann and Greindl 

The fatal significance of the part played by Schiemann 
in embittering and in rendering more acute the relations be- 
tween Germany and the Entente Powers is emphasised in 
various passages of the Belgian ambassadorial reports, as 
well as in Baron Beyens's book L'allemagne avant la guerre. 1 '' 

In his report of May 6th, 1908, Baron Greindl, of all Bel- 
gian Ambassadors the most friendly to Germany, refers to 
Schiemann's jingoistic activities on the occasion of the Moroc- 
can conflict, which was then again breaking out; he testifies 
on behalf of the Kreusseitung-^roitssor that "he is persona 
grata with the Emperor and in high favour with the Foreign 
Office, from which he obtains his information, and by which 
he is frequently inspired, without being in consequence in any 
way semi-official." In his report of May 13th, 1908, Greindl 
again emphasises that "serious consideration must be given 
to the articles of Herr Schiemann, although this journalist is 
in no way to be regarded as semi-official." 

Herr Greindl is quite lost in admiration before the great 
Schiemann ; in fact, he borrows from him a large portion of 
his views and his inferences. The attentive reader of 
Greindl's reports observes at every stage that the Belgian 
Ambassador was one of the most industrious and grateful 
readers of Schiemann's weekly reviews; everywhere in 

1 [English translation: Germany before the War. Nelson.] 



30 THE CRIME 

Greindl we find the demonstrations of the Entente Powers' 
guilt with which the Kreusseitung-iproiessor had coruscated, 
and with which he now coruscates in his war-pamphlets. 
"Herr Schiemann, whose great position as a journalist and 
whose relations to the Government are known to you, states 
. . . "; so we read in Greindl's report of February 17th, 
1909, immediately after the visit to Berlin of King Edward 
and his consort. 

The manner in which Schiemann, to the accompaniment of 
Greindl's enthusiastic applause, represents the result of the 
English King's visit, is so characteristic of the method of this 
arch-firebrand that I should like to devote a few words to this 
episode. Even a Schiemann could not deny that the visit 
passed off in a satisfactory manner, and that, occurring just 
when it did during the crisis in connection with the annexa- 
tion of Bosnia, it was of the greatest importance. What 
therefore does he do? He expresses the view that it is neces- 
sary to wait at least five or six weeks, in order to learn the 
attitude of the English Press towards the royal visit: 

We shall wait to see whether by then a calming down of 
public opinion in England with regard to the German danger 
will have taken place; for so long as this phantom rests like a 
nightmare on the English people, everything is possible. It will 
therefore be necessary to watch the attitude of the Times, the 
Standard, the National Review and their companions, in order 
to determine whether the campaign of incitement against Ger- 
many will be continued or whether it has at last come to an end. 
For the rest it is admitted that friendly political conversations 
have taken place but no agreements. 

The Belgian Ambassador accompanies Schiemann's ac- 
count with the very significant commentary: 

On ne peut pas mieux dire It cannot be better expressed 

que meme si le roi d'Angleterre than by saying that even if the 

a un desir sincere de se rappro- King of England should possess 

cher de l'Allemagne, il est mal- the sincere desire for an ap- 

gre sa grande influence person- proximation with Germany, he 

nelle incapable de le realiser, would, notwithstanding his 



THE PREVENTIVE WAR 31 

aussi longtemps qu'un revire- great personal influence, not be 
merit ne se sera pas opere dans in a position to give it effect, 
l'opinion publique anglaise. — until a revolution will have tak- 
Greindl. en place in English public opin- 

ion.— Greindl. x 

Thus on this occasion it suits the Kreuzzeitung-professor 
and his docile follower the Belgian Ambassador, to describe 
King Edward the Encircler, as pacific, and his Berlin visit, as 
calculated, in intention at least, to promote peace. Herr 
Greindl is, indeed, compelled to state that King Edward's 
diplomatic attendant, in his consultations with the Chancellor 
and the Foreign Secretary, was in agreement with the Ger- 
man statesmen 

that the greatest efforts must be made to prevent any war aris- 
ing out of the Balkan question, ... there was agreement as to 
the necessity for calling a conference with the purpose, not of 
reviewing, but of recording the result of the negotiations taking 
place between the most interested Powers. Sir C. Hardinge thus 
assumed the Austrian standpoint. It was agreed that both parties 
should declare themselves satisfied with the result of the meeting 
in Berlin. Communications to the Press were drawn up in this 
sense. 

The account thus given by Greindl affords the completest 
refutation of the charge brought by Herr von Bethmann and 
his semi-official writers against the English Government, that 
they did nothing during the Bosnian crisis to bring about a 

1 See Belgian Documents, 1905-1914; published by the Foreign Office 
(Berlin: Mittler & Son), No. 55. 

The official German translation is here guilty of the small but impor- 
tant error involved in translating the words : "Si le roi d'Angleterre a un 
desir" by "if the King of England should possess (besasse)," etc. To be 
correct, it should be "possesses" (besitzt). There is the further error 
involved in translating "il est incapable" by "he would not be in a posi- 
tion" (er ware ausserstande). It should be "he is not in a position" (er 
ist ausserstande). The difference between Greindl's original and the 
German translation is obvious : the Belgian diplomatist admits the pos- 
sibility that the English King is really pacific, whereas the German 
translator entirely cuts off this possibility by the use of the subjunctive. 



32 THE CRIME 

peaceful understanding, but on the contrary, pressed for an 
armed conflict. I shall elsewhere demonstrate in detail the 
emptiness and, indeed, the dishonesty of this charge. 
Greindl's report of February 17th, 1909, affords weighty sup- 
port to this demonstration. Even at that time, however, in 
1909, the obvious efforts for peace made by the English King 
and his Government in no way suited the purpose of Schie- 
mann and Greindl, who nearly always pulled together ; osten- 
sibly the aggressive conspiracy against Germany had been 
forged eight months earlier, in June, 1908, between the Tsar 
and the King of England in the roadstead at Reval (this is 
Schlemann's discovery, which later on I propose to consider 
further). They were thus in a dilemma: an aggressive con- 
spiracy in June, 1908, cannot very well be reconciled with 
pacific tendencies in February, 1909. As has been observed 
above, the German translator of Greindl's report helps him- 
self out of the difficulty by a mistranslation of the French 
text. But how do Schiemann and Greindl get out of it? 
Nothing is simpler than this. On this occasion, by way of a 
change, they represent the English King and his Government, 
not as the leaders of the alleged English policy of encircle- 
ment and aggression, but as the slaves of certain English 
Press organs, and they make their recognition of the official 
English peace policy dependent on the gracious concurrence 
of these journals. In other words, with England it is a case 
of "the Jew is always burned." x If King Edward does 
something which can be turned or twisted into a war policy, 
then he is the undisputed ''eader of Great Britain's foreign 
policy; if, however, he does something which obviously serves 
the maintenance of peace, his action can have no significance, 
until certain organs of the Press have communicated their 
concurrence; in such a case he is not the intellectual director 
of English policy, but merely the executive organ of public 
opinion. Since in every country, and especially in a demo- 
cratic country like England, authoritative organs of the op- 
position can always be found to criticise the actions of the 

1 [Der Jude wird verbrannt — Nathan der Weise.] 



THE PREVENTIVE WAR 33 

Government, it is always possible by resorting to this childish 
game to refuse any significance to the pacific actions of the 
Government, on the ground that they are not approved by 
public opinion. We shall elsewhere see in how masterly a 
fashion this cunningly devised system of accusation is carried 
out by the Schiemanns, and how confidingly it is aped by the 
credulous Greindl, who in the course of his long residence in 
Berlin had become quite identified with the views of the 
Wilhelmstrasse. 



The leading part played by the German Deroulede in the lit- 
erature of incitement on this side of the Rhine is also con- 
firmed, as has already been observed, by Baron Beyens, for- 
merly Belgian Ambassador in Berlin, in his book already 
mentioned. 1 Beyens speaks of the pernicious influences exer- 
cised on the national sentiment by the chauvinist Press in 
Germany and in France, and in particular he depicts the effect 
of its daily perusal on the views and the decisions of the Em- 
peror. Of all these criminal jingoes it is only Dr. Theodor 
Schiemann whom he mentions by name, exactly as in the 
case of Delaisi's pamphlet; he produces him as a specially 
appalling example "in order to form a conception of the 
haughtiness, insolence and bad faith of certain German pub- 
licists," and he explains Schiemann's fatal influence by ref- 
erence to the fact that he then "had his little hour of favour 
and popularity at the Court of Berlin, and regaled the Gal- 
lophobe and Russophobe readers of the Kreuzseitung in his 
political notes of the week every Wednesday morning." 

It will be seen that among the political writers of Germany 
Herr Schiemann was, and is, one of the most significant and 
influential phenomena, though, to be sure, in the worst sense 
of the word — in the sense more or less in which Disraeli said 
of Gladstone: "He is a good man, in the worst sense of the 
word." The fact that he of all men should be let loose by 
the Wilhelmstrasse against the accuser redounds greatly to 
my honour. I propose to return this compliment by dealing 

1 L'Allemagne avant la guerre. [English translation. Nelson, page 36.] 



34 THE CRIME 

as fully as possible with Schiemann's counter-pamphlet, and 
to place in the pillory, as he deserves, this noxious growth on 
the body of the German people, this chief journalistic insti- 
gator of the present war, this political poisoner of springs, 
who dares to charge those who are the true friends of their 
country with lack of patriotism. 

The Entente an Aggressive Alliance? 

It cannot be demanded of me that I should drain to the 
last drop the unpalatable concoction of Schiemann's and other 
similar war-writings, nor do I propose to impose upon myself 
such a task; I must be content to emphasise the essential 
points in these writings in order to place in their true light 
the historical minuticu of the KreuzEeitung-professor and his 
colleagues, Schiemann, as well as Helmolt, Rohrbach and 
Chamberlain, all without exception proceed from what is for 
them the clearly established principle that England, France 
and Russia have for years, ever since somewhere about the 
beginning of the century, desired and prepared for war 
against Germany and Austria, and that they only waited until 
their preparations were completed to the last ship and the last 
man in order to strike the blow. The Entente has been an 
aggressive alliance. This is the starting point of all their dis- 
cussions, and from this preconceived point of view, or rather 
from this point of view advanced against their better knowl- 
edge, they elucidate all the occurrences of the last fifteen 
years. 

Now in all the writings of this category, absolutely and 
without exception, there is an entire absence of even the 
slightest proof of the theory from which they thus proceed to 
argue. King Edward VII. promoted the Entente with France 
(1904) and the quasi-Entente with Russia (1907). As we 
know, these Ententes were essentially nothing more than an 
agreement with regard to questions of interest within and 
without Europe, and as a result of the removal of these 
sources of friction a more and more secure relation of politi- 
cal friendship gradually arose. Military discussions also took 



THE PREVENTIVE WAR 35 

place, and it was intended that they should be continued. It 
is also unnecessary to dispute the fact that they were meant to 
be continued not only between France and England, but so 
far as naval matters were concerned between England and 
Russia as well. Schiemann and his comrades are greatly con- 
cerned because the extension of the military discussions to 
matters concerning the English and Russian navies was im- 
minent or had in fact been initiated. As from all other oc- 
currences on the side of the Entente, they infer from this 
fact the intention to conspire — an attempt which I have al- 
ready illustrated elsewhere, and shall later have an opportu- 
nity to discuss more closely. Everywhere there are insinua- 
tions, nowhere is there any proof! 

I am not in the happy position of knowing all that the 
Rohrbachs, the Helmolts and the Schiemanns maintain that 
they know with such enviable certainty with regard to secret 
agreements between rulers and diplomatists which have never 
been officially published. In my book and in this work also, 
I have restricted myself to publicly known historical facts 
and documents. I have nowhere given expression to pre- 
sumptions or theories resting on an arrangement of the facts. 
I have nowhere quoted newspaper articles of a more or less 
semi-official nature as evidence of facts or as the expression 
of the intentions of the Government. The history and the 
historical antecedents of the crime I have dealt with by refer- 
ence to, and on the basis of documents, and I do not propose 
to follow my opponents on the slippery and uncertain field of 
newspaper extracts and journalistic arrangements of facts. 

There is one exception to this rule which I shall be obliged 
to make in a later chapter intended to give a survey of Ger- 
man chauvinism before the war. In this case the newspaper 
extracts are, in fact, the documents. As the attempt is made 
to smuggle Bernhardi out of the way as an alleged "unique" 
concurrence, I am compelled to show that this "brav' gene- 
ral" is only one among many. 

The method adopted by the saviours of German innocence 
is in itself sufficient to indicate the impurity of their inten- 
tions and the weakness of their position. While in my "An- 



36 THE CRIME 

tecedents" I support my statements by reference to figures, 
dates and documents, nailing down the German imperialists 
and their highly situated leader to their own words, statis- 
tically proving that Germany more than any other country 
already possessed the place in the sun alleged to have been 
denied to her, demonstrating the hollowness of the imperial- 
istic efforts to expand by figures and dates dealing with the 
development of industry and population in Germany; while 
by reference to the minutes of the Hague Conference and the 
authentic account of Anglo-German negotiations for an un- 
derstanding, I prove the resistance offered by Germany to 
every organisation resting on law and to every restriction of 
armaments, and as a consequence Germany's responsibility 
for the tension in the European situation, Schiemann and his 
comrades work all the time merely with snippets, snippets, 
snippets of paper. Whether they maintain the existence of 
suspicious diplomatic secret occurrences, or tax the other side 
with deceitfulness in what would appear to be conciliatory 
actions, they never support their arguments on documents, 
they constantly suppose, suggest or assort their material, 
relying on the help of a masterly arranged collection of 
snippets. 

The Aggressive Conspiracy of Reval (1908) and the 
Method of Snippets 

To take one example, Herr Schiemann naturally attaches 
the utmost importance to King Edward's visit to the Tsar in 
June, 1908, in the roadstead at Reval, and does so, starting 
from his preconceived thesis, on the ground that this visit 
was intended to bring about a further extension of the war- 
conspiracy. To prove the evil intentions against Germany 
pursued by King Edward in his visit — or at least to furnish' 
what Herr Schiemann understands by proof — he quotes the 
article appearing in a Russian paper Golos Moskwy of May 
31st, 1908, which "as the organ of Gutschkof reflected at that 
time the opinion of very influential circles," and without more 
ado he adopts the assertion of this paper that the royal visit 



THE PREVENTIVE WAR 37 

represented the introduction of an Anglo-Russian alliance 
directed against Germany. 'Tressed back on the west and 
the east by the armies of Russia and France, cut off from the 
sea by the English fleet, Germany would fall into a position 
of embarrassment from which there would scarcely be any 
way of escape" (A Slanderer, page 28). 

To the article taken from this paper Schiemann adds the 
observation : "Even then war was desired in Russia." The 
object of the war so far as Russia was concerned is said to 
have been the possession of Constantinople and the Dar- 
danelles; for France the reacquisition of Alsace-Lorraine, 
and for England the surrender of the German Fleet. 1 Ac- 
cording to Schiemann the leading politicians of the three 
Powers knew that these aims were not to be achieved with- 
out a struggle. It is in this way that he introduces the royal 
visit in the roadstead at Reval, supported by an unsigned 
article in an irresponsible Russian newspaper. 

Herr Schiemann is sufficiently modest not to affect a knowl- 
edge of what the Tsar and the King discussed with each 

1 My attitude (distinctly one of disapproval) towards the intention 
proclaimed by the Russian authorities at the end of 1916 to conquer 
Constantinople and the Dardanelles is more closely discussed in the 
chapter on "War-Aims." Now that the Government of the Tsar has 
been swept away, these intentions have rapidly fallen into the back- 
ground and will completely disappear with the advance of the Revolu- 
tionary movement ; they will make way for the demand for the "inter- 
nationalisation of the straits" — a demand which can only be approved 
and supported by every friend of a pacific international organisation. 
At the same time, in view of the former designs of the Russian Authori- 
ties on Constantinople, which even now find support in many quarters, I 
should like to point out how entirely different are the two propositions 
(1) that a belligerent State, attacked by Germany and already robbed 
by the formal disseverance of Russian Poland and by the disseverance 
of the Baltic provinces for which preparations had been made, should 
herself make known annexational intentions in order to gain the long 
desired free outlet to the Mediterranean Sea as a reward for her mili- 
tary exertions, and (2) that the same State in the midst of peace (1908) 
should hatch with other States a conspiracy against Germany, in order 
to pursue her territorial expansion by means of a world war. This latter 
charge is the one that has been brought by the Schiemanns against Rus- 
sia, and no evidence has ever been produced in support of it. 



38 THE CRIME 

other. On the other hand, he is completely informed of the 
way in which Sir Charles Hardinge and Isvolsky came to an 
understanding with regard to their future plans. Herr 
Schiemann knows all this, although the understanding that 
was arrived at was merely an oral one; he maintains that it 
came "to our knowledge later in a roundabout way." To 
what did this understanding amount? 

Isvolsky declared that he was ready to proceed with England 
against Germany when Russia should have sufficiently increased 
her military strength. As the latest point in time for this event, 
six to eight years were contemplated, that is to say from 1914- 
1916. ... A fairly lengthy period of military preparation was 
as a matter of course contemplated for the three Powers. (A 
Slanderer, page 29.) 

This is the basis of all Schiemann's further assertions of 
the danger of war by which the German people were men- 
aced. Herr Schiemann knows that the resolution to make 
war was arrived at in the roadstead of Reval in June, 1908. 
The outbreak of war was only a question of time and of the 
completion of the military preparations of the Entente 
Powers. 

"Where is the evidence on which your assertion rests?" 
I ask the professor of history. If anyone were to assert that 
the Emperor William and the Archduke Francis Ferdinand 
had, in the course of their continual meetings, decided on the 
provocation of the "inevitable European war," and had de- 
termined all the details of the "when" and the "how," what 
would your comment be, Herr Professor? Would you, or 
would you not, ask for evidence? And would you be content 
with evidence similar to that which you are bold enough to 
produce as evidence of the decisions for war taken at Reval 
(pages 29 and 30 of your pamphlet), namely, that in Eng- 
land "immediately after the Reval days ... the agitation 
for the concentration of the Channel Fleet in the North Sea" 
began; that in England Hislam's well-known book appeared, 
that the Russian imperial council approved the construction 
of armoured cruisers, that England and Russia intervened 



THE PREVENTIVE WAR 39 

for reforms in Macedonia, and that manoeuvres of the Eng- 
lish fleet took place in the North Sea ; that President Fallieres 
also made a visit to Reval, and King Edward met the Aus- 
trian Emperor in Ischl, and Clemenceau and Isvolsky in 
Marienbad? All these world-shaking facts are for Herr 
Schiemann parts of a great "machination" — a war-machina- 
tion 'which was to make an end of Germany, and even to 
divert Austria from her ally. 

I have intentionally selected this point, because the method 
of the German falsifiers of history must be illustrated by ex- 
amples, if it is to be made comprehensible. The decisive fact, 
the resolution of Russia and England to make war, arrived at, 
as is suggested, merely in an oral manner, is supported by 
absolutely no evidence whatever. A Russian newspaper arti- 
cle by way of introducing the Reval meeting, a series of 
events in themselves entirely insignificant compiled with Ger- 
man professorial thoroughness — I am repeatedly constrained 
to congratulate the professor on his incomparable collection 
of snippets and would be glad to learn how it is done — the 
book of a private English writer, English naval manoeuvres, 
presidential and royal visits, etc., all these come in useful to 
the German professor of history in creating the suspicion that 
the fact asserted by him may be true. He attempts by the 
most miserable methods to produce circumstantial proof, 
which is absolutely insufficient, and of which the individual 
links, even if they are true, in no way prove Schiemann's as- 
sertion of the existence of an offensive alliance. Nothing 
that Schiemann produces gives the slightest support to the 
contention that England and Russia intended to make war 
against Germany. Hislam's book? And what about our 
chauvinist and Pan-German literature of which I propose to 
give elsewhere some edifying examples? Naval manoeuvres 
in the North Sea? And what about our annual manoeuvres 
on sea and land towards the east, west, and the north ? Presi- 
dential and royal visits? Is it not the fact that a year before, 
in August, 1907, the Tsar and the King of England paid a 
visit in Swinemunde and Wilhelmshohe ? Is it not the case 
that the Emperor was at Windsor in November, 1907, and 



40 THE CRIME 

was accorded a brilliant reception in the Guildhall at Lon- 
don? In August, 1908, King Edward, as is known, also 
visited the German Emperor accompanied by the same Sir 
Charles Hardinge, whose presence at Reval appears so ex- 
tremely suspicious to Herr Schiemann. And it was precisely 
on this occasion that the English Under-Secretary, acting on 
Grey's instructions, submitted to the German Emperor and 
the German Government proposals with regard to an agree- 
ment as to naval armaments on both sides — proposals which 
the Emperor William is known to have rejected from the 
outset. 1 King Edward's visit to the German Emperor in 
August, 1908, which Herr Schiemann naturally passes over 
in silence, and the contents of the negotiations conducted by 
the English Under-Secretary with the German Government, 
are in themselves sufficient to reveal the worthlessness of 
Schiemann's circumstantial evidence. But quite apart from 
such considerations, this evidence is entirely insubstantial in 
its character, in view of the fact that it is based on a ten- 
dencious compilation of completely insignificant facts. 

It is thus that history is made by us in Germany! Every- 
thing that took place after 1908, if it does not fit in with the 
theory of the Reval resolution to make war, is either passed 
over in silence, or falsified, or represented as an intentional 
cozening and misleading of Germany. Schiemann and his 
comrades proceed exactly on the same prescription as Herr 
Helfferich. According to Helfferich, the resolution of the 
three Entente Powers to strike was taken on July 29th, 19 14. 
Previously, contemporaneously, and subsequently, these Pow- 
ers took action in countless ways which flatly contradict 
Helfferich' s assertion. These actions and proposals are either 
passed over in silence, or falsified, or represented as insincere. 
Helfferich and Schiemann — par nobile fratrum! 

The Bosnian Crisis, 1908-9 

As Herr Helfferich deals with the immediate historical 
antecedents of the war, so Herr Schiemann deals with the 

1 See Cook : Hoiv Britain Strove for Peace, page 14. 



THE PREVENTIVE WAR 41 

more remote, more particularly the historical facts which 
reduce to an absurdity his assertion of the conspiracy of 
Reval. He cannot conceal the fact that, after long negotia- 
tions between Aehrental and Isvolsky, Russia recognised in 
March, 1909, that Bosnia and Herzegovina belonged to the 
Hapsburg monarchy, and also persuaded Serbia to recognise 
the same fact; he does not, however, observe that this his- 
torically established fact overthrows his whole invention of 
the Reval conspiracy. He is of course silent on the fact that 
the chief credit for the peaceful settlement of the annexation 
crisis was due to the English Government and to Sir Ed- 
ward Grey's efforts for peace. Herr Schiemann is proud 
that he is able to say: "It was not he (Grey) but Kiderlen 
who carried his point" — in other words: It was Germany's 
mailed fist, threateningly raised behind Austria, that compelled 
the other European States, with England at their head, to 
give way. He does not, however, possess the sense of justice 
to recognise, as a merit of the English Government, the fact 
that this disposition to yield was exercised in the interests 
of European peace and that this course was recommended to 
Russia, but he adds to his account of the incident the further 
unproved insinuation that Sir Edward Grey expressed his 
annoyance, and directed against the Petrograd Cabinet very 
emphatic reproaches on account of their pacific attitude. 
Where does Herr Schiemann get this information? Where 
is the evidence in support of it? I, the insignificant author of 
J' accuse, can boast of no highly placed connections on either 
side of the German frontier. All that I know are the publicly 
known facts which are documentarily supported : in 1909, 
as in 1913, the English Government laboured with unweary- 
ing zeal for the maintenance of European peace, on both oc- 
casions by their moderating influence on Russia and on both 
occasions against the stiff-necked, unyielding resistance of 
Austria. 

It was only natural that Germany's attitude in the annexa- 
tion crisis, which appears to Herr Schiemann to have been 
"loyal and correct in every point," was somewhat differently 
viewed in England and Russia. Herr Schiemann speaks of 



42 THE CRIME 

the "hatred" against Germany, which expressed itself in 
England "in the form of a panic." Hitherto I have only- 
heard that it is fear that can degenerate into a panic, whereas 
hatred can at most rise to bitterness. In any case, the dis- 
satisfaction in England and Russia was easily explicable, 
since Germany by her resolute support of Austria's act of 
violence could not fail to provoke feelings of passion in other 
countries, especially in Slavonic countries, and in this way 
she materially contributed to inflame the Great Serbian move- 
ment, and in the last analysis to provoke the present war. 
Here again Herr Schiemann inevitably confuses cause and 
effect. Certain utterances of English politicians and journal- 
ists, which were only the reaction of the attitude adopted by 
Austria and Germany, giving expression to the bitterness of 
feeling caused by the criminal endangering of European peace 
by such a policy of the mailed fist, are for Herr Schiemann 
so many facts in evidence of England's intentions to crush 
Germany. 1 

Then, however, according to Schiemann, a sudden change 
of feeling took place in England. English clergymen visited 
Berlin; in June, 1909, the Tsar met the Emperor William 
and the speeches at the banquets which were then exchanged 
"permitted the inference that Russia would allow herself 
to become the ally neither of French revenge nor of the 
English policy of panic." 2 I was under the impression that 
a 3^ear previously war against Germany had been decided 
on at Reval ! King Edward's new meeting with Clemenceau 
in Marienbad in the summer of 1909 produces, according to 
Schiemann, "almost an elegiac impression." How does Herr 
Schiemann know this? At the end of 1909 Isvolsky was 
nominated as a member of the Imperial Council, and in Oc- 
tober, 1 910, was translated to Paris. In the English and 
Russian Press voices were heard which pleaded for the main- 
tenance of European peace. Indeed, Herr Schiemann as- 
sures us that he was informed by political friends in France 

1 1 shall return later in detail to the Bosnian crisis and to the attitude 
of Germany and England on that occasion. 
2 Slanderer, page 33. 



THE PREVENTIVE WAR 43 

(1910) "that the public opinion of the country desires to 
maintain peace and is resolved not to act with England/' 
I thought that the conspiracy of the Triple Entente was de- 
cided upon in 1908 in the roadstead at Reval as something 
that was fixed for 1914-1916! How are all these indications 
of peace to be reconciled with the existence of the con- 
spiracy ? 

The Emperor William travels to London to attend King 
Edward's obsequies. The Tsar Nicholas comes to Potsdam 
accompanied by his Minister Sazonof. In consequence of the 
common efforts for peace made by all the Great Powers, 
the Moroccan crisis of 191 1 is happily solved. The Balkan 
crisis begins. Under Grey's leadership the London Con- 
ference of Ambassadors succeeds in overcoming once again 
apparently insuperable difficulties, and in maintaining the 
peace of Europe. Meanwhile, from 1909 to 19 12 the Anglo- 
German negotiations for an understanding are under con- 
sideration; in the beginning of 1912 Haldane's visit to Ber- 
lin takes place — events to which I will return in a separate 
chapter; — in the first half of 19 14 the Anglo-German agree- 
ment with regard to Asia Minor and the Baghdad line is 
concluded and the delimitation of spheres of interest in East 
and West Africa prepared by Lichnowsky and Grey; in the 
spring of 191 3 the monarchs of England, Russia and Ger- 
many meet in Berlin for the celebration of the marriage of 
the Emperor's daughter — in short, a series of political in- 
cidents and Court events of incisive importance takes place. 
For Schiemann and his fellows, however, all these occurrences 
have no significance whatever, since they do not adapt them- 
selves into their theory of a conspiracy. They are silent as 
to these incidents, or depreciate their value, or, acting on the 
well-known prescription, they represent them as malicious 
tricks on the part of the adversary : 

Parliament was also ignorant that war against Germany had 
been resolved on in principle since 1909, and that since that time 
it was only a question of seeking the occasion of bringing it about 
with the greatest possible assurance of a prospect of success. In 
1905, 1908 and 191 1 it was believed in England that they were 



U THE CRIME 

near their goal, and it is not due to England that it was con- 
gresses and conferences, and not the sword, that decided the 
conflicts in these years. Thereafter, however, English policy took 
the new direction of postponing the outbreak of the struggle, 
the magnitude of which was rightly foreseen, until the Russian 
preparations as well as their own had proceeded as far as was 
required to give an assurance of success. At the earliest the 
year 19 15 was kept in view; until then every conflict must be 
avoided, and by negotiations on the problems then pending (the 
proportion of naval construction, the "naval holiday," African 
Colonies and the Baghdad line) Germany had to be persuaded 
to retain the view that she had little to fear from England. As 
is well known, we retained this view until the latest moment. Sir 
Edward Grey's game had been played with success. Now his 
cards are lying open before us, and we see that they are the 
cards of a professional card-sharper. (A Slanderer, pages 64- 

65-) 

This is the fundamental idea on which the whole Euro- 
pean history of the last ten years is treated. Everything that 
contradicts this fundamental idea is passed over in silence, 
or else it was done "for the sake of appearances" to deceive 
Germany, or else it took place against the desire and the in- 
tention of the English Government. 

The Tactics of Falsification of Schiemann and Co. 

It is indeed monstrous to observe with how brazen a fore- 
head Schiemann and Company treat all events in this manner, 
particularly all events since 1905. Those incidents which 
cannot be suppressed or falsified and which it is impossible 
to deprive of their unmistakably pacific tendency are frigidly 
and derisively explained away on the ground that the Rus- 
sian, French and English military preparations had not yet 
proceeded far enough, and that it was therefore necessary to 
await the determined point in time before provoking the 
war that had long been resolved upon. On this plan, of 
course, the German falsifiers of history escape from their 
difficulties on every occasion. Whenever it is possible to 
ascribe a bellicose character to a political incident, to a royal 



THE PREVENTIVE WAR 45 

visit, a ministerial conference, or a newspaper polemic, this 
course is inevitably adopted. Where this is absolutely im- 
possible the pacific character of the incident is admitted, but 
it is based on the motive: to postpone is not to give up; we 
must now appear pacific, because we are not yet ready; but 
as soon as we are ready, the great blow will be struck. Any- 
one who reads Schiemann's pamphlets A Slanderer and How 
England Prevented an Understanding with Germany, will 
find that on every occasion without exception when mention 
is made of a European peace-action under England's partici- 
pation or leadership (where possible it is suppressed) there 
is added the observation that it took place only "for the 
sake of appearances," only to deceive Germany, only in order 
that the preparations of the Entente Powers might be con- 
tinued undisturbed. 

As has already been pointed out above, the Potsdam inter- 
view "had as a consequence merely the appearance of an 
improvement in the relations between Germany and Russia" 
{A Slanderer, page 36). The plan of an Anglo-French naval 
demonstration before Agadir, which was discussed as a 
counter-stroke to the dispatch of the Panther, encountered 
Caillaux's resistance and also miscarried in the English Cab- 
inet — a decision which doubtless served the cause of peace, 
but which Herr Schiemann reports, adding that Sir Edward 
Grey was much "embittered" at the course of events (page 
43). Here again, as on so many other occasions, I ask: 
How does Herr Schiemann know this? Of course he does 
not know; he invents it out of nothing because it fits in with 
his arraignment that Grey should have been embittered at 
the pacific decision. Everywhere in Schiemann's pamphlets 
we come across phrases similar to the following: "the war 
towards which English statesmen were working"; England's 
resolution "under all circumstances to maintain her high pol- 
icy on lines which must lead to a breach with Germany" ; "his 
(Grey's) system of political preparation for a war against 
Germany" ; "it was a policy of war, and the task was to de- 
mand everything that could be serviceable to the three Powers 
which had conspired against Russia at the moment of the 



46 THE CRIME 

prospective conflict"; "the great conspiracy of the Entente 
Powers, directed against Germany and Austria-Hungary" ; 
"chess moves in preparation of that struggle for existence." 

In accordance with this theory, every peace action taken 
by England and the other Entente Powers is a "two-faced 
move." When peace was maintained by conferences, con- 
gresses and diplomatic negotiations, "it was in no way due to 
England." In the negotiations for a political understanding 
and for a simultaneous restriction of naval armaments the 
question was merely one of a "deceptive show." Lord Hal- 
dane was sent to Berlin "ostensibly to pave the way to an un- 
derstanding ; in reality to reconnoitre, and to procure new ar- 
guments for the policy of the Cabinet, which was already 
firmly established" (A Slanderer, page 47). In his other 
pamphlet mentioned above (page 24) Schiemann the historian 
expresses himself to the same effect regarding Haldane's mis- 
sion which, according to his account, was not seriously in- 
tended by the English Government, but "had no other object 
than to pacify the sentiment in England which continued to 
press more loudly for an understanding with Germany." 

The conclusion of the Anglo-German agreement with re- 
gard to Asia Minor and the Baghdad line is suppressed by 
Schiemann, because he cannot represent as a mere pretence 
a real settlement of real questions of national interests. On 
this subject, under the general heading "Double-dealing in 
England," he writes as follows: 

The long dormant negotiations with Germany on a settlement 
of mutual interests in the territory of the Baghdad railway and 
in Africa at the cost of Portugal were again resumed, and with 
apparent sincerity were brought quite near a conclusion, so that 
in September, 191 3, an agreement appeared to be quite imminent. 
That in this case, as in the negotiations with regard to a naval 
agreement which were also continued, the whole thing was merely 
a deceptive show, we know from Haldane's confession of July 
5th, 19 1 5, quoted above. They were chess-moves in prepara- 
tion of that struggle for existence which Haldane on his return 
from Berlin in February, 1912, had represented to his colleagues 
in the Cabinet as inevitable. (A Slanderer, page 59.) 



THE PREVENTIVE WAR 47 

As a matter of fact, the agreement with regard to Asia 
Minor and the Baghdad Railway was not merely "quite 
imminent in September, 191 3"; it was actually concluded in 
the spring of 1914. Further, the negotiations with regard 
to the spheres of interest of the two Powers in Africa were 
not, as Schiemann dishonestly says, a "deceptive show" ; they 
had proceeded so far that on the outbreak of war their con- 
clusion was near at hand. In both pamphlets Schiemann is 
silent as to the actual conclusion of the treaty with regard to 
Asia Minor — a fact which clearly reveals his mala fides. In 
so far as the agreement with regard to East and West Africa 
was not actually completed, it is better adapted to the lying 
insinuation of English insincerity; of this he asserts in the 
Understanding-pamphlet (page 26) that Grey had refused to 
give this treaty the definite form of a proposal to be laid be- 
fore both Houses of Parliament, because here again Grey 
was throughout concerned "merely with the appearance of 
conciliatoriness." This also is a deliberately lying insinua- 
tion intended to represent the whole English policy as having 
been for years a continuous system of specious manoeuvres. 
The agreement was indeed not yet complete in all points when 
the war broke out, and for special reasons a publication was 
impracticable, since the question involved was the delimita- 
tion of spheres of interest, not with regard to African sav- 
ages, but with regard to a European State, Portugal. 

Thus, in order to tune the English actions, which in reality 
served peace, into conformity with the war-conspiracy which 
is later to be produced, Schiemann is compelled at every stage 
either to suppress or to falsify the facts, or to ascribe to the 
English actions motives which are contradicted in the most 
unambiguous manner by the actions themselves. Or, if this 
is not possible, he is at least compelled to point out that the 
maintenance of peace was "not due to England," and took 
place entirely against the personal wish of the "inner circle 
of the Cabinet," in which he arbitrarily includes Asquith, 
Grey, Haldane and Churchill. 



48 THE CRIME 

Another example of the perfidious policy of falsification 
may be taken. In his pamphlet on the Slanderer he entirely 
ignores the fruitful activity of the London Conference of 
Ambassadors, although otherwise he speaks at length of the 
Balkan War, of the London negotiations of the Balkan States 
with Turkey, of the failure of these negotiations, of the re- 
newal of the war, of the intestinal struggle of the allies, of 
the peace of Bucharest, and of the final conclusion of peace 
between Bulgaria and Turkey (page 54). He leaves entirely 
aside the activity in the cause of peace undertaken in com- 
mon by Germany and England, an activity which was hon- 
ourable to both parties, rich in result, and full of the most 
auspicious promise for the future peace of Europe, although 
it was to this activity that the maintenance of peace was 
exclusively to be attributed, and he concludes the paragraph 
on the subject with an observation which deliberately and 
completely reverses the then political situation : "All this 
created an entirely new political situation, the various stages 
of which were of decisive influence on the great conspiracy 
of the Entente Powers directed against Germany and 
Austria-Hungary." 

In the Understanding-pamphlet (page 26) Herr Schie- 
mann is so good as to make mention of the activity of Eng- 
land, in common with Germany, at the London Conference 
of Ambassadors, but he introduces the few sentences bearing 
on the subject with the base insinuation: 

He (Grey) and France also were resolved to defer the action 
prepared against Germany until Russia, who was eagerly arming, 
had completed her preparations, which had been critically re- 
viewed by General Joffre in August, 1913; among these were 
included, inter alia, the construction of railways, intended to lead 
in Poland to the Prussian and Austrian frontier. This consid- 
eration also explains the attitude of England during the Balkan 
imbroglios of 1912 and 1913. 

Thus Grey's activity for the maintenance of peace at the 
London Conference was also merely a specious manoeuvre 
with the object of postponing the outbreak of the intended 



THE PREVENTIVE WAR 49 

European war until the Entente Powers had finished their 
military preparations. A military visit paid by General Joffre 
to Russia is thrown in by the way and represented as a 
link in the chain of the preparations for the offensive war. 
As if the Austrian and German rulers and generalissimos 
never visited each other and never reviewed each other's 
troops! It is in this way that the German Deroulede, from 
the beginning to the end of his war and jingoistic pamphlets, 
pursues his task of poisoning the political springs. He falsi- 
fies the facts or their motives ; but one fact he forgets, namely, 
that in so doing he is constantly placing himself in opposi- 
tion to the official declarations of the German Government. 
Grey's policy during the Balkan crisis of 19 12-13 not on ^Y 
received unstinted recognition and praise in Europe and the 
whole world, but was also eulogised by Herr von Jagow 
himself in the Reichstag on February 7th, 191 3, in the follow- 
ing words: 

One of the last statements — unless I am mistaken, quite the 
last — made by my late predecessor in the Reichstag dealt with 
our relations with England. He stated on that occasion that 
throughout the recent crisis (in the Near East) our relations with 
England had been specially trustful. He pointed out the good 
service rendered to the cause of an understanding among all 
the Powers by the frank conversation conducted in entire confi- 
dence between London and Berlin during all the phases of this 
crisis, and he expressed the expectation that they would continue 
to render this service. It affords me special satisfaction that on 
the first occasion which has presented itself for me to speak 
in this place I can affirm that this expectation has been absolutely 
and entirely fulfilled. The intimate exchange of view which 
we are maintaining with the British Government has very mate- 
rially contributed to the removal of difficulties of various kinds 
which have arisen during the last few months. We have now 
seen that we have not only points of contact with England of a 
sentimental nature, but that similar interests also exist. I am 
not a prophet, but I entertain the hope that on the ground of, 
common interests, which in politics is the most fertile ground, 
we can continue to work with England and perhaps to reap the 
fruits of our labours. (Quoted from Cook, page 35.) 



50 THE CRIME 

This recognition on the part of the German Secretary of 
State, Herr von Jagow, and his predecessor completely dis- 
poses of the whole of Schiemann's lying account, and this 
applies not merely to his account of English activity at the 
London Conference, but to everything else which he has the 
audacity to produce with regard to the Anglo-Franco-Russian 
conspiracy since 1909. If it is true "that war with Ger- 
many had been resolved upon in principle since 1909" (A 
Slanderer, page 64) it would have been impossible for Grey 
during the Balkan crisis to have co-operated with Germany in 
the cause of peace in the sincere, open, honourable, and trust- 
ful manner for which he is praised by Jagow, who expressly 
appeals on the subject to his predecessor Kiderlen. The one 
possibility excludes the other. Herr Schiemann may there- 
fore be left to settle matters with Herr von Jagow and with 
the Manes of Herr von Kiderlen-Wachter. 

If the motive which Herr Schiemann ascribes to the Eng- 
lish Government in explanation of their earlier attitude were 
correct, they could not have laboured for the maintenance of 
peace during the critical days from July 23rd to August 4th, 
1 9 14, so indefatigably, so devotedly and so energetically 
as is indicated in the praises which Herr von Bethmann be- 
stows upon them in the White Book. I have compiled in my 
book (pages 245-246) the list of the eulogies which Beth- 
mann devotes to the English Government; it concludes with 
the solemn recognition, contained in the declaration of war 
against Russia, of the English efforts for peace. How does 
Herr Schiemann explain the Chancellor's hymn of praise, 
if the damning judgment is correct, which he, the professor 
of history, dares to pass on English policy since 1908? "The 
hypocrisy with which the intrigue was conducted is unex- 
ampled," exclaims Schiemann in indignation. There were 
thus six years of the game of intrigue! A whole series of 
positive peace-actions, crowned by the peace-efforts in the 
critical July days of 19 14, which unfortunately remained 
fruitless; the amicable settlement of three Moroccan crises 
in 1905, 1909 and 191 1 — the prevention of an Austro-Russiari. 
war on account of the annexation of Bosnia in 1908-9 — 



THE PREVENTIVE WAR 51 

the prevention of an Austro-Russian war and its inevitable 
sequel of a European war during the Balkan crisis in 191 2- 13 
— added to this the comprehensive, exhausting, leading ac-. 
tivity for the prevention of the present war, 1 — all this is but 
trickery and hypocrisy, the action of a "professional card- 
sharper" continued throughout six long years. 

And yet all this was unnoticed in the Wilhelmstrasse I 
They continued to work with Grey; up till August 4th, 1914, 
they showered their praises upon him, and now Herr Schie- 
mann comes along and disowns, not Sir Edward Grey as might 
be imagined, but Herr von Bethmann, Herr von Jagow 
and their friends, and depicts them as the deceived and mis- 
guided victims of the slim Englishman, whose devices are 
now at last unveiled by the great Schiemann. One is in fact 
at a loss to know whether in these falsifiers of history one 
should most admire the brazen forehead with which they ex- 
ecute their falsifications, or the shameless contempt for the 
German intelligence to which they have the temerity to dish 
up their fables as historical facts. 

"The aggressive tendency of England is proved by the 
agreements with France and Russia, which we have noticed; 
above, and which are to-day publici juris" (How England, 
etc., page 21). These agreements, as I have already ex- 
plained above, were alleged to have been arrived at in the 
roadstead at Reval in June, 1908, between Hardinge and 
Isvolsky, "not officially but in an oral negotiation." Herr 
Schiemann is possessed of full knowledge of the contents of 
these oral agreements, the point of time at which they were 
to take effect, the aggressive tendency against Germany, the 
positive intention to make war; on these alleged agreements 
he builds his whole arraignment, but at no time has he ever 
produced the least shadow of proof for his assertions. With 
this phantom of a war-conspiracy of 1908 he disposes of all 
proved historical facts, just as Helfferich does with his war- 
conspiracy of July 29th, 1914; or else he seeks to falsify them 
to fit his thesis, and represents the leading German diplo- 

1 See J 'accuse, page 242 et seq., and the relevant sections in Volume I 
of this work. 



52 THE CRIME 

matists, whom I am certainly not called upon to defend, as 
such short-sighted dupes that they would really be justified 
in suing him for libel. Indeed, he goes so far as to cast 
on his personal friends in England aspersions which are un- 
worthy of a gentleman. Let anyone read in the concluding 
pages of his Understanding-pamphlet his conversations with 
Charles Trevelyan in February, 19 13, and with Lord Haldane 
in the spring of 1914, both members of Asquith's Govern- 
ment. Trevelyan assured him in the most definite manner that 
under no circumstances would England go to war ; a Govern- 
ment which made preparations for a war would be at once 
turned out. As is well known, Trevelyan, with Burns and 
Lord Morley, resigned on the outbreak of war; not however 
because they considered that the slightest blame for the out- 
break of war attached to Sir Edward Grey, or because they 
denied his sincere efforts for peace, but because, notwithstand- 
ing the outbreak of war, they considered it preferable that 
England should remain neutral. 

Lord Haldane's conversation "at a political supper a deux," 
a- few months before the outbreak of war, also confirmed 
Schiemann's impression that the inclination to an understand- 
ing with Germany prevailed in all the industrial circles of 
England. Haldane considered that the existing grouping of 
Powers furnished the best guarantee of peace, since Grey 
could curb Russia, and Germany could do the same with 
Austria-Hungary. The conversation turned on the injury 
done to English and German interests by "the present siege 
on both sides of the North Sea." In a letter from Haldane 
to Schiemann, the former assured his correspondent that "my 
ambition is to bring Germany and Great Britain into relations 
of ever closer intimacy and friendship. Our two countries 
have a common work to do for the world, and each of 
them can bring to bear on this work special endowments 
and qualities. . . . The less the nations and the groups 
treat political questions from a purely egotistical standpoint, 
the more will frictions disappear, and the sooner will the 
relations that are normal and healthy reappear. Something 
of this good work has now come into existence between the 



THE PREVENTIVE WAR 53 

two peoples. We must see to it that the chance of growth 
is given." 1 This letter, which is inspired by an honourable 
and sincere friendship, is given by Schiemann with the com- 
mentary: "It is difficult to believe in the sincerity of the 
views here expressed, when it is reflected that Lord Haldane 
belonged to the inner circle of the Cabinet, and must, there-i 
fore, have been acquainted with the secret moves of Grey's 
policy" {How England, etc., page 28.) 

Thus not only did Grey lie consistently throughout the 
years, but Trevelyan and Haldane also lied. Schiemann's per- 
sonal impressions in England were deceptive. Albion's per- 
fidy extended, not only to the nation as such, but also to all 
the various individuals with whom Schiemann, the unsullied 
knight of truth, came into friendly relations. The English- 
men lied, and the good honest Germans were taken in by their 
lies. 

Immediately after narrating Haldane' s utterances, Schie- 
mann once more gathers together all Grey's lies. On August 
4th, 1914, it had clearly emerged that the "conversations" of 
the diplomatists and of the military representatives of the 
Entente had become treaties, the Ententes had become Alli- 
ances, which previously had passed current only under false 
names. Six weeks after Grey had denied the existence of 
binding war obligations, "England placed us before the ac- 
complished fact of a struggle for life and death." 

This is not one of Grey's lies, but one of Schiemann's! 
We are now acquainted with the correspondence between 
Grey and Cambon of November 22nd/23rd, 1912, to which 
it is unnecessary that I should again return here ( see J' accuse,) 
page 85). In these letters there is no trace of an alliance; 
on the contrary, complete freedom is reserved for both the 
countries concerned to determine what their attitude would 
be in the event of an outbreak of war. On the outbreak of 
the European war England made full use of this freedom. 
She allowed the war between Germany and Russia to break 
out without participating in it; she gave the French no un- 

1 [As given in the original English in Schiemann, except one sentence 
which is clearly misquoted.] 



54 THE CRIME 

dertaking to participate in the war in the event of France be- 
coming involved, but merely the conditional and restricted 
promise of naval support (August 2nd, Blue Book, No. 148). 
England did not intervene in the war until she did so on 
account of the Belgian question, which directly affected Eng- 
lish interests, and this step, moreover, was only taken after 
the failure on August 4th of all the attempts to secure a with- 
drawal from the violation of Belgian neutrality (Blue Book, 
No. 160). Grey therefore did not "deliberately tell Parlia- 
ment an untruth," as he is accused by Schiemann of having 
done. He spoke the truth, and acted accordingly. The 
"accomplished fact of a struggle for life and death" was 
therefore not the consequence of secret alliances, but the con- 
sequence of Germany's action towards Belgium, of which 
England vainly endeavoured to secure the cancellation. 



Schiemann takes the liberty of telling a further lie, while 
accusing Grey of lying. I have already observed elsewhere 
that I do not have at my disposal the connections of the 
Kreuzzeitung professor which enable him to bring forward, 
and represent as proved, facts which are not known from 
public documents. Therefore I cannot say whether it is 
true, "as is known from Russian sources" (as Schiemann as-> 
serts without proof), that Grey had already accepted the 
Russian proposal for the conclusion of a naval agreement 
and had approved the working out of the relevant details by 
the naval staff on both sides. That may or may not be 
so. In any case it affords not the slightest evidence in sup- 
port of Schiemann's aggressive conspiracy. Military and 
naval agreements of a much more intimate character have 
existed time out of mind between Germany and Austria, and 
yet Schiemann and his friends assert that these agreements 
served defensive purposes only. Why then should Anglo- 
Russian naval conventions, if, indeed, they already existed 
or were contemplated, have unconditionally served offensive 
intentions ? 

In my book I have already dealt in detail with the grounds 



THE PREVENTIVE WAR 55 

out of which there arose the deep and constantly increasing 
feeling of distrust towards Germany and her ally Austria- 
Hungary, not only among the Entente Powers, but alsa 
among the neutrals throughout the whole world, and I cannot 
here return to the question. The demeanour of the Central 
Powers at the Hague Conferences, the blunt refusal of any 
suggestion to assure peace by an organisation resting on law, 
of any restriction of armaments by international or partial 
agreements, the crassly egotistical policy adopted by Austria 
in the Balkans in ruthless pursuance of her own interests, 
the blind support given to this policy by Germany's "mailed 
fist" and "her shining armour," the criminal intrigues of the 
Pan-Germans, Prussian militarism which raised its head with 
increasing shamelessness — these and other circumstances 
which are narrated in my first and in this my second book 
had brought the Entente Powers together and had cemented 
them more and more closely to each other. There would 
therefore have been no occasion for surprise if in addition to 
the Anglo-French military discussions, discussions between 
England and Russia should also have taken place. This fact, 
however, does not furnish the slightest evidence of the exis- 
tence of an aggressive war-plan on the part of the "conspir- 
ing" Powers ; it merely proves that a European war was con- 
sidered as possible, and that the discussion of the military 
measures to be adopted in such a contingency was considered 
expedient. 

The whole train of thought, that military measures and 
agreements on the other side are aggressive whereas the same 
actions on this side are defensive, constantly recurs in the 
German literature of incitement to war; it might be designated 
as entirely fatuous if it were not devised with such devilish 
ingenuity, and planned with a view to its effect on the psy- 
chology of the German people as it existed then and now. 
The essence of the European balance of power was to be found 
in the idea that the military forces on both sides were to be 
so strengthened and linked together that the two groups of 
Powers should mutually balance. The strengthening of one 



56 THE CRIME 

side was necessarily bound to provoke that of the other, in 
order that the scale on the one side should not sink to th£ 
disadvantage of the other. How, then, can it be made a 
charge against England that she sought to increase her in- 
sufficient land power by contingent agreements with France 
and Russia in order thus to hold the balance to some extent 
against the forces of Germany which were equally strong 
by land and by sea, although to these there had also to be 
added the forces of her ally Austria and, as had to be assumed, 
of Italy as well? How can it be made a charge against 
France that she answered the German Military law of 191 3 
by introducing a three years' period of service, since in view 
of her considerably smaller population it was only by pro- 
longing the period of service that she could find something 
to adjust the gigantic increase of German troops? 

The German Military Law and the French Three 

Years Law 

Here again Schiemann and his fellows lie in representing 
France as having taken the lead with her three years period 
of service and in depicting the German Military Law as 
merely the consequence of the increase of the French army. 
The reverse of this is the truth. The German Military Law 
was introduced earlier, and was voted earlier (April, 191 3) 
than the French measure relating to the three years period 
of service (August, 1913). It was not in any way explained 
by reference to an imminent increase in the French forces 
through a prolongation of the period of service, but rather 
by the new political constellation in the Balkans, which might 
in certain circumstances create for the Austrian Empire a 
dangerous opposition in the South, and might thus make nec- 
essary an increase of German forces to compensate for a 
diversion of a part of the Austrian forces. There was no 
mention of the introduction of the three years period of ser- 
vice in France when the great German Military Law was in- 
troduced and elaborated. The idea of the three years period 
of service did not appear until after the German measures had 



THE PREVENTIVE WAR 57 

been made known in France, and effect was not given to it 
until the increase of German troops had been approved. 

The Schiemanns cannot of course abolish these facts, of 
which the chronological order is clear, and to which I propose 
to return later. What then do they do in order to represent 
the French as "the bloke what begun it" ? They maintain — 
that is to say they imagine — that Poincare, on the occasion 
of the tour to Petrograd which he undertook as Premier in 
1912, had already pledged himself to introduce the three years 
period of military service in France after his election as 
President of the Republic (A Slanderer, page 51). Where isj 
the evidence in support of this? Who could tell in the sum- 
mer of 19 12 that Poincare would be chosen as President of 
the French Republic in the beginning of 1913? Is it not the 
case that his election depended on all kinds of chances? Waa 
it not imperilled in the gravest manner by strong and intrigu- 
ing political opponents, as for example by Clemenceau? And 
are we to suppose that Russia was so stupid as to give, in 
return for this bill drawn on the future, definite promises to 
the French Government such as Schiemann would have us 
believe? The fact is that the last gigantic increases in the 
army which — as we Pacifists and Socialists rightly foretold — 
were bound to strain the condition of Europe to the breaking 
point, were also begun by Germany, and that her example 
was merely followed by France. The assertion that France 
would have been willing to make the beginning is entirely un- 
substantial and void of all proof. The Belgian ambassadorial 
reports, to which we know the German Government attaches 
so much evidential value, also place it beyond doubt that the 
relation between the German and the French increases in the 
army was that of cause and effect (as I shall prove in the 
special study of the Belgian documents). 

Thus constantly and everywhere we find the same policy 
pursued by the arraigners of the Entente; even facts, the 
chronological order of which is firmly established, they seek 
to remodel by baseless assertions and insinuations. 



58 THE CRIME 



The Anglo-Russian Naval Consultations 

But let us return to Schiemann's record of lies against 
Grey. He seeks to represent the contemplated naval con-, 
sultations between English and Russian experts as a symp- 
tom of the aggressive conspiracy, and in doing so he gives us 
the following sentence {How England, etc., page 28) : "A 
war between the Triple Entente and the Triple Alliance was 
thereby expressly contemplated, and the full alliance of Eng- 
land was the presupposition." This manner of expression is 
intentionally selected with so much ambiguity to induce in the 
reader the belief — again without the shadow of evidence — that 
war against Germany and her allies was positively intended 
and that England's support was completely assured. This 
again is a perfidious insinuation, to which from the outset it 
is difficult to give credence in view of the fact that Herr 
Schiemann, who, after all, was not consulted by the Anglo- 
Russian experts, cannot know what these experts "contem- 
plated," or how far English support was guaranteed to the 
Russians. But let us assume that Herr Schiemann was an 
eavesdropper at the door of the council chamber, if indeed it 
ever got so far as a consultation. Is it not entirely natural 
that the discussions of the naval experts were bound to con- 
template the contingency of a war between the Triple Alliance 
and the Triple Entente, and to presuppose the participation 
of England in such a war? What purpose could the con- 
sultations have had, if not to consider joint Anglo- Russian 
naval operations in the event of a European war? Did the 
consultations of the military experts of the States of the Triple 
Alliance, Germany, Austria, and Italy, not contemplate a 
European war and the participation of all three States? It 
was only to meet the contingency of a war that the two groups 
stood opposed to each other in arms. Agreement as to their 
operations was as much a part of their military preparations 
as troops, cannon and ships. Why need it occasion surprise, 
and why should it be regarded as suspicious, that Anglo- 
Russian experts should have based their deliberations on the 



THE PREVENTIVE WAR 59 

same presupposition of the possibility of a European war, 
as did the Austro-German experts in the same circumstances? 
This entirely natural basis and presupposition of the de- 
liberations is transformed by Herr Schiemann by means 
of an intentionally ambiguous phraseology into a tendency 
to aggression. The war against the Triple Alliance was 
according to him "expressly contemplated," that is to say, 
it was intended. The complete alliance of England was a 
"presupposition," that is to say, it was guaranteed. And 
it is with this deceitful manoeuvre that Herr Schiemann here 
again trickles into the credulous souls of his German readers 
the poisonous slander that the aggressive conspiracy was 
already resolved upon and that agreement had been reached 
as to all its details. I have intentionally dwelt at somewhat 
greater length on this example, because it is characteristic of 
all the demonstrations given by Schiemann and his friends. 
They do not proceed inductively by collecting and bringing 
forward evidence in support of their thesis, but they proceed 
deductively, placing their thesis without any proof at the 
head of their dissertations like a mathematical or geometrical 
proposition, and then every individual occurrence, even the 
most insignificant and the most harmless, is brought forward 
in the light of their thesis. How long will they continue to 
have any success with the German people by resorting to these 
juggling devices? When will Truth finally dawn? When 
will Clio discard her pencil, and with broom in hand drive her 
faithless disciples from the temple of knowledge ? 

The Entente Conspiracy Invented by Schiemann 

It is extraordinarily significant to observe how these his- 
torical inquirers hasten, with the fear of detected criminals, 
past facts which they are unable to falsify or remodel. It is 
possible to arrive at any desired result by means of news^ 
paper articles, unproved reports regarding oral negotiations, 
etc. I will undertake to give a picture of the sentiment pre- 
vailing in any country, at any time that may be chosen, which 
will agree exactly with my wishes in the matter, if it is suffi- 



60 THE CRIME 

cient to quote the speech of a politician (from which, of course, 
I would leave out what did not suit my purpose) or an article 
by a journalist, which exactly supports my opinion and the 
objects I have in view. In every country there are parties and 
diversities of opinion, to which expression is given in speech 
and in writing. It is only necessary that I should choose 
those which correspond to the picture I wish to draw, and I 
shall have proved that France, England or Russia at any 
given moment thought as it suits me to portray. 

This is Schiemann's system. The more we read him 
(an arduous task for anyone who honourably seeks thei 
truth!) the more we see behind his tricks. This "Schiemann" 
is the "snippet-man" nar' e&xyv. All the newspapers in 
the world are represented in his snippet-box. Mention is 
made of a political event in Russia; he draws out, as suits 
his purpose, an English, French, Roumanian or Belgian news- 
paper-cutting and by means of it refutes what has been as- 
serted. The subject in question is, let us say, the settlement of 
the Moroccan conflict in 191 1, and the successful co-operation 
of England in preventing the outbreak of war. ITerr Schie- 
mann opens his snippet-box and draws out — (guess, Reader, 
what he draws out!) — a number of the Leipsiger Illustrierte 
Zeitung of December, 191 1, in which the position of the 
English and German fleets in the summer months of 191 1 is 
graphically represented (A Slanderer, page 43). This praphic' 
representation of course proves nothing at all. It gives, how- 
ever, to Herr Schiemann, the student of history, the oppor- 
tunity of adding these sentences: 

These were the days in which consideration was given to the 
question of overwhelming our fleet by superior fo r ce. In Sep- 
tember the English officers were already informed of their des- 
tination on the Continent. 

This chart in the Leipziger Illustrierte Zeitung is thus 
another convincing proof that the only thing that England 
desired and sought was the opportunity to attack and annihilate 
us. 

On November 27th, 191 1, Sir Edward Grey delivered his 



THE PREVENTIVE WAR 61 

famous speech in the English Parliament (see J' accuse, page 
106), in which he expressed England's strong desire for the 
establishment of improved relations with' Germany; Great 
Britain had facilitated a friendly settlement of the Moroccan 
crisis between Germany and France; it was to be hoped that 
this settlement "had also cleaned the slate in respect of Ger- 
man relations with England." England's existing friendships 
did not constitute a hindrance to the conclusion of new friend- 
ships. He, Grey, would gladly welcome any wish on the part 
of Germany to improve their mutual relations, and there would 
be nothing of a grudging attitude in England's policy. 1 What 
does Herr Schiemann make of this sincere and honourable 
peace-speech of Grey? England was resolved, said Grey, as 
interpreted by Schiemann {A Slanderer, page 45), to maintain 
the form of her relations with France and Russia which, as 
Schiemann adds, "merely meant that Grey would continue 
his system of political preparation for a war against Ger- 
many." Was there ever a more preposterous and impudent 
falsification ? 

But now the snippet comes to his aid. The relevant port- 
folio is opened, and — consider what is drawn out — a tele- 
gram from Paris to the Journal de Geneve, in which the writer 
points out that the non-existence of a military convention 
between England and France, which Grey had correctly de- 
nied, did not justify the "inference that England and France 
had never contemplated the possibility of combining their 
forces." What evidence in favour of Schiemann's perversion 
of Grey's peace-parley into a fanfarade of war is furnished 
by this insignificant tattle wired to a Swiss newspaper by an 
unknown Parisian, of whose standing we are entirely igno- 
rant? No matter; a newspaper snippet has to be worked off. 
In this case, indeed, Herr Schiemann appears to have got 
hold of the wrong one in the portfolio, for the snippet from 
the Journal de Geneve has as much to do with Grey's speech 
as Herr Schiemann with the service of Truth. 



1 See Cook, p. 29. 



62 THE CRIME 

Take another example, this time a ludicrous one, of the 
great historian's method of using snippets. At the con- 
clusion of his pamphlet on the Slanderer (pages 65-67) he 
flatters himself that he has given the accuser a fatal blow 
in publishing, of all things in the world, the letter of an 
Englishman to a Chilian, which is said to have appeared 
in Santiago in the Gazeta militar there, and which consitutes 
for the historian "an important document in contemporary 
history." Thus, be it observed, we do not know who wrote 
the letter; we do not know whether he really exists; we are 
further not in a position to check whether the letter was writ- 
ten in English or in Spanish, or whether it appeared in Chile 
in the Gazeta militar in the words in which it is reproduced 
by the historian. We have to rely on its reproduction by 
Schiemann, who again takes it from the Kolnische Zeitung, 
and with this momentous document in his hand he trium- 
phantly exclaims to the accuser: 

There at last is a voice which openly acknowledges the mo- 
tives of the men who made the war; after all the official hypoc- 
risy here is a sincere word. We recommend it to the "accuser," 
for the correction of the appreciation he bestows on the unselfish 
love of peace of his English heroes. He has now obtained a 
picture of the real historical antecedents of the war, a frag- 
ment of the truth, so far as it can be established to-day. 

I pass over what the alleged English letter-writer com- 
municates to his Chilian correspondent, because I am reluctant 
to stoop to the low level of a historian who produces such 
anonymous stuff as a historical document, and actually makes 
use of it as the final volley for the pulverisation of the ac- 
cuser. To what a pass must the defenders of German inno- 
cence have come, when they debase themselves to such a meth- 
od of proof! It is, of course, unveiled to the Chilian people 
that it was England's commercial envy that caused the war, 
that the idea of a league to crush Germany had arisen in Bel- 
gium earlier even than in England (this is printed by Herr 
Schiemann in emphatic type), that the English manufactur- 
ers and commercial magnates aimed at the devastation of the 



THE PREVENTIVE WAR 63 

Continent — including the "areas of France and Russia which 
were industrially the wealthiest" — for the more the Continent 
was devastated "the greater and more positive will be the 
resulting advantages for England." 

With this newspaper snippet, Herr Schiemann, you have 
certainly broken the record, and you have not only broken 
the record but have also broken me, the accuser. I feel my- 
self crushed. Now the "cards of the professional card- 
sharper" Grey are really uncovered. Now we have authentic 
information to show what criminals and rogues the English 
are. Illumination has come to us from Chile, and it is to you, 
Herr Professor, that we owe it. 

Sir Edward Grey's Constant Disappointment 

Herr Schiemann is obliged to have recourse to the most 
outrageous devices in order to adapt to his war-conspiracy 
all the facts which proclaim the pacific intention of the En- 
tente Powers. For this purpose he applies various methods. 
Either he represents the attitude of the Entente Powers, 
which was obviously directed to the maintenance of peace, as 
having been merely specious, and proves this by reference to 
any particular interests or situations which the Power in ques- 
tion had to take into account at a given moment. From this 
deceitful standpoint the maintenance of peace is never an end 
in itself, but merely the consequence imposed by a passing 
necessity. . The second method adopted by Schiemann, and at 
the same time the one that is most convenient, is to suppress 
the incident altogether. The third method is this: according 
as he wishes in the passage in question to represent England 
or France or Russia as the leader of the war conspiracy, he 
maintains that the two others for quite special reasons could 
not at the critical moment allow war to break out, but that 
the third, the leader and the instigator, "grievously disap- 
pointed" or "embittered," was forced to be a spectator of 
the peaceful issue of the crisis. 

This grievous disappointment and embitterment is repre- 
sented at every stage as the state of mind of the English 



64 THE CRIME 

statesmen, especially of Sir Edward Grey. It is something of 
a miracle that this hapless wight has not ere now done away 
with himself out of sheer disappointment. The reader may be 
interested to hear what an accumulation of grievous disap- 
pointments are credited to Grey on page 19 of the Under- 
standing-pamphlet alone. 

It was a grievous disappointment for the English statesmen 
that in spite of the enormous din made by the Serbians and the 
emphatically bellicose attitude of Russia, Nicholas II. neverthe- 
less recognised the annexation of March 25th, 1909. The dis- 
appointment was all the greater inasmuch as shortly before this 
the Moroccan difficulties between Germany and France were 
also settled, notwithstanding the Casablanca conflict which was 
still pending. On the day on which King Edward made his first 
visit to Berlin, on February 9th, 1909, a Franco-German agree- 
ment with regard to Morocco was signed, and in the end of May 
the Casablanca conflict was also settled by arbitration to the 
tolerable satisfaction of both parties. 

Then the Bosnian crisis of 1908-9 was happily overcome 
by the compliant disposition shown by Russia towards the 
Austrian breach of law, the second Moroccan agreement be- 
tween Germany and France was brought to a safe conclusion, 
and the Casablanca conflict was also settled by arbitration. 
In arriving at these results the chief merit was to be ascribed 
to England, as the intermediary with Russia and with France. 
The peace of Europe had once again been maintained. Yet 
Herr Schiemann has the audacity to speak of a "grievous dis- 
appointment for the English statesman," and to add the sen- 
tence : "It is not too much to say that King Edward did what 
lay in his power to arrive at another issue. ..." (The Un- 
derstanding-pamphlet, page 19.) 

I have already spoken of another of Grey's embitterments ; 
he was "embittered" (A Slanderer, page 43) because the 
dispatch of the Panther was not answered by an Anglo-French 
naval demonstration; in this case he was embittered by the 
double resistance which it encountered from the French Gov- 



THE PREVENTIVE WAR 65 

ernment and in his own Cabinet — all, of course, pure inven- 
tions on the part of Schiemann. 

The worst "disappointments," however, naturally befell the 
English war-politicians, Grey, Asquith and their partners, 
when the third Moroccan agreement of November, 191 1, took 
form, a result to which, as is well known, they had largely 
contributed. The English naval measures during the pro- 
longed crisis, which brought Europe to the brink of a war are, 
of course, represented as implying aggressive intentions. 
As early as 1905 — that is to say, after the fall of Delcasse — ■ 
"England considered in all seriousness the question of making 
an attack" {How England, etc., page 12), that is to say, 
three years before the agreements of Reval, which, as Schie- 
mann elsewhere maintains, first laid the foundation of the 
conspiracy. The merit of England in having brought about 
the third Moroccan agreement is naturally completely in- 
verted. "It was not due to Asquith and Grey that peace was 
notwithstanding finally maintained" (A Slanderer, page 44) 
: — so we read immediately after mention is made of the agree- 
ment. And in exactly the same way, with the object of at 
once effacing in the reader the impression produced by the 
fact that the dispute ended peacefully, mention is made in the 
same breath of the renewal of the Anglo- Japanese treaty of 
alliance, which was effected "clearly with the intention of 
assuring for herself an ally in the East against Germany, in 
the event of the war, for which the English statesmen were 
working, not breaking out until after August, 191 5, or in 
the event of its not yet being finished by that time" (A Slan- 
derer, page 43). 

Anyone who so far suppresses his nausea as to follow for 
a time Schiemann's system of falsification will be seized by a 
kind of admiration for this man, like the tribute of recogni- 
tion one is compelled to pay to the burglar who successfully 
breaks open even the strongest Milner safe. The criminal 
skill is the same in both, but the latter in the end produces 
gold, whereas Schiemann only brings forth lead. 



66 THE CRIME 



The Moroccan Agreement of 191 i 

The Moroccan settlement of 191 1 is an inconvenient ob- 
stacle to Schiemann. In the first place he falsely says that 
the English statesmen, who materially contributed to bring 
it about, would have prevented it had they had their way. 
Thus on this occasion it is the Englishmen, on other occa- 
sions the leaders and the instigators of the trio of criminals, 
who are overruled. Then, however, in order to produce evi- 
dence (in the Schiemann manner) in support of his assertion 
of English opposition to the peaceful settlement, he has the 
assurance to represent the prolongation of the Anglo-Japanese 
Alliance as an act taken in preparation for war against Ger- 
many, although, as everyone knows, this treaty was concluded 
merely to afford Japan support against Russia. The use made 
of the Japanese Alliance against German possessions in East 
Asia, which was only a consequence of the outbreak of the 
European war, is thus represented as an intention entertained 
by England as far back as 191 1, and this invention is again 
used to prove that in the summer of 191 1, when England 
laboured for a settlement of the Franco-German conflict, she 
was in truth devoting her efforts not to the peace of Europe, 
but to war against Germany. What expression plays on the 
features of Herr Schiemann when he transcribes such falsi- 
fications, the true character of which is of course quite known 
to him? What contempt must his eyes reveal for the Ger- 
man reader, whom he seeks to humbug with such fairy tales; 
for he himself knows that in all the rest of the world there is 
no one who believes his inventions. 

Herr Schiemann, indeed, is so bold as to express his indig- 
nation that Sir Edward Cook should assert that Great Britain 
facilitated the conclusion of the Franco-German Moroccan 
agreement, The indignation, Herr Schiemann, is on our side. 
Cook correctly quotes Grey's speech of November 27th, 191 1, 
mentioned above (Cook, page 22; F accuse, page 106), in 
which Grey not merely truthfully emphasised England's activ- 
ity in the cause of peace in the Moroccan question, but also 



THE PREVENTIVE WAR 67 

gave expression to England's strong desire for friendly rela- 
tions with Germany. The activity in the cause of peace dis- 
played by England, who no doubt gave diplomatic support to 
France, in accordance with the Anglo-French Moroccan 
agreement, but who nevertheless sought by every possible 
means to prevent a European war, is a historical fact which 
Herr Schiemann, in his approved method, seeks to get rid 
of by producing newspaper-snippets. In the spring of 191 1 
an English naval paper gave an illustration of the German 
High Sea Fleet with the inscription: "The Enemy!" This is 
a proof of the bellicose intentions of the English Government! 
After the crisis was over, an open letter was addressed by 
Morel and Hirst to the members of the English Parliament, 
in which England's foreign policy during the last seven years 
was sharply criticised, and a protest entered against any alli- 
ance or political agreement which might force England to 
measures at variance with her own national interests {How 
England, etc., page 23; A Slanderer, page 45). Does this 
critical letter written by politicians of the opposition contain 
the slightest shadow of a charge that the English Govern- 
ment was intentionally pursuing a warlike policy? Is it not 
rather the case, on Schiemann's own quotations, that the writ- 
ers merely point out the danger that England might be in- 
volved in a war against her will, as the result of certain agree- 
ments with Continental Powers? Is the standpoint here as- 
sumed by Morel and Hirst not exactly the same as their atti- 
tude to the present war, the standpoint, that is to say, that the 
Liberal English Government desired and laboured for peace, 
but that it would have been a better policy for England in the 
past to have abstained from any Entente with Continental 
Powers? How little this criticism of English policy before 
the war has to do with the present war is confirmed by the 
following sentence which Morel wrote in an article in The 
New Statesman of February 13th, 191 5: 

I am not concerned with the first point about Belgium, because 
on the inevitableness of an Anglo-German war arising out of a 
German invasion in 1914 of Belgian territory, I imagine there 
can be no difference of opinion in this country. 



68 THE CRIME 

This recognition of the fact that Belgium was the cause 
of the Anglo-German war, and was necessarily bound to be 
so, is all the more important when expressed by Morel, inas- 
much as in other matters he accuses English foreign policy of 
a long catalogue of errors. In any case Schiemann's snippet 
affords not the slightest proof in support of his assertion that 
the English Government worked against the Moroccan agree- 
ment, and, like the whole of the snippet collection, it is merely 
dust to throw in the eyes of the uncritical reader. 

The last device of the historian is this: If all other means 
are unavailing to transform the peace action of the Entente 
Powers into a preparation for war there always remains a 
last way of escape. He can always say that they were not yet 
ready; their military preparations were not yet completed; it 
was not until somewhere about 191 5 that the blow was to be 
struck, and until then the German Michel had to be kept in 
the dark regarding the evil designs of his enemies. I have 
already referred to these tactics and to their practical ap- 
plication. 

With the aid of these four methods Herr Schiemann is 
always safe. Grey and Asquith may pursue what line of action 
they chose. Either it never happened at all, or it was not 
seriously intended and only ostensibly served the cause of 
peace, being in reality dictated by their own interests ; or else 
it was the product of the necessity of the moment, or finally 
it was designed for the deception of Germany and for the 
preparation in safety for a later attack. 

We may take a pleasing example of the way in which this 
professor of history, the model historian, who accuses me 
of "the unscientific nature of my method of investigation," 
"the superficiality of historical knowledge," "the tendencious 
compilation of fragments of documents," etc., deals with the 
same facts according to the end he is pursuing at one place 
or another. It may be regarded as a historically incontro- 
vertible fact, that the crisis in connection with the annexa- 
tion of Bosnia would in all probability have led to a European 



THE PREVENTIVE WAR 69 

war through the fault of Austria and of Germany which stood 
behind her, had not England and France exerted all their influ- 
ence on Russia, with whom they were connected by an En- 
tente and by an Alliance, and in the end induced the Russian 
as well as the Serbian Government to recognise the situation 
created by Austria. Schiemann also recognises the fact that 
there was a grave European crisis, which, as is well known, 
led to the Austrian and the Russian mobilisation, and which 
in March, 1909, had reached its culminating point. He fur- 
ther speaks of "a diplomatic campaign which was almost on 
the point of developing into a European war," of a "Press 
campaign of almost unexampled violence," of the protest of 
the Entente Powers against the annexation, and of the final 
surrender of Russia and Serbia after a Russo-Austrian war 
had appeared inevitable (A Slanderer, pages 30-32 ; How 
England, etc., page 19). I have already pointed out that on 
this occasion also Schiemann ascribes to the English Govern- 
ment the intention of driving matters to war. At the moment 
I am only concerned to make it clear that Russia, supported 
by the Entente Powers, protested against the Austrian an- 
nexation, that Austria and Russia mobilised, and that a Euro- 
pean war was imminent. 

At another place in his Slanderer the state of affairs so 
determined does not suit Herr Schiemann's purpose. He is 
displeased that in my book I should represent the annexation 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a challenge addressed to Russia 
and Serbia, as one of the many systematically accomplished 
Austrian actions which for the sake of purely selfish interests 
constantly imperilled the peace of Europe and in the end pro- 
voked this terrible war. What, then, does Herr Schie- 
mann do? He calls the Austrian action of 1908 (A Slan- 
derer, page 22) "the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
which was carried out in agreement with Russia and with her 
previous concurrence." This outsoars all that has ever been 
achieved in reshaping facts according to the momentary pur- 
pose of the narrative. The grave European crisis, the diplo- 
matic campaign which was almost on the point of developing 
into a European war (A Slamderer, pages 31-32), the resolute 



70 THE CRIME 

militant attitude of Russia {How England, etc., page 19)/ 
these dangerous facts are transformed in the skilful hands 
of the historical juggler into an "annexation carried out in 
agreement with Russia and with her previous concurrence" ; 
and this is done merely because on one occasion the one asser- 
tion, on another the other, is better suited to the juggler's pur- 
pose. I have already quoted in my book the English proverb 
that a liar should have a good memory. Herr Schiemann 
has already forgotten on page 31 what he wrote on page 22. 

The Venezuela Conflict 

I should like to illustrate by a further example Schiemann' s 
system of hunting out such newspaper snippets as may be 
required in order to throw into prominence feelings and 
tendencies in the English people which suit his argument at 
the moment. This example is all the more striking because 
here I can refute Schiemann by Schiemann himself. In his 
Slanderer pamphlet one point on which he makes a great fuss 
and accuses me of having suppressed important facts is that 
in the interval between the first and the second Hague Con- 
ferences I failed to mention — who would guess it ? — the Vene- 
zuela incident (1902-3) ! 

Now I must confess to my shame that even now, notwith- 
standing Schiemann's explanations, I have been unable to 
grasp the connection between the Venezuela conflict and the 
ideals of the Hague Conference (establishment of arbitration 
for international disputes, limitation of armaments, etc.). 
It is well known that the English and German Fleets co- 
operated in the winter of 1902-3 to compel Castro, the Vene- 
zuelan tyrant, to observe his international obligations. This 
co-operation was inevitably received with great sympathy by 
all sections disposed to peace in both countries and was inter- 
preted as a favourable sign for the future. Of course there 
always have been, and there still are, in England as well as in 
Germany, elements which direct their efforts against the 
peaceful co-operation of the nations, and which find their 
bread and their profit in the incitement of one pacific people 



THE PREVENTIVE WAR 71 

against others. These bands of intriguers and conspirators, 
from the lowest selfish or class interests, make a trade of 
poisoning public opinion; they seek by subterranean channels 
to conduct their unclean water to authoritative places and 
when at last after years of boring, after years of intrigue and 
of agitation, the world-conflagration breaks out and the dev- 
astating fire consumes all the nations, they then stand forth 
and point with their finger across the frontier, exclaiming: 
"There stands the incendiary!" 

Herr Schiemann, the German Deroulede, knows better than 
anyone else this criminal circle in Germany. To him, as to 
all his fellows on both sides of the German frontier, one may 
properly apply the words which at the conclusion of the Slan- 
derer he addresses to those in England, France and Russia 
alleged to have been guilty of the war: 

"The blood which has been shed in this war, and all 
the misery which has accompanied it, cries aloud to 
Heaven for retribution. It will recoil on the heads of 
those who have instigated the war." 

In this hope I participate. This is one of the few points in 
which I am in agreement with the Kreuzzeitung professor. 
To the lamp-post with the guilty! will, it is to be hoped, be 
the battle-cry of all nations after this insensate carnage. To 
the lamp-post with all Derouledes, those on this side as well 
as on that! 

I should, however, like to guard against a misunderstand- 
ing which might arise from the conjunction of the German 
and the French Derouledes. It was not I, but a Frenchman, 
who linked his countryman, the enthusiastic patriot who no 
doubt wrought much harm in his honourable excess of zeal, 
with a German falsifier of history who is destitute of honour 
and of true patriotism (he was not even born a German!), 
who possesses not a spark of enthusiasm for an ideal cause; 
on the contrary, he sits and sneers in cold blood in his study 
and twists and moulds dates and facts until they produce the 
picture desired by those in high places. The true Deroulede 



72 THE CRIME 

was an honourable enthusiast inspired for a great cause, the 
false is a dishonest manufacturer of history who pursues base 
ends by petty means. The two Derouledes have nothing in 
common with each other, apart from their success in ren- 
dering national divergencies more acute. The Frenchman 
courageously drew his sword, and called upon his coun- 
trymen in glowing songs to regain their lost provinces. 
The German, on the other hand, created dangerous poisons in 
his secret laboratory, and by night privily infected the public 
springs. Paul Deroulede did not deserve to give his name to 
a Theodor Schiemann. I owe this testimony to the Manes 
of the French patriot. 

* * H« * * * 

Let us return to Venezuela. In his construction of the 
conspiracy which he attributes to King Edward from the 
beginning of his reign (1901) Herr Schiemann is embarrassed 
by the common action for peace taken by England and Ger- 
many which, notwithstanding the failure of the first Hague 
Conference, clearly proclaimed the existence, on the English 
side also, of a desire for action in common. According to 
Schiemann, it is a fact that "the one political idea which was 
firmly established so far as the King was concerned since the 
beginning of his reign was to make the central point of Eng- 
lish policy the exploitation of the French idea of revenge 
which still survived" (How England, etc., page 11). 

The exploitation of the idea of revenge, a conspiracy to 
make war against Germany and a pacific collaboration in 
Venezuela — these obviously do not fit into* each other. The 
conjurer must therefore set to work without delay! 

One, two, three ! Hey, presto, hey ! 

The quickness of the hand deceives the eye ! x 

The snippet-box is therefore opened, and a snippet pro- 
duced which is alleged to come from the National Review 
( I am not in a position to check the existence and the contents 

1 [Hokus, Pokus, eins, zwei, drei ! 
Geschwindigkeit ist keine Hexerei!] 



THE PREVENTIVE WAR 73 

of this Press-utterance of which the text is not given). Im- 
mediately after chronicling the fact of co-operation in Vene- 
zuela it is asserted on the strength of the utterance in the 
National Review that a group of conspirators in England and 
Russia had taken as their watchword "a world-alliance against 
Germany," and that they had thus made use of the action of 
peace to evolve a war-cry. Here again we have the same sys- 
tem ! an attempt to obliterate a historical fact by means of any 
sort of newspaper extract, which cannot be checked and is 
not even quoted verbatim, and which even if it really exists 
reflects the unauthoritative ideas of a band of intriguers, not, 
however, the ideas of the English people nor of their Gov- 
ernment. 

In the case before us. — and it is for this reason that I de- 
vote some time to the present incident — it is possible to prove 
by means of Schiemann himself the untenability and the ob- 
jectionable character of this method. While in the Slanderer 
(page 17) he bases his inference of a world-alliance against 
Germany on an utterance in the National Review, he impru- 
dently quotes in his Understanding-pamphlet (page 11), since 
he apparently considers that his readers are even more un- 
critical than they really are, a speech delivered by Balfour, 
then Prime Minister, on February 13th, 1903, in which he 
combated with the greatest energy the incitement of English 
public opinion against Germany: 

Let us remember — said Balfour, according to Schiemann's 
quotation — that the old ideal of Christendom should still be our 
ideal; and all those nations who are in the forefront of civili- 
sation should learn to work together by practicable means for the 
common good, and that nothing militates against the realisa-* 
tion of that great ideal so conclusively as the encouragement of 
these international bitternesses, these international jealousies, 
these international dislikes. ... So far as Venezuela is concerned, 
that will pass. ... As regards the future, I am filled with dis- 
quietude when I think how easy it is to fan these international 
jealousies, how difficult it seems to me to be to allay them. 1 

* [Speech delivered at Liverpool.] 



74 THE CRIME 

This speech of the Prime Minister's, which is prudently 
concealed from the readers of the Slanderer, necessarily dis- 
poses altogether of the alleged utterances of the National 
Review. The responsible Government, the Conservative Gov- 
ernment then in power, as well as the Liberal Government to- 
day, were, in fact, absolutely disposed to peace; they sought 
for an understanding with Germany and a cessation of the 
ruinous naval competition, and they entered into the Ententes, 
not to provoke a war, but for the maintenance of peace — for 
the maintenance of peace by means of the European balance 
of power, which was still considered to hold out a prospect of 
success. 

How does the historical juggler escape from the difficulty 
involved in reconciling the words of the English Prime Min- 
ister, quoted by himself, with his fundamental thesis of a 
"war-conspiracy against Germany" ? Nothing is easier. The 
magician here again works with the double devices of his art. 
Balfour expressed the views of the English Government, the 
National Review and its journalistic comrades expressed "the 
spiritual sentiments which, as was well known in these jour- 
nalistic circles, animated King Edward" {How England, etc., 
page 10). It will be seen that the "new Prussian" historian 
of Russian Baltic origin is never in a difficulty. The in- 
triguers agitate against Germany. The leader of the Cabinet 
attacks them with the greatest emphasis, but the King secretly 
stands behind the intriguers — against his own Ministers! — 
and so we are again furnished with the desired picture of the 
Royal English war conspiracy against Germany. It is spe- 
cially worthy of remark in this juggling device that on every 
other occasion, when the Schiemanns find it convenient, King 
Edward is represented in his very own person as the instigator 
and the inciter of the devilish policy of "encirclement" and 
of war, and his Ministers are represented merely as his execu- 
tive agents. Here, however, in the Venezuela incident, where 
the Minister unmistakably turned against the intriguers, it is 
necessary to construe a lack of harmony between the royal 
will, which on other occasions alone decided matters, and his 
Ministry — solely for the purpose of transforming the Vene- 



THE PREVENTIVE WAR 75 

zuelan action of peace into an element in the preparation for 
war. 

Italy's Role in the War 

In his hopeless endeavour to refute my "Antecedents of 
the Crime," it is only natural that Herr Schiemann should 
scarcely consider the points discussed by me, which in all 
essential matters rest on historically established facts and 
documents. To this aspect of the matter I propose to return 
in a further section. On the other hand, by way of creating 
a diversion, he seeks to invoke the whole history of the world, 
everything that has anywhere happened on the globe, in Japan, 
South America or elsewhere, though it has not the slightest 
connection with my demonstration that Germany and Austria 
are primarily responsible for the state of tension in Europe; 
he seeks to introduce every possible remote incident, and 
finally concludes this compilation of insignificant or unproved 
facts with the proud words: 

I think that these facts will suffice to illumine a page of the 
"Antecedents of the Crime," of which the "accuser," who claims 
to know the truth, has obviously had no knowledge. (A Slan- 
derer, pages 21, 22.) 

Evidence of the existence of the war-conspiracy is thus also 
discovered by the historian in the "Franco-Italian intrigue," 
as he chooses to designate the relations between France and 
her partners in the Entente towards Italy from 1902 down to 
the entrance of Italy into the war. I should here like to make 
it clear that I regard the attitude of Italy down to the declara- 
tion of neutrality as entirely correct and loyal, such an atti- 
tude as was demanded, not only by Italian interests, but also 
by political fidelity and honour — which for me are "no empty 
delusion." I have nothing to retract in the judgment which I 
have already passed in my book. On the other hand, I have 
no hesitation in condemning — as the most distinguished states- 
man of Italy, Giolitti, has condemned — the later action of the 
Ministry of Salandra during its negotiations with Austria and 
Germany, the higgling and bargaining on both sides, and the 



76 THE CRIME 

final resolution for war against her former allies. The cele- 
brated "parecchio" of the shrewd Piedmontese ("What Aus- 
tria offers us is, after all, something"), and the conclusion 
he drew from this that a bird in the hand is preferable to two 
in the bush, I still consider to-day — indeed, more than ever 
to-day, after two years of war between Italy and Austria — 
the shrewdest word that could be spoken, the shrewdest ad- 
vice that could be given to the Italian people. I am by no 
means certain that the King, the Government, and the people 
of Italy would not have been glad to-day if they had accepted 
the compensation offered in May, 191 5, for their neutrality, 
which they could then have gained without any sacrifice of 
wealth or life, but which they rejected on the ground of its 
insufficiency. Perhaps the moment is no longer far distant 
when the man who, like so many other true patriots in other 
countries, was reviled and branded as a traitor on the out- 
break of war, will return as the saviour of his country and 
will restore peace to Italy and to Europe also. 

However this may be, those who regard Italy's military 
accession to the Entente as a crime have in no way any right 
to raise such a charge. Italy's accession was a consequence 
of the European war, as was also the participation of other 
Powers, of Turkey, Bulgaria and Roumania. None of these 
declarations of participation in the war, on one side or the 
other, have anything to do with the origin of the war. They 
were occasioned by special national aspirations which made 
use of the European storm as a favourable opportunity to fish 
out of the general deluge the booty that had been so long de- 
sired. Had not the war been provoked by Germany and Aus- 
tria, these special crusades for plunder would have been im- 
possible. The great originators of the war have, therefore, 
no right to reproach for their behaviour the minor people who 
have endeavoured to turn it to their advantage. 



This I say to make clear my standpoint with regard to the 
action of Italy. But now to return to Schiemann and his meth- 
od of falsification. According to his account, Italy had al- 



THE PREVENTIVE WAR 77 

ready sold herself to France in 1902 and to Russia in 1909 
in Racconigi. As always happens, Schiemann maintains that 
he is fully informed of the Franco-Italian and the Russo- 
Italian agreements, which, of course, like everything else that 
Schiemann produces, were directed against Germany and 
Austria. Although he must himself admit that Italy's agree- 
ments with France were kept strictly secret, he finds the proof 
of Italy's accession to the conspiracy in the fact "that the 
troops sent to Tripoli were taken, not from the neutral Swiss 
or from the Austrian frontiers, but from the French frontier, 
which Italy entirely denuded of troops" (A Slanderer, page 

19). 

This, again, is a favourite trick of the juggler. When he 
desires to prove diplomatic agreements and his collection of 
snippets does not render him the necessary service in the 
matter, he advances military measures in evidence : for exam- 
ple, English naval manoeuvres in the North Sea or the Baltic, 
French Army manoeuvres on the eastern frontier, Russian 
manoeuvres on the western frontier. These are all supposed 
to prove bellicose intentions against Germany. As if the 
French could start manoeuvres towards the Atlantic Ocean, 
Russia towards Kamchatka, England towards Iceland! As 
if it were not the fact that Germany also had chosen to carry 
out her manoeuvres on the eastern or western frontiers to- 
wards Russia or France, but not towards Austria or Switzer- 
land! In many passages in his war-pamphlets Schiemann 
makes use of such references to manoeuvres in confirmation of 
warlike intentions, apparently with success so far as his 
credulous readers are concerned. At the conclusion of his 
Understanding-pamphlet, for example, we read : — 

The hypocrisy with which the intrigue was carried out is un- 
exampled. The palm is doubtless due to the friendly visit of the 
English squadron to Kiel under the leadership of Admiral Beatty. 
Two days after the murder of the Archduke it began its return 
journey through the Kaiser Wilhelm Canal, in order to join the 
concentrated forces of the entire English fleet, which was lying 
ready for battle before Spithead. 



78 THE CRIME 

Thus the return of the English squadron from Kiel on 
June 30th, 1 9 14, and its union with the rest of the fleet for 
the purpose of naval manoeuvres — an event which took place 
twenty-three days before the Austrian Ultimatum, which 
evoked the danger of a European war, was sent to Serbia — 
the return of the English vessels to their home-ports and the 
institution of naval manoeuvres on a large scale (not even on 
the North Sea or Baltic coasts of Germany, which elsewhere 
is represented as so incriminating a circumstance), this en- 
tirely inoffensive incident deserves, according to Schiemann, 
"the palm of hypocrisy," and forthwith attaches to the Eng- 
lish manoeuvre-fleet the suspicion that it was "lying ready for 
battle before Spithead"! 

The German patriot, Schiemann, does not appear to con- 
sider that his German readers are capable of realising what 
results must necessarily follow from this entirely idiotic sys- 
tem of transforming manoeuvre incidents into bellicose inten- 
tions. Every conclusion that he has anywhere or at any time 
deduced from the land or sea manoeuvres of the Entente 
Powers could be applied with the same logic to the Powers 
of the Triple Alliance. They also have manoeuvred every 
year on sea and on land; they also have, as a matter of course, 
manoeuvred only on the sides on which a possible war could 
take place. The tactical principles of German military science 
lay down that "the best defence is found in the attack," and 
in accordance with this doctrine the German manoeuvres were 
always offensive and not defensive; they always took place 
towards the east, the west or the north, and were thus directed 
towards the Entente Powers. On Schiemann' s logic this fact 
must furnish indisputable evidence to the Schiemanns of Eng- 
land, France, and Russia that Germany for forty-five years 
has devoted all her preparations to an offensive against the 
Entente Powers. But this in no way troubles the great mind 
of Schiemann, nor apparently his readers. In the general 
rise in prices in Germany, logic has clearly become an object 
which is beyond the reach of these people. 

It need occasion no surprise that in creating the Franco- 
Italian intrigue, for which no other evidence was available, 



THE PREVENTIVE WAR 79 

Italian military measures should be called to his assistance. 
Because Italy took her troops for Tripoli from the French 
frontier and not from the Swiss or the Austrian frontier, the 
conclusion of the Franco-Italian plot is, so far as Schiemann 
is concerned, proved for a date as far back as 191 1. There 
was no cause for apprehension from France — France had al- 
ready become the "secret ally" of Italy. From Austria, how- 
ever, everything was to be apprehended, although Italy was 
united with Austria in the Triple Alliance, and although the 
Treaty on which the Triple Alliance rested was renewed with- 
out modification in the following year, 191 2, even before its 
expiration. What, however, was there to apprehend from 
Switzerland. If the fact that troops were left on the frontier 
facing Austria was an indication of the dissension which al- 
ready existed between Austria and Italy, was the fact that 
troops were left on the Swiss frontier a sign of dissension 
or perhaps even of an aggressive conspiracy on the part of 
Italy and the Entente Powers against Switzerland? Ah, yes, 
the logic of it all ! You are a bitter enemy of the truth, Herr 
Schiemann. But you fight it without understanding and 
without logic, and you allow yourself to be caught only too 
often in your own snares. 

But there is something better to come: 

In the circles of the Triple Alliance the conclusion was rightly 
drawn (from the denudation of the Franco-Italian frontier) that 
the question now must be to gain Italy for an active co-operation 
with the enemies of Germany and Austria. (A Slanderer} 
page 19.) 

Thus the removal of troops from the French frontier, 
and exclusively from this frontier — which Schiemann asserts, 
without, however, producing a shadow of proof in support of 
his assertion, and which, even if true, may have happened for 
all sorts of strategical and not political reasons — this insig- 
nificant and unproved fact gave the Entente Powers the signal 
that poor Italy was now to be completely entangled, and 
drawn to their side against the Central Powers. Schiemann 



80 THE CRIME 

needs and makes use of this fact, in order to prove once more 
by reference to this example the diabolical preparations for 
war pursued by the Entente Powers throughout many years. 

In this arbitrarily devised inference he is nevertheless much 
inconvenienced by one fact, which, unfortunately, he cannot 
conjure out of the way, namely, the renewal of the Triple 
Alliance. What then does he do? He construes a further 
conspiracy, in which, "as it appears, Isvolsky had directly or 
indirectly a part" (without Isvolsky, Delcasse or Grey it is 
impossible to get along). As a result, the conspirators re- 
solved no longer to direct their efforts to Italy's withdrawal 
from the Triple Alliance; it was, on the contrary, considered 
preferable to continue as more advantageous "the existing 
relation in which Italy in fact paralysed the policy of the 
other side." Thus as far back as 1911-12, simultaneously 
with the formal renewal of the Triple Alliance, there was a 
kind of secret treaty between Italy and the Entente Powers, 
the effect of which was that Italy should only ostensibly re- 
main a member of the Triple Alliance, whereas, in fact, she 
should be subservient to the interests of the Entente Powers. 
Has there ever been such a falsification of history? Is it not 
a notorious fact that it was only under the protection and 
with the support of her partners in the Triple Alliance that 
Italy was able to carry out with success her campaign in 
Tripoli? Is it not well known that it was just the policy of 
England and of France, of whom the former was apprehen- 
sive for Egypt and the latter for Tunis, which put all kinds 
of difficulties in the way of the Italians in their Libyan cam- 
paign? We may recall the very serious disputes which broke 
out between France and Italy on account of certain naval inci- 
dents in the Mediterranean Sea, and which might have in- 
volved grave consequences had it not been for the support 
given by the Central Powers. We may recall the French oc- 
cupation of the hinterland of Tripoli, and the English claims 
on certain frontier territories between Egypt and Cyrenaica. 
It was exclusively the existing Triple Alliance that Italy had 
to thank for the success of her African campaign of plunder. 

Herr Schiemann suppresses everything that contradicts his 



THE PREVENTIVE WAR 81 

assertion of the existence since 1912 of a Franco-Italian con- 
spiracy, as well as of a general European conspiracy to make 
war against Germany and Austria. He is, for instance, en- 
tirely silent with regard to Giolitti's revelations, which con- 
stitute a decisive and essential part of my "Antecedents of 
the Crime." x In contradistinction to the snippets of the 
professor of history, these revelations however are docu- 
mentarily proved, both in their date and their text ; they have 
never at any time been disputed by Austria or Germany, and 
they prove beyond doubt that in the summer of 19 13 Austria 
had already planned an aggressive war against Serbia, which 
was then put into execution in the summer of 19 14. In con- 
nection with the point now under discussion (the secret agree- 
ment alleged to have existed for years between Italy and the 
Entente), Giolitti's revelations prove that such a secret agree- 
ment cannot possibly have existed : for had it existed, it could 
not have remained concealed from Austrian and German 
diplomacy until the summer of 1913, and before executing 
her aggressive intentions against Serbia, Austria would have 
taken care not to have asked Italy for her eventual support 
in any European war that might break out. That later, in 
the course of the present war at a given point in time, Italy 
began negotiations with the Entente Powers, and finally in- 
tervened on their side is another question, on which I have 
already expressed my opinion. That, however, is a step which 
was taken after the outbreak of the European War. On the 
other hand, Schiemann's construction of a conspiracy be- 
tween Italy and the Entente Powers existing long years be- 
fore the war (intended along with his other untenable proofs 
of guilt to confirm the bellicose intentions of the Triple En- 
tente) is entirely nebulous in its character, and is in contra- 
diction with all the firmly-established historical facts. 

On this occasion Schiemann is guilty of a pleasing lapsus. 
He accuses the Italian Government of that time (1911-12) 
of a "non plus ultra in perfidy," and this perfidy is to be found 
more particularly in the fact that the Italian diplomatists 
stood in the most confidential relations with their Entente 

1 See J'accuse, p. 121. 



82 THE CRIME 

friends, but that "simultaneously they allowed the Italian 
General Staff to consider military measures with ours to meet 
the event of a war." (A Slanderer, page 20.) Thus the 
Italian General Staff, and not merely the Austrian, in other 
words the whole Triple Alliance had down to 19 12, and 
therefore in all preceding years as well, considered military 
measures to meet the event of a war! What else did the 
English, the Russian and the French naval and military staffs 
do? Did they not also consider military measures to meet 
the event of a war? Why is it that what they contemplated 
was on their side an offensive war, whereas on the side of 
the Triple Alliance it was merely a defensive war? 

Thus Herr Schiemann disposes of his own argument. 
These are the "crushing proofs," with which he endeavours 
to slay the accuser. I should require to write volumes, if I 
desired to pursue in detail this ludicrous manner of demon- 
stration, resting on newspaper snippets, on arbitrary con- 
structions and insinuations, on the interpretation of similar 
incidents in one sense or another, according to the side from 
which they emanate. Schiemann's untenable and inconse- 
quent pamphlets of intrigue are unworthy of so great pains, 
Nevertheless, it is worth while to show clearly on one point 
the method adopted by these writers, in order to prove to the 
German people by what means and by what malice — for 
Schiemann himself does not believe a word of his accusa- 
tions — it has been deceived, incited, and no matter how the 
war ends, led to disaster. If in this place I consider in detail 
the machinations of Schiemann, what I say applies as em- 
phatically to the other professor of history, Herr Hans F. 
Helmolt, whose book, The Secret Antecedents of the World 
War, teems with as many perversions of the truth as the war- 
pamphlets of his colleague, Schiemann. The proof of this 
fact I must reserve for another occasion. The Esprit d'es- 
calier of the World's History x has ordered that Herr 
Helmolt should bring out a book under this title — a book 
which in its sub-title is described as a collection "of historical 
errors, perversions and inventions." The book is written by 

1 [Treppenwitz der Weltgeschichte.] 



THE PREVENTIVE WAR 83 

W. L. Hertslet, and in its eighth edition was prepared and 
edited by Herr Professor Helmolt. I may express the hope 
that the ninth edition may be considerably enlarged and en- 
riched by the perversions and inventions of Herr Helmolt 
and Herr Schiemann. 

Lies Have "Short Legs" 

It is throughout possible to determine how short are the 
legs with which Schiemann's lies are furnished. Ostensibly 
the war-conspiracy was hatched in the summer of 1908 in 
the roadstead at Reval. Nevertheless, Russia's climb-down 
in the crisis caused by the annexation of Bosnia took place in 
the spring of 1909; in the summer of 1909, as Schiemann 
himself relates, the Tsar and the Emperor William met, and 
the speeches which were then exchanged "permitted the in- 
ference that Russia would allow herself to become the ally 
neither of French revenge, nor of the English policy of panic." 
(A Slanderer, page 33.) 

Isvolsky is removed from his post as Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, and Sazonof appointed in his place (Autumn, 1910) ; 
English and Russian journalists point to the dangers of 
European tension and preach reconciliation ; from France po- 
litical friends of the professor write to him "that the public 
opinion of the country desires to maintain peace, and is re- 
solved not to act with England" (A Slanderer, page 35). 
The Emperor William, who stands in the best personal rela- 
tions to the new English King, George V., goes to London to 
the funeral of King Edward VII. ; the Tsar comes to Pots- 
dam accompanied by Sazonof. These are all facts which 
Schiemann himself relates in detail (A Slanderer, pages 34- 
36) ; but in so doing he completely forgets that a few pages 
previously he has given us a picture of the war-conspiracy, 
and a few pages later he again depicts it in his pages. In 
order to solve all these contradictions, mention is made of 
"contradictory political tendencies" in England, France and 
Russia, and, in passing, of the lack of independence of the 
rulers in relation to their bellicose Governments. In short, 



84 THE CRIME 

that he may be able to continue to spin the red thread of the 
war-conspiracy, the historical scribbler plays ducks and 
drakes with historical facts, and fits in everything to the 
needs of the theories which he is construing. 

The Negotiations for An Anglo^German Understand- 
ing in the Light of Schiemann's Historical 
Investigations. The Agadir Incident 

In the first half of 191 1 the Emperor William went to Lon- 
don to the unveiling of the memorial to Queen Victoria, 
and was enthusiastically received by the population. Shortly 
afterwards, the German Crown Prince attended the corona- 
tion of King George, and was also most sympathetically re- 
ceived. In the same period there took place between the two 
Governments the extremely important negotiations with a view 
to a political understanding and a simultaneous limitation of 
naval armaments, which I have already discussed in J'accuse 
(pages 99-114), and to which I will return in detail in a 
special chapter. 

These negotiations were also reflected in the meetings of 
Parliament in both countries. It may be sufficient to refer 
here to the meetings of the Reichstag of February 23rd and 
March 30th, 191 1, in which violent charges — and these not 
merely from the side of the opposition — were directed against 
the Chancellor, Herr von Bethmann, on account of the frigid 
attitude he had assumed towards the English proposals, and 
in a resolution couched in fairly sharp terms a request was 
directed to the Government to enter into negotiations with 
other Powers on the subject of a simultaneous and propor- 
tional limitation of armaments. I would also refer in this 
place to Grey's memorable speech of March 13th, 191 1, in 
which he described the level of the English naval estimates 
of that time as the "high-water mark," and prophesied the 
breakdown of civilisation, if some way were not found of 
restricting the increase of expenditure on armaments, and of 
arriving at an agreement with Germany. Grey's words and 
proposals of peace should be compared with the answer of 



THE PREVENTIVE WAR 85 

the Chancellor, von Bethmann Hollweg, in the meeting 1 of 
the Reichstag of March 30th, 191 1, which merely repeated 
the wretched hackneyed argument on the other side, that it 
would be impossible to be sure that the other side was not 
secretly exceeding the agreed limits (although, as everyone 
knows, not a gaiter-button on the other side can be concealed 
from the wonderfully organised system of espionage of all 
countries, Germany being the most efficient) and that there- 
fore the question of general disarmament "was insoluble so 
long as men are men and States are States." And in this 
argument the Chancellor, acting on the traditional policy of 
the Prussian opponents of every agreement as to armaments, 
produced in conscious perversion the bogey of general dis- 
armament, although in reality in the English proposals of 
that time, and in all similar proposals, the question was in no 
way one of general disarmament, but in the first place of a 
suspension only of armaments on the basis of the status quo, 
and it was only as a possibility that a later proportional re- 
duction of armaments was contemplated. 

As I have said, I propose to enter more fully into this 
question in a special chapter devoted to the Anglo-German 
negotiations. For the moment, in settling accounts with the 
German Deroulede my only purpose is to place in the pillory 
his tactics of suppression and falsification as exemplified on 
this point also. Schiemann has not a word to say of all these 
epoch-making negotiations between the Governments in the 
first half of 191 1, of their reaction on the parliamentary ne- 
gotiations, of Grey's peace-utterances, and of their frigid re- 
jection by the Chancellor. Of Haldane's mission he speaks 
only in passing. For the better instruction of the accuser 
he refers to his Understanding-pamphlet Even in this 
pamphlet, however (pages 22-23), I seek in vain for any- 
thing bearing on the important events of 191 1. It is true 
that Schiemann mentions Asquith's speech of July, 19 10, 
and also the answer which Bethmann gave in December, 
1910, although, of course, he is careful not to refer in closer 
detail to the contents, which implicate the German Govern- 
ment while exculpating that of England. He makes no men- 



86 THE CRIME 

tion whatever of the speeches and negotiations of the first 
half of 191 1, down to the occurrence of the Agadir incident; 
he suppresses also the Crown Prince's visit (although other- 
wise he attaches enormous importance to the visits of 
Princes) and instead of dwelling on this, he adds to his ac- 
count of the Emperor's visit an observation, which it is 
impossible to verify, in the following words: 

Immediately after his (the Emperor's) departure, the cam- 
paign was again renewed, and even while the Emperor William 
was in London, Grey had already stated to Metternich, our 
Ambassador, that the agreements concluded between England and 
France imposed on England the duty of supporting France even 
if they should remain in Fez for a lengthy period; this could 
only be understood as signifying that England had promised the 
French the right of gradually annexing Morocco, and that she 
was resolved to support them in the process by force of arms. 
(A Slanderer, page 41.) 

Since Schiemann omits to quote his authority, I am un- 
able to determine whether Grey made these observations to 
Metternich, and if so in what form. Having regard to the 
complete incredibility of this student of history I do not hesi- 
tate to tell him to his face that a statement by Grey in the 
sense that England promised the French the right to annex 
Morocco and that she would support her in this matter by 
force of arms, was not and cannot have been made. Pro- 
duce your evidence, Herr Schiemann. Without evidence I 
believe nothing you say. Your own statement that the Eng- 
lish Government had declined to concur in the suggestion of 
an Anglo-French naval demonstration against the dispatch 
of the Panther, above all the fact that the English efforts to 
reach agreement were crowned with success, prove that so 
prudent a diplomatist as Grey cannot possibly have given 
expression to such a brutal threat of war, especially while 
the Emperor was still in London. You invented it, Herr 
Professor, like nearly all your other similar stories, in order 
to reveal in that incident, which promoted and promised 



THE PREVENTIVE WAR 87 

peace, the cloven hoof of the war-conspiracy you yourself 
imagined. 

The further observations which Schiemann links to his 
account of the Emperor's visit and to the dispatch of the 
Panther are extraordinarily characteristic of his method: 

Our general staff received from their agents information which 
indicated the gravity of the situation. They pointed to the inten- 
tion of England to occupy Belgium or Copenhagen in the event 
of a war. Thus our military attache in Berne on absolutely 
trustworthy information intimated that the landing of English 
troops in Belgium had been directly imminent in the course of 
the summer. It was also an extremely suspicious fact that the 
tours of the French General Staff at that time and the manoeuvres 
of the third, fourth and fifth cavalry divisions took place exclu- 
sively on the Belgian frontier. (A Slanderer, page 42.) 

Thus: 

( 1 ) The agents of our General Staff pointed to England's 
intention to occupy Belgium or Copenhagen. Our military 
attache in Berne — Berne of all places! presumably because of 
its geographical proximity to Brussels and Copenhagen — 
was quite sure of this. A remarkable state of affairs! Why 
was it that English troops only appeared in Belgium eigh- 
teen days after the German invasion of August 4th, 1914, 1 
although the Belgian Government had asked for military 
assistance on August 5th, and Belgium had, as is well known, 
"sold herself to England many years ago"? Further, why 
was it that the English in the summer of 1914 did not oc- 
cupy Copenhagen, which in the summer of 191 1 they had 
firmly intended to occupy? From the Understanding- 
pamphlet (page 24) we learn where Herr Schiemann and 
the German General Staff got this terrifying information 
with regard to England's intentions: 

It has not become publicly known, but it has been determined 
on reliable authority that at that time the English naval attache 

1 Waxweiler, page 191. 



88 THE CRIME 

in Rome indicated that in the event of the war which he expected, 
England would be compelled to occupy Belgium ot Copenhagen. 
This would certainly be a brutal action, but it would be demanded 
by historical precedent as well as by the circumstances of the 
case. 

We thus have the whole intrigue before us. The English 
naval attache in Rome (this is in Schiemann's view "deter- 
mined on reliable authority") indicates that England would 
be compelled to occupy Belgium or Copenhagen. This stra- 
tegical idea, the peculiar property of the English naval at- 
tache in Rome, is communicated to the German military 
attache in Berne, and by him conveyed to the German Gen- 
eral Staff. On the way from Rome to Berlin via Berne, the 
strategical opinions of the English naval attache are trans- 
formed into a firm intention on the part of the English Gov- 
ernment and into the immediate imminence of the predatory 
act in question. It is thus that history is made by Herr 
Schiemann ! 

(2) The tours of the French General Staff and the ma- 
noeuvres on the Belgian frontier constituted, according to 
Schiemann, "an extremely suspicious fact." I have already 
asked : Where, then, were the French to manoeuvre, in order 
not to strike Herr Schiemann as suspicious? Towards the 
Pyrenees, perhaps, or the Atlantic Ocean?' If Herr Schie- 
mann were to be satisfied they would not even have been al- 
lowed to manoeuvre towards the Italian frontier, for in that 
case he would at once have exclaimed : "Aha ! another proof 
of the Franco-Italian intrigue; the French are manoeuvring 
on the Italian frontier in secret agreement with Italy, in order 
to make it appear as if they considered it possible for a war 
to arise with the partner in the Triple Alliance; whereas in 
reality they are all tarred with the same brush." Once more, 
then, what manoeuvres would really appear to you to be un- 
suspicious, Herr Schiemann? Clearly, only the Prussian 
manoeuvres when directed towards Russia and France, and 
the Austrian when they took place on the Galician frontier. 
Here again we have the same picture of the student of his- 



THE PREVENTIVE WAR 89 

tory, as we find him in his book, before whom the accuser 
with his "unscientific method" must stand uncovered. The 
man omits the most important negotiations between Parlia- 
ments and Governments, and instead of these he carries on 
his operations by means of tours of the General Staff, ma- 
noeuvres and reports from a military attache at Berne — all 
matters, be it observed, which are not merely insignificant 
but also unproved. 



Schiemann achieves a further preposterous falsification in 
his account of English sentiment after the settlement of the 
Moroccan conflict. In conscious contravention of the truth 
he construes a divergency between the tendencies of a section 
of Liberal public opinion in England and Asquith's Cabinet. 
This divergency is sheer imagination. All the members of 
Asquith's Cabinet stood, not in opposition to, but at the head 
of the movement for an understanding, which arose directly 
out of the dangerous Agadir conflict. The initiation of the 
campaign for an understanding is to be found in Grey's 
speech delivered in Parliament on November 27th, 191 1, of 
which mention has already been made. The same honour- 
able fundamental note of a sincere desire to improve the rela- 
tions with Germany, and in this way to secure a rapproche- 
ment between the two groups of European Powers, runs 
through all the speeches and actions of the English Ministers 
at this time. It would take us too far to consider all these 
utterances here. I challenge the professor of history to point 
out a single utterance of Asquith, Haldane, Churchill, or 
Lloyd George, or of the other members of the English Cab- 
inet in which they occupied a position which is inconsistent 
with the Liberal Press notices quoted by Schiemann himself, 
or in which they preached anything else than an understand- 
ing and a reconciliation with Germany. Grey's speech of 
November 27th, 191 1, which has been mentioned on several 
occasions, is perverted by Schiemann, as I have already 
pointed out, into its direct contrary, both in its meaning and 
in its tendency (see Cook, page 29, J 'accuse, pages 106, 107). 



90 THE CRIME 

The speech is, in fact, the initiation of the resumption of the 
Anglo-German negotiations for an understanding which had 
been interrupted by the Agadir conflict. Grey expressly em- 
phasised the fact that the Franco-German settlement "cleaned 
the slate" with regard to Anglo-German relations as well. 

Even Schiemann cannot avoid producing from his register 
of snippets significant English Press extracts in favour of 
an Anglo-German understanding. Further, he cannot con- 
ceal the fact that a real military convention between France 
and England did not exist, but that there was rather another 
condition of affairs which he depicts as follows: 

On every occasion when a war appeared to be more or less 
threatening, the two Governments consulted together, and prom- 
ised to afford each other mutual military support for a definite pe- 
riod of time. This was the case in the course of the summer of 
1905, as well as at the time of the incident of Casablanca. In the 
course of this year, however, the Entente Cordiale had become 
so flexible an instrument, that whenever the circumstances ap- 
peared to demand it, a military agreement was orally concluded 
to remain in force for the duration of the crisis, and this led to 
the exchange of very precise views as to how the military forces 
of the two nations were to be used. (A Slanderer, page 45.) 

Here again the Professor gives himself away by involun- 
tarily revealing the character of the Entente as a defensive 
and not as an offensive union. Military agreements which 
were concluded only from case to case, when a war more or 
less "threatened," or "whenever the circumstances appeared 
to demand it," and then were only orally determined "for 
the duration of the crisis," cannot possibly have been agree- 
ments for an offensive war and for a military attack. The 
words used by Schiemann himself, "when a war appeared to 
be threatening," etc., clearly indicate that on all the occa- 
sions cited by him (1905, 1909, 191 1) war was not intended 
by the Entente Powers, but was merely dreaded by them — a 
state of affairs which is diametrically opposed to an inten- 
tional provocation of war — and that their agreements were 
designed for defence, and not for aggression. So here again, 



THE PREVENTIVE WAR 91 

as everywhere, lies have short legs because the liars have 
short memories. 



I shall speak elsewhere of Haldane's mission of February, 
1 91 2 — the immediate consequence of the approximation of 
the English and German Governments to each other. Here 
it is sufficient to point out Schiemann's perfidious insinua- 
tion, which is in agreement with his whole general system, 
that this mission also was not sincerely intended, but was 
merely designed "to pacify the sentiment in England, which 
continued to press more loudly for an understanding with 
Germany" {How England, etc., page 24), or as we find it 
expressed in the Slanderer, page 47, "ostensibly to pave the 
way to an understanding, in reality to reconnoitre and pro- 
cure new arguments for the policy of the Cabinet which was 
already firmly established." It is always the same old song. 
The English Ministers may do what they like; they may 
make pacific speeches in Parliament — their speeches are sup- 
pressed or falsified; they may travel to Berlin to negotiate an 
understanding — deceitful and dishonest motives are ascribed 
to their journeys; they may make positive proposals for a 
political understanding and a restriction of armaments — 
these proposals are ascribed to the evil arriere pensee, that 
they are designed merely to lull Germany to sleep and to 
weaken her from a military point of view, in order that stupid 
Michel might be attacked with the greater security later on. 

To the account of the failure of Haldane's mission and of 
Haldane's report (distorted by Schiemann), to which I re- 
turn later, there is at once added the lying sentence, intended 
to obliterate in the credulous reader the impression of Eng- 
land's efforts for peace: 

It was a policy of war, and the task was to promote every- 
thing that could be required by the three conspiring Powers 
against Germany at the moment of the contemplated conflict. 
That the breach was not provoked earlier was due to considera- 
tion for Russia, which was backward with her preparations for 
war and could appeal to the fact that a further period of time 



92 THE CRIME 

had been granted to her in the negotiations of Reval. (A 
Slanderer, page 48.) 



In the further description of Anglo-German relations the 
system of falsification is gaily continued. Churchill's well- 
known proposals for a naval holiday, which were twice made 
by the English Minister (in 1912 and 191 3) are quoted by 
the man of the scientific method of investigation, the de- 
fender of the truth, who has the audacity to accuse others of 
conscious slander. He refers to these proposals in the fol- 
lowing sentence (A Slanderer, page 48) : "Immediately 
after Haldane's return Churchill delivered his notorious 
speech, in which he declared that the German fleet was a 
luxury but the English fleet a necessity." Here again Schie- 
mann's jugglery consists in selecting from Churchill's speech, 
though it is true he gives it in a falsified form, an idea which, 
in fact, occurred in many English ministerial speeches, and 
which was entirely justified, 1 yet he nevertheless entirely 
suppresses the essential substance of Churchill's statements. 
Certainly no one can dispute the justice of the idea expressed 
by English statesmen, that for England with her then insig- 
nificant land force, her insular position, and world-wide co- 
lonial possessions, the navy had a very different importance 
from what it had for Germany, which, after all, is primarily 
a Continental State, with relatively insignificant colonial pos- 
sessions, and with land forces exceeding that of all other 
countries in efficiency and striking power. This was exclu- 
sively the idea to which English statesmen gave frequent 
expression, not with the object of hindering Germany in the 
development of her fleet, but of explaining their point of 
view, that England must always adhere to the principle that 
her naval forces should maintain a certain proportional su- 
periority over those of Germany. The falsifier of history 
tears this correct idea from Churchill's speech in a garbled 
form, and he suppresses the sagacious and weighty proposals 

1 See also Grey's speech in Parliament, March 29th, 1909. Cook, page 8. 



THE PREVENTIVE WAR 93 

of the English First Lord for the introduction of a naval 
holiday between the two countries. 

Anyone who reads the more detailed accounts of Church- 
ill's proposal contained in Cook (page 33) and in my 
book, and compares with these the three lines which the 
Slanderer gives to Churchill's speech, will be able to form 
some idea of the love of truth which inspires this journalistic 
leader of the "true Prussian people." I have carefully ex- 
amined both his pamphlets, and only once in an enumeration 
of all the English "specious manoeuvres" of recent years 
have I found any indication of the naval holiday, and that is 
contained in a single word without any more detailed ac- 
count of what it involved {A Slanderer, page 65). While he 
thus suppresses the essential contents of Churchill's state- 
ments, in the same passage as that in which he is guilty of 
this suppression he does not fail to quote as symptomatic of 
opinion in England English Opposition papers which write 
against the policy of bringing about an understanding pur- 
sued by the Liberal Government, and at the same time he 
quotes the epoch-making fact that Englishmen and French- 
men took part in the Sokol celebration in Prague, "of which 
the anti-German character was then so clearly manifested" 
{A Slanderer, page 48). Over this historical hotch-potch 
some sauce is then poured from the Temps, and from a mili- 
taristic speech by Lord Roberts ; the presence of Russian offi- 
cers and later of the Grand Duke Nicolai Nicolaievitch in 
France is emphasised, an indiscretion of Gil Bias is added, 
Poincare's tour to Petrograd and the conspiracy in the Bal- 
kans are denounced, extracts from Novoye Vremya are in- 
troduced, the London peace negotiations and finally the Peace 
of Bucharest are mentioned, more or less in passing, and in 
the end there is given to this medley of suppression, falsifi- 
cation and suppression the title: "The great conspiracy of 
the Entente Powers directed against Austria-Hungary" {A 
Slanderer, page 54). 

It is difficult, and indeed impossible without the quotation 
of whole pages, to give the reader a faithful picture of Schie- 
mann's poisonous mixture. The reader, overcoming his 



94 THE CRIME 

natural repugnance, should peruse pages 48-54 of the Slan- 
derer in order to gain enlightenment as to the author and 
his methods. Lord Roberts, for example, who is well known 
to have been the most zealous protagonist of universal serv- 
ice in England, and who in his other views, which were 
purely militarist in character, showed much similarity to our 
Bernhardi, is quoted in the same breath as Churchill, Hal- 
dane and the other Liberal Ministers. And in doing so, the 
fact is intentionally overlooked that our Bernhardi, whom 
it is true many would now like to disown, gave classical ex- 
pression to the views and the endeavours of our imperialists, 
militarists, Pan-Germans and Junkers, that is to say, of 
those who were in fact the dominant classes who controlled 
the Government, whereas Lord Roberts with his militaristic 
aims stood in sharp opposition to the views and the actions 
of the Liberal English Cabinet. The authoritative Liberal 
paper, The Nation, called the ideas of Lord Roberts a code 
of "morals fitter for a wolf -pack than for a society of Chris- 
tian men." * It was such wolfish morality that directed Ger- 
man policy, but in England it was void of significance, nor 
had it any influence on public opinion, not to speak of the 
actions of the English Government. It was not until the war 
had lasted for more than a year that universal compulsory 
service, which had for years been demanded by Roberts, was 
introduced into England under the pressure of military 
necessity. 

Confession of a Preventive War and Other 
"Discrepancies" 

"The brave books of Bernhardi, rightly foreseeing 
how things were being prepared, pointed to the necessity 
of seizing the sword before the conspiracy which threat- 
ened Germany proceeded to action. To-day scarcely 
anyone will deny that Bernhardi rightly saw and recog- 
nised the position of affairs" {A Slanderer, pages 6 
and 7). 

[The Nation, October 26th, 1912.] 



THE PREVENTIVE WAR 95 

In these words Herr Schiemann defends the Roberts-Bern- 
hardi code of wolfish morality, which he condemns for Eng- 
land, as a right and a necessity for Germany. This is a 
grateful confession, which involves the clear recognition of 
the fact that we are not waging a war of defence, but a pre- 
ventive war. So here again Herr Schiemann has let him- 
self in. 

He does so, in fact, at every stage. Immediately after the 
great conspiracy which for him shines out from the Balkan 
occurrences, he tells of Poincare's election as President and 
of Delcasse's appointment as Ambassador at Petrograd (be- 
ginning of 1913) : "His (Delcasse's) task was to transform 
the Franco-Russian defensive alliance into a defensive and 
offensive alliance" (A Slanderer, page 54). So that up till 
then it was only a defensive alliance! I had thought that 
ever since the Entente of 1904 between England and France, 
ever since the Anglo-Russian Entente of 1907, and more par- 
ticularly since the meeting in Reval in 1908, the war of the 
Triple Entente against the Triple Alliance was a settled 
affair. And now suddenly, in 191 3, the offensive alliance is 
not even yet concluded, but is only in course of preparation 
as a result of Delcasse's endeavours in Petrograd! Here 
again I would ask the professor for a friendly explanation 
of a contradiction which cannot be reconciled by my limited 
intelligence. 

There then follows an account of alleged French and 
Russian intriguing manoeuvres supported by a copious sup- 
ply of newspaper extracts. The Slav banquets and the ex- 
change of telegrams with the Tsar in the winter of 191 3, 
reports from the Temps and from Russian papers which are 
not even mentioned by name (where does the snippet on page 
56 come from?) are all represented as indications of bellicose 
sentiment. The essential point, however, is again ignored 
that at the London Conference of Ambassadors Russia, 
France and England gave way to all the Austrian demands 
without exception, that they politely turned the Montenegrins 
out of Skutari, which they had purchased with streams of 



96 THE CRIME 

blood, that they pushed the Serbians back from the Adriatic 
coast, that they interposed what purported to be the princi- 
pality of Albania in the way of Serbian efforts to expand, 
and did not even allow the Serbians their celebrated window 
on the Adriatic. In short, the Entente Powers accorded an 
unconditional victory along the whole diplomatic line to the 
insatiability of Austria, who in certain questions acted in 
agreement with Italy, her partner in the Triple Alliance. 
The professor of history suppresses all the facts which are 
essential and decisive and confines himself to subsidiary 
points, to banquets, to telegraphic correspondence (in our 
case also correspondence between Pan-Germans and reigning 
personalities might be voluminously quoted) and thus he 
perverts historical truth into its opposite. 

A masterpiece of creative and inventive talent is achieved 
by Herr Schiemann in his narrative of the ministerial coun- 
cil, which the Tsar summoned to his Winter Palace at the 
beginning of March, 19 13, in order, as Schiemann maintains, 
to decide on the question of war or peace. The Tsar himself 
is supposed to have communicated the result of the delibera- 
tions to the gentlemen in his immediate entourage in the fol- 
lowing words: "We shall have no war. Suchomlinof, Sazo- 
nof and Kokofzef say that we require from five to six years 
in order to get ready" (page 56). I ask Herr Schiemann 
how he knows so exactly the words which the Tsar spoke to 
those who were in his immediate presence? How does he 
know, and how can he prove, that the Tsar indicated that the 
Russian army would in from five to six years be in a state of 
preparedness, in the sense which the historian ascribes to 
him, namely, that in five to six years the aggressive war 
against Austria and Germany was to begin? 

I take the liberty of asserting that this narrative of Schie- 
mann's is a pure invention. As he quotes no authorities, and 
mentions as witnesses only those who were in the immediate 
presence of the Tsar, I await his proofs. What is a fact is 
the compliant disposition shown by Russia in every question 
without exception which occupied the attention of the Lon- 



THE PREVENTIVE WAR 97 

don Conference of Ambassadors. It is further a fact — and 
this also is not denied by Schiemann — that after the settle- 
ment of the questions dealt with at the Conference the ten- 
sion between Austria and Russia disappeared and an under- 
standing as to demobilisation was arrived at between them. 
Finally, it is a fact that it was Austria, and not Russia, who 
refused to be satisfied with the results of the peace of Bu- 
charest and in the summer of 191 3 (see Giolitti's revela- 
tions) contemplated an attack upon Serbia, which had now 
become too strong for her plans. The historian seeks to get 
rid of these decisive facts, of which only the second is men- 
tioned, by inventing the words used by the Tsar regarding 
the aggressive war intended for a later date. How long will 
the German people continue to give ear to such perverters 
of the truth and to follow their words? 

It is clear that Herr Schiemann must fall into difficulties 
at every step when he seeks to bring his inventions into har- 
mony with historically established facts which he is not al- 
ways in a position to suppress. He then gets out of the diffi- 
culty by the evasion that the undeniable fact in question is 
"especially surprising," "very remarkable," etc. The exist- 
ence of this element of surprise and remarkability depends 
entirely on Schiemann's inventions being true. Then, indeed, 
there would be a hitch. But if they are unmasked as inven- 
tions, the occurrences in question appear at once as entirely 
logical and reasonable, and are seen to be in complete har- 
mony with the other facts. Herr Schiemann, for example, 
is inordinately surprised by the fact (for which he can find 
no explanation) that in the autumn of 191 3 Russia acqui- 
esced in Serbia yielding to an Austrian Ultimatum on the 
occasion of a grave new Austro-Serbian crisis which arose 
on account of Albania. To anyone who truthfully gives an 
account of Russia's attitude during the Bosnian crisis of 
1908-9 and during the Balkan crisis of 1912-13 there is 
nothing surprising in Russia's compliant attitude in the au- 
tumn of 1913. The fact is that Russia always gave way to 
the Austrian demands, and moved Serbia to compliance. 



98 THE CRIME 

The furthest point to which Russia went in this direction is 
to be found in the Austro-Serbian conflict of July, 19 14, 
when she induced the Serbian people, who were akin to her, 
to submit to a complete diplomatic subjection to the out- 
rageous and unprecedented demands of Austrian pride. For 
Herr Schiemann, the inventor and the upholder of the Anglo- 
Franco-Russian conspiracy, all this is bound to be "remark- 
able" and "surprising." But to us who know Russia's love 
of peace and compliant disposition in all conflicts with Aus- 
tria there is nothing in this which is in any way surprising; 
it is but the simple continuation of what had throughout been 
the attitude of the Russian rulers and of their Government 
towards the maintenance of European peace. 

Special importance is attached by Schiemann to a visit to 
Paris made by King George in April, 19 14, accompanied 
by Grey. In order to show the importance of this visit, he 
quotes extensively the unsigned reports of German agents in 
foreign capitals, which are contained in the second German 
White Book, "Documents relating to the Outbreak of War" 
(pages 49-57). If the apologists of the German Govern- 
ment frequently deny the credibility of official papers pub- 
lished by the Entente Powers in their collections of docu- 
ments, even when these papers are signed and confirmed by 
the complete connection existing between the diplomatic oc- 
currences and the publications, we may well be allowed to 
add a large mark of interrogation to the anonymous reports 
which the second German White Book ventures to describe 
as "Official documents relating to the Outbreak of War," 
of which, however, we neither know the author nor the place 
of origin. From what shady sources these unconfirmed re- 
ports spring may be seen from No. X (White Book, page 
56), where we are furnished with a copy of a letter, dated 
from Petrograd on July 12/2 5th, 19 14, and addressed by his 
adjutant to a Russian Grand Duke who was at the time 
abroad. The letter "proves in my humble way of thinking" 
■ — so the agent who transmits it observes in his covering 
letter — "that since the 24th of the month war has been re- 



THE PREVENTIVE WAR 99 

solved on in Russia." How can the German agent have 
obtained the copy of such a private letter? What can have 
been the "confidential method" of which he made use for 
this purpose? For the rest these "official documents" fur- 
nish not the slightest proof for the assertion which Schie- 
mann extracts from them "that the war against Germany- 
had been resolved on in principle since 1909, and that since 
that time it was merely a question of seeking the opportunity 
of conducting it with the greatest possibility of an assured 
prospect of success" (A Slanderer, page 64). 

Correspondence Between Grey and Cambon, 
November, 1912 

The "agreement" between England and France — if the 
correspondence of November 22nd and 23rd, 1912, between 
Grey and Paul Cambon (Blue Book, No. 105; Enclosures 
1 and 2) can indeed be called an agreement — bore, as Schie- 
mann himself is forced to admit, a conditional character 
"pour sauver la face." In reality it was neither an agree- 
ment, nor did it- bear a conditional character, but on the con- 
trary made it quite clear that each of the two Governments, 
notwithstanding the consultations which had taken place be- 
tween naval and military experts, should retain full free- 
dom to decide whether they would or would not afford mili- 
tary support to the other in the event of a future war. 
("That such consultation does not restrict the freedom of 
either Government to decide at any future time whether or 
not to assist the other by armed force. We have agreed that 
consultation between experts is not, and ought not to be re- 
garded as, an engagement that commits either Government 
to action in a contingency that has not arisen and may never 
arise. The disposition, for instance, of the French and Brit- 
ish fleets respectively at the present moment is not based 
upon an engagement to co-operate in war.") 

Even in the event of an unprovoked attack on France or 
England by a third Power, that is to say, in the event of a 
purely defensive war, the other Power was to be under no 



100 THE CRIME 

obligation to give military assistance, but "it should immedi- 
ately discuss with the other whether both Governments 
should act together to prevent aggression and to preserve 
peace, and, if so, what measures they would be prepared to 
take in common. If these measures involved action, the plans 
of the General Staffs would at once be taken into considera- 
tion, and the Governments would then decide what effect 
should be given to them." 

Anyone who desires to form an independent view of these 
Anglo-French negotiations, which in the discussions of the 
defenders of the German Government play a much greater 
part than they really deserve, is recommended to read care- 
fully the correspondence between Grey and Paul Cambon 
(Blue Book, No. 105; Enclosures 1 and 2). He who under- 
takes the slight trouble involved in so doing will at once rec- 
ognise that all the conclusions drawn from these documents 
by our German Governmental Press are entirely void of sub- 
stance, and that in reality these documents do not impose on 
one Power or on the other the slightest obligation to afford 
military support. The external form of the correspondence 
— Grey writes, "My dear Ambassador," and Cambon an- 
swers, "Cher Sir Edward" * — is in itself an indication that 
we are here concerned, not with treaties between States, but 
with a written confirmation of oral conversations, which it 
was desired to protect against misunderstandings or possible 
perversions in malicious quarters. Of course if all the ut- 
terances of the Entente diplomatists are represented as de- 
liberate deception "pour sauver la face," as is systematically 
done by our "historians," and if some other concealed inten- 
tion is sought behind every word, then here again it would 
be possible, as is, in fact, done by Helfferich, Schiemann, and 
their friends in the case of the letters exchanged in Novem- 
ber, to describe the written confirmation of oral conversa- 
tions as a specious manoeuvre, and to seek behind the ap- 
pearance a reality for which no evidence whatever exists. 

1 It is significant that the intimate form of address thus adopted by 
Cambon is omitted in the German White Book (page 51), whereas it is 
included in the second enclosure to No. 105 of the Blue Book. 



THE PREVENTIVE WAR 101 

Anyone who reads the words which Schiemann adds in men- 
tioning the "agreement" of November, 19 12, according to 
which "England, bound hand and foot, was, in fact, in a 
state of dependence on the decisions which it might please 
Russia or France to take" (page 64) and compares with 
this statement the strict emphasis which Grey laid on the fact 
that each Government was to reserve full freedom in arriv- 
ing at a decision in the event of an unprovoked attack, will 
be able to appreciate the degree of brazen perversion to which 
these Prussian historians have advanced. 

Moreover, not merely the frank manner in which the Eng- 
lish Government made public the letters exchanged in No- 
vember, 1912 (in the Blue Book and in Grey's speech of 
August 3rd, 19 14), but also the actual behaviour of England 
after the outbreak of war between Germany and Russia and 
between Germany and France, proves that England was nei- 
ther bound to France or Russia by her hands or her feet, nor 
even by her little finger, but rather that she remained com- 
plete mistress of her own decisions. If the letters in ques- 
tion had in fact constituted an obligation resting upon Eng- 
land to make war, which had been in existence for two years, 
the English Government would not have printed them in the 
Blue Book, and laid them before a public session of Parlia- 
ment. Had England been bound to France since the end of 
1912, it would be impossible to explain the conditional and 
restricted promise of naval support which Grey gave on 
August 2nd, 191 4, and the feeling of satisfaction evoked in 
France in consequence. The promise of August 2nd, when 
contrasted with the agreement of November, 19 12, would 
have been a diminution, and France ought in consequence to 
have been indignant instead of being satisfied and grateful. 
Had the letters exchanged in 191 2 bound England hand and 
foot to make war, England would not have been in a position 
to send to Germany on the evening of August 4th, an Ulti- 
matum which demanded exclusively the non-violation of Bel- 
gian neutrality, and thus in the event of compliance with this 
demand desisted from participation in the war. Had Eng- 
land been bound hand and foot for two years, she would in 



102 THE CRIME 

any case have been obliged, with or without the violation of 
Belgian neutrality, to intervene as the ally of France when 
war broke out on the previous day between France and Ger- 
many. 

Thus the text of the letters, the circumstances of their pub- 
lication, and the actual behaviour of England prove beyond 
dispute that the documents of November, 1912, are to be 
understood in the sense in which they were written, that they 
represent, not an external show, but the substance itself, 
and that this substance is something entirely negative, the 
exclusion of any obligation to give assistance in a war. 

Further, the manner in which Paul Cambon in his con- 
versation with Grey on July 30th, 191 4 (Blue Book, No. 
105), referred to the correspondence of 191 2 confirms the 
absolutely unbinding character of this correspondence. Cam- 
bon reminded the English Secretary of State of the letters 
exchanged, but expressly added that he did not wish to ask 
Grey to say directly that England would intervene, but he 
would like to hear from Grey what England would do if cer- 
tain circumstances arose, "the particular hypothesis he had 
in mind was an aggression by Germany on France." Grey 
declined to enter into the questions raised by Cambon, and 
referred him to the meeting of the Cabinet next day. I have 
already shown elsewhere in detail that the result of the 
meeting of the Cabinet was a strict refusal to give any un- 
dertaking to intervene in any war that might arise (Blue 
Book, Nos. 106 and 119). Would it have been possible for 
the English Cabinet to assume this attitude if the corre- 
spondence of 1912 had constituted an obligation binding 
England hand and foot, a state of dependence on France and 
Russia, as Schiemann endeavours to delude his readers into 
believing? 

At every stage we are presented with the same picture : the 
concealed intentions ascribed to the English Government are 
in contradiction with all the documentarily proved facts. On 
the other hand, if the actions and the statements of England, 
as of her partners in the Entente, are taken as what they pur- 



THE PREVENTIVE WAR 103 

port to be, as the honourable expression of their real inten- 
tions, they are found to be in complete agreement with all the 
proved facts and to form a complete chain of evidence — a 
fact which no doubt is highly inconvenient to our German 
historians. When Grey stated in Parliament on June nth, 
191 4, as Asquith had done a year previously, that "there 
were no unpublished agreements which would restrict or 
hamper the freedom of the Government or of Parliament to 
decide whether or not Great Britain should participate in a 
war," he was not, as Schiemann suggests, guilty of a Mac- 
chiavellian statement intended to conceal the truth; on the 
contrary, he represented in the most correct manner the 
true situation of affairs. The naval discussions with Russia, 
the authenticity of which I am neither in a position to dispute 
nor to admit, could not possibly have a more extensive char- 
acter than the discussions between English and French mili- 
tary officers initiated some years before. The significance 
or the latter, or rather their complete lack of significance in 
the sense of an alliance for war, may be seen in the corre- 
spondence of November, 1912. If similar discussions be- 
tween English and Russian naval experts were proposed, or 
if they had already been initiated, the only purpose to which 
they could be directed would be that of technical consulta- 
tions to meet the contingency of a war; they could in no way 
constitute the basis of an obligation resting on England to 
participate in war. When Grey denied not only the exist- 
ence of any agreement as to an alliance, but also the fact 
that any such negotiations were in progress and finally -even 
the likelihood that any such negotiations would ever be en- 
tered upon, I do not know how he could have expressed him- 
self more comprehensively or more precisely. The German 
Government itself in its Documents relating to the Outbreak 
of War (pages 53, 54) cannot avoid quoting expressions 
from English papers and politicians which define the mean- 
ing of Grey's speech in the following sense : "England is not 
in the leading-strings of any other country. She is not the 
vassal of Russia, nor the ally of France, and she is not the 
enemy of Germany." Someone in intimate relations with 



104 THE CRIME 

Grey — so reports the second German White Book — had most 
definitely given the assurance: 

that no agreements of a military or naval nature existed between 
England and France, although the desire for such had repeatedly 
been made known on the French side. What the English Cabinet 
had refused to give to France it would not grant to Russia. No 
naval convention had been concluded with Russia, and none would 
be concluded. 

The assertion that England before the outbreak of war 
had, at an earlier or later date, already undertaken an obliga- 
tion towards Russia or France to participate in the war is 
thus not only unproved but is directly refuted. Even if we 
assume that such a promise of participation were proved 
(which is not the case), the further assertion that this par- 
ticipation in war was promised for an offensive, and not 
merely for a, defensive war is quite unsubstantiated. This, 
however, is the cardinal point in the whole affair. Could an 
accusation rightly be brought against England even if she 
had in fact made herself the ally of France or Russia against 
an unprovoked attack on the part of Germany? Had not 
England the same right as Germany to conclude defensive 
alliances? An accusation could only be brought against Eng- 
land if she had allied herself with Russia and France for an 
aggressive war against Germany and Austria. This is the 
only point that matters. This is the object pursued by all 
the discussions of Schiemann and his friends. As they are, 
however, unable to produce even a vestige of proof in sup- 
port of the assertion that England had made any kind of a 
promise to participate in war, still more do they fail to fur- 
nish any proof that she gave any such undertaking with re- 
gard to an offensive war. No attempt even is made by any 
of the defenders of Germany to prove this. They invent the 
alliance for war, and they add to this the further invention 
of an alliance for an offensive war. On a paper foundation 
they erect a structure of clay; it need surprise no one that 
their construction miserably collapses. 



THE PREVENTIVE WAR 105 

In these discussions on the agreements for a conspiracy 
alleged to have been made in Paris in the spring of 1914 Herr 
Schiemann has also, as so often happens, the misfortune of 
giving himself away and of forgetting the part he is playing. 
We all know that the conspiracy for war was concluded, ac- 
cording to Schiemann, at Reval in June, 1908. The war of 
the Entente against Germany and Austria was from that mo- 
ment a settled affair, and henceforward it was merely a ques- 
tion of waiting for the most favourable opportunity of strik- 
ing the blow. If this is correct, a naval agreement with 
Russia must have been in the highest degree welcome to the 
English Government. The English Government must also 
have endeavoured to prepare, as far as in them lay, the in- 
tended annihilation of Germany by entering into increasingly 
closer military relations with the two other Entente Powers. 
Nevertheless, the anonymous writer of a Report in the Ger- 
man White Book (page 52) tells us — and Schiemann inad- 
visedly repeats what he says — that "the satisfaction of the 
Russian and French diplomatists on the fact that the English 
politicians had again been taken by surprise was great." The 
"surprise" consisted in the common decision of the Entente 
Powers to consider a naval agreement between England and 
Russia, and to conduct the negotiations on the matter be- 
tween English and Russian naval officers in London. How, 
I ask, should this be a "surprise," if England had already 
been since 1908 an ally of the two other robber States, and 
was eagerly awaiting the most favourable moment for the 
attack? You again contradict yourself, Herr Schiemann! 
Your "surprise" is inconsistent with the conspiracy of Reval. 

The Historical Antecedents and the History of the 

Crime 

As I have already pointed out, the author of the Slanderer 
does not enter into the essential contents, the central point 
of my book, that is to say, the inquiry into the immediate 
cause of the war and the responsibility for the war. He 
refers to certain books and writings, which are said to in- 



106 THE CRIME 

vestigate the question of guilt by reference to the official 
publications "with scientific thoroughness, exhaustively and 
impartially," and to leave "not a point standing in the asser- 
tions of the accuser" (page 67). For my part I decline to 
honour the draft which the historian Schiemann has drawn 
on other alleged investigators of history and to take up the 
cudgels with Herr Ludwig Bergstrasser whom Schiemann 
puts before him as a screen. I have chosen a more weighty 
and more highly-placed opponent, the Secretary for State, 
Dr. Helfferich; and I am conscious that in J' accuse and in 
this supplementary work I have annihilated the degree of 
guilt against the Entente Powers expressed, and presumed 
to have been proved, by him, and I am satisfied that I have 
proved more firmly and unshakably than before my own de- 
cree of guilt against the Central Powers. It is an impossible 
task which would demand half a lifetime, if after the chief 
opponent is out of the way, it should still be necessary to 
cross swords with all his seconds. The method of these gen- 
tlemen is everywhere the same. In refuting Helfferich, they 
are all refuted. I believe that I may rest content with having 
disposed of Helfferich's thesis of incendiarism. 

Herr Schiemann, however, sets himself too easy a task. 
He discusses, in his own way, in sixty-seven pages the more 
remote antecedents of the war, but, relying on other inquir- 
ers, he declines any discussion of the immediate antecedents. 
This standpoint is in itself mistaken and illogical. It is sug- 
gestive of the action of a barrister who should restrict him- 
self to an inquiry into the past life of the accused, without 
discussing the charge brought against him. Even if Schie- 
mann's assertion that France, Russia and England had 
planned and intended an aggressive war against the Central 
Powers were as correct and as completely demonstrated as 
it is incorrect and undemonstrated, it would not by a long 
way follow that the present war was the aggressive war in- 
tended by the Entente Powers. This is all the less so, inas- 
much as Schiemann himself postpones the aggressive inten- 
tions until a later period of time. If two persons, of whom 
one has a shady past and the other a spotless record, are 



THE PREVENTIVE WAR 107 

suspected of an action that has in fact taken place, it does 
not follow from the shady past of the one that he has com- 
mitted the deed. Even if the suspected man were a pre- 
viously convicted criminal, and not merely a man in whom 
there is ground "for suspecting the deed," his past life is in 
no way sufficient to justify his being regarded as convicted 
of the deed. His past life gives a reason for suspicion, and 
nothing more. The deed itself has to be proved against 
him. 

It is exactly the same in passing a judgment on the respon- 
sibility for the present war. Even if France, England or 
Russia had been previously convicted criminals, that is to 
say (transferred into the sphere of politics) even if in the 
course of post-Napoleonic history since the rearrangement 
of Europe by the Congress of Vienna, they had carried out 
warlike attacks on European Great Powers — which in view 
of Bismarck's confessions with regard to the origin of the 
war of 1870, cannot as we know be asserted even of the 
France of the time of Napoleon III. — they would not, by vir- 
tue of this criminal past, be thereby convicted of the guilt of 
the present war. Even acts of war in the past would not 
suffice to prove guilt, still less would intentions to make war 
in the future. 

Even if I were to take at their face value all that Schie- 
mann and his friends bring forward with regard to the 
malicious and treacherous war conspiracy of the Entente 
Powers, even if I were to forget for the moment Bernhardi's 
assertion that the Entente Powers had no need to think of 
an aggressive war, 1 in short, if I were to take as immovable 
verities the brazen falsifications of the professor of history, 
there has still been produced not the slightest proof that 
this war of 19 14 was provoked by France, Russia and Eng- 
land. The position is quite otherwise. The evil intentions 
of the other side would be proved, but not the execution of 
these intentions, to which indeed, if we accept the time given 
by Schiemann himself, effect was only to be given some 

1 See J' accuse, page 28. 
( 



108 THE CRIME 

years later. Just because of the evil intentions of the En- 
tente Powers, which after all must have been known to the 
German Government as well as to Herr Schiemann, it would 
be reasonable to consider that there were grounds for the 
suspicion, indeed for considering it probable, that Germany- 
had anticipated the aggressors, in order to avoid by a pre- 
ventive war the attack which was alleged to be intended. 

Thus all the arguments of Schiemann and his people tend 
to confirm the preventive war, but contradict, although in- 
voluntarily, the thesis of a war of defence. 

In an earlier passage I have already pointed out an open 
admission on the part of Schiemann that this is a preventive 
war. Another admission of the same nature runs as follows : 

"It is also historically an untenable view that a pre- 
ventive war cannot in view of its character be a war 
of defence. What, then, was the war which for seven 
long years Frederick the Great waged for the main- 
tenance of the Prussian State, if it were not a war of 
defence, a war in which he would have been lost, had 
he not chosen to anticipate events? The saying which 
was often applied in the 17th century, Melius est prae- 
venire quam praeveniri, is an entirely fitting description 
of the decision before which Frederick stood, and cor- 
responds to the facts with which we had to reckon in 
August, 1 914" {A Slanderer, page 7). 

In this passage the whole of official Germany, from the 
Emperor down to the last Governmental hack, are given the 
lie. Schiemann, the spokesman of the Prussian Junker party, 
the habitue and the confidant of the Wilhelmstrasse, the much 
read and, especially in the highest place of all, the much 
respected weekly reviewer of the Kreuzzeitung, the mouth- 
piece and frequently also the prompter of the Prussian au- 
thorities — Schiemann, who must know better than anyone 
else, admits that Germany was not attacked but provoked the 
war, in order to anticipate a future attack. It only remains 
to investigate the questions, 



THE PREVENTIVE WAR 109 

Firstly, whether a preventive war can, in fact, be defended 
on moral and political grounds; and 

Secondly, in the event of the first question being answered 
in the affirmative, whether the actual presuppositions of pre- 
vention existed in the summer. of 191 4. 

We shall go into these questions in detail in the following 
chapter. 



CHAPTER II 

THE THEORY AND THE PRACTICE OF THE 
PREVENTIVE WAR 

When in my book I spoke of the "gigantic lie" by means 
of which the German people has been enticed into this war, 
I intended primarily to give expression merely to the nega- 
tive thought that the assertions that there had been a hostile 
attack and that this was a war of defence were deliberate 
untruths, designed for the deception of the German people. 
Of these untruths all have been guilty who knew that no such 
attack had been made, above all those who provoked the 
war by word and writing, and by the course of action which 
they in fact pursued. The motives which induced the various 
individuals or groups to act as they did are a matter of in- 
difference so far as the moral judgment is concerned. The 
supporters of the view that this is a preventive war have lied 
equally with those who advocate a war of conquest. In 
the case of the former it is at the most possible to allow 
mitigating circumstances, if they earnestly and sincerely be- 
lieved in the future attack and considered that anticipation 
was necessary. Mitigating circumstances, I say, may be 
allowed, but there can be no acquittal. 

Bismarck and the Preventive War 

On the question of the moral justification of preventive 
wars much, and it must be admitted much that is contradic- 
tory, has been spoken and written. The strongest witness 
against preventive wars is Prince Bismarck. His observa- 
tions against preventive wars contained in his Gedanken und 

110 



THEORY AND PRACTICE 111 

Erinnerungen 1 have frequently been quoted and have also been 
mentioned in my book (page 44). In his famous speech in 
the Reichstag on February 6th, 1888, he spoke as follows: 

"If I were to come before you and say: We are seriously 
menaced by France and by Russia : it is to be foreseen that we 
shall be attacked; that is my conviction as a diplomatist, based 
also on military information; for our defence it is better to em- 
ploy the anticipatory thrust of the attack and open hostilities at 
once; accordingly I ask the Reichstag for a credit of a milliard 
of marks in order to start the war against both our neighbours — 
well, gentlemen, I do not know whether you have sufficient con- 
fidence in me to vote such a grant. I hope not. ... It is not 
fear which disposes us to peace, but the consciousness of our 
strength, the consciousness that even if we were attacked at an 
unfavourable moment, we shall be strong enough for our defence ; 
and we shall keep the chance of peace, leaving it to Divine Provi- 
dence to determine whether in the meantime the necessity of 
war may not disappear. 

The attempt has been made to create a divergence between 
the Bismarck after 1870 and the Bismarck before 1870, and 
it has been asserted that his later aversion from preventive 
wars was a "mere trifle," after he himself, especially in the 
provocation of the Franco-German War, had successfully 
made use of the means of prevention with all the ruthless- 
ness of genius. This attempt of our Imperialists and chau- 
vinists to claim the great German statesman as an abettor in 
their instigations to war is baseless. Napoleon's attitude 
after the day of Sadowa, during the Luxemburg crisis of 1867 
and throughout the following years down to the outbreak of 
war, proved conclusively that the impulse of the German 
people towards a new German Empire, an impulse justified 
from the historical and national point of view, found in the 
French Emperor an inexorable opponent, and that this hos- 
tility could be overcome only by blood and by iron. Napo- 
leon's enmity to German unity was a fact, not an apprehen- 

1 [English translation. Bismarck: His Reflections and Reminiscences. 
Smith Elder.] 



112 THE CRIME 

sion or a supposition. The establishment of this unity was 
a national right, and the effort in this direction was a his- 
torical necessity for the German people. It was an effort 
towards a new formation within and towards consolidation, 
which was not aggressively directed against other European 
Powers and contained no expansive tendencies beyond the 
German frontier; it was in no way intended to injure the 
rights and the interests of third parties. To place obstacles 
in the way of this effort for national unity on the part of 
the German people was a crime. The watchword, "revanche 
pour Sadowa," was a nefarious cry, an act of presumption 
against which the national consciousness of the German peo- 
ple rightly revolted. The decision to free Germany from 
this Bonapartist tutelage was not a preventive act, but the 
shaking off of a political yoke which in fact existed ; it was a 
struggle of the German people for freedom, for the right to 
control its destinies in its inner political development; it was 
a counterpart to the struggle for freedom of 1813, which 
had shaken off externally the yoke of foreign domination. 

From all this it follows that the opposition on principle 
to preventive wars shown by the great German statesman 
was not merely the attitude of the sated beast of prey, which 
after the satisfaction of its appetites lies carelessly in the 
sun with no thought of further murder; on the contrary, it 
corresponded to Bismarck's deeply-rooted inner views, which 
rested on moral and religious grounds alike, as well as on 
grounds of practical statesmanship. As a matter of fact, 
the Prussian Junker, Herr von Bismarck-Schonhausen, had 
already spoken the following words in the Prussian Landtag 
in December, 1850. 1 

It is easy for a statesman in his office or his chamber to blow 
the trumpet of war with the breath of popularity and all the time 
to sit warming himself by the fireside, or to deliver fiery speeches 
from the tribune, while he leaves it to the rifleman who lies bleed- 

1 1 have taken the following quotations from Bismarck from the excel- 
lent little pamphlet published by the Society "Neues Vaterland," under 
the title 'What would Bismarck have done?" 



THEORY AND PRACTICE 113 

ing on the snow, whether his system attains victory and glory. 
Nothing is easier ; but woe to the statesman who at such a time 
does not look about for a reason for the war which will be valid 
when the war is over. 1 

The attitude which he took up against Moltke's desire 
for the provocation of war in 1867 on the occasion of the 
Luxemburg question is explained by Bismarck in his Gedan- 
ken und Erinnerungen (Volume II, page 230) as follows: 

At the time of the Luxemburg question ( 1867) I was an op- 
ponent on principle of preventive wars, that is to say of aggressive 
wars which we would conduct only because we presumed that we 
would later have to wage them against a better armed enemy. 

The same point of view against "anticipatory wars" was 
adopted by an article in the Hamburger Nachrichten, in- 
spired by the old Chancellor (November 4th, 1892) : 

The conclusion has sometimes been drawn in military circles 
that the prospect of having probably to wage a war later furnishes 
sufficient grounds for beginning it earlier under more favourable 
circumstances ; and one of the chief reasons for the dislike mani- 
fested by these classes towards the then Chancellor is to be found 
in the fact that at all times he very definitely opposed such antic- 
ipatory wars. 

An article which appeared in the Hamburger Nachrichtert 
(evening edition of May 3rd, 1890) a few weeks after Bis- 
marck's resignation, breathing in every word the spirit and 
the style of the old Chancellor, attacks even more strongly 
the supporters of preventive wars. 

The Kreuszeitung recently published, with entire approval and 
laudatory recognition of its contents, extracts extending to col- 
umns from an anonymous pamphlet published by Kay in Cassel 
bearing the title : Videant consules ne quid res publica detrimenti 
capiat. The pamphlet, which is directed against the foreign and 
military policy pursued under Prince Bismarck, comes to the 
conclusion that Germany, while she was still the stronger party 

• (See Headlam : Life of Bismarck, page 83.] 



114 THE CRIME 

from the military point of view, should have again settled matters 
with France, and should then have turned her whole forces 
against Russia, the true enemy of the nation; but that Prince 
Bismarck prevented this, so that all the sacrifices imposed on the 
German people have been in vain. By its attitude towards a 
pamphlet which makes it a charge against Prince Bismarck that 
he prevented two bloody wars, the Kreuzzeitung confirms the 
existence of bellicose undercurrents which on other occasions it 
has zealously combated. . . . We leave it to the Kreuzzeitung 
to determine how it is to explain the situation in which it has 
thereby brought itself ; but we are struck by the frankness with 
which the paper acknowledges the nefarious programme devel- 
oped in the pamphlet. 

On another occasion Bismarck coined the epigram which 
is so characteristic of his plastic method of expression, that 
the anticipation of a possible attack seemed to him like sui- 
cide in the expectation of death. 

These and similar expressions of Bismarck are well 
known. Less well known, however, are the individual cases 
in which he had to exert all his authority in order to oppose 
military influences on the decision of questions relating to 
the beginning or the conclusion of wars. 

Strategy and Diplomacy 

In a short paper of much interest entitled, "Military 
Strategy Versus Diplomacy in Bismarck's Time and After- 
wards" Munroe Smith, Professor of Jurisprudence in Co- 
lumbia University, shows by reference to Bismarck's memoirs 
and other similar German works the almost uninterrupted 
struggle which the old Chancellor had to carry on against 
the generals, with Count Moltke at their head — the struggle 
on the question whether wars which appear inevitable should 
or might be intentionally provoked at a moment when military 
superiority over the enemy is assured. 

Even in 1864, in the war waged in common by Germany 
and Austria against Denmark, strong military influences were 
at work to persuade the King of Prussia to cross the Jut- 



THEORY AND PRACTICE 115 

land frontier alone without Austria. The old Field-Marshal 
Wrangel could not refrain from sending to the King the 
most calumnious telegrams against Bismarck, and that not 
even in cipher, and he even went so far as to speak of diplo- 
matists who belonged to the gallows. 1 

In 1866 the opposition of the military party to Bismarck's 
statecraft was shown not only before the beginning of the 
war, but still more at its conclusion. Although the war 
with Austria appeared inevitable, Bismarck did not at once 
precipitate matters, but allowed Austria to take the lead 
at every stage in the military preparations. In the middle 
of March Austria concentrated her troops in Bohemia. 
Prussia's answer to this was restricted to placing her active 
army in a state of readiness for war. In the course of April 
some of the German Federated States began to make military 
preparations. On April 8th Bismarck concluded a treaty 
with Italy. Austria and Italy mobilised. It was not until 
the first half of May that Prussia mobilised her reserves and 
began to concentrate troops on the Saxon frontier and in 
Silesia. Then Bismarck waited; Moltke, however, lost pa- 
tience and wished military operations to begin forthwith 
since every day's delay would strengthen the enemy's forces 
which so far were imperfectly equipped and only partially 
concentrated. King William, however, supported Bismarck 
and kept the Prussian troops mobilised for almost a month 
without attacking. It was not until open aggression on the 
part of Austria took place that Bismarck authorised the begin- 
ning of hostilities. 2 

The same differences between the statesmen and the strate- 
gists as we find at the beginning of the war of 1866 are also 
shown on its conclusion in the formulation of the conditions 
of peace. Here again Bismarck put in practice the principles 
which in his Gedanken and Erinnerungen he defines in the 
statement that "the determination and the delimitation of the 
objects of a war are, both before and during the war, political 
and not strategical problems, and that the responsible states- 

1 Gedanken und Erinnerungen, page 323. 

2 Sybel, Begriindung des deutschen Retches, vol. iv., page 421. 



116 THE CRIME 

man, in order to find the right way to the attainment of these 
aims, dare not remain without influence on the conduct of 
the war itself." As is known, it was on these principles that 
he acted on the conclusion of peace with Austria. He waived 
the victorious entry into Vienna, the cession of Austrian ter- 
ritory, the imposition on Austria of a large war-indemnity, 
because even then he foresaw that he would need Austria 
as an ally in Europe, and that therefore he could not afford 
to incur her enduring enmity by the imposition of degrading 
and oppressive conditions of peace. 

Special interest attaches to Munroe Smith's reference to 
the divergence of view which existed between Bismarck and 
Moltke a year after the war between Austria and Prussia 
on the possibility of a Franco-German war on the occasion 
of the Luxemburg question in 1867. As far back as 1867 
Moltke desired the outbreak of war with France, which he 
considered absolutely inevitable. He desired an immediate 
breach, because he was of the opinion that the indubitable 
superiority which Germany then enjoyed from a miltary 
point of view might later be made good by France. 
Count Bethusy-Huc communicated Moltke' s view to the 
Chancellor, who did not indeed disapprove of the military 
considerations advanced by Moltke, but refused to accept 
any responsibility for the provocation of a war. The per- 
sonal conviction of a statesman that a war might ultimately 
break out, no matter how well founded it might be, could 
not in his opinion justify its provocation. Unforeseen events 
might alter the situation and avert what appeared inevitable. 1 

After the Franco-German War Bismarck again resisted 
military influences and declined the confiscation of purely 
French territories which was desired and suggested by the 
military authorities. He contented himself with the an- 
nexation of Alsace-Lorraine, and in this case it is true that 
alongside the national point of view he also allowed military 

1 See Moltke's Memoiren, Vol. II., 204 and Bismarck's Gedanken und 
Erinnerungen, page 441. 



THEORY AND PRACTICE 117 

considerations to have influence to a certain extent. This, 
perhaps the only, concession made by Bismarck to military 
considerations has had fatal consequences for Germany and 
for Europe. It is indeed, in the last analysis, the origin 
and the germ of the present war. Had France then received 
the treatment meted out to Austria after 1866 there would 
presumably have arisen from the first a more friendly re- 
lation between the two neighbouring countries, more particu- 
larly as the war had after all been begun only against the 
French Empire and not against the third Republic. It may 
be presumed that the frenzy of armaments would not have 
assumed the enormous proportions which in the end could 
not but lead to war. In place of the dangerous system of 
the balance of power, there would have arisen a European 
condition of peace, which would have guaranteed to each 
State its natural conditions of existence, and would have pre- 
pared a propitious soil for the pacific settlement of all extra- 
European questions. Bismarck's one concession to the gen- 
erals was fatal for the whole of Europe's future. 

This should have been a warning and an instructive ex- 
ample for our present-day statesmen. Had they not fallen 
in with "the purely military consideration of the question 
by the General Staffs" (Red Book, No. 28), had they fol- 
lowed during the critical days from July 29th to July 31st 
the Bismarckian principle that no explanation should be de- 
manded from neighbouring States as to concentrations of 
troops, but that the answer in such cases should be restricted 
simply to military counter-measures (see Bismarck's speech 
on February 6th, 1888), had they been content with the 
threat expressed in Jhe Ultimatum of July 31st, that mobilisa- 
tion would be answered by mobilisation instead of changing 
it seventeen hours later into the formula, "The answer to 
mobilisation is war," — had they so comported themselves, 
we would not have been to-day in the midst of a European 

war. 

* * * * * * 

Bismarck's successor, Caprivi, like his predecessor, was 
also called upon to suffer from the craving for war of a 



118 THE CRIME 

camarilla which on every occasion admitted the validity 
merely of the point of view of momentary military superi- 
ority, while attaching no importance to political, moral, or 
humane considerations. He also, in one of his speeches in 
the Reichstag, expressed himself with the utmost emphasis 
against the preventive war (November 23rd, 1892). 

I have found the view put forward in the Press, and also ad- 
vanced by well-meaning and highly patriotic men: "Yes, but 
think of the position that arises from the fact that armaments 
are so heavy as these we now have to bear, and that they are 
likely to become even heavier. Will such a position not in time 
become intolerable, and would we not be acting more wisely to 
put an end to it by grasping the sword ourselves, by seizing the 
favourable moment and then by making use of the victory which 
we may hope to achieve, once more secure peace for twenty or 
thirty years?" I believe that that is a view which the Govern- 
ments, and the German people also, will never be disposed to 
accept. Apart from moral scruples which lie in the way, there 
are also grave material considerations which oppose the execu- 
tion of such ideas. ... I am firmly convinced that even after 
a happy issue of a prophylactic war the condition in which we 
would be placed would be much more unfavourable than that 
in which we are now situated. I repeat, then, not only as my 
own conviction but so far as is known to me as the view of the 
Governments, that such a preventive war will never be waged 
by Germany. 

A. H. Fried rightly points out in mentioning the speech 
of Caprivi, how little cogency there is in the phrase about 
the "inevitability" of a war, which is constantly repeated 
by the inciters of strife. At that time, in 1892, "well-meaning 
and highly patriotic men" thought of securing peace for 
twenty or thirty years by a new Franco-German war, which 
would undoubtedly have been widened into a European war. 
Yet even without such a war, peace was secured for twenty- 
two years, and would have been continuing at this moment, 
had the Governments and the rulers of Germany and Austria 
resisted the suggestion of the militarists and war-inciters as 
Bismarck and Caprivi did. In any case, it has been shown 



THEORY AND PRACTICE 119 

subsequently that the war alleged to be inevitable in 1892 
was in fact avoided, and that notwithstanding this it was 
still possible that a peace of twenty or thirty years could 
result. 

Frederick the Great 

The defenders of the preventive war show a predilection 
for relying on certain expressions used by Frederick the 
Great : 

There are wars of prevention, and princes act wisely when 
they undertake these. They are really wars of aggression, but 
they are not therefore less just. When the excessive power of a 
State threatens to overflow its banks and inundate the world, it 
is prudent to place dams in its way and to stem the tearing 
stream while such a course is still possible. It is seen that the 
clouds are gathering, that the thunderstorm is drawing near and 
the lightning proclaims its approach. If a prince who is menaced 
by such a danger cannot avert the storm acting alone, he will, 
if he is wise, unite with all those to whom a common danger 
brings common interests. Had the Kings of Egypt, Syria and 
Macedonia united against the power of Rome, Rome would never 
have been in a position to overthrow these empires. A wisely 
concluded alliance and a war waged with decision would have 
annihilated those ambitious plans whose fulfilment forged fetters 
for the world. It is wise to prefer the lesser evil to the greater, 
and to choose the surest way to avoid what is uncertain. A 
prince therefore adopts the better course in undertaking an 
aggressive war, so long as it is still open to him to choose between 
the laurel-wreath and the olive branch, instead of waiting until 
the time of need when a declaration of war can only postpone 
for a short time his bondage and his downfall. It is a well- 
established principle that it is better to anticipate than to be an- 
ticipated; the great men have thus always acted well when they 
exercised their power before the enemy could take measures 
which might have bound their hands and robbed them of their 
strength. 

These and similar expressions of the Great Prussian king 
are to be explained by reference to the conditions of his time. 
The political conformation of Europe at that time still re- 



120 THE CRIME 

sembled a molten fiery mass which required many years 
before it could cool down to a relatively solid state. In par- 
ticular the small State of Prussia, which had become a king- 
dom only within the last fifty years, was on the point of gain- 
ing a territorial position corresponding with her inner strength 
and efficiency, and the opposition that was put in the way of 
this development came pre-eminently from the old power of 
the Hapsburgs, who had allied themselves with the French 
and the Russians for the suppression of the new rival. The 
State of Prussia, at that time really "encircled" on all sides 
and compelled to make good the defects of her territorial, 
political and financial situation by military preparedness and 
extreme rapidity of action, was then struggling to rise, and 
in the time of Frederick the Great it might under certain 
circumstances find its only salvation in the anticipation of 
imminent attacks, and by peacefully waiting might find its 
destruction compassed. In addition, the danger of wanton 
wars, springing from dynastic considerations or from motives 
of power and conquest, is to-day quite different from what 
is was then, when dynasties fought out their battles almost 
exclusively with armies of mercenaries, without Parliamen- 
tary control or approval of war-expenditure, without any in- 
fluence being exercised by the peoples on the provocation or 
the conclusion of the wars which had been decided upon by 
the absolute monarchs. At that time a small, struggling 
State, which was inconvenient to its great neighbours was 
indeed confronted by the danger of being surprised in a sense 
which is no longer true to-day, when, after all is said, not- 
withstanding all open or concealed absolutism, the nations 
are entitled to a share in counsel and in action. Or perhaps 
we should rather say: "In a sense which should no longer 
be true to-day," for, unfortunately, the history of the origin 
of this war, especially the attack on Belgium, has taught us 
that we have no occasion to boast pharisaically of our prog- 
ress in civilisation as compared with past times. 

In passing judgment on Frederick's preventive theories, 
it is further necessary to consider the enormous difference 
between the consequences of a war at that time, even of 



THEORY AND PRACTICE 121 

one extending over seven years, and those of a world-war 
to-day. Seven days of the present world-war inflicts on the 
whole world, on belligerent countries, and on neutrals, a 
thousand-fold greater distress, a thousand-fold greater loss 
in life and in well-being and in the ruin of civilisation than 
seven years of the war which Prussia then waged against 
Austria and her allies. At that time in the age of stage- 
coaches and sailing vessels, there was yet no question of a 
world-trade, a world-intercourse, a world-exchange of spir- 
itual and material goods. Who will compare the present age 
of wireless telegraphy, of electricity, or aeronautics, of tele- 
phonic intercourse over remote distances with the mercantile 
system of internal trade then existing, which indeed was not 
without the impulse to external development, but lacked the 
appropriate means of communication for settlement and de- 
livery? If Frederick's idea of anticipating by an aggres- 
sive war an attack of which there was an assured menace, 
was at that time open to question, to-day, at any rate, in view 
of the improbability of the premises postulated and of the 
immeasurable consequences which are bound to ensue, it does 
not admit of discussion, and an attack which is carried out 
for such a reason can only be reckoned in the category of 
wars which Bismarck once branded as "a Bonapartist de- 
pravity." 

When is War Inevitable? 

The question whether a war is inevitable, whether it is 
in reality intended sooner or later by the other side, is one 
of the most difficult which can be presented to a statesman 
for solution. It is impossible that it should ever be answered 
with a definite yea or nay. The existence of warlike ten- 
dencies in neighbouring countries is not sufficient to prove 
that these tendencies have acquired or will acquire domination 
over the supreme heads and leaders of the State. Such ten- 
dencies are always, or at any rate most frequently, merely 
emanations of minorities, and in judging of their dangerous- 
ness the essential question to be considered is whether these 



122 THE CRIME 

minorities have the power in their hands, or are in a position, 
to develop into majorities. 

The success, however, of the incitement to war, even within 
these criminal strata, very frequently depends on the life 
or death of individual leading personalities. If the war- 
intriguers occupy positions in the Government itself, they 
may become innocuous if they are dismissed from their office, 
either by the peremptory decree of a monarch, or by the ac- 
tion of a majority in Parliament or among their colleagues 
in the Ministry. If the desire and the danger of war exist 
in the ruler himself, there are innumerable personal and ma- 
terial factors which may supervene and remove or weaken 
even this the greatest of all dangers, A ruler in sickness will 
not so lightly decide on war as a ruler in health. A rup- 
ture in the king may in certain circumstances prevent a 
rupture in diplomatic relations; an attack of gout in the 
Emperor may prevent a military attack on his neighbours; a 
gall-stone in the prince may be the stone of offence over 
which all the war-intriguers stumble, be they never so power- 
ful. The king who is thirsting for war may die, and a peace- 
loving successor may mount the throne. Strong popular 
sentiments, movements in the nation or tendencies in Parlia- 
ment which conflict with the bellicose intentions of the ruler, 
may convince him of the impossibility of executing his plans 
or of the danger to his monarchical position which might 
be evoked by the attempt to give them effect. 

How strongly the influence of individuals on the main- 
tenance of peace or the outbreak of war is assessed even by 
leading politicians is proved, apart from countless other ex- 
amples, by the Delcasse incident of June, 1905. The view 
that the French Foreign Minister of that day was by his 
Moroccan policy unintentionally, no doubt, but unconsciously 
and involuntarily, creating a situation involving the danger 
of war for Europe was disseminated not merely on this side 
of the Vosges but on the other side as well, and was ex- 
pressed in the historical meeting of the Cabinet of June 6th, 
1905, when Rouvier, the Prime Minister, and his colleagues 
compelled the too temperamental Foreign Minister to resign. 



THEORY AND PRACTICE 123 

(It is said to have been on this occasion that Rouvier coined 
the phrase that Delcasse, the little Don Juan, had not only 
ensnared England, Russia and Spain, but had ended by seduc- 
ing Italy as well: "L'Allemagne vous reproche d'avoir 
debauche lTtalie.") It is incontestable that the period of 
most dangerous tension between Germany and France since 
the war of 1870 was the time of Boulangism. After the fall 
of the "brav' General" and the removal of his most con- 
spicuous adherents, a calmer relation between Germany and 
France supervened, which was again stirred to tempestuous- 
ness by the Dreyfus affair, but soon after the conclusion of 
this affair quieter waters were again entered. Our chau- 
vinists attach importance to Poincare's election as President 
of the French Republic as symptomatic of the re-awakening 
of French intentions of revenge, although they are wrong in 
so doing. On what chance, on what unforseeable result of 
Parliamentary intrigue did it depend that M. Pams, the most 
harmless of all candidates for the presidency, was not called 
to the Ely see in place of the Lorrainer of alleged "nation- 
alist" sympathies. The tour of the Austrian successor, 
Francis Ferdinand, to Serajevo furnished the external oc- 
casion on which the European War depended. It will be 
remembered that the old Emperor Francis Joseph was for 
months seriously ill in the year preceding this tour, and that 
at that time he was constantly hanging between life and 
death. Had the Emperor died then, Francis Ferdinand would 
presumably not have proceeded to the Bosnian capital, and 
the European conflagration would not have burst out, or at 
least not from this cause. 

We have in Germany the comfort and the agreeable pros- 
pect of possessing a future Emperor who, as I have shown 
from many of his writings, speeches and actions, belongs to 
the worst category of "heroes of war." He is one of those 
who, exposed to no personal dangers, love war for war's 
sake, who still regard international peace as "a dream and 
not even a beautiful dream," who look upon the laceration 
and the dismemberment of millions of human bodies, upon 
the misery, hunger and destitution of countless millions of 



124 THE CRIME 

unhappy men and women, of babes and of those stricken in 
years who have been driven from house and home, who look 
upon fire and devastation, upon economic and cultural de- 
struction as a wholesome medicine, as a "steel-bath" to re- 
store once more the relaxed nerves — not their own nerves, 
be it observed, but those of the labouring classes. It is clear 
that such views, if entertained on an imperial throne, rep- 
resent the gravest danger for the world. But if by chance 
the eldest son of the German Emperor had been differently 
constituted, if he had shared the views of all nations and of 
all modern rulers of humane sensibilities that it is not in 
pulling down but in building up and in promoting further de- 
velopment that the lofty task of all Governments and rulers 
lies, that it is peace which is the highest possession of the 
nations, the only sure foundation of their well-being and pros- 
perity — if by chance the eldest son, the successor to the 
throne, had been like his grandfather, a prince of peace, and 
if perhaps the military note of the Hohenzollerns had been 
transmitted to a harmless younger son, then the danger from 
above would at once have been avoided, and the maintenance 
of the peace of the world would have been rendered much 
more probable. Thus by this example we see how the des- 
tinies of countries and of nations may be determined by the 
accident of primogeniture — which, however, can be again 
eliminated, and as may be hoped will be eliminated, by a 
further accident in the disappearance of this first-born (by 
death, sickness or other "unforeseen" circumstance). 

Everywhere in the fate of men and in fate of nations 
there is chance, nowhere is it possible to make a sure cal- 
culation in advance. Even within the unpretentious bounds 
of private life, who would venture to< say that a certain de- 
velopment must inevitably and by predetermination happen 
in such or such a way? "Man proposes and God disposes." 
This true proverb, which is also popularly expressed in the 
words that "the unexpected always happens," should be well 
pondered by the pious and the faithful in the land. "Nothing 
is so constant as change" — these words should be borne in 
mind by those who are constantly speaking of the "inevi- 



THEORY AND PRACTICE 125 

lability" of wars, and yet cannot themselves foretell whether 
in the evening they will sit round the table with their families, 
or will have fallen a victim to the reaper who is indeed in- 
evitable. Chance, it is nothing but chance, which governs 
the destinies of individuals and of nations — so say the sceptics 
and the unbelievers. What is chance other than "the little 
finger on the hand of Almighty God" ? — say, with Jean Paul, 
the faithful and the believers in God. Everywhere this 
fatalism is expressed. "Kismet" is what the Turks call it, 
avayni) is what it was called by the Greeks. We cannot 
see the cards of Providence far enough ahead to anticipate 
historical development according to our own calculations — so 
Bismarck spoke and acted. On this one ground alone, by 
reason of the impossibility of calculating human events in 
advance, the provocation of a war because it must come some 
day, that is to say the provocation of a war to anticipate an 
aggressive war, is a crime as grave as the impious misdeed 
of a war of pure aggression and conquest. 

The Three Presuppositions of a Preventive War 

The defenders of the aggressive war waged for the pur- 
pose of prevention must prove three points in order to justify 
their thesis, and the burden of proof lies on them, the ag- 
gressors, not on us who deny their right of aggression: 

i. They are bound to answer in the affirmative the 
question of principle, whether an aggressive war, under- 
taken as an anticipatory war of defence, is justifiable on 
political and moral grounds as well as on grounds of 
humanity. That in modern political life and for modern 
statesmen this question is on principle to be answered 
in the negative I believe that I have proved elsewhere, 
and will turn to the question later. 

2. If the question of principle is answered by them 
in the affirmative they are bound to prove that the ac- 
tual premises of the war of prevention which they ad- 
vance as permissible or even as imperative exist in the 



126 THE CRIME 

particular case; in other words, that the aggressive war 
from the other side was beyond question intended, de- 
termined and imminent, and that therefore, so far as 
the State which is now attacking is concerned, the only- 
question at issue is whether it will have to meet its op- 
ponent in battle at an earlier or a later date. 

3. They must prove that the responsibility for the 
political and diplomatic situation which made the attack 
from the other side inevitable is also to be attributed to 
the other side, and is therefore not a product of the 
mistakes and the offences of the State which is now at- 
tacking; in other words, that the other side has not 
merely created a dangerous situation, without any blame 
resting on the State now attacking, but also that it was 
on the point of putting an end to this situation by the 
provocation of war. 

All these questions, the question of principle relating to the 
justification of preventive wars in general as well as the two 
questions of fact indicated in the second and third para- 
graphs, must simultaneously be answered in the affirmative, 
if the preventionists wish to justify their point of view. If, 
for example, only the second question could be answered in 
the affirmative, the answer to the third being in the nega- 
tive, the final link in the logical chain leading to the justifica- 
tion of the preventive war would at once be lacking. In that 
case the intention of the other side to provoke war at a later 
moment would no doubt be proved, but it woula at the same 
time be made clear that this intention had its origin in a 
political situation of which the dangerousness was properly 
to be entered in the debit account of the present aggressor, 
and not in that of the possible later aggressor. If A by his 
provocations, his actions of violence, his disregard for B's 
honour and interests excites in B feelings of exasperation and 
the impulse to revenge, and then anticipates the prospective 
act of vengeance on the part of B by opening hostilities him- 
self, he is doubly to be condemned, because he provoked B 
in the first place, and because in addition to this he then an- 



THEORY AND PRACTICE 127 

ticipated, instead of awaiting, the natural consequence of 
this provocation. The situation is different when the provoca- 
tion emanated from B, when B, apart from the provocation, 
has also manifested the demonstrable intention of forcibly- 
proceeding against A, and when A, by his actual attack, an- 
ticipates the imminent act of violence of B, the provocator. 
In this case the second and third questions above are to be 
answered in A's favour, and his attack, always assuming the 
permissibility on principle of the preventive war, can be justi- 
fied, or at least excused. 

Although, on grounds of principle, I myself uncondition- 
ally reject the preventive war, I have in my book already 
investigated from this point of view the question whether 
Germany and Austria are in a position to justify, at any rate 
from their point of view, their aggressive war as a war of 
prevention. I have been obliged to answer this question in 
the negative. I undertook to prove: 

First, that France, Russia and England did not intend to 
attack Germany and Austria, but rather that their alliances 
and ententes had only a defensive character. 

Secondly, that even if the strained European situation was, 
in fact, pressing towards an "inevitable" war, the respon- 
sibility for this was not to be ascribed to the Entente Powers 
but, at any rate in an overwhelming degree, to the Central 
Powers. 

The attempt of the Central Powers to put an end by a 
European war to a state of tension, which they themselves 
brought about, is thus criminal in a double sense. 



The German preventionists are, as a rule, content to an- 
swer the second of the questions indicated above. From the 
antecedents of the war, from the attitude of the Entente 
Powers and the agreements which they made with each other, 
from King Edward's policy of "encirclement," from the 



128 THE CRIME 

alleged revenge policy of Pomcare and Delcasse, from the 
Pan-Slav tendency in Russia, which had gradually become 
convinced "that the way to Constantinople lay through the 
Brandenburger Gate," from the commercial envy of the Eng- 
lish huckster-people which throughout the course of history 
had always endeavoured by alliances with other continental 
States to secure the suppression of the strongest continental 
sea Power for the time being, from such facts as these the 
German chauvinists and preventionists seek, after the manner 
of Schiemann, to prove the existence of an offensive alliance 
directed to the destruction of the Central Powers. On the 
other hand, they pass in significant silence over the other 
question how far Germany and Austria are themselves re- 
sponsible for the creation and the consolidation of this union. 
I have already pointed out in my book and in the previous 
section of this work : 

That in all the German writings which assert that 
the authorship of the war rests with the Entente Powers 
not a scrap of evidence is produced in support of the 
offensive intentions of these Powers: 

That their initial union and the increasing closeness 
of the links between them are rather to be ascribed ex- 
clusively to the fear of the military imperialistic inten- 
tions of Germany, to her efforts to establish world- 
power and hegemony, to the immeasurable increase in 
the land and sea forces of the German Empire, to the 
military enthusiasm and the incitement to war of the 
"Pan-German Union," and its affiliated associations the 
"German Defence League" and the "German Navy 
League" ; 

That all the military and naval agreements and dis- 
cussions between France and England, and between 
France and Russia, as well as the prospective agreements 
between England and Russia, were intended merely for 
the purpose of defence against a possible German attack, 
but never contemplated a spontaneous attack on Ger- 
many. 



THEORY AND PRACTICE 129 

I have explained fully the reasons which evoked an in- 
creasing feeling of distrust not only in France, England and 
Russia, but also in the whole of the neutral world, towards 
Germany's intentions and towards the sincerity and the hon- 
esty of her assurances of peace. Essentially these reasons 
were as follows: 

The attitude of Germany and of her ally Austria- 
Hungary at the Hague Conferences, and the decisive 
resistance offered to compulsory arbitration and to any 
restriction of land and naval armaments; 

Her ambiguous and suspicious behaviour during the 
Anglo-German negotiations for an understanding in 
1909-1912; 

The doctrines of Bernhardi and Treitschke, these 
brutal theories of war and of world-power, which were 
more and more carried by apt pupils, in and out of uni- 
form, amongst various classes of society, and which 
were more and more made use of cunningly to poison 
the soul of the German people; 

The impulsive policy of fits and starts pursued by 
the Emperor, who in grave European situations preferred 
to strike on the table with the mailed fist rather than 
have recourse to diplomatic negotiations, who chose to 
appear in shining armour rather than in the diploma- 
tist's garb, constantly speaking of the sharp gleaming 
sword and the dry powder, recalling with threatening 
mien in the midst of peace the battles of the past, the 
struggle for freedom of 18 13, and the days of Worth, 
Weissenburg and Sedan 1 ; 

The provocative, nerve-wracking, theatrical policy 
which found appropriate expression in the Emperor's 
action in sending first of all the Kruger-telegram and 
then in despatching a South African plan of campaign to 

1 See, inter alia, the speeches of the Emperor William in the summer of 
1904 at Karlsruhe and at Mainz, his address to Prince Henry before his 
departure for East Asia (1897) and his answer to the Burgomeister of 
Vienna in 1910. 



130 THE CRIME 

his royal grandmother, in his private letter to Lord 
Tweedmouth, in the landing in Tangier and in the 
Agadir spring of the Panther, — a policy which in the 
internal life of Germany, especially in the Reichsland in 
the hard Prussian treatment meted out to the inhabi- 
tants of Alsace-Lorraine, in the encroachments of the 
military power on civil authority, offered a true reflec- 
tion of external policy. 

All these facts increased the distrust felt towards the 
Prusso-German policy in Europe to such a degree that it 
was only by an increasingly firm and strong counter-alliance 
that the possibility of the maintenance of the peace of Eu- 
rope appeared to be assured. 

With the continuation of this electrically charged state of 
tension no surprise need have been occasioned even if the 
union of the Entente Powers were constantly to advance to 
closer agreements. If the outbreak of war had not inter- 
vened, the preliminary steps to the Anglo-Russian naval con- 
vention in the spring of 19 14 would possibly have led to a 
conclusion of the negotiations, to a system of co-operation of 
the two fleets worked out in all its details. And yet, not- 
withstanding all this, it is possible to read through the whole 
of the war literature of Germany from beginning to end 
without findi'ng any tangible evidence, or even any attempt 
to prove, that the approximation and the cohesion of the 
Entente Powers had for its object an attack on Germany or 
her allies. Their union was not the cause but the effect of 
the state of European tension. King Edward's policy, which 
has been called a policy of "encirclement," should more cor- 
rectly be described as the policy of rendering innocuous the 
militant efforts of Germany to achieve world-power. 

Two years before King Edward ascended the throne, the 
first Hague Conference had taken place without result, chiefly 
owing to the fault of Germany; compulsory arbitration, sup- 
ported by England, had been declared by Germany; the 
discussion of a restriction of armaments, in accordance with 
treaty agreements, had been rejected by Germany but in- 



THEORY AND PRACTICE 131 

stead of this, by the German Navy Law there was laid 
the beginning of a sea power which in the course of years 
threatened to approximate more and more closely to Eng- 
lish supremacy on the sea, and was also bound to awake in 
the pacific English people, who had at their disposal no land 
forces of any importance, apprehensions for the security of 
the United Kingdom. Complete failure attended all the 
attempts undertaken in the first place by the Unionist and 
later in increased measure by the Liberal English Cabinet to 
bring to a stop by restrictions resting on treaty, the ruinous 
competition in armaments between the two countries. The 
Emperor William and his Grand Admiral, von Tirpitz, had 
taken their passionately adored child, the new-born German 
Navy, too much to their hearts to allow any hindrances and 
restrictions to be laid in the way of the growth of this 
offspring. A word may occasionally have fallen from the 
lips of the Grand Admiral, indicating that Germany might 
perhaps consider the idea of a certain proportion between 
the strengths of the two fleets. But no practical consequences 
followed any such statement; Germany wished to remain 
free, and did remain free in the development of her naval 
forces. 

So far as the most important question which occupied 
it was concerned, the second Hague Conference passed off 
as ineffectively as the first. The crisis with regard to 
Bosnia-Herzegovina revealed Germany as the second stand- 
ing behind her ally with mailed fist threateningly raised aloft; 
and it brought the danger of a European war so near at 
hand that it required all the compliance which Russia could 
muster and all the good counsel of England and France to 
prevent even at that date the outbreak of the world con- 
flagration. 

All these facts, and many others which would take too 
long to enumerate here, occasioned and promoted King Ed- 
ward's policy of rendering the situation innocuous; it was 
not a policy of war, but a policy of peace; its tendency was 
directed, not to the disturbance, but to the maintenance of 
European peace. This maintenance, it was rightly believed, 



132 THE CRIME 

could best be achieved by the creation of a Triple Entente as 
nearly as possible equal in value and in strength to the 
Triple Alliance. As the tendency of German naval prepara- 
tion was expressly in the direction of securing the creation of 
a navy so strong, that even the strongest opponent could not 
oppose it in war without danger to her own sea power, so 
the tendency in the creation of the Entente was in the 'direc- 
tion of opposing to the Triple Alliance with the super-power- 
ful Germany at its head, a coalition which, it was true, was 
only in part linked together by a firm alliance but which 
on the approach of any dispute which threatened war was 
designed to constitute so strong an opposition that even the 
greatest military power in the world could not risk a war 
without danger to herself. 

From this standpoint, from the point of view of the peace- 
ful intentions of the Triple Entente — which as we shall see 
later cannot be transformed into an intention for war even 
by the revelations of the Belgian archives — the greater part 
of German war literature, in so far as it relates to the more 
remote antecedents of the war, appears at once as untenable 
and fatuous. The defenders of Germany are constantly refer- 
ring to the discussions between English and French military 
officers, and between English and Belgian military officers, to 
the correspondence between Grey and Paul Cambon in No- 
vember, 1 9 12, to the intended Anglo-Russian naval conven- 
tion, the foundations of which are said to have been laid by 
Isvolsky in the spring of 19 14 on the occasion of the visit 
to Paris of the English King and Queen. All the details 
of these military agreements between the Entente Powers are 
dished up in a sensational form to the German public, who 
are informed of the landing of English troops in Denmark or 
Schleswig-Holstein, the transport of Russian troops to Pom- 
mern by English merchantmen, the dispatch of auxiliary Eng- 
lish troops to Belgium and France, etc. Even if all these de- 
tails were true, they do not furnish the slightest proof of 
the intention to carry out a predatory attack; they rather 
represent military measures which in themselves might just 



THEORY AND PRACTICE 133 

as well serve a war of defence as a war of aggression. They 
thus furnish no circumstantial evidence to which appeal could 
be made as the basis for a preventive war. 

Indeed one may go even further; even if it were proved 
— for which, however, there is in fact no evidence — that these 
actions of a military and naval character, which are alleged 
to have been concerted, were primary in character and that 
thus they were acts intended to anticipate a German attack, 
even this would not show that they were designed to serve 
a predatory war of aggression. Is it not the case that a 
Prussian has laid down the military principle that "the best 
defence lies in the attack"? Are we not told that Germany 
and Austria began the present "war of defence" by issuing 
the decisive declarations of war themselves, and by the in- 
vasion of foreign countries? How can the people who at- 
tacked Serbia, Belgium, Russia and France, the people who 
wage a war that has been "forced upon" them, dare to as- 
sert that an aggressive war cannot at the same time be a war 
of defence. Even if the military agreements between the 
general army and naval staffs of the Entente Powers had 
constituted an alliance of obligation — which is not the case 
— even if they had been contrived as military measures of 
aggression and were proved as such — which is still less the 
case — there would still be not the slightest evidence for the 
assertion that the Entente Powers contemplated a predatory 
attack on Germany and her allies; there would still remain 
the explanation, for which equal justification could be ad- 
vanced, that these military actions were intended, on the Prus- 
sian model, as acts of aggression for the purpose of de- 
fence. 

The burden of proving the intention to embark on purely 
spontaneous acts of aggression directed towards the anni- 
hilation and dismemberment of Germany lies on those who 
deduce from these aggressive intentions the fact that Ger- 
many had a right to adopt preventive measures. Such a 
proof, if it is to form the basis of so portentous a decision 
for war, must conform to strict standards and must not rest 
merely on probabilities and presumptions. The proof of this 



134 THE CRIME 

has, however, been nowhere seriously embarked upon, much 
less furnished with success. In dealing with Schiemann I 
have sufficiently characterised the methods of proof adopted, 
and I need not return to the point here. The question has 
been put with sufficient precision by the preventionists ; it is 
the question, already touched on above, of the "inevitable" 
war; but the answer which they give is distinguished by any- 
thing but precision. 

What is the meaning of "inevitable"? We may describe 
a thing as inevitable when it can in no way be avoided, when 
its occurrence is absolutely certain, like the rising of the sun 
in the morning or its setting in the evening. What mortal 
man will presume so to penetrate into the mysteries of in- 
scrutable destiny as to dare to predicate the inevitability of 
a future event? Who claims the gift of prophecy whereby 
he can foretell the future with such certainty as to build on 
a future event the most momentous resolutions in the present ? 
Who possesses the Promethean presumption to speak of "in- 
evitability" in matters of human decision which can always 
be averted and which, whether in agreement with or contrary 
to the will of the actors, may turn out for good or for evil? 
It is only the forces of Nature that are inevitable because they 
are not subject to the determination of the human will. 
Where man has to will and to act, everything can be averted 
except the consequences of his actions, and these follow his 
actions as a shadow follows the human figure, small or great, 
broad or narrow, according as they are illumined by the sun 
of a higher power of destiny. The rumble of an earthquake, 
the outburst of a thunderstorm are inevitable. The rumble 
of war, the outburst of a revolution can always be averted. 

It is therefore something "beyond our power," indeed be- 
yond the power of our nationalistic supermen, to prove the 
inevitability of a war even if they attempted to furnish this 
proof by better means than those on which in fact they rely. 
I have undertaken to prove the contrary proposition in op- 
position to their assertion that the Entente Powers intended 
a European war and that they meant in this way to an- 
nihilate Germany and Austria. This counter-proof may be 



THEORY AND PRACTICE 135 

regarded as successful or unsuccessful, but the failure of the 
counter-proof in no way implies the success of the proof of 
the main proposition, the burden of which falls on my op- 
ponent. I have proved, and by means of further evidence I 
will later on support my assertion : 

That the tendencies to war were stronger and more 
dangerous in Germany than anywhere else in the world; 

That the military preparations of Germany exceeded 
those of all other countries in strength and extent; 

That the collaboration for war between the German 
and the Austrian armies was more precisely and more 
carefully studied and prepared than in the case of the 
Entente Powers; 

That the strategic plans of Germany (the attack on 
Belgium and France as the prelude, followed by the 
crushing of Russia) had an expressly aggressive charac- 
ter. 

I have quoted from Bernhardi's famous book the sentence 
which pitilessly demolishes all the preventionists : "Neither 
France nor Russia nor England need to attack in order to 
further their interests." I shall quote later a series of utter- 
ances in the imperialistic Press, which, like Bernhardi, pro- 
claim the imperialistic war of conquest without any rag to 
cover their shame in the form of talk about "prevention 
against hostile attack." These gentlemen might indeed be 
left to themselves : the imperialist completely disposes of the 
preventionist. Many who oscillate backwards and forwards 
between preventionism and imperialism, like Harden for ex- 
ample, at one time declare that it is a shameful thing to con- 
ceal the good German right to strive for world-power behind 
the cowardly bulwark of the "defence of the frontier/' while 
at another time, when preventionism suits their purpose, they 
speak of the right and the duty of the anticipated defence 
against future attack. 

Although the burden of proof does not lie upon me, I have 
produced sufficient proof and testimony from the German 



136 THE CRIME 

imperialistic camp itself (and later will produce more) in sup- 
port of my assertion that the Entente Powers did not intend 
the European War. The proof of the contrary assertion is 
still lacking. The basis of the theory of prevention thus fails; 
it is left hanging in mid-air, since its presupposition, the in- 
evitability of a hostile attack, is, to say the least, unproved — 
in reality, for anyone who will follow what I have said, it is 
directly refuted. 

The Military Preparations of the (Triple Entente 
and the Triple Alliance 

I said above that the miltary preparations of Germany had 
exceeded those of all other countries in strength and extent. 
In J' accuse (page 32) in a section entitled: "Have we been 
attacked or were we going to be attacked?" I have already 
pointed out the grounds which for years have been deceitfully 
advanced by the German War party to prove the aggressive 
attentions of the Entente Powers: 

" 'What did they mean by their enormous preparations ?' is 
what they most frequently say. And what about our prepara- 
tions? I reply, which were certainly greater and more compre- 
hensive than in any other country in the world. Did ever any 
country in time of peace act as we did in 19 13 when we suddenly 
raised the strength of our army on a peace footing by 140,000 
men, that is to say, from 720,000 to 860,000, and when we rose 
to an extraordinary war tax of £50,000,000?" 

This sentence has been attacked by various of my oppo- 
nents and the contrary assertion has been advanced that the 
Entente Powers, Russia, England and France, were more 
strongly armed for war than Germany, Austria and Italy, 
the Powers of the Triple Alliance. Since the assertion also 
frequently recurs in the German literature of defence, ^con- 
sider it expedient to enter more closely into this question of 
military statistics, although it is only very loosely connected 
with my sentences quoted above. Every unprejudiced reader 
will at once see that these sentences in my book did not pur- 



THEORY AND PRACTICE 137 

port to give a statistical comparison of figures, but that the 
whole stress was laid on the sudden increase in the effective 
peace strength by 140,000 men and on the unprecedented 
German device of a war tax of £50,000,000 in times of peace. 
Such a sudden and entirely unexplained increase in the effec- 
tive peace strength of the army never took place to the same 
extent in any other country and it evoked the alarm and 
the astonishment of the whole world and materially con- 
tributed to the baneful process of rendering more acute the 
tension in the European situation; it is for this unprovoked 
and provocative increase, taken in conjunction with the sudden 
war-tax of £50,000,000 and current over-expenditure of 
£10,000,000 that J' accuse reproaches the German Govern- 
ment and their war-intriguers, when these deceive the Ger- 
man people by representing the military preparations of the 
other side as indications of an aggressive intention. It is 
this fatal incident of the military law of 191 3 which the de- 
fenders of Germany now endeavour, by giving falsely the 
sequence of events in time, to represent as the consequence 
of the prolongation of the period of service in France, whereas 
in fact it was its cause — it is this irresponsible attack on the 
quiet and peaceful development of Europe, which at that 
moment appeared to some extent to be secured as a result of 
the propitious efforts for peace in the Balkan crisis — it is 
this dangerous preparation for war and the awakening of 
bellicose instincts which the sentences in question were meant 
to denounce; it was not intended to furnish numerical statis- 
tics relating to the military strength of the various nations 
on a peace basis. Only a malicious misapprehension of the 
meaning and context of the relevant sentences could lead 
my opponents to display their statistical compilations in 
refutation of my alleged assertions. Tant pis pour eux! I 
will now prove that even on the ground of statistics, that is 
to say of correct and appropriate statistics, their assertion 
that the Entente Powers were more strongly armed is un- 
tenable, and that, on the contrary, there was a consider- 
able preponderance in armaments on the part of the Powers 
of the Triple Alliance. 



138 THE CRIME 



Which Side made greater Military Preparations 
before the war, the triple alliance or the 
Triple Entente? 

It is clear that in answering the question which of the 
two groups made greater military preparations it is neces- 
sary to ignore entirely the arrangements which have been 
produced in the course of this war. These arrangements 
could not be foreseen with certainty by either side and might, 
according to the formation assumed, strongly modify or in- 
deed completely upset the proportional strength of the two 
groups. If, for example, England had remained neutral — 
a consummation which up to the last moment Germany sought 
to attain — the military preponderance would from the first 
moment have been on the side of the Central Powers, even 
if Italy had refrained from entering, or indeed even if she 
had supported the other side. While on the one side Italy 
and Roumania have increased the military forces of the Triple 
Entente, on the other side Bulgaria and Turkey have joined 
the group of the Central Powers. Further, the possibility 
of other groupings in the future is not excluded. It is im- 
possible to base a comparison of the strength of the two 
parties on all these transpositions which have already taken 
place, or may yet take place, or to invoke them in answering 
the question which side had made greater military prepara- 
tions before the war. This question can only be decided ac- 
cording to the state of the alliances or ententes as they then 
existed. The purpose of these groupings was the mutual 
keeping-in-check by means of the menace exerted by the in- 
struments of force on both sides. The increase of these in- 
struments of force on the one side, that is to say, the height- 
ened menace had to be compensated by an increase of the in- 
struments of force on the other side. This was the famil- 
iar endless screw. The investigation with which we are at 
the moment concerned is aimed at determining which group 
took the initiative in putting the screw on more tightly, and 
thereby rendered more acute the state of tension in Europe. 



THEORY AND PRACTICE 139 

This question can be determined only on the basis of the for- 
mation of groups as they then existed, not on the basis of 
war-combinations which have supervened at a later date. 

A further point of departure which is obvious for everyone 
of impartial judgment, and for this reason is almost univer- 
sally ignored by my opponents is that the comparison of the 
armaments of the two groups of Powers cannot be established 
by reference to absolute numbers, but only in comparison 
to the figures for the population. 

It is only a fool or a knave who could undertake the task 
of comparing together absolute 'figures with reference to 
military armaments, in order to deduce conclusions with re- 
gard to the greater or less "militarism" of the States in ques; 
tion. That militarism is not identical with military prepara- 
tions is a point I have elsewhere sufficiently explained, and I 
need not return to it here. If the object is to institute a com- 
parison between military figures, it is self-evident that abso- 
lute figures give no standard for the degree of these military 
preparations ; in each State the important point is rather that 
of the proportion between the entire population and the 
strength of the army on a peace and a war basis. By means 
of absolute figures we arrive at entirely meaningless con- 
clusions. Let us assume that a State of five million inhabi- 
tants supports 500,000 soldiers in time of peace, that is to say 
10 per cent, of its population, and that another with thirty 
million inhabitants supports 1,000,000, that is to say 3 1-3 
per cent, of its population. Which is more strongly armed, 
the former or the latter State? Without doubt the former, 
although taking the absolute figures it supports only half the 
soldiers of the latter. Those who are perpetually blind would, 
however, see in the State of thirty million inhabitants half 
a million more combatants on the field, and would at once 
triumphantly exclaim : "You see for yourself which side is 
making the stronger preparations." 

The comparison of military figures is an extremely diffi- 
cult operation since the statistics in the various countries are 
estimated from different points of view, and the various cate- 



140 THE CRIME 

gories of troops are arranged in different ways. I confess 
that I am a layman in military matters and must be content 
to assure the reader that to the best of my knowledge and 
conscience I have made use of various sources which I have 
compared together, and that I have entered in my tables those 
figures which receive general confirmation. The books which 
I have consulted are: Hickmann, Universal Pocket-Atlas of 
1915; Justus Perthes (Gotha), Pocket Atlas of 1916; The 
Statistical Y ear-Book for the German Empire of 19 14, etc. 

In order to overcome my defective knowledge of the special 
subject and to avoid any charge of tendencious compilation, 
in addition to my own compilations from the sources men- 
tioned I have consulted a military expert belonging to a neu- 
tral country. The statements of this expert with regard to 
the war and the peace strength of the six European great 
States are, according to the assurance of this gentleman, "de- 
termined by a similar method of calculation, so far as this is 
possible having regard to the divergency in the organisa- 
tions of the armies." All these difficulties in the comparison 
of military statistics have, of course, no existence for most 
of my opponents; as a rule they rely on any compilation 
which appears to be particularly favourable to their asser- 
tions, whether or not it can lay claim to any special authority. 
They omit any comparison with other estimates, any more 
detailed investigation of the system of calculation adopted by 
their authority, and by means of this most superficial of all 
methods of demonstration they seek to refute alleged asser- 
tions of the accuser which, in fact, he never advanced. In the 
first place I accused the Government and the rulers of Ger- 
many of having always taken the lead in turning still further 
with a dangerous suddenness the endless screw of arma- 
ments, and further that they and their allies were relatively 
— that is to say, in proportion to the figures of the popula- 
tion — more strongly armed than the other European Great 
States. 

The former charge I have already proved elsewhere. The 
latter charge I will now prove. 



THEORY AND PRACTICE 141 

I 

Effective Peace Strength of Army and Navy 

Germany 1 .. 868,000 men France .. 713,000 men 

Austria .. 435,000 " Russia .. 1,448,000 " 

Italy . . 343,000 " England 2 . . 613,000 " 



1 ,646,000 men 2,774,000 men 

Accordingly, the proportion existing between the military 
preparations of the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente in 
times of peace is approximately 1 :i.68; this, be it observed, 
is on the basis of the figures most favourable to the Triple 
Alliance. 

If in place of the above figures I take those furnished to 
me by my military expert, the relation between the Triple 
Alliance and the Triple Entente is as follows: 

Germany . . 870,000 France . . 750,000 

Austria-Hungary 414,000 England .. 170,000 

Italy . . 305,000 Russia . .1 1,200,000 



1,589,000 2,120,000 

According to these figures, the ratio of the military prepa- 
rations of the Triple Alliance to those of the Triple Entente 
in time of peace is approximately 1 :i-33. 

1 So far as the forces of the German Empire by sea and land are con- 
cerned the Year Book for 1914 gives a total strength in peace of approxi- 
mately 880,000 men. In order to apply the same standard to Germany 
and to other countries, I have restricted myself to the compilation in 
Gotha, which gives for Germany 868,000 men, and thus falls short of the 
official figures. 

2 The total English strength is given by Hickmann at only 570,000 men, 
including the troops stationed in India. In order to avoid the charge 
of a prejudiced reduction of the figures, I have taken the higher figure 
from Gotha. One of my opponents indeed estimates the English army 
on a peace footing at only 285,000 men; although, it is true, he estimates 
the entire peace strength of the Entente at 3,035,000. 



142 



THE CRIME 



II 

What now is the ratio between the figures for the popula- 
tion of the two groups? Here again I follow Gotha, and dis- 
tinguish between the European population and the whole 
population. 



European Population 



Germany- 
Austria 
Italy 



68 millions 

53 " 

36 " 



France 
Russia 
England 



40 millions 
140 
46 " 



157 millions 



226 millions 



The European populations of the two groups of Powers 
thus stand to each other in the ratio of approximately 
1 n.44, so that the peace strength of the Entente Powers, 
measured on the basis of the European population: 

(a) If I take the figures in Gotha, only exceeds that of 
the Triple Alliance by 0.24 (1.68 — 1.44) ; 

(&) If I take the figures of my expert, it is indeed 0.11 
(1.44 — i-33) behind that of the Triple Alliance. Had I 
chosen to make use of statistics which give the figures for 
the Triple Alliance slightly higher and those of the Triple 
Entente slightly lower than those given in Gotha, the ratio 
between the number of troops and the population would have 
been almost identical in the two groups. 

In the face of these facts one of my opponents ventures the 
assertion that in 19 14 the peace-strength of the armies of the 
Triple Entente was more than double that of the Triple 
Alliance ! 

5|C ?Ji 3|C 5Jt 3J5 #|* 

This is the situation if the calculation is based on the 
European population of all the States. This standard is, how- 
ever, not appropriate; for not only are the armies partially 
composed of colonial troops, but they are also intended to 
afford protection by sea and by land to the colonies outside 



THEORY AND PRACTICE 143 

the Mother Country. The greater the extent of the colonial 
territory and the colonial population, the stronger will be the 
protection required for possessions abroad. In deciding the 
question which was more strongly armed in peace, it is thus 
impossible to leave aside the other question : Which side had 
a greater population to protect by its military forces within 
and without Europe? 

Apart from this point of view consideration must also be 
given to the other point already indicated above. The ratio 
of the number of troops in each country to its own popula- 
tion becomes less the wider the circle of this population is 
drawn. If the English military forces are compared with 
the 46 million inhabitants of the United Kingdom, a very 
different result is obtained from that arrived at if the 377 
million inhabitants outside the kingdom are included. In 
reality they must be included, for the English peace-army is 
not only partially recruited from English possessions in other 
quarters of the globe, but it also serves to protect these pos- 
sessions and to maintain the English world-empire. 

In the case of Russia the addition of the Asiatic posses- 
sions, etc., with approximately 36 million inhabitants to the 
140 millions of European Russia is all the more imperative, 
inasmuch as the Russian Empire forms a connected territory 
complete in itself, and therefore its military forces cannot be 
divided into a European and an extra-European force. In 
order to arrive at a result in our calculation in correspond- 
ence with the actual relations, it is necessary to compare the 
entire Russian population (as well as the English and 
French) with their military forces by sea and by land. 

From this point of view the following result is obtained: 

Entire Population 

Germany . . 80 millions France . . 86 millions 

Austria • • 53 " Russia ..176 " 

Italy ..38 " England ..1423 " 

171 millions 685 millions 



144 THE CRIME 

The figures for the population of the two groups of Pow- 
ers are thus almost in the ratio of 1:4. Their strength on a 
peace-basis, as we have seen above, is according to Gotha 
only 1 :i.68. In other words in order to be armed to the 
same extent as the Triple Alliance the Entente Powers ought 
to have had four times as many soldiers in times of peace as 
those maintained by the Triple Alliance; instead of 2,774,000 
men they ought to have had 6,600,000 men under arms. 
They were thus 4,000,000 men below the level of the military 
preparations of the Triple Alliance. 



Ill 

Even more surprising is the result if we investigate the 

War-Strength 

of the two groups of Powers by reference to the figures for 
the population. 

The ratio of the European populations to each other, as I 
have shown above, is according to Gotha 1:1.44; the Triple 
Alliance comprises 157 million and the Triple Entente 226 
million. 

The ratio of the entire population in the two cases is, ac- 
cording to Gotha, almost the same as given by Hickmann, 
namely, 1 : 4=171 million : 685 million. 

(a) According to Hickmann we get the following figures 
for the war-strength for the army and navy: 

Germany . . 3,000,000 men France . . 2,350,000 men 
Austria . . 1,800,000 " Russia . .1 4,600,000 " 

Italy . . . . 1,100,000 " England . . 1,080,000 " 



5,900,000 men 8,030,000 men 

The ratio is thus 1 :i-36. 

Since the European populations of the two groups of 
Powers are in the ratio of 1:1.44 there is a deficiency in 
the military preparations of the Entente Powers for war of 



THEORY AND PRACTICE 145 

0.08. If, however, as I consider is necessary, we take as the 
standard the entire population of all States within and with- 
out Europe, the ratio of which is 1:4, there is a deficiency 
in military preparations on the part of the Triple Entente of 
2.64 (4 — 1.36) ; in other words, the Triple Alliance could 
have increased its war-preparations to 23,600,000 men (four 
times the war-preparations of the Triple Alliance) and would 
only then have reached the level of preparation of the Triple 
Alliance. 



(b) According to Gotha, the figures are as follows: 

Germany.. 5,077,000 men France . .» 4,120,000 
Austria . . 1,920,000 " Russia . . 4,048,000 

Italy . . 1,220,000 " England . .1 1,281,000 



8,2 1 7,000 men 9,449,000 men 
The ratio is thus 1 11.15. 

(c) According to the calculations of my military expert, 

the strength of the European Great Powers on a war basis 
is as follows: 

Germany . . 5,800,000 France . . 4,200,000 

Austria-Hungary 2,000,000 England . . 800,000 

Italy . . 1,100,000 Russia . . 7,668,000 



8,900,000 12,668,000 

The ratio is thus 1 :i.42. 

Accordingly, on the basis of the figures in Gotha, it fol- 
lows that if only the European population is taken into con- 
sideration, there is a deficiency in the military preparations 
of the Entente States compared with the Triple Alliance of 
1.44— 1.15=0.29. 

If the calculation is based on the figures of my military 
expert and the European population as given by Gotha, there 
is on the part of the Entente less preparation for war by 0.02 
than in the case of the Triple Alliance (1.44 — 1.42). 



146 THE CRIME 

If, however, as I consider necessary and right, the entire 
population is considered, we find on the figures' given by 
Gotha the enormous deficiency in military preparation on the 
part of the Entente Powers of 4 — 1.15 = 2.85 ; on the figure 
of my expert of 4 — 1.42 = 2.58. In other words the Triple 
Alliance could have raised its war-preparation to 32,- 
800,000 or to 35,600,000 men (four times the war-prepara- 
tion of the Triple Alliance) and would only then have reached 
the level of preparation of the Triple Alliance. 

The deficiency in the preparations of the Entente Powers 
appears most stupendous, if we accept as correct the war- 
strengths of the two groups of Powers as put forward by 
one of my opponents on the basis of his authorities, and if we 
are allowed to compare the strength on a war basis as so 
given with the entire populations. The writer <in question 
gives the ratio of the war strength of the Triple Alliance to 
that of the Triple Entente as approximately n : 12, that is 
to say, 11 million to 12 million men. As the entire popula- 
tion of the Triple Alliance as shown above is to that of the 
Triple Alliance in the relation of 1 : 4, the war strength of 
the Entente Powers ought to have amounted to 44 million 
men in order to remain on the same level as that of the Triple 
Alliance. Since it only amounts to 12 million men it remains 
behind the war level of the Triple Alliance by the gigantic 
figure of 32 million. 

This is the result of the comparison, if we occupy the same 
ground as my opponents — if, totally ignoring the essence and 
the kernel of the question in dispute, we entirely leave aside 
the priority and the suddenness of the increase in Germany's 
forces, and only rely on the figures giving the strength of 
the army, although no doubt on the basis of the number of the 
population. On their own ground my opponents are defeated, 
and they themselves deserve the charge of "superficiality," 
which here again they are unable to refrain from throwing 
in the face of the author of J'accuse. 



THEORY AND PRACTICE 147 



The Fall of Delcasse (June, 1905) 

After this military digression, rendered necessary by the 
citation of military statistics by my opponents, I return to 
my subject, to my assertion that never on any occasion has 
there been produced the slightest proof, resting either on 
military or on diplomatic facts, in support of the alleged ag- 
gressive intentions of the Entente Powers, nor has the at- 
tempt to furnish such a proof ever been seriously made. Al- 
though, as has already been observed, the burden of proving 
the contrary in no way devolves upon me, I will neverthe- 
less here consider a question, already briefly touched on 
above, which the German preventionists habitually emphasise 
with special zeal as a sign of the bellicose intentions of Eng- 
land and France. 

In June, 1905, as is well known, Delcasse, then Minister 
for Foreign Affairs, the man who is always represented in 
Germany as the prototype of a French politician of revenge, 
fell as a consequence of the Moroccan conflict. In his de- 
fence Delcasse made in the Paris Matin, in October of the 
same year, certain revelations relating to his negotiations 
with the English Government and the events in the Cabinet 
which led to his fall. I intentionally quote these revelations 
according to the account given by Helmolt (The Secret An- 
tecedents of the War) because this account of the literary 
leader of the preventionists is certainly beyond suspicion so 
far as concerns the foundation of the idea of prevention. 
According to this version Delcasse revealed in the Matin the 
"astonishing secret" : 

France had been informed by England that should France 
be attacked, England was ready to occupy the Kaiser- Wilhelm 
Canal and to disembark 100,000 men in Schleswig-Holstein. If 
France wished, England would repeat this offer in writing 
(page 13). 

In nis speech of defence in the Cabinet Delcasse, according 
to Helmolt's account, also communicated to his colleagues in 



148 THE CRIME 

the Ministry the fact "that England was ready to support 
France to the end and to stand by her should she be attacked 
in the near future." To the account thus given by Delcasse, 
Stephen Lauzanne, in the Matin of October 8th, 1905, added 
the following memorable words (which I also quote from 
Helmolt) : 

If Herr von Biilow complains of the desire to isolate Germany, 
he should much rather ask himself the question whether it is 
not Germany by her own action that is isolating herself from 
the rest of Europe. The creators of the distrust and suspicious 
hatred which every day more and more ensnare the German 
Empire are not Delcasse and Lansdowne, they are not Edward 
VII and Roosevelt; their names are Bismarck and Moltke, 
William II and Biilow. These are the men who have created 
and developed the bristling Empire, stiff with steel, irritating 
and irritated, the empire which for a quarter of a century has 
faced Europe with a look of challenge and at which Europe 
herself must in the end be compelled to look askance. It is these 
men who, by continuing increasingly to Prussianise it, rob Ger- 
many of that sympathy which was formerly assured to it by 
its activity in learning and by its sincere modesty. It is these 
men who in our time, which was once thought humane, have 
evoked barbaric threats and enkindled brutal passions. Europe 
is afraid of the fire which burns unceasingly in Berlin and is 
already prudently banding itself together (pages 17, 18). 

Delcasse' s revelations and Lauzanne's commentary which 
in Helmolt's view clearly reveal the "devilish league" for the 
suppression of Germany, prove to the unprejudiced reader 
exactly the opposite; they express in unambiguous terms the 
exclusively defensive intentions of the Anglo-French Entente. 
They aptly describe the reason and the origin of the Euro- 
pean tension; they lay the finger on the wound in revealing 
that the cause of the chain of defence which was being more 
and more surely forged was to be found in the fear of the 
fire that was burning in Berlin, in the distrust felt towards 
the Empire stiff with steel, irritating and irritated. The reve- 
lations in the Matin became in the Press of Europe and more 
especially in that of England a subject of lively discussion. 



THEORY AND PRACTICE 149 

The English Government (which was at the time still repre- 
sented by Lord Lansdowne) as well as the inspired and non- 
inspired Press of England disputed certain details in Del- 
casse's revelation, particularly the military preparations al- 
leged to have been planned, but they did not deny that Eng- 
land would be ready to extend military support to the French 
Republic in the event of an unprovoked attack on France. 
The Times then wrote (I quote according to Helmolt, page 
19): 

M. t)elcasse, the Matin affirms, informed his colleagues in 
the Ministry that England was ready to support France, and 
that in the event of an unexpected act of aggression directed 
against France, England would side with the Republic. With 
that statement we have no fault to find. We do not at all doubt 
that in such a contingency the English Government would 
have supported France with the hearty approval of the na- 
tion. 1 

No agreement on these lines was, as we know, concluded, 
but, as is shown by the correspondence between Grey and 
Cambon in November, 19 12, even in the event of an unpro- 
voked German attack it was still left free to England to 
decide whether she would or would not afford military sup- 
port to the party attacked. This point is not, however, rele- 
vant to our present inquiry. It is sufficient for me to point 
out here that even this alleged portentous agreement which is 
supposed to reveal the "devilish intentions" of our oppo- 
nents, even if it were true in all its details, had no offensive 
character but a clearly expressed defensive character. 
"Should France be attacked" England was ready to give 
military assistance — that is how the position is expressed in 
the revelations in the Matin and in the confirmation by the 
Times. It does not deal with the position, "should France 
attack." Europe was afraid of Berlin, and therefore it com- 
bined together — so runs the commentary of Stephen Lau- 
zanne. Where is there any question here or elsewhere of in- 
tentions to annihilate or to attack Germany? Where is there 

1 [Times, October 9th, 1905.] 



150 THE CRIME 

the slightest indication of aggressive war, the "inevitable" 
war, which it was necessary to anticipate by a preventive 
war? If Delcasse fell from office merely because of this 
defensive agreement, merely because France in her prudence 
and anxiety saw in it a provocation of her dangerous neigh- 
bour, what would have been the fate of a French Minister 
or of a President of the Republic who should have enter- 
tained the insensate idea of plunging the pacific and demo- 
cratic commonwealth into sanguinary and war-like adven- 
tures to please a few irresponsible jingoes and intriguers. 
Poincare would not have remained a day longer at the head 
of the Republic if he had ever entertained or announced such 
ideas of war. The completely pacific party of Radicals and 
Socialists of the Left who gained so brilliant an electoral 
victory in the spring of 1914 would not have tolerated for 
another day a Ministry which had endeavoured to ease the 
European tension by the sanguinary struggle of arms instead 
of by a pacific understanding. If even the creator of the de- 
fensive Entente of 1904 was regarded as a dangerous prov- 
ocator and had to give way to threats from without and 
to his opponents within, what fate would have been in store 
for a President who was eager for aggression ? No, all these 
alleged aggressive intentions are merely lies and inventions, 
inventions for which in the past there was no proof and 
which quite recently, in the days before the outbreak of war, 
were contradicted by the indefatigable efforts made by France 
for the maintenance of peace. 

Delcasse's fall in 1905 proves exactly the opposite of what 
our chauvinists seek to infer from it. It proves : 

Firstly, that even the Minister of the Republic who is 
denounced in Germany as the most pernicious instigator 
of war, never aimed at anything more than the protec- 
tion of France against German attack; and 

Secondly, that even this purely defensive policy cost 
him his office, because of the desire under all circum- 
stances to prevent a provocation of distrust and suspi- 
cion on the part of Germany. 



THEORY AND PRACTICE 151 

So even this argument which is regarded as specially co- 
gent turns out solely to the disadvantage of the preventionists. 



The Jury Court of the World 

If a world-jury were called upon to decide the question of 
guilt, there are two main questions and a number of sub- 
sidiary ones which would be submitted for an answer. The 
two main questions are: — 

Are the Central Powers, Germany and Austria, wag- 
ing an aggressive war ? Or : 

Are they waging a war of defence? 

If the first question is answered in the affirmative then, 
in the unanimous judgment of the world, in which the ac- 
cused themselves could not refuse their concurrence, sen- 
tence would be passed. 

If the second question is answered in the affirmative the 
accused must be acquitted — and this judgment also would 
secure the approval of the whole world. 

So far the decision is clear and simple. The difficulties in 
the question to be put and in the answer to be given only arise 
on the subsidiary questions which must be added to the main 
question first mentioned. These subsidiary questions relate 
to the preventive war, which is in itself an aggressive war, 
but is conducted under circumstances and for reasons which 
make it appear, at least in the sense of the preventionists, 
justifiable and therefore undeserving of punishment. In the 
event of the first-mentioned question being answered in the 
affirma:ive the counsel for the defence in the process before 
the jury of the world would therefore have to put the follow- 
ing secondary question : 

"Is it true that the aggressive war begun by the ac- 
cused was solely undertaken with the object of antici- 
pating an aggressive war from the other side, which was 
certain and could not otherwise be avoided?" 



152 THE CRIME 

Always assuming the permissibility on principle of the 
preventive war, this secondary question, if answered in the 
affirmative, would furnish a ground for not imposing a pun- 
ishment, which notwithstanding that the main question of 
guilt was answered in the affirmative would necessarily lead 
to the acquittal of the accused. 

But the matter would not be disposed of with this one 
secondary question. The public prosecutor would have to 
ask a further subsidiary question in the event of an affirma- 
tive answer being given to the first main question and the 
first subsidiary question. This question would be to the 
following effect: 

"Is it true that the accused by their own action have 
produced a situation in Europe which has made possible 
or has occasioned the aggressive intention of the oppos- 
ing party?" 

This secondary subsidiary question, which is to be asked in 
the event of an affirmative answer being given to the first 
main question and the first subsidiary question, relates to the 
account (in my first book and in this work) which ends with 
the demonstration of the fact that it is not the Entente Pow- 
ers but the Central Powers which bear the guilt (or at least 
the chief guilt) of the state of European tension, of the con- 
stant friction and danger of war, the guilt of the continued 
existence of international anarchy and of the competition of 
armaments. Assuming then that it were true — though, of 
course, it is untrue, and is here only regarded as a hypothesis 
— that the Entente Powers entertained aggressive intentions 
against the Central Powers, the existence of such warlike in- 
tentions, even if demonstrated, would not excuse the pre- 
ventive war on the part of the Central Powers because they 
themselves, in the language of the above formula, "have 
produced a situation which has made possible or has occa- 
sioned the aggressive intention of the opposing party." Even 
on the hypothesis most favourable to the accused, on the 
hypothesis of a preventive war provoked by the positive ag- 



THEORY AND PRACTICE 153 

gressive intentions of the opposing party, the second sub- 
sidiary question would still have to be answered against the 
Central Powers, and sentence would accordingly have to be 
passed. 

As the facts stand, however, this case, which is taken as 
the most favourable hypothesis, does not arise. For even 
the first subsidiary question relating to the preventive war 
must be answered in the negative, so that there is no occa- 
sion to answer the second subsidiary question. 

Why must the question relating to the preventive war be 
answered in the negative? 

Because without exception all the presuppositions which 
would justify prevention, even from the standpoint of the 
preventionists, are absent. 

(a) There is a complete absence of any proof that 
an aggressive war was intended by the other side. On 
the contrary, this assertion is refuted. 

(b) There is no proof — here again the contrary is 
rather proved — that the war was exclusively undertaken 
for the purpose of anticipating an aggressive war. The 
antecedents of the war at every stage and in every aspect 
show that the question was not one of an anticipatory 
war of defence, but of a carefully prepared and pre- 
meditated war of imperialistic extension. 

(c) Above all, there is an absence of proof that the 
alleged aggressive war from the other side — assuming, 
indeed, that aggressive intentions on the other side ex- 
isted and were proved — could not be avoided otherwise 
than by a war of prevention. Here also the contrary is 
proved; namely, that the war could have been avoided, 
had Germany and Austria lent a willing ear to the count- 
less proposals for mediation and for arriving at an un- 
derstanding, had they — to name only one point — gone 
so far as to accept merely the convocation of the Hague 
Tribunal. It was easier to avoid war than to provoke it. 
It could have been avoided by an honourable and sin- 



154 THE CRIME 

cere desire for peace; it could only be provoked by sub- 
terfuges, ambiguities, procrastinations and, finally, bru- 
tality. 

Altogether, then, even assuming the standpoint of principle 
adopted by the preventive politicians, there is a complete ab- 
sence of all the actual presuppositions which might make pre- 
vention in the case before us appear justified, and therefore 
as undeserving of punishment. The first subsidiary question 
with regard to the war of prevention must therefore be an- 
swered in the negative on grounds of fact, so that no answer 
need be given to the second question relating to the responsi- 
bility for the state of tension and its explosions, a question 
which had only to be raised in the event of the first being 
answered in the affirmative. The world-jury must in any 
case arrive at a verdict against the Central Powers, whether 
it answers both the subsidiary questions or the first only. 
If it denies the existence of a preventive war, the purely ag- 
gressive war remains. If it affirms its existence on grounds 
of principle and of fact, this favourable verdict must be re- 
scinded by the affirmative answer to the second subsidiary 
question, which lays on the Central Powers the burden of the 
guilt of the anarchical and nervous state of Europe, which 
was full of the promise of war. 

In all these discussions which cannot but lead to a result 
unfavourable to the Central Powers, no matter how the ques- 
tion is viewed, I have entirely disregarded the fact that even 
if prevention is admitted in principle, on general grounds, 
nevertheless, prevention against an attack which in the calcu- 
lation of our preventionists was planned to take place only 
in two or three years' time is opposed to all principles of 
right and of reason. 

The example of the "state of defence" (Notwehr) ad- 
mitted in criminal law may here be regarded as entirely in 
point. I do not see why the anticipatory right of defence 
(Verteidigungsrecht) of a State with its enormous world- 
shaking consequences should be more widely extended than 



THEORY AND PRACTICE 155 

the right of defence of an individual whose act of self-de- 
fence (N otwehrakt) affects only the restricted circle of two 
or more persons. If the act of defence of the individual is 
immune from punishment only in so far as it is intended and 
is necessary to ward off a present attack which is contrary to 
law (Imperial Criminal Law Code, section 53), why should 
an indefinite extension be given to the right of defence of the 
most powerful, the most adaptable and the readiest for war 
of all the military States in the world as against a ponderous 
Colossus like the Russian Empire? Why should the state of 
defence (Notwehr), the anticipated self-defence (Verteidi- 
gung) against future attacks which are only intended after 
the lapse of years, be permitted to a State, while the indi- 
vidual is allowed in law only to defend himself against a 
present attack? Is it not possible that the idea might occur 
to a private citizen to penetrate into his neighbour's domain 
with loaded rifle on the plea that his neighbour contemplated 
similar action towards him at a later and still remote period 
of time and that his only desire had been to anticipate him? 
Would the most imbecile counsel for the defence venture to 
represent such an act of trespass as an action of defence and 
plead for immunity? 

When the Chancellor in his speech of the 4th of August, 
1 914, explained the invasion of Luxemburg and Belgium 
by the state of defence ("Gentlemen, we are now in a state 
of defence, and necessity knows no law"), he could rely on no 
grounds of fact, but at any rate he could appeal to a certain 
measure of logic. For Herr von Bethmann, like his Im- 
perial Master, does not belong to the preventionists ; he is 
the leader and the herald of the party of defence. Both, 
master and servant, have from the beginning down to the 
present day, maintained the assertion of the "unscrupulous 
attack" against which we "are called upon to defend our 
holiest possession, our Fatherland, our very hearths." The 
upholders of the war of defence, in so far as their theories of 
the state of defence (Notwehr) and of the self-defence (Ver- 
teidigung) of the Fatherland are directed against a really 
present aggressor, and not against entirely disinterested and 



156 THE CRIME 

innocent neutrals, 1 stand on ground which is incontestable in 
law, only in the present case there is an entire absence of any 
basis in fact on which to base their theories. On the other 
hand, the preventionists who assign the intended attack to 
1916 or 1917, and thus explain a present state of defence by 
reference to a future attack, the materialisation of which is, 
moreover, dependent on a thousand contingencies, not only 
fail to furnish any proof in the question of fact, but they for- 
feit every support in law, and they are thus defeated in both 
directions on the ground which they have themselves chosen. 

Analogy of Criminal Procedure 

The charge has been brought against me, and will no doubt 
be renewed with regard to this present work, that I treat 
these political questions too much from the juridical stand- 
point of guilt and punishment. This charge is unfounded. 
If in passing judgment on the question of guilt the issue 
turned on the interests of States, on territorial or commercial 
expansion, on the increase of power or similar questions, it is 
obvious that investigations as to the greater or less degree of 
responsibility of the individual Powers would not be in place. 
When our candid imperialists of the school of Bernhardi — 
whom I may be allowed to call the "shameless" as opposed 

1 That even the justifiable state of defence can never justify the viola- 
tion of the rights of a third State, and that moreover one whose neu- 
trality has been guaranteed, is a point on which there is not the slightest 
doubt in the modern theory of international law. In J'accuse (page 217 
et seq.) I have explained at length this universally recognised principle 
and summarised it in the words : "The state of defence never excuses 
the violation of the rights of a third party. The state of defence against 
France could not excuse the violation of the rights of Belgium." The 
only deviation from this communis opinio of the teachers of international 
law in all countries is to be found in the most recent doctrines of 
international law in Germany which, arising out of the war, have, with 
a few honourable exceptions, undertaken the ignominious task of cover- 
ing with the mantle of scientific support even the most shameful breaches 
of law by Germany. In so doing they in no way advance the German 
cause in the world, but rather deprive German learning of the last rem- 
nant of respect. 



THEORY AND PRACTICE 157 

to the "shame- faced" who shroud themselves in a preven- 
tionist's mantle — proclaim Germany's right to world-power 
and to conquest within and without Europe, to maritime and 
commercial supremacy, and who have recommended and still 
recommend war as the means to this end, it is clear that they 
cannot be attacked by juridical investigations on the question 
of the responsibility for the war. They deride the investi- 
gator to his face and gladly and fearlessly take the responsi- 
bility on the shoulders of Germany, provided only that suc- 
cess attends the armies of Germany. For military imperial- 
ism there are no considerations of law and of guilt; if we 
wish to reveal to its eyes the perniciousness and the fatuity, 
the dangerousness and the repugnance to civilisation of its 
efforts, the only method by which it can be got at is on po- 
litical, economic and military grounds. 

It is quite otherwise with those who uphold the war of de- 
fence and prevention. They take their stand on grounds of 
law, and they must therefore concede that their opponent also 
has the right to occupy the same ground. They unanimously 
maintain that they are waging a war of defence; the former 
against a present, the latter against a future aggressive war. 
The question whether this assertion as to an aggressive war 
is true or untrue is a question of fact, which must be deter- 
mined in the same way and by the same methods as all ques- 
tions of fact in judicial investigations. Witnesses and docu- 
ments constitute the instruments of proof : it is from these 
that the correctness or incorrectness of the assertion of the 
war of defence (immediate or anticipated) must be deduced. 
The guiding lines on which this examination of evidence has 
to be conducted are determined on principle, just as the judi- 
cial examination of evidence must be conducted according to 
the legal standpoint. The result of the admission of evi- 
dence must be either a verdict of guilty or an acquittal, ex- 
actly as in judicial investigations. 

There is thus a complete analogy between civil criminal 
procedure and the criminal investigation into the guilt of 
the European war from the point of view of international 
law. The imperialists rightly decline this investigation, since 



158 THE CRIME 

in their view the provocation of war is not a crime but a 
right, and indeed a duty towards the future of Germany. 
The upholders of the war of defence and prevention cannot, 
however, decline the investigation into the question of guilt, 
since they state that the war was not a spontaneous under- 
taking of the German and Austrian Governments, but was an 
act of defence forced upon them, occasioned by the criminal 
contrivance of war by their opponents. All the speeches and 
the writings of German rulers, of the members of the Ger- 
man Government and of their Press, move on the same lines. 
I also stand on the same ground, the only difference being 
that I (a fact which may displease them) arrive in my in- 
vestigations at a result which is absolutely opposed to theirs. 
They reproach me for my system of accusation because it 
leads to highly unwelcome results; they, however, unremit- 
tingly apply the same system of accusation to their opponents 
in the war, because they are still foolish enough to believe 
that they will thereby obtain a favourable verdict from the 
world. 

The Historical Antecedents Furnish a Prima Facie 
Case for Germany's Will for War 

When people like Schiemann in their demonstrations lay 
weight exclusively on the historical antecedents, they might 
at least be expected to enter fully into the essential points in 
the antecedents. From the entirety of the antecedents I drew 
the conclusion : 

That before the murder of the Archduke Francis Fer- 
dinand there was a prima facie case against Germany 
and Austria of having worked for the European war, 
Germany in order to give effect to her plans of world- 
power, Austria in order to secure and improve her posi- 
tion in the Balkans. 

The main arguments which led me to this conclusion may 
be summarised under six groups : 



THEORY AND PRACTICE 159 

i. The tendencies of our Pan-Germans and Imperialists, 
which I have proved from their speeches, their writings and 
their agitation conducted with increasing success throughout 
many years, under the leadership of Bernhardi and other 
generals and with the energetic encouragement of the German 
Crown Prince. As the attempt is being made to disown 
Bernhardi as a solitary phenomenon and to preserve silence 
as to the emphatic leadership of the German Crown Prince, 
I propose, as already observed, to give in a special section 
of this work a more copious selection from other speeches 
and writings of Pan-German and Imperialist politicians, and 
in this way to designate the guilty in such a way that evasion 
will be impossible. The war-aims now proclaimed by these 
circles, including enormous annexations, confiscations of the. 
rights of neighbouring nations, transference of territory and 
of power, are in exact agreement with the aims pursued by 
them for decades, and thus serve to confirm the tendencies 
which they have proclaimed before the war and with regard 
to the war. 

2. The immovable opposition shown by Germany and 
Austria to any organisation of the European community of 
States resting on law, which was more particularly made 
manifest in opposition to the efforts of the Entente Powers 
at the two Hague Conferences. 

3. The same unremitting opposition to any agreement be- 
tween the European States in general, or between Germany 
and England in particular, with regard to the suspension or 
diminution of armaments on land and sea. 

4. The progress made, in advance of all other European 
States, in the constant increase and perfection of armaments 
by land and sea. 

5. The constant diplomatic endeavour to lead England to 
an obligation of neutrality in continental conflicts — an effort 
which was still manifest at the last moment, shortly before 
the outbreak of war, in Bethmann's famous proposal for 
neutrality. 

6. The attempt of Austria, documentarily proved by the 
revelations of Giolitti, to carry out a military attack on Serbia, 



160 THE CRIME 

in the summer of 191 3, and thus to risk the outbreak of a 
European war. 

These six groups of facts cannot but lead every unpreju- 
diced student of history to the conclusions drawn by me, and 
they have in fact led to these conclusions, not only in Eu- 
rope, but in the whole world. This is one of the chief grounds 
for the antipathy mingled with fear which Germany encoun- 
tered in the world, even before the present enormous guilt of 
the war; yet of these groups of facts there is either no men- 
tion in Schiemann's pamphlets and in similar writings, or 
else these matters are there intentionally treated in so super- 
ficial a manner that the endeavour to avoid them is manifest. 
The Hague Conferences, the Anglo-German negotiations for 
an understanding, Giolitti's revelations, the unprecedented 
combination of a first-rate land Power with a maritime 
Power which more and more approximated to the strength of 
England, etc., etc., all these groups of facts cited above, 
which are of the utmost importance for the question of re- 
sponsibility so far as the more remote antecedents are con- 
cerned, are either passed over in silence by the defenders of 
German innocence, or else they are falsified or treated as baga- 
telles. Their one endeavour is to place in the limelight the 
"tendencies to war" alleged to have existed in the Entente 
countries, in order thereby to arouse the suspicion that the 
intention to make war emanated from that side. But the 
proof designed to create this suspicion also completely fails 
when the tendencies to war on the two sides are compared 
together according to their strength and their influence. 

That is War as We Love It 

Such historians devote not a single word to the literature 
and the agitation of the Pan-Germans, to their protection in 
high quarters, to the writings and actions of their exalted 
protector, who even now in the midst of this murderous 
war cannot refrain from giving expression on every suitable 
or unsuitable occasion to his former sympathies and his pas- 
sion for war for war's sake. In no other country in the 



THEORY AND PRACTICE 161 

world has the successor to the Throne put himself at the head 
of the war-party in so provocative a manner as in Germany; 
nowhere has the heir formed so open an intrigue against his 
own father and his originally peace-loving Government. The 
German Crown Prince, who did not withhold his applause 
from the heroic deeds of Lieutenant von Forstner against 
the lame cobbler in Zabern, who encouraged Colonel Reuter, 
after he had locked up the judges and the prosecutors in the 
Panduren-keller, to other similar achievements in the notori- 
ous telegram "Stick to it," this heir to an Imperial Throne, 
at a time when millions of corpses manure the battlefields of 
Europe, when millions of the maimed trail their misery 
through the world, when earth has become a hell and a vale 
of lamentation, when destitution, affliction and penury cry 
to heaven, is still clearly destitute of any feeling for the re- 
sponsibility which rests on the heads of the instigators of 
such wholesale carnage. His sympathies are still what they 
were before the war. To the fallen Lieutenant von Forstner 
he devoted — ostentatiously, as a special mark of distinction! 
— a telegram and a magnificent laurel wreath; on August 
22nd, 191 5, he issued an enthusiastic war-appeal to his armies 
which must be preserved and perused to attain a right com- 
prehension of the tendencies which have plunged Europe into 
this wholesale massacre. He can scarcely await in patience 
until this "war of moles" in the West shall have again given 
place to the "joyful life of the proud onslaught of battle"; 
in the uninterrupted joy of struggle he awaits the "day when 
the Kaiser will summon us to a new attack; out of the 
trenches and the dug-outs, into war as we love it! God 
grant that the day may soon appear!" 

War as we love it ! There we have exactly the spirit which 
speaks from the Crown Prince's writings quoted in my book. 
There we have the "spirit of the attack" of those whose task 
it is to command the attack, but who are not personally called 
upon to carry it through at the risk of life and limb. What 
can have been the feelings of the men of the Landwehr and 
the Landsturm when they read this fiety appeal of their army 
leader? What can they think about the "joyful life of the 



162 THE CRIME 

proud onslaught of battle"? What can be their feelings 
when they are compelled to leave the trenches and the dug- 
outs and throw themselves against the devastating fire of the 
enemies' machine-guns, the bursting grenades, the shrapnel 
and the poisonous gases? What can they feel when their 
limbs are mangled, their eyes blinded, their intelligence 
clouded, when their faces and their bodies, their arms and 
legs, are torn by the deadly lead and iron? Will they also 
exclaim with their distinguished leader: "That is war as we 
love it"? Will they also pray to God that the day of the 
advance, the day when they will leave their trenches, may 
soon appear ? No, they have all left at home wives and chil- 
dren, mothers and fathers, who in anxious torment, hour by 
hour and day by day, think of their dear ones out in the field. 
For these men who fight in the trenches it is death that is 
waiting. It is glory, however, that is awaiting the King's son, 
in the security of Headquarters. Behind the front the 
young hero of war is already in anticipation binding the 
laurel about his forehead. "France must again make your 
acquaintance, you conquerors of Longwy" — so ends the 
Army Order. Already he is intoxicating himself with the 
successes of coming days, with new battles and new conquests 
which will not cost him a drop of his noble blood and will not 
even scratch his carefully tended skin. But these men in the 
trenches who already die in mud and in dirt, in hunger and 
in cold, in the agony and the torture of death — it is some- 
thing else than war that they love; they love peace, they love 
their homes, they love their dear ones, in whose arms they 
would rest themselves, soon and for ever, from the horrible 
task of murder. 

sjc 5{£ 5|S JJC ' 5|5 SfS 

This enthusiasm for war for the sake of war in high places, 
in very high places, and in the highest places of all and in 
their retinue of soldiers and Junkers, this characteristic of 
Prussian militarism, this special mental tendency, which is 
easily to be explained by reference to Prussian and Hohen- 
zollern history but is in the modern world a unique phenom- 
enon, it is this that we must recognise and brand as one of 



THEORY AND PRACTICE 163 

the chief causes of this war. Imperialistic efforts, desire of 
expansion, colonial fanaticism, the interests of the manufac- 
turers of armaments exist in other countries also, as causes 
of intrigues to war, weaker and less influential than in Prus- 
sian Germany, but nevertheless they exist and have also in a 
certain measure contributed to the friction and the tension 
between the European Great Powers. But even if I were 
willing to assume (what, in fact, I dispute) that these ef- 
forts in other countries also contemplated a relaxation of the 
existing tension by resort to war (even Bernhardi, as we 
know, does not ascribe to the Entente Powers the intention 
of seeking a solution by war), there would still remain the 
special factor of the Prussian love of war for the sake of 
war (Vart pour I'art) and this grave factor brings the scale, 
on which the guilt of the various nations is to be measured, 
to sink to the disadvantage of Prussia and Germany. 

If anyone will refer me to expressions, similar to those 
which I have quoted from the writings of the German Crown 
Prince, spoken or written by a ruler or an heir to the Throne 
or a responsible member of the Government or even by a 
general in any other country; if anyone will refer me to an 
outburst of the madness of war in an authoritative position 
in any other nation similar to that contained in the Crown 
Prince's Army Order of August 22nd, 1915, "Into war as 
we love it!" I will acknowledge that my judgment on the 
Prussian war-intriguers is unjust. I ask anyone to show me 
in any other country an heir to the Throne past the age of 
thirty, and therefore presumably responsible for his words 
and actions, who has put forward the assertion: "The sym- 
pathies of civilised nations are to-day, as in the battles of 
antiquity, with the sturdy and the bold fighting nations," who 
in the manoeuvres feels and says with his comrade "Donner- 
wetter! if that were only the real thing," who expresses the 
"ardent wish" to be allowed to experience "the supreme mo- 
ment of a soldier's happiness," when the King calls him to 
battle. If anyone will show me such an heir to the Throne, 
I will confess with shame that Prussian militarism is to be 
found not only in Prussia but that it also exists elsewhere in 



164 THE CRIME 

the world. But so long as this proof is not furnished, I shall 
infer from this and countless other phenomena that Prussian 
militarism is a true peculiarity of Prussianism and that this 
peculiarity, alongside all the other tendencies in the direction 
of war, turned the scale in favour of a decision for war. 

The proof of the guilt for the war which Schiemann and 
his comrades endeavour to deduce from the existence of 
tendencies to war in the Entente Powers thus collapses. In 
Prussian Germany these tendencies were stronger than else- 
where; but above all they found in the Prussian military and 
war-spirit a broad river-bed which opened the way to a dev- 
astating inundation of the whole of Europe. They found a 
fostering soil which existed nowhere else in Europe, on which 
the bacillus of war could develop unhindered and finally in- 
fect the world. Thus even from this restricted point of view 
of tendencies to war, history will and must pronounce a ver- 
dict of guilt on Prussia, and on Germany, which has unfor- 
tunately been Prussianised. 



CHAPTER III 

GERMANY AND THE HAGUE CONFERENCES 

The defenders of Germany pass with intentional cursori- 
ness over the Hague Conferences and the later Anglo-Ger- 
man negotiations, because, in dealing with these subjects, 
account must be taken not of newspaper-articles, currents 
and tendencies, but of facts which are documentarily proved 
and recorded, and which therefore render impossible any 
attempt to obscure or to falsify the situation. 

In my book (pages 78-106) I purposely considered in 
detail the Hague Conferences and the Anglo-German nego- 
tiations for an understanding and in so doing made constant 
reference to my authorities. These represent the few points 
in the more remote antecedents of this war regarding which 
we are documentarily informed and which are therefore 
adapted to a scientific investigation and determination of the 
truth. At the same time these are the points which afford 
an explanation of the increasing state of tension in Europe, 
of the fear of Germany and consequently of the formation 
of the Entente for protection against Germany. In an essay 
entitled "The German Professors and the War," (Forum, 
April, 1915), Walter Schiicking rightly says: 

Nowhere has there been any recognition of the fact that all 
the practical love of peace manifested by Germany throughout 
44 years has been powerless to cancel in the public opinion of 
foreign countries the harm caused by the attitude of Germany 
towards the theoretical movement of making preparations for 
peace' instead of war. Which of all the professors who have 
signed manifestoes and written war-pamphlets in any way knows 
how much Germany in this very question offended foreign Pow- 
ers at the Hague Conferences? Which of the more recent his- 
torians in Germany has considered that it is at all necessary to 

165 



166 THE CRIME 

become acquainted with the course of events at the Peace Con- 
ferences at The Hague? 

In these sentences Schikking hits the nail on the head. 
The attitude of Germany at the Hague Conferences and, as 
I would add, throughout the later Anglo-German negotia- 
tions, taken in conjunction with many other phenomena 
which have already been indicated, evoked and constantly 
increased the feeling of distrust towards Germany and the 
fear of Germany's war-intentions and aspirations to world- 
power; it was this that led to 1 counter-coalitions and finally 
to a state of tension which Germany then undertook to end 
in her favour by deciding on war. It was on Germany's 
resistance that compulsory arbitration came to grief, and it 
was also because of Germany's resistance that any real con- 
sideration of the question of the suspension and the possible 
later reduction of armaments was made impossible. It is to 
Germany's resistance that we must attribute the fact that 
Europe at that time continued to be denied the blessings of 
an organisation resting on law, which was imperiously de- 
manded by the development of the nations of the Old World, 
and which must sooner or later be realised. It is Germany 
that is responsible for the fact that the rage of armaments 
assumed the most enormous dimensions, which even in times 
of peace led the nations to the verge of exhaustion, and which 
made it appear to many that war was to be preferred to such 
a peace. 

Those Guilty of the Past. Those Guilty of the 

Future 

The guilt of this condition of affairs in the past rests ex- 
clusively on Germany and Austria. But for their resistance 
we would have had compulsory arbitration to decide inter- 
national disputes ever since the beginning of this century, 
we would have had treaty agreements relating to armaments 
by land and by sea. Had the war ended with the military 
superiority of the Central Powers, this guilt in the past would 



HAGUE CONFERENCES 167 

have become a guilt in the future also. There is no country 
and no Government which is so far, so immeasurably far, 
removed as Germany and Austria from pacifist ideas, to 
which after all the future belongs. Nowhere in the official 
and semi-official, or even in the Liberal and democratic, Press 
of Germany and Austria up to the war, was there so much 
as any serious discussion of the idea of an organisation of 
the European community of nations resting on law, which 
was bound to have as a logical conclusion an agreement as to 
armaments. 1 All the authoritative circles, the Government, 
the Conservatives, the National Liberals, the Liberals, in- 
deed, a part of the Social-Patriots still occupy the old ground 
of the assurance of power, of "real" guarantees, of the mili- 
tary and economic security of Germany. No one in these 
circles has even the remotest idea that in future the question 

1 The most recent specious conversion of the Chancellor to pacifism 
(November, 1916) is discussed, as already observed, in a later chapter 
"Bethmann the Pacifist" (section "War-Aims"), where I show the true 
value to be attached to this sudden "illumination" of the German states- 
man, which is to be attributed to necessity and not to his own bent. 

How far at the time when I am writing this footnote (beginning of 
1917), the Liberals of the Left are in Germany still removed from pacifist 
ideas and are immured within the narrow horizon of the one-sided 
security of Germany's power, appears from the discussions and resolu- 
tions of the recent meeting of the Progressive Popular party (fort- 
schrittliche Volkspartei) for Greater Berlin. In his speech Dr. Wiemer, 
the leader of this party which stands on the extreme left wing of 
German Liberalism, expressly appealed to the Chancellor's speech of 
December 9th, 1915, and emphasised anew that Germany must obtain 
"political, military and economic security" in order that "Belgium might 
not again be used by England and France as a territory for deploying 
against Germany." The resolution, unanimously adopted in the presence 
of the most eminent leaders of the party, demands a peace "which will 
afford the empire security for the future by military and economic meas- 
ures as well as by the necessary extensions of territory." Neither in the 
proceedings nor in the resolutions of the meeting of the party was there 
so much as a word said of a guarantee of all nations by an organisation 
resting on law. It is in this form that German pacifism on the extreme 
Left appears. From this it is possible to imagine what ideas are still 
prevalent with regard to these "Utopias" in the minds of all the parties 
on the right, that is to say the great majority of German representatives. 



168 THE CRIME 

will be not that of a German but of a European peace, and 
that such a peace cannot be created by rendering secure the 
position of Germany — by which the initiated naturally un- 
derstand a policy of annexation — but only by securing all 
European nations against war, oppression and a preponder- 
ance of power. However the frontiers within and without 
Europe may be determined, however the countries and the 
nations may be partitioned by adding here and subtracting 
there, whatever may be the future grouping into Alliances 
and Ententes, Europe will be irretrievably lost, it will again 
be torn by dissension, by military preparations, and by wars, 
in civilisation and in industry it will be led to the brink of 
the precipice and become a slave of America destined to ab- 
sorb all the wealth of the world, if out of the groups one 
great group is not formed, a whole resting on a basis of law 
with the absolute exclusion of any solution of a conflict by 
war, and the creation of the necessary guarantees for this 
order of law. 

It would take us too far to enter more fully at this point 
into the subject of the future configuration of Europe. We 
shall return to this in a special section. Anyone who follows 
what has hitherto been the German custom and regards as 
Utopian and impracticable these ideas as to the future should 
peruse the pacifist literature as to the law of nations, which 
has, even in the course of this war, been greatly enriched; 
he will then be convinced that it is a substantially easier task 
to create a structure resting on international law than it was 
in its time to create the reign of law within the State. The 
abolition of club-law and of the private right to make war 
in Germany and in other countries, which deprived countless 
cities and lords of the possibility of asserting by their own 
arms their so-called rights, was accompanied by greater diffi- 
culties and greater apparent sacrifices for individuals than 
would be to-day the creation of an organisation resting on 
law among the few States which have to be considered so 
far as conflicts in war are concerned, and which, as a result 
of the present war, the most terrible of all times, must all 
have been convinced that it is only in the organised guaran- 



HAGUE CONFERENCES 169 

tee of all against future wars that the well-being of their 
peoples and of humanity is to be found. 

These thoughts already fill the whole civilised world out- 
side the German and Austrian frontier-posts, and after the 
conclusion of the war they will struggle with renewed energy 
to assume actual shape; had the Central Powers been in a 
position to dictate peace, they would, however, never have 
secured realisation. The guilt in the past would have be- 
come a guilt in the future as well, and only the occurrence of 
new and unforeseen events, of revolutionary movements 
among the masses would have compelled a lawfully ordered 
peace among the nations. The opposition of the Central 
Powers to the ordered peace of the nations in the past pro- 
voked the world-war; had they conquered, their opposition 
to an order of peace in the future would have involved the 
world-revolution as a consequence. 

All these questions as to the past and the future are of 
course of no interest to a Schiemann or to people like him. 
Over the Hague Conferences and the Anglo-German nego- 
tiations, the most important point in my Antecedents of the 
Crime, the "slanderer" passes lightly in a few lines. Re- 
garding the first Hague Conference, he reports nothing more 
than the alleged "political antecedents of the Russian Con- 
ference proposal." For him it is, of course, proved that the 
Tsar Nicholas called a Conference, not with the object of 
giving Europe a protective organisation against war and of 
putting an end to the devastating competition in armaments," 
but solely in order "to avoid a war for which Russia knew 
she was not prepared" — as we are led to believe a war with 
England. 1 Here, again, we meet the familiar tactics of the 
"slanderer" : the Russian proposal was not seriously in- 
tended, but was only a trick to serve Russian interests. 

In view of this unexampled falsification no other course 
remains open to me than to refer to the actual occurrences 
at the first Hague Conference, to the records and the deci- 

1 Slanderer, page 10. 



170 THE CRIME 

sions of that Conference, and to the comprehensive literature 
which has gathered round that event of world-historical im- 
portance. In my book I have referred to Fried's Handbook 
of the Peace Movement (Vol. I., page 204), and the atten- 
tion of those who feel in these vital questions for the nations 
the interest which they merit, may be invited to the copious 
literature which is cited in Fried's Handbook (Vol. II., page 
437 et seq.). My account of the events at this conference is in 
every word in agreement with the truth, and is everywhere 
confirmed by the literature bearing on the subject and the 
official minutes approved by all the States concerned. 
Amongst countless other books on the first Hague Confer- 
ence there is a large work in two volumes by Christian 
Meurer. Anyone who is more interested in the accessories 
and the sidelights of the Conference than in the material 
contents of its deliberations should read the Autobiography 
of Andrew D. White, formerly American Ambassador in 
Berlin. He will there find very interesting disclosures, espe- 
cially with regard to the attitude of Germany and her dele- 
gates on the stage and behind the scenes of the Conference. 
The most extensive account in the German language of the 
labours of the second Hague Conference is to be found in 
the distinguished work of Otf ried Nippold : The Second 
Hague Peace Conference. I will also mention the work on a 
large scale Written by Walter Schucking, The Union of 
States (Staatenverband) of the Hague Conferences, in which 
the services rendered by the pacifist movement in the develop- 
ment of international law is frankly recognised and the fur- 
ther enlargement of the basis of a Union of States created by 
the Hague Conferences is represented as the aim of Euro- 
pean development. 

THE FIRST HAGUE CONFERENCE 

The following paragraphs contain only a few observations 
on certain points supplementary to the account which is given 
in J' accuse of the occurrences at The Hague; they serve to 
characterise with unusual lucidity the behaviour of the Cen- 



HAGUE CONFERENCES 171 

tral Powers on the one side and of the Entente Powers on the 
other. 

Many defenders of the German Government have endea- 
voured to excuse the behaviour of Germany at The Hague by 
asserting that the point at issue is rather one of "formal mala- 
droitness" and of "purely theoretical scruples" on the part of 
Germany. It is stated that Germany's behaviour at The 
Hague was in substance entirely justified, and that it was 
only maladroit in form. To these apologists the attitude as- 
sumed by Germany, not only against international arbitra- 
tion but also against the limitation of armaments, appears 
justified in substance. This is based on the familiar asser- 
tion, which is constantly advanced by all people of this 
kidney, that all such restrictions on the freedom of move- 
ment, of development, and of armaments can be advan- 
tageous only to the nations which are sated and which rest 
on great inherited possessions, but that they can only hinder 
young and aspiring nations in their future development. For 
these worshippers of force, freedom of development is equiv- 
alent to freedom to murder, submission to legal decisions is 
equivalent to the suppression of the personality of the State, 
restriction of armaments — which after all is equally in the 
interests of all and can damnify no party to the advantage 
of others — is equivalent to the renunciation of political and 
economic advancement. How extensively this narrow mode 
of thought entangles the intellectual classes of Germany is 
again proved by Prince Billow's most recent volume Imperial 
Germany, 1 which, even at this date, accurately reflects the 
guiding lines along which Billow's policy moved in so fatal 
a manner in relation to the aspirations of The Hague. With 
consummate stupidity this class of people ask the question: 
"Is it supposed that arbitration can decide the question 
whether one nation is ripe to withdraw from the stage of 
the world's history, and whether another should take its 
place?" What does this amount to but to declare war in 
perpetuity and to hand over all future competitive struggles 

1 Deutsche Politik. [English translation: Imperial Germany. Cassell 
& Co.] 



172 THE CRIME 

between civilised nations in culture and economic life to the 
big guns, the poisonous gases, the mine-throwers and the 
submarine torpedoes? That the greater efficiency of a na- 
tion makes itself felt, not on the fields of battle, but in every 
domain of peaceful human activity and throws into the lap 
of the more efficient nation — whether it is from the military 
point of view the more powerful or not — the fruits of its 
industry and of its gifts, is an obvious truth, confirmed by 
the present position in the world of many small and power- 
less States, although, of course, it has not yet dawned on 
such German politicians of Powers. For them political and 
military power is still equivalent to industrial and cultural 
authority. They still adhere to views which may perhaps 
have been justified some hundreds of years ago, but have 
to-day been long outstripped by the world-wide interconnec- 
tion of intellectual and economic interests. When those who 
on principle are fanatics for war produce such mediaeval 
views, they have at least the advantage of being consistent; 
they enthuse for the cure of blood and iron in itself, and at 
the same time make use of it as a means to the attainment 
of their political aims of power. When, however, modern 
statesmen, profound philosophers, when even men who call 
themselves Liberals and the friends of peace decline arbi- 
tration and a restriction of armaments, because they hamper 
aspiring nations in their freedom of development and favour 
other nations which "are in a position to live on the rents 
from their inherited possessions" — then we reach the sum- 
mit of narrow-mindedness and inconsistency. For the free- 
dom of movement which these "friends of peace" preach 
means nothing else than freedom for war. 

But let us return to the Hague Conferences. It is only 
the form of Germany's procedure which is censured by these 
forbearing German critics, not its substance. I must decline 
once again to explain for the sake of these people all that I 
have already expounded in my book and in this work with 
regard to the close connection which exists between the pres- 
ent war on the one hand and the Hague Conferences and the 



HAGUE CONFERENCES 173 

subsequent Anglo-German negotiations for an understanding 
on the other. The question was not one of "formal mal- 
adroitness" or "purely theoretical scruples" when Germany 
offered the most stubborn resistance to the most important 
aims of the Hague Conferences, to the establishment of an 
international court of arbitration, to the compulsory obliga- 
tion of all States that might be parties to the treaty to submit to 
this court at least certain restricted categories of disputes, and 
to the discussion of a general and proportional restriction of 
armaments, if only in the form of a temporary suspension, 
and when Germany by this resistance repeatedly came within 
an ace of imperilling the whole work of the Conference. 
The question involved was a divergence in principle between 
the views of the great majority of the States represented at 
The Hague and those of the small groups consisting of Ger- 
many and her allies — the same divergence between the Prus- 
sian-Hohenzollern ideas of power and the democratic West- 
European ideas of law which from time immemorial had 
emerged in an increasingly acute form in all discussions on 
the future configuration of the European community of na- 
tions. This antithesis which Choate, the representative of 
the United States at the second Hague Conference (and for- 
merly American Ambassador in London), once described 
to Freiherr Marschall von Bieberstein as "the antithesis be- 
tween good faith and confidence in the relations between the 
nations and the application of force" — this antithesis between 
the Prussian-feudal-mediaeval and the West-European-dem- 
ocratic-modern points of view was not made manifest merely 
at the Hague Conferences; it has existed for half a century, 
ever since the time when Bismarck translated into action his 
policy of blood and iron, and after three sanguinary wars 
concluded a peace resting on force which was bound to en- 
gender new wars. A genius like Bismarck was no doubt 
strong enough to prevent the logical consequences flowing 
from his political theories and actions, so long as these con- 
sequences appeared to him undesirable. He had the skill 
so to control the European game of chess that a dangerous 
combination of powerful opponents could not be formed or 



174 THE CRIME 

could at any rate be postponed. His weak followers, on the 
other hand, could not exorcise the spirits which he had con- 
jured up, the spirits of rising resistance, of a hostile union 
for defence, which any policy of force at home as well as 
abroad could not fail to provoke. What could not be dan- 
gerous to him and to the ship of State so long as he steered 
it, drove the vessel, under the unskilful pilotage of his un- 
talented and supine followers, to the abyss and caused the 
stormy waves of a European deluge to break over the unfor- 
tunate passenger, the German people. 

It is to Bismarck and his work that we must trace the 
ideas which even after his departure have controlled German 
policy and German political and historical science, which 
has degraded itself to be the handmaiden of this policy. The 
theoretical and practical defenders of the uncontrolled inde- 
pendence of Germany in her foreign policy, in the choice 
and the limitation of the military means for its execution, who 
in every international regulation resting on law, even in its 
mildest form, in every restriction of armaments, see an in- 
vasion of sovereignty and of the freedom of development of 
the German Empire aspiring to a position of world-power — 
these defenders who sit on imperial and royal thrones, in 
professorial chairs, in pulpits and in the club-rooms are all 
followers and descendants of the seed of Bismarck, even if 
no faint reflection of his spirit has ever fallen upon their 
souls. 



The "theoretical scruples" of the German Government 
with regard to the aspirations of The Hague had the very 
tangible practical basis that Germany desired to retain an 
absolutely free hand as to the line of action to be adopted 
in all international disputes and so to extend and increase 
her armaments as seemed good to her, in order that she 
might at any time be in a position to attain her political aims 
by force of arms. She did not desire to be bound in any way, 
either in a political or in a military sense. She decired to 
be at liberty to provoke a war how, where, when, and on 



HAGUE CONFERENCES 175 

what occasion might appear expedient to her. It was ac- 
cording to this prescription that Germany governed her be- 
haviour at the Hague Conferences as well as on the later 
occasion of the Anglo-German negotiations for an under- 
standing. It was according to this prescription that she 
crowned her work by provoking the European War at the 
very moment that appeared most favourable to her. But 
even this action does not represent the final step in the exe- 
cution of the system. If matters had gone according to Ger- 
many's desire, the peace which was to follow the war would 
have borne the same distinguishing features as the so-called 
state of peace which preceded the war. "Realpolitik," that 
is to say, the extension and the increase of Germany's power 
based on military force and political suppression, the selfish 
pursuit of selfish ends, the rejection, indeed the contempt, of 
these Utopias, which alone can guarantee an enduring state 
of peace and friendship between the European nations — 
these would have represented the guiding-line of Germany's 
policy as a conqueror, as they have been for a generation 
the guiding-line of Germany's "peace" policy. 

These governing principles of Prussian-German policy are 
everywhere to be encountered, whenever a German writes 
to-day of German war-aims, if we except the few real Paci- 
fists and Socialists, whose voices, however, resound in the 
German wilderness without an answering echo. These are 
the ideas which governed Germany's action at The Hague; 
indeed on that occasion, when the representatives of various 
points of view sat together around the council table, the deep 
inner antithesis which divides Prussianism and Hohenzol- 
lernism from West European democracy and the pacifist 
development of international law which West European 
democracy advocated, emerged more sharply than at any 
other time. It has hitherto occurred to no one, least of all 
to the Prussian-German spokesmen themselves, to deny this 
antithesis. On the contrary, they were and are proud that 
they had no part in this "chatter about peace and under- 
standing among the nations," that they rely on their good 



176 THE CRIME 

sword and that they leave "vapourers about humanity" to 
themselves and to their "Utopias." 1 

An extraordinarily characteristic example of German na- 
tional psychology in this direction is furnished by an appeal 
of certain professors in the University of Berlin which has 
just appeared (end of July, 1916) in celebration of the sec- 
ond anniversary of the war, over the signature of seven 
distinguished names (including Giercke, Kahl, Meyer, Wag- 
ner, and Wilamowitz-Mollendorff) . This appeal is worthy 
of being placed beside the celebrated manifesto of the intel- 
lectuals which appeared at the beginning of the war. The 
whole spectrum of German deceit about the war, or, if it is 
preferred, of German delusion about the war, radiates from 
these illumined minds. Neither on the question of the origin 
of the war nor on that of the aims of the war do these 
learned gentlemen produce any single thought which rises 
above the lowest Pan-German level. "It is the lust of re- 
venge, the greed of land, the commercial envy nourished by 
their neighbours which have forced the German people to 
take up arms to save themselves from the mutilation and dis- 
memberment that had been planned." No one who still dares 
to write in this manner can possibly have cast even a .cursory 
glance into the diplomatic documents relating to the imme- 
diate antecedents of the war and must be in complete igno- 
rance regarding the clear and unambiguous utterances of the 
Entente statesmen, who have rejected every idea of a. dis- 
memberment of Germany (as I shall show in more detail in 
the section on War-Aims) : 

We have not taken the sword in our hands — so we read in the 
most recent professorial appeal — for purposes of conquest. Now 

1 These sentences, written in the summer of 1916, are still in essential 
matters valid to-day. It is no doubt true that an increasing interest in 
a European peace is now making itself felt after the second year of war 
with the increasing conviction in Germany that they will not be m a 
position to dictate the desired German peace. This late and enforced birth 
of pacifism by force majeure, which I treat at length in a later chapter, in 
no way affects the correctness of the above observations. 



HAGUE CONFERENCES 177 

that we have been compelled to draw the sword, we neither will, 
can, nor may return it to the sheath, until we have gained assur- 
ance of a peace which even the enemy will be compelled to 
observe. That, however, is not to be attained without an increase 
in our power, without an extension of the sphere within which 
our will is decisive with regard to war and peace. For this 
purpose we require unfailing pledges, real guarantees. On this 
point only one view is held among all Germans. 

Here we have once more the typical expression of the 
peace resting on force and conquest, such as has always been 
present to the minds of all the great usurpers in history, but 
which has always been wrecked on the natural impulse of the 
nations to freedom and independence. Further comment on 
this professorial megalomania is superfluous. These most 
eminent teachers of politics, of international law, of history 
and economics have obviously never heard even from afar 
off the music of pacifist ideas. For them the only governing 
point of view for the future is still to be found in the increase 
of Germany's power for the purpose of obtaining "security 
against future attacks." It is consequently self-evident that 
the premise that we were in fact attacked in 19 14 is and must 
be maintained. The fact that an enduring peace for all Eu- 
ropean nations, including Germany, can never be guaranteed 
by increasing the power of one at the expense of the others, 
but that on the contrary such an increase of power must be 
the sure source of new wars, is a truth which has long ago 
been familiar to every thinking workman but has hitherto 
failed to penetrate into the auditoria of the Universities of 
Germany. 

Germany Against Arbitration. White's 
Autobiography 

It is well known that at the first Hague Conference twen- 
ty-six States were represented and at the second forty- four, 
among which were included all the States of South America, 
several Asiatic States and, of course, all the European States. 



178 THE CRIME 

The representatives of all these great and small States saw 
with their own eyes and heard with their own ears how Ger- 
many and Austria, followed by their faithful Turkey, stub- 
bornly resisted every decisive step in the direction of the 
diminution of the dangers of war and the alleviation of the 
state of armed peace. In connection with this subject it is 
interesting to recall the memoranda already mentioned writ- 
ten by White, the leading American representative at the 
first Conference, who was at the time American Ambassador 
in Berlin. White always speaks of Germany, and particu- 
larly of the German Emperor, with great admiration and 
respect but, on the other hand, he was greatly grieved by the 
German resistance to the establishment of international arbi- 
tration — which was the darling child of the American diplo- 
matist. He tells us in quite an affecting manner how he was 
obliged to combat, by all the means of persuasion, convic- 
tion and partial compliance, the deep disinclination enter- 
tained on principle by the Emperor William and his leading 
representative at The Hague, Count Munster, towards the 
whole idea of arbitration, in order that he might gain in the 
end Germany's concurrence at any rate in the establishment 
of the tribunal. 

To my great regret — says White, speaking of a conversation 
with Count Munster — I found him entirely opposed to it, or, 
at least, entirely opposed to any well-developed plan (of arbi- 
tration). He did not say that he would oppose a moderate plan 
for voluntary arbitration, but he insisted that arbitration must 
be injurious to Germany; that Germany is prepared for war as 
no other country is or can be; that she can mobilise her army in 
ten days ; and that neither France, Russia, nor any other Power 
can do this. Arbitration, he said, would simply give rival Powers 
time to put themselves in readiness, and would therefore be a 
great disadvantage to Germany (White, Autobiography, Vol. II., 
page 265). 

We were all glad to find, upon the arrival of the London 
Times, that our arbitration project seemed to be receiving exten- 
sive approval, and various telegrams from America during the 
day indicated the same thing. It looks more and more as if we 



HAGUE CONFERENCES 179 

are to accomplish something. The only thing in sight calculated 
to throw a cloud over the future is the attitude of the German 
Press against the whole business here; the most virulent in its 
attacks being the high Lutheran conservative — and religious ! — 
journal in Berlin, the Kreuzzeitung (Vol. II., page 286). 

At six o'clock Dr. Holls, who represents us upon the sub- 
committee on arbitration, came in with most discouraging 
news. It now appears that the German Emperor is determined 
to oppose the whole scheme of arbitration, and will have nothing 
to do with any plan for a regular tribunal, whether as given in 
the British or the American scheme. This news comes from 
various sources, and is confirmed by the fact that, in the sub-com- 
mittee, one of the German delegates, Professor Zorn of Konigs- 
berg, who had become very earnest in behalf of arbitration, now 
says that he may not be able to vote for it. There are also 
signs that the German Emperor is influencing the minds of his 
allies — the sovereigns of Austria, Italy, Turkey and Roumania — 
leading them to oppose it (Vol. II., pages 293, 294). 

He (Munster) is more than ever opposed to arbitration, and 
declares that, in view of the original Russian programme ... we 
have no right to take it up at all, since it was not mentioned. He 
was decidedly pessimistic regarding the continuance of the ses- 
sions. . . . He now came out, as he did the day before in his 
talk with me, utterly against arbitration, declaring it a "humbug," 
and that we had no right to consider it, since it was not men- 
tioned in the first proposals from Russia, etc., etc. (Vol. II., 
pages 296, 297) . 

The American expresses his surprises on this occasion 
that Count Munster "had been selected by the Emperor to 
be chief of the German mission at The Hague just because 
of his common-sense" ; he finds consolation, however, for 
Miinster's unfavourable judgment regarding arbitration in 
the fact that the German Ambassador had at the same time 
declared that telegraphs and telephones, bacteria and mi- 
crobes were also "all a modern humbug." White is of the 
opinion that this most eminent representative of German 
diplomacy of the time was "saturated with the ideas of fifty 
years ago." 



180 THE CRIME 

In his diary of June 13th White again reports the arrival 
of disquieting news from Germany: — 

There seems no longer any doubt that the German Emperor is 
opposing arbitration, and, indeed, the whole work of the Con- 
ference, and that he will insist on his main allies, Austria and 
Italy, going with him. ... I had learned from a high imperial 
official, before I left Berlin, that the Emperor considered arbitra- 
tion as derogatory to his sovereignty, and I was also well aware, 
from his conversation, that he was by no means in love with the 
Conference idea. . . . There seems danger of a catastrophe. 
Those of us who are faithful to arbitration plans will go on 
and do the best we can; but there is no telling what stumbling- 
blocks Germany and her allies may put in our way. . . . Some 
days since I said to a leading diplomatist here, "The Ministers 
of the German Emperor ought to tell him that, should he oppose 
arbitration, there will be concentrated upon him an amount of 
hatred which no Minister ought to allow a sovereign to incur." 
To this he answered, "That is true; but there is not a Minister 
in Germany who dares tell him." 

In his conversations with the American Ambassador, 
Count Miinster was constantly parading his special hobby 
that international difficulties could be much better settled by 
"trained diplomatists" than by "entrusting them to arbitra- 
tion by men inexperienced in international affairs, who really 
cannot be unprejudiced or uninfluenced" (page 302). The 
American on the other hand did not fail to impress seriously 
on the Ambassador that the counsellors of the German Em- 
peror "ought never to allow their young sovereign to be 
exposed to the mass of hatred, obloquy and opposition which 
would converge upon him from all nations in case he became 
known to the whole world as the sovereign who had broken 
down the conference and brought to naught the plan of arbi- 
tration." In conversations lasting for hours the American 
Ambassador sought to convince the representative of Ger- 
many that the German Emperor would be regarded as "the 
enemy of all nations" if Germany refused to abandon her 
resistance to the establishment of a court of arbitration. 

The American then "took up an argument, which, it is 



HAGUE CONFERENCES 181 

understood, has had much influence with the Emperor — 
namely, that arbitration must be in derogation of his sov- 
ereignty — and asked, 'How can any such derogation be pos- 
sible? Your sovereign would submit only such questions to 
the arbitration tribunal as he thought best; and, more than 
all that you have already committed yourselves to the prin- 
ciple. You are aware that Bismarck submitted the question 
of the Caroline Islands for arbitration to the Pope.' "... 
(Vol. II., page 305.) 

In spite of all the counter-efforts made by White, who had 
also moved other members of the Congress to exercise a 
favourable influence on the Berlin Cabinet, an official com- 
munication from the German Government was received by 
Count Minister in the middle of June, "in which, the Ger- 
man Government, which, of course, means the Emperor, had 
strongly and finally declared against everything like an arbi- 
tration tribunal" (page 308). This communication fell like 
a bomb in the Conference, and universally awakened the 
apprehension that the work of the Conference in its most 
important point, the question of arbitration, was doomed to 
failure. In consequence of renewed efforts addressed to 
Count Minister, the German delegate resolved to send Pro- 
fessor Zorn to Berlin to obtain new instructions. White sent 
another American delegate, Dr. Holls, to the German capital 
in Zorn's company and entrusted to him a long private letter 
addressed to Herr von Biilow, who was then Foreign Secre- 
tary, extending to many pages, in which all the grave 
grounds against Germany's negative attitude were once more 
adduced and it was clearly indicated that the bitterest hatred 
would break out against the German Empire throughout the 
whole civilised world, should Germany finally place herself in 
the way of this decisive step forward in the relations between 
the nations. 

In any case, whether failure or success may come, the Emperor 
of Russia will be hailed in all parts of the world as a deliverer 
and, virtually, as a saint, while there will be a widespread out- 
burst of hatred against the German Emperor. . . . Should his 



182 THE CRIME 

advisers permit so noble and so gifted a sovereign to incur this 
political storm of obloquy, this convergence of hatred upon him? 
Should a ruler of such noble ambitions and such admirable pow- 
ers be exposed to this? I fully believe that he should not, and 
that his advisers should beg him not to place himself before the 
world as the antagonist of a plan to which millions upon mil- 
lions in all parts of the world are devoted. (White's letter to 
von Biilow of June 16th, 1899.) 

White also refutes the familiar military objection against 
arbitration by advancing reasons which are not without in- 
terest for the question of guilt to-day: "It has also been 
said that arbitration proceedings would give the enemies of 
Germany time to put themselves in readiness for war; but 
if this be feared in any emergency the Emperor and his Gov- 
ernment are always free to mobilise the German army at 
once." It will be seen that the same reasonable objection 
which the Tsar advanced in his last telegram of the after- 
noon of August 1st against an immediate declaration of war 
and in favour of further negotiations for an understanding, 
is in these words put forward against the military reasons 
which are generally adduced for striking at once without the 
delay of negotiations : namely, that there should be mobil- 
isation without fighting. Had this principle, which must be 
recognised as correct by every reasonable man and by every- 
one who is conscious of his enormous responsibility, been 
followed on August 1st, and had the proposal made by the 
Tsar three days previously for a decision by the Hague Tri- 
bunal been simultaneously accepted, there would to-day have 
been no European War. 

The excitement caused in The Hague in these days — in 
June, 1899 — by reason of Germany's attitude was at the time 
so great that voices were heard suggesting that, if the Ger- 
man Government should refuse to assume the standpoint of 
the idea of arbitration, the negotiations should be continued 
without Germany, and that they should be brought to a con- 
clusion at any rate among the Powers which concurred. 

At last, in consequence of the personal intervention of 
Prince Hohenlohe, who was then Chancellor, and in conse- 



HAGUE CONFERENCES 183 

quence of the report of Professor Zorn and the influence of 
the American delegate, Dr. Holls, the German Government 
condescended to place no obstacle in the way of the principle 
of establishing a permanent court of arbitration at The 
Hague, but they made their concurrence conditional on the 
deletion of Article 10 of the existing draft, which was in- 
tended to make the convocation of the Tribunal obligatory 
in a number of less important cases. The desire so expressed 
by Germany without doubt deprived the whole work of the 
Hague Conference of a part of its world-historical impor- 
tance in principle — a point on which none of the other par- 
ticipants in the Conference were in any doubt, as can be 
read in White and in all the commentaries — yet neverthe- 
less Germany's desire was acquiesced in, that at least the 
Tribunal itself might be safely brought into harbour. 

At the official celebration of the conclusion of the Con- 
gress the unfortunate Count Minister, as president of the 
German delegation, had to' deliver a speech which, accord- 
ing to White's humorous account, must have been pain and 
grief to him : "for he was obliged to speak respectfully, in, 
the first place of the Conference, which for some weeks he 
had affected to despise; and, secondly, of arbitration and 
the other measures proposed, which, at least during all the 
first part of the Conference, he had denounced as a trick 
and a humbug; and, finally, he had to speak respectfully of 
M. de Staal (the President of the Conference) to whom he 
has steadily shown decided dislike!" 

International Commissions of Inquiry. "Good 
Services" and Mediation 

In addition to the question of arbitration, the first Hague 
Conference had also, in accordance with the proposals laid 
before it, to devote its attention to the establishment of in- 
ternational commissions of inquiry for the determination of 
disputed facts, and further to the offer of good services or 
of mediation on the part of disinterested Powers. In these 
questions also the German Government — acting, of course, 



184 THE CRIME 

throughout in concert with the Austrian Government, but 
without the support of the Italian Government which co- 
operated with the Western Powers — formed the constant ob- 
stacle to all progress. For example, in the draft relating to 
good services and mediation there appeared, in anticipation 
of the German disinclination to any mediatory activity, the 
attenuating words that resort was only to be had to the good 
services and the mediation of disinterested Powers in so far 
as circumstances should permit (en tant que les circonstances 
I'admettraient) . Since this addition made the clause entirely 
illusory and frustrated its purpose of making the offer of 
good services possible in every case and of thus preventing 
wars, the delegates of Holland and Belgium, and Count 
Nigra, the delegate of Italy, with even greater emphasis, 
proposed in the meeting of the Committee dealing with this 
subject that this addition should be deleted. Professor Zorn, 
the German delegate, at once rose and demanded the reten- 
tion of the original text, "in order to leave to the Powers 
concerned their full freedom of decision; the new version 
was unacceptable." After various attempts at mediation in 
the Committee, the Conference had finally to decide on ap- 
proving the attenuating clause demanded by the German 
delegate. 

The importance which such resolutions might have had 
for the destiny of the world, according as their scope was 
extended or restricted, has been shown in the summer of 191 4 
when Austria and Germany declined every mediatory action 
on the part of third Powers — presumably because they were 
of the opinion that "the circumstances did not permit of 
mediation." Had it then been confirmed in The Hague that 
a general obligation should be imposed on Powers in dispute 
to accept the mediation of third parties, Germany and Aus- 
tria might no doubt have declared that this treaty also was 
a scrap of paper, but in so doing they would have placed 
themselves even more grossly and flagrantly in the wrong 
towards the contracting Powers of The Hague and towards 
the world than is already the case. 



HAGUE CONFERENCES 185 



Cour Permanente d' Arbitrage 

In another important point connected with the establish- 
ment of the permanent court of arbitration there is similarly 
revealed the systematic resistance offered by Germany to 
all clauses, which would have rendered possible a really ef- 
fective intervention of the new Institution on the emergence 
of the danger of war. Leon Bourgeois, the President of the 
French delegation, in a remarkable speech in the Committee 
of which he was President, proposed that the permanent 
bureau of the court of arbitration should be entrusted with 
the duty and the power of taking a certain initiative in cases 
of conflict and of reminding the Powers which were the par- 
ties to a dispute of the possibility of settling the dispute by 
the Hague Tribunal. Bourgeois rightly pointed out that 
very frequently there might be a failure to summon the tri- 
bunal because neither Power would be willing to be the first 
to take this step, owing to the fear of being taxed with weak- 
ness in their own country and throughout the world. These 
difficulties would be overcome if the right and the duty of 
taking such an initiative were conferred on the bureau of, 
the Tribunal itself: 

To put one of the mighty machines in motion — so said the 
French Minister — by which modern science transforms the 
world, it is sufficient to lay a finger on a point of contact; but 
there must nevertheless be some one whose task it is to carry out 
this simple motion. The French delegation is of the opinion that 
the institution, to which this international mandate would be 
entrusted, would be called upon to play a distinguished and bene- 
ficial role in history. 

Other delegates also expressed themselves in the same 
sense. It was only Professor Zorn, the representative of 
Germany, who, it may be observed, at the time produced in 
the Conference the universal impression that he alone 
among the German delegates was favourably disposed to 
the tendencies of the Conference and was only compelled to 



186 THE CRIME 

offer resistance on the instructions of his Government — it 
was only Dr. Zorn who spoke not only against the proposed 
initiative, but also against the establishment of a permanent 
tribunal, an attitude which as I have more fully explained 
above was revised by Germany at a later date. In this 
earlier stage Zorn endeavoured in every way to replace the 
"Cour d' Arbitrage permanente" by a "Cour d' Arbitrage oc- 
casionelle." In spite of the most urgent persuasion, and in- 
deed supplication on the part of Count Nigra, the Italian 
representative, the German delegate insisted that he must 
refuse in the name of his Government the establishment of a 
permanent court of arbitration, and the only concession to 
which he brought himself was that, notwithstanding this re- 
fusal on principle, he would not withdraw from the further 
work of the Committee. 

Afterwards, when matters developed further, after Zorn's 
journey to Berlin, and the consent of the German Govern- 
ment was given to the Institution as such, there began — it 
would be absurd if it were not so entirely miserable — a 
verbal dispute as to the designation of the Court of Arbitra- 
tion. The proposed title "Tribunal permanent d' Arbitrage" 
appeared to the German delegation to savour too much of 
legal compulsion and of a binding decision; Dr. Zorn there- 
fore proposed that "Cour" should be substituted for Tri- 
bunal and "des arbitres" for "d'arbitrage," a proposal which 
would again, so to speak, have at once demolished the new 
institution, and falsified its meaning and purpose. In the 
end it was agreed that the designation should be "Cour per- 
manente d'Arbitrage." 

The "Initiative" of the Hague Bureau 

Now, however, when the child of grief had at last after 
painful travail been brought into the world the question be- 
fore the Conference was to procure for it at any rate as 
great a capacity for life as was possible. As we have seen, 
the compulsory obligation of the contracting Powers to sum- 
mon the tribunal, if only in minor disputes, had been re- 



HAGUE CONFERENCES 187 

moved on Germany's demand. It was therefore all the more 
important that on the menace of a conflict the permanent 
bureau of the Tribunal should be given at least the possibil- 
ity of reminding the parties in dispute of its existence, and 
of relieving them of the "painful necessity" of taking the 
first step towards an amicable settlement — painful, I say, 
according to the prejudices which unfortunately still prevail 
with regard to political honour and prestige and other simi- 
lar mediaeval conceptions which may possess some authority 
in governing the habits of rowdy students, but ought not to 
be admitted in considering the interests of modern great 
States. 

The Frenchmen, Leon Bourgeois and d'Estournelles de 
Constant, accordingly took up with renewed energy the 
earlier proposal that an initiative should be entrusted to the 
Hague Bureau, and in particular the latter delegate, the 
pacifist senator who is so honourably known, threw himself 
with special zeal into the idea of the initiative: 

We require an automatic procedure which will oblige the 
Powers in dispute to declare themselves before public opinion 
and before their Parliaments either for or against a decision by 
arbitration; if we devise machinery of this nature, and indicate 
precisely the person whose duty it is to dispatch the letter of in- 
vitation, the situation will be fundamentally altered. It will then 
be as difficult for a Government to refuse a decision by arbitra- 
tion as it has hitherto been to accept it in serious cases. 

When Dr. Zorn pointed out the difficulties in the way of 
giving practical effect to such an initiative, d'Estournelles 
de Constant drafted a resolution of the Conference, which 
entrusted to the General Secretary of the Bureau of the 
Tribunal the duty of sending a communication in similar 
terms to the representatives at the Dutch Court of the par- 
ties to the dispute, in which he placed himself and the Bureau 
at their disposal with a view to further steps being taken. 
D'Estournelles- even went so far as to draft the text of such 
a letter, and I think it might be of interest to reproduce here 
a translation of this draft in order to illustrate on the one 



188 THE CRIME 

side the ingenious zeal of the Frenchmen and on the other 
the short-sighted opposition of the Germans: 

"Sir, — Whereas the signatory Powers- to the General Hague 
Convention expressly pledged themselves to leave nothing un- 
done to bring about a pacific solution of conflicts which might 
break out between two or more of them, and whereas these 
Powers by Article 10 of the said Act entrusted to the general 
secretary of the international Bureau the duty of reminding the 
interested parties at a given moment of the above pledge, I have 
the honour to inform you that I am at your service for the pur- 
pose of convoking the permanent court of arbitration, should 
your Government consider it incumbent upon them to communi- 
cate to me their intentions in this respect, simultaneously with 
the names of the arbitrators selected." 

This proposal of the French delegate which was practical, 
easy of execution and full of the promise of success, was 
received with great applause in the Committee. It was only 
the hapless Dr. Zorn, the man whose line of action was 
prescribed, who stated, after the manner of German states- 
men in all progressive matters, that while in principle he 
was in favour of the initiative-proposal, he foresaw an 
insuperable difficulty in the selection of the proper person 
for the secretaryship, an office to which so great a moral 
authority was to be attached. The French proposal was 
wrecked on Germany's opposition, and thus it happened that 
in the summer of 1914 the Bureau of the Hague Tribunal, 
which had been in existence for fifteen years, could not move 
and was unable to give any sign of its existence, notwith- 
standing the Serbian and the Russian proposal for a deci- 
sion by arbitration. 

Characteristic incidents of a similar nature, fatal for the 
future development of Europe, took place at every stage 
during the first and second Hague Conferences. It would 
lead us too far to consider all these details here. I can only 
refer to the minutes of the Conferences and to the critical 
literature on the subject. The reader who desires a short 
compilation of the relevant facts bearing on our present dis- 



HAGUE CONFERENCES 189 

cussion should refer to the excellent little volume by the 
Geneva Professor, Edgard Milhaud, Du droit de la force a 
la force du droit (Atar, Geneva, 191 5) to which, as I desire 
gratefully to acknowledge, I am much indebted in this sec- 
tion of my work. 

Professor Zorn and the Problems of The Hague 

Professor Philipp Zorn, the German delegate at the first 
Hague Conference, published in the Neue Ziircher Zeitung 
of January 14th, 1917, a long reply to a Christmas letter 
of the French Senator d'Estournelles de Constant which is 
very interesting from the two points of view of the origin 
and of the aims of the war. 

1. Herr Zorn still continues to adopt the official German 
attitude of the war of defence. He is in entire agreement 
with the French pacifist in repudiating the idea of the pre- 
ventive war. The war of defence he bases on the thesis 
"that the Russian Tsar is the author of the war." To prove 
this, he gives the following summary of the facts which 
brought about the war — a summary which is so characteristic 
of the profundity of German professors in their investiga- 
tions into the immediate origin of the war that I regard it 
as of sufficient interest to reproduce it textually here: 

The Austrian successor and his consort were murdered in 
Serajevo by Serbian cut-throats with the previous knowledge 
of the Serbian Government. For this hideous crime, which rep- 
resented the culminating point of a long-continued process of 
undermining the dignity of the Austro-Hungarian State on the 
part of Serbia, Austria-Hungary demanded satisfaction, which 
no doubt was far-reaching as the greatness of the crime de- 
manded, but which violated neither the territorial existence nor 
the sovereignty of Serbia. Serbia was prepared to give this sat- 
isfaction but was prevented from doing so by Russia. Germany 
urged in Vienna for an immediate understanding with Russia 
by stating that she would not allow herself to be plunged in a 
world-war on account of Serbian affairs. While these negotia- 
tions were still pending, Russia mobilised her whole army, and 



190 THE CRIME 

this mobilisation, as had already been announced to the army in 
a secret army-order in 1912/ meant war with Germany. 

It is not necessary that I should submit to detailed criti- 
cism this historical resume of the celebrated German teacher 
of international law. My various volumes furnish such a 
criticism at great length, and at the same time show the 
method by which independent inquirers who neither belong 
to the guild of Professors nor are otherwise blessed with titles 
of honour, must treat and explain the difficult and compli- 
cated historical material bearing on this subject. For a 
German professor the matter assumes so simple an aspect 
that he believes that he can dispose of it in twenty lines. 
His short summary which narrates almost in a telegraphic 
style of composition, certain events arbitrarily selected from 
the history of the origin of the war, which was brief in the 
length of time covered but infinitely long in its substance, 
reminds me of the parody of Goethe's Erl-King, which re- 
produces the famous poem in telegraphic abbreviation: 

Father and child 
Riding — (night wild) — 
Erl-King's daughter's teasing 
Boy finds unpleasing. 

Boy keeps on crying: 
"Father, be flying." 
Got home — much distressed 
Father living — boy at rest. 2 

With as much brevity and conciseness as marks this ab- 
breviated Erl-King the indignant Professor Zorn represents 

1 1 return later to this mysterious army-order in the chapter "Bethmann 
the Pacifist." 

2 [Vater und Kind 
Reiten durch Nacht und Wind. 
Tochter von Erlkonig 
Necken Kind ein wenig. 

Kind schreit: 

"Vater, reit." 

Kommen nach Haus in Not, 

Vater lebendig, Kind tot.] 



HAGUE CONFERENCES 191 

the shameful attack of the Entente Powers on the innocent 
Germany, and adds to reinforce his account: 

In their judgment of these facts the whole German nation of 
seventy million souls is practically unanimous. . . . Never in my 
long life has the unity between the Government and the people 
in Germany, in judging the measures of the Government, been so 
complete and so firm as on the outbreak of the war and since 
then to the present day. . . . The German people and the Hohen- 
zollerns are to-day indissolubly united for life and death as has 
never before been the case in the history of the world. 1 No, the 
German people did not desire war. And the Emperor desired 
it as little as did the nation; we alone of all the Great Powers, 
notwithstanding all the good occasions for war which have arisen, 
have kept the peace for forty years. But the Tsar desired war, 
and he knew that France and England would lend him the sup- 
port of their armies, and that since 1906 Belgium had broken 
her neutrality and had bound herself to the Western Powers for 
anti-German purposes. That is our view of the causes of the 
war, and the whole German people with one accord shares this 
view. 

As I have said, I am content merely to make plain Zorn's 
historical account which would demand for its refutation in 
detail that I should once more write my books. The reader 
of my works, even without special critical endowments or 
training, is in a position to show that every one of the above 
sentences is contrary to the truth and to recognise that this 
method of simplification which consists in tracing back his- 
torical occurrences to a few arbitrarily selected events is a 
record achievement which would justify its author in bear- 
ing the title of "Simplizissimus." 

2. Zorn's views on German war-aims are as interesting as 
his observations on the origin of the war: 

"In view of the declaration of the Chancellor (of 
November 9th, 191 6) there can be no doubt that the 

1 Fortunately this is only professorial truth, as it may be hoped the 
future will prove. Should it be the real truth, so much the worse for 
the German people. 



192 THE CRIME 

Central Powers, notwithstanding their attitude at the 
Conference of 1907, will be ready to refer to the Hague 
Tribunal all international disputes, in which the honour 
and the vital interests of the State are not concerned." 

This, then, is the maximum in the direction of pacifist 
concessions which the German teacher of international law, 
the German delegate at the first Hague Conference, who 
certainly is in a better position than anyone else to know the 
intentions of the German Government, foresees for the fu- 
ture peace negotiations: he is prepared to concur in a deci- 
sion by arbitration, but with the exclusion of all cases in 
which the honour and the vital interests of the States in 
question are concerned. Professor Zorn knows just as well 
as we do that the crucial point in all discussions concerning 
a pacifist organisation resting on law has always centred 
in the question whether all international disputes should be 
referred to the Hague Tribunal, or whether such as involved 
the honour and the vital interests of the States (in the words 
of the formula constantly advanced by the opponents of 
arbitration) should be excepted from decision by arbitra- 
tion. 

All theorists and practical men have long been in agree- 
ment that these exceptions would make the whole institu- 
tion illusory. The leading American pacifists, who are 
known to be identical with the leading statesmen there — men 
like Taft, Bryan, Wilson, etc. — have long ago discarded 
this outworn formula which rests on exploded views as to 
prestige, and the treaties relating to arbitration concluded 
by them extend to all international disputes without any ex- 
ception. It was only as a first instalment, as we shall see 
later, that the first Hague Conference, in the event of Ger- 
many being prepared to accept the principle of obligatory 
subjection to decision by arbitration, was ready to clog this 
important achievement with this exception, in the sure ex- 
pectation that if the obligation, even in a restricted scope, 
once existed, the restriction would of itself disappear at a 
later date. If the exceptions permanently remained — on 



HAGUE CONFERENCES 193 

this point there was no doubt felt in The Hague — the treaty 
as to arbitration would be deprived of a great part of its 
value. Even in the most important and dangerous cases it 
would then depend on the caprice of every State concerned 
to snap its fingers at the institution of arbitration by assert- 
ing that its honour or its vital interests were concerned. 
The door was opened wide to the arbitrary interpretation 
of this extensible clause. How far a malicious State which 
is eager for war may go in this direction is aptly proved by 
the example of Austria in the summer of 1914: the misera- 
ble formal differences between the Austrian Ultimatum and 
the Serbian answer were alleged to affect the vital interests 
of the Hapsburg monarchy to such a degree that Austria 
and Germany did not consider that the proposal for a deci- 
sion by the Hague Tribunal which was twice put forward 
(by Serbia and by Russia) was worthy of discussion, but 
instead passed it over in silence. 

What was then in 1907 demanded as the minimum, as 
the first beginning in the practical accomplishment of the 
idea of arbitration — as a minimum, because any further de- 
mand appeared hopeless from the outset in view of the op- 
position of Germany — this is what Professor Zorn now offers 
after two and a half years of the most fearful war as the 
maximum German concession, and in doing so he proudly 
refers to the world-historical speech of the Chancellor of 
November 9th, 19 16. What had long ago been recognised 
as worthless in the theory and practice of pacifism Herr Zorn 
brings us to-day as Germany's most priceless gift to the great 
nuptial feast of peace of the European nations. In fact, the 
Germans have "got up somewhat late," and in this matter as 
elsewhere they have missed the connection. 
3. It is true that the German Professor adds: 

"With this a great part of the difficult way is already 
overcome. But after the fearful catastrophe of the world- 
war this no longer contents the world; it demands that 
those disputes also in which the honour and the vital 
interests of the States are involved should be brought to 



194 THE CRIME 

a pacific settlement, if this is in any way possible, and it 
demands that legal dispositions should be taken with this 
end in view." 

Here again it is necessary to note the reservation, "if th'S 
is in any way possible," which leaves open exactly the same 
back-doors as the clause with regard to the honour and the 
vital interests of States. Speaking for himself Herr Zorn 
thus appears to go a step further than the German Govern- 
ment, so far as he foresees, will be prepared to go, but he also 
remains standing in the middle of the path and leaves open all 
manner of possibilities by which the sure operation of a ma- 
chinery of law in international disputes can be made illusory. 
Either a system of law is created or it is not : a submission to 
legal forms and to legal decisions "if it is in any way possi- 
ble" is in fact no submission; it is the negation of the institu- 
tion itself, and leaves in existence in the future the anarchy 
which ostensibly it desires to remove. 

In reality, notwithstanding the sympathy for international 
arbitration which he appeared to display at The Hague in 
1899, Professor Zorn in the eighteen years which have since 
then elapsed has not yet personally arrived at the recognition 
of a real obligation, of a real exclusion of resort to war as a 
means of solving disputes. As he explains in his essay men- 
tioned above, the most proper way still apears to him to be 
found in "the elaboration of the American idea that a Power 
should act as a second (Article 8 of the Convention as to ar- 
bitration of 1907) and that this should be a binding obligation 
on the States." In other words, the travailling European 
mountains are to bring forth the pacifist mouse represented by 
the substitution in the introduction of the article mentioned 
of a "binding obligation" in place of the "agreement" of the 
contracting Powers. According to Zorn's maximum-proposal 
the contracting Powers are to be under an obligation in serious 
disputes, which imperil the peace, each to select a Power to 
act as a "second" which will get into touch with the second of 
the other Power in order to avoid the breach of friendly rela- 
tions. That is to say, there is to be an obligation to accept 



HAGUE CONFERENCES 195 

mediation, which according to the circumstances or the good- 
will of the parties concerned may be successful or unsuccess- 
ful, but there is to be no obligation to accept a decision resting 
on law. This more than modest amelioration of the previous 
position is the utmost that Professor Zorn personally puts 
forward as desirable, but he in no way advances it as a proba- 
ble concession by the German Government. The standpoint 
of the latter, as we now authoritatively learn from Herr 
Zorn, is much more restricted than even that of their learned 
defender; it is a standpoint represented by the clause relating 
to honour and vital interests which has long since been out- 
worn. That is the utmost limit of the concessions which may 
be expected from Germany. 

This admission in so authoritative a quarter is of inesti- 
mable value in judging the most recent pacifist utterances of 
the Chancellor. We have here before us an authentic inter- 
pretation which again proves to us what we long ago knew : 
that we are not at liberty to expect from Germany any con- 
currence in an effective organisation of the nations resting 
on law for the prevention of war, or in the restriction of arma- 
ments which is the essential attribute of such an organisation. 
Such a concurrence on the part of Germany will only be given 
as a result of coercion, and it would be desirable in the inter- 
est of the peace of the world and in the interest of Germany 
itself that here also the threat of the King in Goethe's ballad 
should be realised: "And if thou refuse, I will make use of 
force." 

THE SECOND HAGUE CONFERENCE 

Obligatory Arbitration, World Treaty or 
Individual Treaty? 

In amplification of what I have said in J' accuse (page 88 
et seq.) I should merely like to emphasise certain character- 
istic features from the second Hague Conference (July to 
October, 1907) in order to show at their true value the un- 
tenable attempts made by certain defenders of the German 



196 THE CRIME 

Government to justify or at least to excuse Germany's action 
at The Hague. 

At the second Conference, as at the first, the question of 
compulsory decision by arbitration, at any rate for certain 
less important matters, constituted one of the most important 
subjects of deliberation. Freiherr Marschall von Bieberstein, 
who was then the head of the German mission, had the 
thankless task of once more announcing and defending Ger- 
many's opposition to any form of compulsory arbitration. 
Confronted with the charge that in the interval Germany had 
herself concluded treaties of arbitration with restricted obli- 
gation, he sought to escape by the subtle distinction that while 
in this question Germany could accept the system individuel 
she could not accept the system mondial. In other words, Ger- 
many wished to seek out from one case to another the parties 
with whom she was prepared to enter into a contract, but for 
heaven's sake she would not at one stroke conclude an arbi- 
tration treaty with a number of other parties, and thus create 
a world-system. The latter, the world-system, was, however, 
precisely the point that mattered. Individual treaties of arbi- 
tration had frequently been concluded since 1899, and even at 
an earlier date. Historical experience, however, taught, and 
still daily teaches, that such individual treaties, as is indeed the 
case with most international treaties, are not observed in the 
decisive moment and are treated as scraps of paper by the 
deliberate breaker of the peace. The position is quite differ- 
ent in the case of a world-treaty which is signed by forty- 
four Governments, the representatives of the whole of civil- 
ised humanity, and which imposes on each individual signa- 
tory positive obligations towards forty-three other contracting 
parties. To break such a treaty according to the interest or 
the whim of the moment would be impossible to-day, or at any 
rate it would be extremely dangerous and disadvantageous for 
the party breaking the treaty, since he would be at once con- 
fronted by forty- three injured parties who, partly by resort 
to arms and partly by means of diplomatic and economic boy- 
cotting, might isolate him in the world and make his exist- 
ence impossible. Germany, notwithstanding her power, nei- 



HAGUE CONFERENCES 197 

ther could nor would expose herself to this danger and this 
explains her stubborn resistance to a world-treaty and her 
withdrawal to the individual treaty. 

When many defenders of Germany see in the conclusion 
of the Anglo-German treaty of arbitration of 1904 a sign; 
that Germany was in reality not so averse from the aspirations 
of The Hague as the malicious accuser endeavours to repre-i 
sent, these writers prove merely that their thoughts are not 
directed to the real issue, that they have not grasped the 
salient point of the discussion but blindly grope past it. The 
salient point of all discussions is the international treaty of, 
arbitration, the system of arbitration which would thereby be 
inaugurated, even if at first on a narrow basis only, but which 
it might be hoped would gradually, under the logical compul- 
sion of development, extend more and more and be fashioned 
into a system of general compulsion. A framework for a 
world-wide treaty of arbitration for all international disputes 
was in the first place to be created ; the full completion of this 
was, however, to be left for later development. Individual 
treaties between States A and B could never furnish such a 
framework. On this rests the inanity of appealing to the 
Anglo-German individual treaty. This, however, also ex- 
plains the logical consistency in the attitude of the German 
delegates towards the world-wide treaty. Since Germany did 
not wish an effective, serious and indissoluble union such as a 
world-treaty would have created, and since she desired still! 
less a gradual extension of this union to cover the most im- 
portant disputes, that is in other words to an elimination of 
war, it was necessary from the very outset to oppose the crea- 
tion of such a frame, in which gradually a highly undesired 
picture might be sketched. 

The German Government and the German Emperor, who 
were above all concerned in the maintenance of their freedom 
of movement, thus acted quite logically when they concluded 
individual treaties but opposed a world-treaty. The defend- 
ers of Germany, however, argue illogically when they en- 
deavour to represent the individual treaty as evidence that 
Germany did not in essence entertain "Machiavellian inten- 



198 THE CRIME 

tions" and had only "theoretical scruples" regarding the as- 
pirations of The Hague. No, the scruples were anything but 
theoretical, they were of an eminently practical nature, as is 
proved by the negotiations at both Conferences, by all the 
commentaries and above all by White's Autobiography which 
has already been quoted; there was no desire to bind their 
hands with regard to forty-three States; there was no desire 
to incur the danger of being gradually carried from the re- 
stricted to the general obligation by the stream of public opin- 
ion throughout the world ; there was no desire to attain a per- 
petual guaranteed state of peace; on the contrary they wished 
to retain the possibility of revealing the shining armour and 
of beating with the mailed fist at the appropriate moment. 
That is the hidden meaning of the whole matter. That is the 
inner ground of Germany's attitude at The Hague. That was 
even then fully recognised by all the nations in the world as 
the governing point of view of German politicians. This is 
the explanation of the hard struggles, the sharp divergencies 
at the Conference, of the apprehensions regarding the future 
of Europe which were entertained from the time of the first 
Conference. This also explains the impulse on the part of the 
great States that were not allied with Germany to unite to- 
gether in order to meet the dangers which were seen to be 
coming from Germany. 

The blindness of the objection that Germany had com- 
pleted an arbitration treaty with England is shown by the 
fact that this treaty, which was completed in 1904, was well 
known to all the participants in the Hague Conference of 
1907. If this individual treaty had served the ends and the 
purposes of a world-treaty, what was the purpose of these 
sharp and embittered negotiations conducted at the Congress 
with a view to obtaining Germany's consent to an obligatory 
world-treaty? This fact alone shows that two entirely dif- 
ferent questions were involved which could be confused only 
by those who are completely ignorant. I had therefore not 
the slightest occasion to conceal in my book — "prudently" as 
one of my critics observes in accusation — the Anglo-German 
treaty of arbitration. This treaty had as much to do with 



HAGUE CONFERENCES 199 

the Hague Conferences as certain new German sociologists 
have with questions of politics and international law. 

If these facts required any confirmation, it would be fur- 
nished by the Hague negotiations themselves. The Ameri- 
can delegate, Mr. Joseph Choate, at one time Ambassador of 
the United States in Great Britain (who recently wrote a 
preface to the excellent book by the American Attorney-Gen- 
eral J. M. Beck on the question of guilt, The Evidence in th&. 
Case), humorously replied to Bieberstein's distinction between 
the individual and the world-treaty. The attitude of the Ger- 
man delegate, who was enthusiastic for arbitration in itself, 
but would concede it only to those contracting parties which 
suited him, appeared to him to be similar to that of someone 
who should see in a dream a heavenly apparition which 
aroused in him the most violent desire, but who should turn 
his back on the divine vision if on awakening he discovered it 
in his bed. 

If a nation is ready to conclude a treaty of arbitration with 
one or several others — such is the substance of the American 
delegate's observations — why did it refuse to conclude such a 
treaty with all the forty-three nations represented, if this is the 
imperative desire of all peoples? This is a question to which 
Germany should furnish an answer, for the rest of us are all 
ready for a general convention, because we have absolute con- 
fidence in the other nations. We respect the equality of all 
other Powers on the basis on which they are here represented 
and exercise their right of voting at the Conference. We rec- 
ognise that in their attitude they all represent in equal measure 
manliness, intelligence, independence and good faith. There 
are here in the last analysis two questions ; on the one side good 
faith, on the other the appeal to force. (II y a ici au fond deux 
questions: Vune de bonne foi, I' autre de recours a la force.) x 

Even more effective than the speech of the American dele- 
gate was the great appeal which Leon Bourgeois, the Presi- 

1 [Quoted by Milhaud (pp. 72-73) from the proceedings of the Con- 
ference.] 



200 THE CRIME 

dent of the Arbitration Committee, delivered on this occasion- 
With logical acumen and rhetorical energy the French states- 
man emphasised the symptomatic significance of the recog- 
nition of the obligatory principle in a world-treaty. Even if 
to begin with the so-called vital interests of the States re- 
mained excluded from compulsory arbitration, it would nev- 
ertheless be of inestimable importance for the peaceful devel- 
opment of humanity that the legal compulsion to submit to 
the decision of arbitration should in the first place be estab- 
lished and that in this way the basis of an international struc- 
ture of law should be laid in correspondence with the views 
of the modern world. The elevation of this building would 
gradually and automatically take place. The objection that 
the conditions of power of each State were different and that 
therefore they could not all be treated on the same juridical 
pattern was untenable; for it had never been the intention 
of the Hague Conferences to intervene in the relations of the 
individual States in matters of power or to restrict their legiti- 
mate development and their political future. Each nation, he 
said, represented a sovereign body-politic, was the equal of 
all others in moral value, and whether small or great, whether 
weak or strong, had an equal claim to the respect of its rights, 
as also an equal obligation to fulfil its duties. Each one, under 
the governance of law, should be in a position to develop 
freely without injuring the corresponding rights of any other. 
All nations to-day were linked together by a narrow net of 
common interests. Every disturbance of the peace between 
two nations reacted immediately on all the others. Therefore, 
in the interests of all, there ought now to be created a mutual 
guarantee by a world-wide treaty relating to compulsory arbi- 
tration which in the first place should be restricted to ques-> 
tions of law, interpretation, liquidation and similar matters, 
but which would even in this restricted form represent a deci- 
sive step forward in the great question of arbitration; for it 
would give expression to the common respect for law, the 
common feeling for the solidarity of duties. This — so the 
French statesman concluded his speech amidst stormy ap- 



HAGUE CONFERENCES 201 

plause — would be the highest moral lesson which could be 
given to humanity. 1 

It is unnecessary to add anything to this significant speech 
of Leon Bourgeois. It raises the negotiations which then took 
place and the vote which ensued to the important position 
which they have occupied in the world's history and of which 
the influence is still felt. 

The voting gave the following result: Article 16 (a) of 
the draft under consideration, which established compulsory 
arbitration for a series of less important disputes which were 
specially enumerated, and expressly excluded vital questions, 
questions of independence and of honour (inter its vitaux, 
independence, honneur) was accepted by thirty- five votes to 
five, four abstaining from voting. France, England, Russia 
and Italy voted in its favour. Germany, Austria and Turkey 
voted against it. 

A further Article 16 (c) submitted to this method of set- 
tlement without any restriction certain subjects which were 
specially appropriate for decision by arbitration. The above 
reservations with regard to vital questions, etc., did not here 
appear to be necessary, since such disputes in their very nature 
excluded the possibility of being exalted to "national" ques- 
tions. This second paragraph was also accepted by thirty- 
three votes to eight, three refraining from voting. Once more 
France, England, Russia and Italy voted in favour of the 
proposal, whereas Germany, Austria and Turkey voted 
against it. 

I have already recounted in my book (page 89) the further 
fate of these proposals. Since unanimity had not been se- 
cured, the resolutions fell through, and the proposal to de- 

1 Second Hague Conference, Vol. II., pages 72-73, 87-89; quoted by 
Milhaud, pages 72-76. It is interesting to observe that the attitude of 
the French and American Delegates towards those nominated by Ger- 
many was even then, seven years before the Franco-German War and 
ten years before the American-German War, dictated by the same prin- 
ciples which to-day serve as the guiding line of the leading statesmen of 
the two great republics in the declaration of their most important war- 
aims. 



202 THE CRIME 

clare them binding on those States at any rate which had 
voted in their favour could not be made a resolution in view 
of the opposition of Freiherr von Marschall, who insisted on 
the principle of unanimity. Like the first, the second Confer- 
ence also remained without result in this most important point 
owing to the action of Germany. 

Another point in the negotiations at the second Conference, 
although apparently of less importance, may still be men- 
tioned, as here again it is possible to recognise the funda- 
mental tendencies of Germany, in opposition to other nations, 
to refuse any effective obligation. In the very important 
clauses with regard to the commissions of inquiry, the convo- 
cation of which in 1904 prevented an Anglo-Russian war on 
account of the Dogger Bank affair, the Russian delegation 
desired to substitute an obligation by treaty in place of the 
freedom of choice; the proposal was that the words "les puis- 
sances contractantes jugent utile" should be replaced by the 
words "les puissances contractantes conviennent." Herr von 
Marschall at once declared against this juris vinculum, and it 
was found necessary to leave the convocation of the commis- 
sions of inquiry to the free decision of the Powers concerned. 

Similar examples of German resistance to every legally 
effective operation of the Hague institutions could be cited 
in large numbers from the minutes. I must content myself 
with the examples quoted, and I believe that they are sufficient 
to give the reader an apt picture of the deep inner divergence 
in view between Germany and the rest of the civilised world 
which was manifested at the Hague Conferences. The ac- 
count of these incidents and the judgment upon them which 
is contained in my book, can therefore be maintained intact 
in every point. The Germany of 1899 and of 1907 was the 
same Germany as that of 1914. It deliberately and inten- 
tionally represented the principle of force in the world, while 
all the other great and small nations — with the exception of 
Germany's allies, Austria and Turkey and a few insignifi- 
cant States — desired to realise the principle of law in the life 
of the nations. Even then Germany was preparing the ground 



HAGUE CONFERENCES 203 

which would make possible at the appropriate moment the 
execution of her efforts for power. As I have rightly em- 
phasised in my book, the Hague Conferences constitute one of 
the most important signposts in the antecedents of the present 
war, a luminous point which at once clarifies the past and the 
present. 

Hague Cause — Triple Entente Effect 

The close connection which links Germany's action at The 
Hague to the union of the Entente Powers and to the genera- 
tion of the state of European tension leading to the explosion 
of war, was recognised by German socialists and pacifists long 
before the explosion actually took place. Anyone who reads 
the commentaries of Fried, Nippold, etc., on the Hague Con- 
ferences will find this confirmed. Here I should like to refer 
to an article by Fried (Friedenswarte of November-Decem- 
ber, 191 5) which adopts exactly the same point of view as 
that contained in my book in describing the famous "encir- 
clement" as a measure of defence provoked by the deep dis- 
trust and embitterment which was occasioned by Germany's 
hostile attitude towards peace at the Hague Conferences: 

It requires courage to say now with regard to the so-called 
"encirclement" what we have said from the very beginning. The 
question involved was not that of an attack on Germany, but of 
what was considered as a necessary protection against Germany. 
There were certain measures taken by Germany, certain 
speeches, certain actions which engendered this fear and led to 
that action which has been expounded in Germany as an attempt 
at isolation. It was then the fear of the danger of isolation 
which evoked German counter-measures and these again ap- 
peared to the others as a menace. Thus we pacifists wrote ten 
years ago and more, that the question was less that of "encir- 
clement" and more that of an "excirclement." This excircle- 
ment began at The Hague in 1899, when the civilised States of 
the world desired to establish in place of the old guarantee of 
power a new guarantee resting on law and agreement, and in so 
doing met with the most violent opposition from Germany. 

Germany's complaint regarding the Delcasses and the Lans- 



204 THE CRIME 

downes is unjustified. She has herself created the situation un- 
der which she suffers. In 1899 at The Hague she gave into the 
hands of her enemies the moral weapon of distrust, and thus 
neglected to seize the great moment and to gain for herself the 
respect paid to a Power which desires to secure peace by mod- 
ern means. She remained unseasonably on the old lines. How 
mistaken was the attitude of Germany in 1899 appears from the 
reminiscences of Andrew D. White recently published. . . . As 
may be read in White,. Count Miinster, who received the title of 
Prince for his services at the Hague Conference, awakened by 
his attitude as German delegate at The Hague a feeling of bit- 
terness and distrust towards Germany among all the other States. 
Germany still suffers under this distrust, and Delcasse would not 
have been possible without Miinster. . . . 

The isolation of Germany dates from the days of The Hague. 
As we have already so often emphasised it was in The Hague 
that the mistake was committed which gave Germany in the rest 
of the world the reputation of a Power which in its main fea- 
tures desired war. 



German Anti-Pacifism in Theory and Practice 

The "theoretical scruples" which, according to many who 
seek to exculpate Germany, are said to have been the only 
ground of the attitude assumed by Germany towards the main 
subjects of the Hague Congresses, the restriction of arma- 
ments by treaty and compulsory arbitration, were in reality, 
as I have already said, nothing more than the effort to main- 
tain in practice that complete freedom of action and of move- 
ment which Germany required for her purposes. In fact 
Germany in the long years from the Hague Conferences down 
to the outbreak of war followed in practice exactly the same 
guiding lines which at the time she "theoretically" reserved 
for herself at the Hague Conferences — firstly in the Anglo- 
German negotiations for an understanding (1909-12) which 
I have already dealt with in my book and to which I will re- 
turn in detail at a later passage in this work, and then contin- 
uously down to the outbreak of war in 19 14. 

Between the attitude of Germany at the Hague Confer- 



HAGUE CONFERENCES 205 

ences and the whole of her later action down to the criminal 
provocation of the present war there lies a straight uninter- 
rupted line. The English proposals Tor a proportional re- 
striction by treaty of naval armaments on both sides had to 
be declined for the same reasons which impelled Germany at 
the first and second Hague Congresses — and likewise before 
and after the two congresses in the utterances of the Emperor, 
the leading members of the Government, the party leaders and 
the Press which was friendly to the Government — to decline 
every agreement as to armaments and to claim absolute inde- 
pendence for Germany in determining her armaments by sea 
and by land. 

The English assurance of 19 12 that she entertained no ag- 
gressive intentions against Germany, and that she would never 
be a party to any aggressive coalition had also to be declined 
as insufficient, since Germany was not in reality apprehensive 
of such aggression, but on the contrary attached decisive 
weight to English neutrality, which would assure her the pos- 
sibility of provoking, as appeared good to her, continental 
wars on the pretext that they had been "forced" upon her. 

Churchill's proposal for a naval holiday had to be left dis-i 
regarded by Germany for the same reasons which made hei? 
decline every other restriction of her armaments. 

Grey's conference at the end of July, 19 14, had also to bej 
declined by Germany because, without doubt, it would have 
led to a peaceful understanding in a very short space of time 
— a result which was as little in accordance with the desires 
of the German authorities as was the creation of an interna- 
tional peace organisation in 1899 and 1907. 

The reference of the dispute to the Hague Tribunal, as was 
proposed firstly by Serbia and then by the Emperor of Rus j 
sia, had to be declined by Germany for the same reasonsi 
which induced Germany to struggle hand and foot against 
the whole institution of the Hague Tribunal, which in the 
end she had only accepted unwillingly under the pressure of 
circumstances. 

Germany had to decline all the English and Russian pro- 
posals for mediation from the same point of view as that on 



206 THE CRIME 

which she had rejected as impracticable every initiative of 
the Hague Bureau in mediation. 

In short, every diplomatic and warlike step taken by Ger- 
many from the Hague Conferences down to the outbreak of 
war in 1914 was the logical continuation of the attitude ob- 
served at The Hague, the practical execution of the theories 
of power there supported, although of course not openly 
acknowledged. 

Taft's Treaties of Arbitration 

But it is not merely what Germany did in these intervening 
years but also what she omitted to do that proves the deep 
divergence in the views which animated Germany and her 
allies on the one side and all other modern States on the 
other. After the second Conference the American Govern- 
ment under Presidents Taft and Wilson continued at the 
head of all other countries the pacifist endeavours which it 
had pursued with ideal zeal at the Hague Conferences. In 
19 10 President Taft laid before the other Powers a draft of 
a treaty elaborated in all its details which aimed at a diminu- 
tion by treaty of the armaments of the individual States and 
the creation of an international military force for the mainte- 
nance of general peace. We must uncover before these ad- 
mirable Americans who, although decried by Prussian junkers 
as coldly calculating "business-men," notwithstanding all Eu- 
ropean disillusions have not abandoned the path to their 
ideals, to peace and general well-being. 1 It is a peculiar irony 
of historical development that it should be just this new world 

1 Even a Hindenburg cannot refrain, in an interview just published by 
Wolff's bureau at the beginning of April, 191 7, from ascribing the basest 
business motives to the American proclamation of war : "Wilson's mo- 
tives and those of his friends are clear to me. The American governing 
and financial circles have entered into a corrupt transaction (the refer- 
ence is to the supply of munitions and the loans to the Triple Alliance). 
Unless they are prepared to sacrifice the capital which they have invested, 
there is no other course open but to support the tottering undertaking with 
the whole of their means. The only question is whether the undertaking 
can be saved in this way." 



HAGUE CONFERENCES 207 

of the United States of America, which has brought to its 
highest perfection human capacity in all material, technical, 
commercial and industrial matters, which should also more 
and more advance at the head of human progress in all ideal 
efforts. "Marcher a la tete de la civilisation" — this appears 
to be more and more the honourable distinction of the great 
transatlantic republic. 

The culminating point in this development is seen in Presi- 
dent Wilson's message, read in Congress on April 2nd, 191 7, 
which formed the basis of the proclamation by the American 
representative body of the existence of a state of war between 
America and Germany. I will quote only the following sen- 
tences from this world-historical document: 

Our object now, as then, is to vindicate the principles of peace 
and justice in the life of the world as against selfish autocratic 
power. . . . Neutrality is no longer feasible or desirable where 
the peace of the world is involved, and the freedom of its peo- 
ples and the menace to that peace and freedom lie in the exist- 
ence of autocratic Governments backed by organised force, which 
is controlled wholly by their will and not by the will of their 
people. . . . We have not quarrelled with the German people. 
We have no feeling towards them but one of sympathy and 
friendship. It was not upon their impulse that their Govern- 
ment acted in entering this war. It was not with their previous 
knowledge or approval. . . . 

We are now about to accept the gage of battle with this nat- 
ural foe to liberty, and we shall, if necessary, spend the whole 
force of the nation to check and nullify its pretensions and its 
powers. . . . The world must be safe for democracy. Its peace 
must be planted upon trusted foundation of political lib- 
erty. We have no selfish ends to serve. We desire no con- 
quests and no dominion. We seek no indemnities for ourselves 
and no material compensation for sacrifices we shall freely make. 
We are but one of the champions of the rights of mankind, and 
shall be satisfied when those rights are as secure as fact and the 
freedom of nations can make them. Just because we fight with- 
out rancour and without selfish objects, seeking nothing for our- 
selves but what we shall wish to share with all free people, we 
shall, I feel confident, conduct our operations as belligerents 



208 THE CRIME 

without passion, and ourselves observe with proud punctilio the 
principles of right and fair play we profess to be fighting for. 1 

This explanation of a declaration of war, so intensely in- 
spired by high idealism, is certainly unique in the history of 
mankind; it is, however, only a logical consequence of the 
earlier attitude of American statesmen towards pacifist prob- 
lems, just as the occasion given by Germany to the adoption 
of this attitude on the part of America is a logical conse- 
quence of the previous German attitude towards these prob- 
lems. That in certain circumstances, when all other means 
fail, the highest ends of peace are only to be attained by war, 
that the liberation of the world from military domination can 
in the extreme case only take place by battle, just as the lib- 
eration of a nation from autocratic domination can only be 
accomplished by revolution, is a fact which is copiously con- 
firmed by the teaching of history. For such cases in place of 
the reprehensible si vis pacem para helium a similarly sound- 
ing principle, though in essence entirely different, may become 
a necessity: Si vis pacem, fac helium. It may be necessary 
to resort to homoeopathic cures in which poison is only to be 
defeated by counter-poison, toxin only by anti-toxin. In a 
later passage we shall treat in detail of the permissibility, in- 
deed the inevitability, of such homoeopathic remedies against 
the European plague of war and its most dangerous bearers 
of infection in the past, in the present and, if a radical cure 
does not take place, in the future as well. 

I mentioned above the interesting fact that in the great 
transatlantic republic the ideal higher development keeps pace 
throughout with material development. The opposition be- 
tween these two developments is indeed only apparent; in 
reality the one is the presupposition and the condition of the 
other. The enormous development of that "land of unlim- 
ited possibilities" was only possible on the sure basis of a 
long-enduring state of peace, guaranteed for the future as 

1 [The version in the German text is somewhat abbreviated, as given 
by the Havas Agency.] 



HAGUE CONFERENCES 209 

well. Peace within the two American continents, apart from 
insignificant disturbances, has been guaranteed once for all 
by the Pan-American Union. If America is not the ag- 
gressor, peace with the States of Europe and Asia is assured 
by the geographically independent position of the two Amer- 
icas and by the protection of the Fleet. This unassailable 
position and the disposition of the country, which is averse 
from the initiation of any aggressive action, has rendered pos- 
sible the development of the incomparable economic prosper- 
ity which we observed with admiration before the war, and 
which will now assume further unimagined dimensions on 
the ruins of mangled Europe. The soberly astute Americans 
see and know to what fortunate circumstances they owe their 
prosperity, but on the other hand they are too much saturated 
with modern ideas of the world and of humanity not to be 
willing to desire and to procure for other civilised people the 
same advantages. For them the harmony of the interests of 
all civilised people, in spiritual as well as in economic mat- 
ters, is no empty delusion, and if now for a time they draw 
profit from the ruin of Europe, they know quite well that an 
enduring advantage, an enduring economic prosperity can for 
them also arise only from the peace and the well-being of 
those countries, with which they are connected in the most 
intimate manner by a thousand spiritual and economic nerv- 
ous links. This explains the fact that material and ideal 
efforts keep pace in the great transatlantic republic, and that 
America in both domains marches at the head of human 
progress. 

The noble initiative of President Taft in the question of 
international disarmament on which I have touched above, 
offered from the outset little prospect of success, after the 
unfortunate experiences of the first and second Hague Con- 
ferences for which Germany bore the chief responsibility; 
for Russia had in fact placed the question of armaments as 
the chief subject of discussion at the head of the Hague nego- 
tiations. On the other hand complete success attended Taft's 
further initiative in the direction of concluding with other 



210 THE CRIME 

nations unrestricted treaties of arbitration, that is to say, 
treaties comprising all disputes. Treaties of this nature, which 
accordingly submitted to arbitration the so-called vital ques- 
tions and questions of honour, were concluded with France 
and England, and failed to become effective only because, al- 
though they obtained in the American Senate a large ma- 
jority, they did not obtain the requisite two-thirds majority. 
England and France signed the treaties. Why was such a 
treaty not concluded with Germany? Because in the period 
which followed, down to the present day, Germany on princi- 
ple continued to pursue the policy of refusal shown at The 
Hague. 

The Bryan Treaties 

An even more striking instance of the self-isolation of 
Germany is furnished by the history of the so-called Bryan 
treaties of 19 13. Bryan, the American Foreign Secretary, 
who had always been one of the most enthusiastic pacifists in 
the world, had along with Wilson, the President of the United 
States, outlined a so-called peace plan, according to which 
the United States were to propose to all Governments that 
disputes of every kind between America and them should 
be referred to a commission of inquiry composed according 
to definite principles, which should examine and determine 
the situation in every direction; the commission should, how- 
ever, communicate the result to the Powers in question at 
the earliest after the expiration of a year. After the com- 
munication had taken place, it was left to each party to act 
according as it might consider expedient; if it desired, it 
could thus begin war. As will be seen, the suggested draft 
American treaty was directed not to decision by arbitration, 
but only to a determination of the state of affairs surrounded 
by every guarantee of impartiality, and left to the parties in 
dispute the unrestricted right, as they might see fit, to acqui- 
esce or to refuse to acquiesce in the result of the investiga- 
tion. The concluding sentence of the third article of the draft 
treaty approved by the American Senate on April 24th, 1913, 



HAGUE CONFERENCES 211 

runs as follows : "The parties reserve to themselves the right 
to act as they consider proper with reference to the subject in 
dispute as soon as they have received the report of the com- 
mission of inquiry." 

This ingenious and carefully devised treaty thus spared all 
the deep-rooted prejudices with regard to the right of sov- 
ereignty, of self-control, of war and peace, or whatever names 
may be given to these cherished idols of a long vanished past; 
it spared the mediaeval phraseology to which every petty State 
and every marauding knight before the introduction of the 
"general peace of the land" had resorted in support of their 
own right of feud; it spared the threadbare trumpery with 
which the craft of diplomacy is still accustomed to drape its 
gloomy handiwork; it spared all the relics of the past, and so 
to speak by a back door, by the opening of a tiny hatchway, 
it admitted the living breath of modern views of the world 
and of law into the fusty and mouldy secret chamber of out- 
worn diplomacy — a breath which, as on the opening of old 
Egyptian coffins, gives over to decomposition and decay the 
thousand-year old mummies that may be found within. "If 
time is won, all is won" — it is on this generally recognised 
principle, which more than elsewhere is applicable to national 
disputes that the Bryan treaties were based. Most wars, es- 
pecially in recent times, could not have been provoked by the 
great criminals who consciously instigated them, if means had 
not been devised at the decisive moment to deceive the nations 
regarding the true state of affairs, regarding the true grounds, 
or rather pretexts, in most cases absurdly insignificant, if it 
had not been possible to inflame their passions, to inspire 
them for what were professed to be "holy" wars, for wars of 
God, while in reality they were only the devilish work of man. 

In times of general compulsory service it is no longer pos- 
sible to wage wars without or against the will of the nations. 
The great men of the world have known and know this quite 
well. Consequently if it is desired to arrive at the wars willed 
by the ruler, the nations must be deceived and taken unawares, 
they must be intoxicated and confused by the still potent 
phrases about the defence of house and hearth and of the 



212 THE CRIME 

Fatherland. All this, however, is only possible in the "heat 
of the fight," in the urgency of precipitant events; it is only 
possible from one day to the next, scarcely until the day 
after the next, and in no event from to-day until a year hence. 
A few days' delay between the German Ultimatum and the 
declaration of war against Russia, and the German people, 
notwithstanding the censorship and the state of siege, would 
have convinced itself that neither the Russians nor the French 
had invaded Germany, that no one menaced the freedom and 
the independence of Germany. It was just because it was 
desired that the deluded people should not return to reflec- 
tion and enlightenment, and at the same time because it was 
hoped to gain for their own side all the advantages of the 
rapid blow, that the declaration of war was precipitated so 
criminally, untroubled about the world conflagration which 
was thereby enkindled. 

Bryan's draft treaty reckons in the subtlest manner on 
this psychological trait of the rulers and of the nations. 1 
The war-game of the mighty ones will be grievously upset, 
indeed rendered impossible, if the trump card, represented 
by the gain of time, is in the hands of the friends of peace. 
A year is a long time and even assuming the greatest malevo- 
lence on the part of those in power, there is no possibility 
that for so long a period the fire of war can remain kindled 
in the nation. The flames become extinguished, the smoke 
disperses, the clear insight returns, and if then the sober im- 
partial decision of the international commission of inquiry 
appears, it will be recognised by all sides, no matter what the 
verdict may be, as an objective determination of the state of 
affairs, and will be hailed as a welcome deliverer from the 
threatening danger of war. 

What attitude was assumed by the progressive Powers of 

1 The League to Enforce Peace recently founded by Taf t in June, 1915, 
proceeds from the same ideas. For the purpose of gaining time this 
league of peace also proposes to compel its members only to summon 
a tribunal or a mediatory council (according to the nature of the dispute) ; 
it does not propose to compel them to submit to the decisions of these 
authorities. 



HAGUE CONFERENCES 213 

the Hague Conferences to the Bryan Treaty? And what at- 
titude was assumed by the retrograde Powers? The answer 
is short and simple. Apart from the whole of the American 
Powers, the Bryan treaty was signed by the following Euro- 
pean Powers : England, France, Russia, Italy, Spain, Switz- 
erland, Holland, Denmark, Portugal, Greece, Sweden and 
Norway. It was not signed by Germany, Austria and 
Turkey. 1 

I have nothing to add to the facts as thus determined. In 
their whole political attitude from 1899 until to-day Ger j 
many and Austria have shown an enviable consistency. 
Might instead of right — for God's sake, let us not be bound 
by any treaty which might take from us or injure our free- 
dom in war! Treaties are after all only scraps of paper. 
What, then, is the good of concluding them? Our strength, 
is the measure of our right. Long live the shining armour, 
the mailed fist, the sharp gleaming sword ! All this, of course, 
is only meant "theoretically." In practice Germany is and 
always has been "a child, no angel is so pure." Dear, good, 
pacific Germany! 

Idealism or Egotism? 

While German inquirers into the war as a rule scarcely 
touch even superficially on the Hague Conferences, they never 
fail in connection with this topic, following the most recent 
German custom, to raise, and of course to answer in the 
negative, the question whether England supported pacifist 
endeavours at the Hague Conferences "out of pure idealism, 
from love of peace," or only from egotistical reasons. I have 
already expressed my views at greater length elsewhere on 
these investigations into national psychology, the object of 
which is to dispose of the plain facts by ascribing to them 
such base motives as selfishness, the duping of others, etc. 
It is an extremely difficult, and indeed an almost impossible 
task, to inquire into the motives of a single individual per- 

1 See Milhaud, page 95. 



214 THE CRIME 

son, let alone the motives of a whole nation, or of its Gov- 
ernment which consists of many individuals. Such inquiries 
are useless and can lead to no result. In politics the only- 
point that matters is whether good has been done; the motives 
which have occasioned the action in question are irrelevant. 
How many great actions, in politics as well as in other fields 
of human activity, have sprung from egotistic and not from 
altruistic motives. So long as man remains what he is, per- 
sonal and general interests will alike make their influence 
felt in most of his actions and decisions. 

When Luther affixed his theses to the church at Witten- 
berg, he certainly purposed dealing a fatal blow at Papal cor- 
ruption. But there may also have been present in his mind 
the thought that he would be the man who would gain the 
glory of being the deliverer from the corruption of Rome, that 
he would himself enjoy the advantages of his new revolution- 
ary doctrine which exchanged Catholic celibacy for Protes- 
tant marriage, that he would be able to lead his beloved 
Katharina Bora to the altar. When the Prussian Junker, 
Herr von Bismarck-Schonhausen, conceived his subversive 
plan of breaking up the German Union, and of forming by 
blood and iron a new German Empire under Prussian leader- 
ship, there were certainly present to his mind the black-red- 
golden ideals for which the German democrats had suffered 
and bled for half a century — men guilty of high treason and 
of treachery to their country, like those of us who are oppo- 
nents of the Hohenzollerns to-day. But at the same time he 
was enough of a Prussian and a Junker to make not merely 
the union of the German Empire but also the increase of 
power of his Prussian Fatherland and of his hereditary royal 
master the target of his political marksmanship, to bear to 
new honour the black and white Prussian flag as well as the 
colours of the German Empire. As in the case of all the 
great deeds of mankind personal ambition also played a part 
in his soul— the ambition to render his name immortal and 
to make the despised Prussian Junkerdom — strange irony of 
history! — achieve the task of bringing to fulfilment the old 
democratic revolutionary demand for unity. 



HAGUE CONFERENCES 215 

What a childish undertaking it is therefore to judge the 
political action of a whole nation by its alleged motives, 
when we cannot even penetrate with certainty into the mo- 
tives of individual men with whom we are in daily inter- 
course. Are these subtle psychologists ignorant of the fact 
that the motives of human actions are like a mosaic which, 
being composed of innumerable small stones, furnishes a 
picture only when taken in its entirety, but signifies nothing 
in its component parts? This is the case in dealing with 
particular men ; much more does it hold when we are dealing 
with whole nations. 

In her consistent intervention on behalf of all pacifist en- 
deavours from the first Hague Conference until to-day, until 
the statement of her present war-aims which are no more than 
the realisation of pacifist ideals, England has consistently and 
unwearyingly followed the path of progress. This must be 
accounted to her as an indisputable merit; and this is what 
has gained for her and for her cause the sympathies of all 
neutrals in this struggle of the nations. 

Germany, on the other hand, has consistently and inexor- 
ably served the cause of retrogression. This must be ac- 
counted as her indisputable offence ; this is what has drawn to 
her and to her cause the antipathies of all neutrals in this 
struggle of the nations. These facts alone are what matter. 
The motives are a matter of indifference. Unfortunately, the 
facts are to-day exactly as they were at the time of the 
Hague Conferences. To-day progress in matters of inter- 
national law is still represented by England; retrogression by 
Germany. All progressively-minded Europeans — no matter 
what their nationality — can hope only for the victory of the 
ideas of progress and their realisation in the conclusion of 
peace. May the third Hague Conference after the war com- 
plete the work which the first and the second could not achieve 
owing to the opposition of Germany. Only thus will the 
peace of Europe be permanently secured. 



216 THE CRIME 



SCHIEMANN AND THE HAGUE CONFERENCES 

A man, who maintains that he is a historian, nevertheless 
dares to combat with the miserable expedients which are 
collected on pages 8-13 of his Slanderer the occurrences of the 
Hague Conferences, which are documentarily proved and con- 
firmed by a voluminous literature dealing with the subject in 
its historical aspects and from the point of view of inter- 
national law. It was, he says, on account of Anglo-Russian 
friction in East Asia, which threatened to lead to a war be- 
tween the two States, that Russia, knowing she was not suf- 
ficiently prepared, resorted to the "Disarmament-Conference," 
as Schiemann prefers to call it, although erroneously. It is 
a familiar fact that the Russian proposal was not directed 
to disarmament, but was intended to secure that for a defi- 
nite series of years there should be no increase in the armies 
on a peace basis, or in the military budgets for land and naval 
forces. It was intended that an agreement on a treaty basis 
should in the first place be arrived at with regard to a sus- 
pension of armaments; the gradual proportional diminution 
was to be left for later developments and for later decisions. 
Years before the Tsar's manifesto Salisbury, the English 
Prime Minister, had indicated the perniciousness of the con- 
stant increase of armaments and the necessity of an inter- 
national agreement on the subject, and it is an indubitable 
fact that public opinion in England in agreement with the 
Government greeted the Tsar's manifesto with the greatest 
sympathy; yet the "slanderer," by means of an inaccurate 
and incomplete quotation of a speech from the English 
Throne of February, 1899, falsifies this fact into a "sceptical" 
attitude towards the Russian proposal. I ask you, Herr Pro- 
fessor, to read the whole literature with regard to the Hague 
Conferences, and then, if you can, venture to dispute my as- 
sertion that England, Russia and France were the leaders on 
the side of those States which desired to put an end by inter- 
national agreement to the ruinous competition of armaments, 
but that Germany and Austria compassed the failure of every 



HAGUE CONFERENCES 217 

such endeavour, and compelled the Conference to restrict it- 
self to a platonic resolution. 

Exactly the same thing happened with regard to the Rus- 
sian proposal for the introduction of international arbitration 
(see J' accuse, pages 90-92). The dangerously acute situa- 
tion reached in the negotiations on the question of the com- 
pulsory convocation of the tribunal of arbitration, the in- 
terlude of Professor Zorn's journey to Berlin, the final sub- 
mission of the Conference to the will of Germany in ordei* 
that the whole matter might not be wrecked — these are all 
facts which are well known and familiar to everyone who is 
acquainted with the subject. Herr Schiemann, however, sup- 
presses all this. Here again he works by means of snippets; 
he seeks to divert attention from the main points to insig- 
nificant subsidiary points; where he cannot entirely suppress 
the facts, he ascribes to the actors base egotistical motives — 
and then this unscrupulous falsifier has the effrontery to re- 
proach the accuser for his "shameless" assertions. 

What does Schiemann mention of the negotiations and 
the resolutions of the first Conference? Nothing whatever. 
Instead of this he draws from his snippet-box an extract from 
the Standard, which deals with the security of private prop- 
erty at sea; he speaks of the use of dum-dum bullets and of 
poisonous gases — without reflecting that the whole of his 
war-writings are nothing but dum-dum bullets and poisonous 
gases with which he seeks to lacerate the truth and to en- 
velop the German people in a poisonous cloud. It would be 
incredible, if we did not see it before us in black and white: 
there is not a word regarding the negotiations and resolu- 
tions on the Russian proposal as to armaments, there is not 
a word regarding arbitration and the institution of the court 
of arbitration, there is not a word as to the attitude dis- 
played by the Entente Powers at the Conference in further- 
ing the cause of peace and as to the contrary attitude of Ger- 
many and Austria ! In place of these we are merely fur- 
nished with incorrect assertions regarding the alleged one- 
sided reservation of England and America in the matter of 



218 THE CRIME 

certain bullets and gases, and emphasis is also laid on the 
question of the security of private property at sea, which 
was then and has again quite recently been declared by Eng- 
land to be a subject which might very well be discussed as 
soon as security is afforded against new wars by means of 
compulsory arbitration, and against the financial ruin of the 
nations by agreements as to armaments. 

The "Freedom of the Seas" 

The well-sounding phrase: "We are struggling for the 
freedom of the seas," which is constantly being paraded by 
German politicians and newspaper-writers, is merely dust in 
the eyes of the uncritical crowd. The freedom of the seas 
exists — in peace. No one places the slightest obstacle in the 
way of the free passage of the ships of all nations on the 
seas of the world. In war, no doubt, it does not yet exist; 
private property at sea fares no better in war than does pri- 
vate property on land. On land towns, villages, fields and 
woods are mercilessly laid waste if the fury of war rages 
over them. According to the existing international law, en- 
emy private property on sea is liable to seizure provided it 
is found on a neutral vessel. Neutral private property, even 
on an enemy vessel, is exempt from seizure. Contraband of 
war is always subject to confiscation, whether it is enemy or 
neutral property, whether it is on an enemy or a neutral vessel 
(Declaration of Paris, April 16th, 1856). In all this the 
only question is that of the seizure of enemy or of neutral 
private property. The destruction of private property at sea, 
the sinking of enemy or neutral ships — instead of their cap- 
ture — the disregard of the circumstances of the property 
(whether enemy or neutral), of the quality of the goods 
(whether contraband or not), the destruction in blind rage 
of thousands of enemy and neutral vessels, accompanied by 
the sacrifice of many thousands of human lives — all this 
is not international law, but the imperial German law of 
nations. These are newly introduced principles of the Im- 
perial German Navy which as a result alienates itself much 



HAGUE CONFERENCES 219 

further from the freedom of the seas, which is so loudly pro- 
claimed, than England and other sea Powers have ever done. 
The freedom of the seas, as understood by Germany, is a 
formula which is not intended to serve peace, but war: its 
object is to better the position of the leading continental 
State as against the leading sea-Power in war, in freeing 
from every hindrance the imports which are now prevented. 
The standpoint assumed by England in refusing this limita- 
tion of its weapons of war, so long as war is constantly threat- 
ening and is not excluded by any organisation of law, cannot 

be impugned by any one of unprejudiced judgment 

****** 

These, however, are all merely diversions from the main 
subject of the Hague Conferences — ineffective attempts on 
the part of Schiemann to obscure the fact that the attitude 
of Germany and Austria at the first and the second Hague 
Conferences is chiefly responsible for the later European ten- 
sion and consequently for the war. Of the five pages which 
Schiemann devotes to the treatment of the first Hague Con- 
ference, two pages tell of the alleged political antecedents of 
the Conference (the egotistical intentions of Russia), one page 
deals with the subsidiary points mentioned above and two 
whole pages — (can the leopard change his spots?) — reproduce 
a newspaper-cutting, on this occasion an article printed ver- 
batim from the Journal des Debats of July, 1899. After the 
Fashoda conflict, which took place in the preceding year, and 
the outbreak of the Boer War in which the sympathies of 
France as of Germany were rightly on the side of the Boers, 
the attitude of hostility towards England then assumed by 
the leading French paper need occasion no surprise. What, 
however, is proved by such a newspaper-article against the 
records and the minutes of the Hague Conference? If, as 
in fact was the case, there was at that time a certain political 
tension in the relations between England and France, is it 
not all the more significant that, notwithstanding this fact, 
both countries and both Governments supported at the Hague 
everything which could serve the security of European peace 
and the diminution of the burden of armaments? That the 



220 THE CRIME 

two countries, which were then united neither by sympathy 
nor by an Entente, should have pursued the same path to- 
wards the one great aim of European peace is a fact which re- 
veals the contrary attitude of Germany in a more fatal and 
criminal light. The article from the Journal des Debats 
proves one fact only : that never yet has a historian dared, by 
means of such miserable newspaper frumpery, to obscure or 
to get rid of historical facts, which are documented and 
proved by existing records. 

Between the First and Second Hague Conferences 

In the section of J'accuse entitled "Between the First and 
Second Hague Conferences" (pages 92-96) I emphasised the 
unwearying efforts of the Liberal English Government to 
continue the peace-work of The Hague, and more particu- 
larly to put an end to the insensate competition of arma- 
ments by means of an international agreement. These efforts! 
were undertaken not only by the Liberal Government which 
has been in power since 1905, but also by the Unionist Govern- 
ment previously in power; in particular Chamberlain, who 
was then the all-powerful Colonial Minister, was favourable 
to the idea of an international regulation of the question of 
armaments. I may refer the reader to the facts collected in 
my book, which furnish only a feeble epitome of the activity 
of the English Ministers in this direction — those same Minis- 
ters who are to-day represented by our German falsifiers 
of history as criminal war-intriguers, and as the authors of 
the vast European carnage. Any one who desires to obtain 
more complete information regarding the efforts made by 
Grey, Asquith, Haldane, Lloyd George and the late Campbell- 
Bannerman, the Liberal Prime Minister, for the attainment 
of an agreement as to armaments — efforts which were fully 
echoed in France and Russia and were pursued with equal 1 
zeal by men of the same mind in Parliament and in the Press 
— should read Fried's Handbook of the Peace Movement 
(Vol. II., pages 147-192) : he will there find evidence to sup- 
port Fried's general judgment that the Liberal English 



HAGUE CONFERENCES 221 

Government "in a truly noble manner and without being de- 
terred by their failures, repeatedly intervened openly and 
frankly in favour of a simultaneous restriction of armaments 
by treaty." 

In Germany everyone, from the Emperor down to Herr 
Schiemann, retained an attitude of hostility or at least of 
scepticism towards the peace work of The Hague (apart, 
of course, from the social democratic party and the enlight- 
ened pacifists, who were both equally powerless) and the Em- 
peror soon after the conclusion of the first Hague Conference 
said : "Many centuries will yet pass before the theories of 
perpetual peace will reach general application. The German 
Empire and its princes are meanwhile the surest protection 
of peace." 1 While this was the position in Germany, there 
developed on both sides of the channel, in England and in 
France, an increasingly active peace-movement within and 
without Parliament, which soon led to practical results, in the 
first place in the Anglo-French Arbitration Treaty of October 
14th, 1903, and later to the Entente agreement of April 8th, 
1904. These agreements, although concluded by Delcasse, 
the alleged war-intriguer, constituted a work of peace, and 
not a preparation for war, in which guise they are now falsely 
represented by Schiemann and his comrades. They were a 
result of the pacifist propaganda in both countries, which was 
conducted by the friends of peace and promoted and en- 
couraged by the Governments. 

The rapprochement between the two nations had begun 
as far back as the Paris Exhibition of 1900. English work- 
men, representing two million members of their unions, came 
to Paris to make a demonstration on behalf of peace with 
their French comrades in a great manifesto (October, 1900). 
French workmen returned this visit (June, 1901) and con- 
veyed in the name of the organised French proletariat an ap- 
peal which concluded with the words : "War against war, long 
live peace, long live the international unity of nations." In 
July, 1903, the memorable Parliamentary meeting between 

"For this and the following facts, see Fried, Vol. II., page 150. 



222 THE CRIME 

members of the French and English Parliaments took place, 
in which the leader of the French peace movement, Senator 
d'Estournelles de Constant, delivered his noble speech in fa- 
vour of peace and arbitration, which was echoed in a sense 
equally friendly to peace by the English Ministers, Balfour 
and Chamberlain, as well as by Campbell-Bannerman who was 
then leader of the Liberal party. Balfour, who was then the 
Unionist Prime Minister, celebrated the conclusion of the 
Anglo-French treaty of arbitration, at the Lord Mayor's 
Banquet, observing that it was to be hoped that there would 
be a constant increase in "that international spirit .... 
which makes every European Power feel that it is committing 
a crime against civilisation if it unnecessarily plunges the 
world into war, and that the only method by which that in- 
calculable disaster is to be avoided is by either submitting the 
questions in dispute to some impartial tribunal, some tribunal 
whose arbitrament shall be taken as final, or by that frank 
and free interchange of view which, in public as in private 
life is the surest and most certain way of avoiding misunder- 
standings." 

All these, be it observed, were utterances and actions of the 
Unionist Government which is accused by our imperialists 
of having brought into the world the idea of militant Im- 
perialism. In so far as we understand by Imperialism the 
more rigid cohesion of the English world-empire, which, as 
we know, Chamberlain desired to attain not merely by a closer 
military union but also by an economic system of preferential 
treatment, to this extent the English Unionist party may be 
described as representative of imperialistic thought ; in so far, 
however, as this phrase is intended to describe the criminal 
pursuit of a European war, the effort to achieve territorial 
expansion at the cost of other European nations by means of 
the most unparalleled shedding of blood in the history of the 
world, it is a deliberate lie and falsification to represent Eng- 
land or any party in that country as the originator of Im- 
perialism. The credit of having brought this Imperialism into 
the world belongs exclusively to Germany, to its Pan-Ger- 



HAGUE CONFERENCES 223 

mans, its militarists and its politicians of world-power, to all 
those to whom we are indebted for this war. 

3fC 2fC 3|£ 2jC 3fC 3|£ 

If the Unionist Government of England had already man- 
ifested such zeal in seeking the realisation of the peace ideas 
of The Hague, it is possible to imagine the activity in this 
direction of the Liberal Government which followed it. While 
our war literature depicts in the blackest colours King Ed- 
ward VII. as the devilish instigator of the world-war, as the 
arranger of the "attack," the Liberal party which was in 
power during the last five years of his life devoted its whole 
energies — like its predecessor the Unionist Government — to 
preaching peace and understanding among the nations and the 
alleviation of the burden of armaments, and it did what lay 
in its power to set this work in train. 

At the head of the great Committee for promoting an 
understanding between England and Germany stood the King's 
brother-in-law, the Duke of Argyll, and with him were associ- 
ated several hundreds of the most distinguished names in the 
English nation. The formation of the English Committee! 
had as a consequence the foundation of a corresponding Ger- 
man Committee. The activity of these societies found ex- 
pression in the following years in the interchange of visits! 
by journalists, mayors, workmen, and clergy. I have al-' 
ready quoted in my book a series of utterances of the Liberal 
English Ministers in favour of the peace-efforts of The) 
Hague. In this place I should further like to refer to the 
words in which Haldane on the occasion of the Lord Mayor's 
banquet on November 9th, 1906, explained the necessity of, 
a limitation of armaments : "We would fain see a time suchi 
as, I believe, will come, when the nations will look back on 
such periods as ours as periods of barbarism, and wonder 
how men could spend millions to the prejudice of the problems) 
that lay around them." These are the words then spoken by 
Haldane with reference to the mania for armaments. What 
words would be in place to-day with reference to the mania 
for murder, which has seized the most highly civilized peoples 
of the world! 



224 THE CRIME 

In France, Italy, and America as well, leading men in 
responsible positions spoke in favour of the peace-efforts of 
The Hague. On June 12th, 1906, in the Chamber of Deputies, 
Leon Bourgeois, who was then Prime Minister, and who has 
now been recalled to the Ministry of Briand — a fact which 
it may be hoped is full of promise — welcomed most sym- 
pathetically any initiative in the direction of a diminution of 
armaments. Tittoni, who was then Italian Foreign Minister 
— another war-intriguer according to the assertions of the 
German falsifiers of history — in June, 1906, in answer to 
an inquiry in Parliament, also expressed himself to the effect 
"that it would be a crime against humanity not to co-operate 
sincerely in those undertakings which had for their aim a 
simultaneous diminution in the armaments of the great na- 
tions." The inclusion of the problem of armaments in the 
programme of the second Hague Conference was, as I have 
pointed out in my book, due to England, since the Russian 
Government, having regard to the evil experiences of the first 
Hague Conference and the whole attitude of the German 
Government and governmental Press in the intervening period 
of time, were impelled to the view that a new discussion of 
this problem would be useless and might indeed imperil the 
pacific course of the Conference. Even then our Yellow 
Press were masters of the art of falsifying every good work 
for the promotion of an understanding between the nations 
by ascribing it to malicious intentions against Germany and 
in this way securing its failure. Let any one compare the at- 
titude of the German Press — always excepting the social 
democratic papers and a few representing the Liberals on the 
Left — the attitude of our leading politicians and of our 
Government, as represented by Prince Billow's speech in the 
Reichstag on April 30th, 1907, towards this question which is 
of equal interest to all nations, with the attitude of the Eng- 
lish Parliament, the English Press and the English Govern- 
ment as I have represented it in my book (pages 92-96). On 
the one side there will be found, not merely sympathy, but 
enthusiastic intervention on behalf of the peace-work of The 
Hague, whereas on the other side there will be found not 



HAGUE CONFERENCES 225 

merely scepticism but scoffing and mockery, contempt and 
threats. 

A month before Prince Biilow discharged in the Reichstag 
his stream of cold water to the effect that Germany would 
not participate in the discussion of the question of armaments, 
but would only later on "conscientiously inquire whether it 
(the result of the discussion) corresponds to the protection 
of our peace, our national interests, and our particular situa- 
tion" — a month before this, Campbell-Bannerman, the Eng- 
lish Prime Minister, speaking in the House of Commons, had 
described the bellicose attitude of the Powers to each other, 
as shown in the inordinate increase of armaments, as a "curse" 
to which a check must be put. Almost simultaneously with his 
speech he published a signed article in the Nation in which 
he urged that British naval power, while it must necessarily 
be predominant on account of the peculiar position of Great 
Britain, nevertheless possessed no aggressive character : he 
emphasised the readiness of the British Government, as in 
the previous year, 1906, so also in the following period, to 
set a good example to other countries by a voluntary reduc- 
tion in the naval estimates in the hope that they would follow 
this lead : he emphatically pointed out the necessity that the 
question of armaments should not be excluded from the dis- 
cussions of the second Hague Conference then pending. The 
wish thus entertained by the English Government was offi- 
cially communicated to the leading naval powers 1 ; as is well 
known, effect was also given to it by the inclusion of the 
question of armaments in the programme of the second Con- 
ference, although in consequence of the emphatic opposition 
of Germany, discussion had to be omitted and the Conference 
had again to restrict itself to a platonic resolution (August 
17th, 1907). 

The personal antipathy of the Emperor William towards 
any restriction or even suspension of naval armaments by 
treaty is in full agreement with the views which were rep- 
resented by the Government, the Parliament and the Press 

1 See Cook, page 10. 



226 THE CRIME 

in Germany. The Emperor was in no way reticent on the sub- 
ject of his aversion from any such idea: he expressed it clearly 
to the British Ambassador, to King Edward and to Haldane, 
who was then Minister for War (King Edward and Haldane 
visited the Emperor in the late summer and in the autumn). 
It is therefore an invention on the part of Schiemann, when 
he asserts that King Edward on the occasion of his visit to 
Cronberg had expressed himself "in a highly ironical manner 
with regard to the Hague Conference," and that Sir Charles 
Hardinge, who accompanied him, denied that the Conference 
had exercised any influence on English naval policy. As is 
the case with most of his assertions, Herr Schiemann cites 
no authority for these statements. The actual behaviour of 
the English Government and of all its members, Campbell- 
Bannerman, Grey, Haldane, Lloyd George, etc., their speeches 
and writings, their successful intervention for the inclusion of 
the problem of armaments in the Hague programme — all 
these prove that Schiemann's assertion regarding the ironical 
or negative utterances of the King and his attendant is a de- 
liberate invention and falsification, designed to hush up and 
to reveal in a milder light the crass German refusal of any 
discussion of the question of armaments before and during 
the Conference. 

Schiemann has the temerity to write the following sen- 
tence : 

In this matter (i.e., the negative attitude towards the discus- 
sion of the problem of armaments), even if from different mo- 
tives, the German and the English views coincided. (How Eng- 
land, etc., pages 13, 14.) 

This is simply a lie. England proposed and secured the 
discussion of the problem of armaments at the second Hague 
Conference; Germany refused to participate in this discus- 
sion. In order to avoid a conflict which would have en- 
dangered the success of the whole Conference, a compromise 
was agreed upon, the substance of which was that the first 
representative of Great Britain delivered an address, in which 



HAGUE CONFERENCES 227 

the problem was illuminated from all sides, and proposed a 
resolution agreed upon in advance, which recommended to the 
Governments the further serious examination of the question 
of armaments. The resolution was unanimously adopted, but 
in accordance with Germany's desire all discussion was ex- 
cluded. This is the historical truth, whereas the contrary as- 
sertions of the German historian are the reverse of the truth. 

Haldane's visit to the German Emperor in September, 
1906, had the same negative result as the previous visit of the 
English King and his Under-Secretary of State, that is to 
say, it was met by a refusal on the part of the Emperor and 
his Government of any discussion regarding an agreement as 
to armaments. To Haldane's visit of 1906 — as to his later 
visit of 1912 — Schiemann endeavours to give the character of 
a trick by the addition of prejudiced observations, regardless 
of the relations of personal friendship already mentioned, 
which had existed between him and the English statesmen. 
These men, Schiemann and his comrades, are, in fact, com- 
plete gentlemen : the fear of seeing their deceitful house of 
cards collapse compels them to lay aside even every personal 
feeling of decency towards those who have been their friends, 
when the question at stake is the protection of their artificial 
construction from the dangerous breath of truth. 

In order to deprive Haldane's visit in 1906 of its true 
significance as a friendly rapprochement to Germany and an 
auspicious preparation for the imminent Hague Conference, 
Schiemann after mentioning it immediately adds the false as- 
sertion "that about this time an Anglo-French military agree- 
ment was concluded with a view to future possibilities" (page 
14). This "military agreement" is merely the non-committal 
discussion of military experts, dealt with in the Grey-Cambon 
correspondence of November, 1912. As we have already 
seen, these discussions were anything but a military agree- 
ment, and above all — the only point which is relevant to 
Schiemann's thesis — they had anything but an offensive char- 
acter. This, however, does not prevent the historian from 
transcribing the sentence : "These military conversations 
were regularly continued until the outbreak of the present 



228 THE CRIME 

war, just as if a secret alliance existed." The reader should 
observe the method pursued : the true aim of Haldane's visit, 
and especially its relation to the imminent Hague Conference 
is effaced: by emphasising the Anglo-French military agree- 
ment, alleged to< have been concluded about the same time, 
motives of direct deceit are ascribed to Haldane's visit, and 
then to crown the building of lies, a secret alliance is made out 
of the military agreement. 

It is thus that the antecedents of the second Hague Con- 
ference are represented by the Kreuzzeitung Professor, who 
affects to adopt towards me the role of the moral preacher. 
He accuses me of suppression, because in dealing with the 
historical antecedents I failed to mention the Anglo- Japanese 
Alliance, the Venezuela incident, or the Anglo-French Entente 
of 1904. I do, in fact, speak of this Entente in numberless 
places in my book, where its discussion is relevant. The Ven- 
ezuela incident and the Anglo-Japanese Alliance are, however, 
so remotely connected with the Hague Conferences, that I 
would have had to relate the whole history of Europe or 
even the history of Europe and America during the last dec- 
ades in order to avoid Schiemann's charge of intentional con- 
cealment. 

The Venezuela dispute has no doubt a certain significance 
from my point of view also, since on the one hand it showed 
the possibility of peaceful co-operation between Germany and 
England for the attainment of common aims, and on the other 
hand it furnished an opportunity to the tribunal set up by 
the first Hague Conference to play its part, and to end the dis- 
pute by pronouncing a judgment (February 22nd, 1904). Be- 
tween the first and the second Hague Conferences other in- 
ternational disputes also were brought before the tribunal, 
and were peacefully disposed of to the satisfaction of all 
parties concerned. All the graver is Germany's offence in 
having offered at the second Hague Conference the most bitter 
opposition to this institution for the maintenance of peace 
and the prevention of war, an institution so full of promise 
for the future, which had already proved its vitality during 
eight years, and in having by her resistance wrecked the com- 



HAGUE CONFERENCES 229 

pulsory convocation of the tribunal and consequently the es- 
sential purpose of this institution. 



The most preposterous aspect of Schiemann's attitude is, 
however, revealed in the fact that this man, who counts it 
as a crime in me not to have mentioned the Anglo-Japanese 
Alliance and the Venezuela dispute, does not have a word to 
say in his two pamphlets of the course of events at the 
second Hague Conference and of its results. He completely 
suppresses this Conference, which, of course, constitutes for 
him a very inconvenient fact. To him more than to anyone 
else we may apply the charge which Walter Schiicking has 
brought against all the Professors who have written war- 
pamphlets, namely, that they do not trouble about the Hague 
Peace Conferences, and that in consequence they do not 
know "how much Germany in this very question (the ques- 
tion of armaments) offended foreign Powers at the Hague 
Conferences." I must at any rate protect Herr Schiemann 
against the charge of ignorance. His crime is worse than 
ignorance. He knows what took place at The Hague; he 
also knows exactly the antecedents of the Hague Conferences, 
but he deliberately suppresses the truth, because it would 
bring down the whole of the house of cards which he ha9 
so laboriously pasted together. He intentionally omits the 
central point of my Historical Antecedents of the Crime in 
order to build in its place his snippet- and lie-factory with 
the object of deceiving the German people regarding the real 
responsibility for the European tension in the last years be- 
fore the outbreak of the war. 

It is a peculiar coincidence that almost immediately after 
the failure of the agreement as to a suspension and a later 
diminution of armaments, which England, Russia and 
France had endeavoured to secure, there followed the Anglo- 
Russian agreement with regard to their mutual spheres of 
interest in Persia, Afghanistan and Thibet, which formed 
the basis and the beginning of the rapprochement between the 



230 THE CRIME 

two Powers in European politics as well, and which is or- 
dinarily described as the Anglo-Russian Entente. The pla- 
tonic resolution on the question of armaments, to which the 
Conference was compelled to restrict itself in consequence 
of Germany's opposition to any material discussion and de- 
cision, was arrived at in The Hague on August 17th, 1907. 
The Anglo-Russian agreement was concluded on August 31st 
of the same year — a sequence of events in time which at any 
rate is interesting, even if no causal connection may have 
existed. 

One "Block," not "Blocks," in Europe 

As we have seen above, the overwhelming majority of 
the civilised world decided on October 5th, 1907, in favour 
of the introduction of a general, compulsory and world- 
wide system of arbitration. It was only Germany and Aus- 
tria, followed by a few smaller States, who offered a most 
violent resistance to this epoch-making advance in the peace- 
ful development of mankind. This fact, however, did not 
prevent the -principle of compulsory arbitration from being 
accepted by thirty-two votes to nine, although no doubt 
with many exceptions which again were introduced by Ger- 
many. The proposal to make compulsion binding at least 
on those States which had voted for the proposal, also came 
to grief on the opposition of the German delegate, Freiherr 1 
Marschall von Bieberstein. Thus the resolution of the second 
Hague Conference also remained a torso — a moral victory 
for the pacifist views which had animated the States which 
voted in its favour, and a moral defeat for Germany, which' 
by combating the proposal for arbitration and the agreement 
as to armaments bears the responsibility for the continuance 
of the anarchical condition between the nations, which has 
led to the world-wide war of to-day. Even now, after the 
outbreak of the devastating conflagration, the leading circles 
in Germany are still without comprehension of these en- 
deavours which might then have prevented the conflagra- 
tion, and which alone can prevent its renewed outbreak in 



HAGUE CONFERENCES 231 

future. 1 Without an organisation of the nations and, con- 
nected with it, an agreement as to armaments there can be 
no enduring peace. A merely partial organisation of the 
European nations, a new segregation into groups, no matter 
out of what elements, under what leadership and in what 
form these groups may be formed, would not cure the evil, 
but would merely cause it to arise in an altered form. The 
new groups would stand; opposed to each other with as 
much distrust and enmity as the old, they would arm against 
each other as before — probably even more intensively and 
ruinously, since the new state of force would give occasion 
to every possible kind of revenge and reparation, the after- 
throes of the world-war would engender new hatred and era- 
bitterment among the nations. In consequence of technical 
progress, armaments would rise to an intolerable height more 
rapidly even than before, and for the same reasons as in the 
summer of 1914 would lead, intentionally or unintentionally, 
to new and even more violent explosions. Only an undivided 
organisation of the nations, without the formation of groups, 
without alliances and ententes, can prevent the repetition 
of such world-catastrophes. Every person of comprehen- 
sion, no matter to which country he may belong, must and 
does realise this fact. It is only in Germany, as is proved 
by all the views expressed in authoritative circles, that reason 
will once again fail to make her influence felt, it is only there! 
that the pursuit of power and of dominion by the govern- 

1 1 must here again point out that my book was almost completed, when 
Herr von Bethmann, to the surprise of the whole world, suddenly came 
forward on November 9th, 1916, with his avowal of pacifist ideas, an 
action in flagrant opposition to the attitude and the views of everyone 
in authority in Germany ever since a pacifist movement has existed. This 
pacifism of necessity, in the highest degree suspicious and incredible, 
which, on the one hand, strives for the security of Germany's power 
in every possible way, but, on the other, produces honey-sweet words 
concerning law and the freedom of the nations — this platonic pacifism 
of power, which is void of presupposition and of result — I have else- 
where, in the later section on War- Aims (Chapter, "Bethmann the 
Pacifist") denounced as it deserves. My characterisation of the past is 
in no way influenced or modified by this deceitful vision of the future. 



232 THE CRIME 

ing classes and cliques is once again directed to securing only 
the interests of victorious Germany and of her allies. Even 
yet they have not got so far as to recognise the fact that the 
interests of all States, including Germany and her allies, if 
correctly understood, can be promoted only in a compre- 
hensive organisation, but not in the formation of new groups, 
no matter of what nature they may be. 

Whatever may be the appearance or the description of 
the newly-planned formation, whether it be conceived as a 
middle-European Union of States or as a block of the Cen- 
tral Powers (with the addition of Bulgaria and Turkey, and 
a zone of territory "from Ostend to Baghdad"), every 
grouping of Powers which presupposes various blocks in- 
stead of one undivided European block of States is from 
the outset exposed to the same dangers and the same catas- 
trophes as the previous formation of groups under the Euro- 
pean balance of Power. There must be one block, not 
various blocks, in Europe! That must be the watchword of 
all the true friends of peace. That is the idea which must 
determine the future of Europe. If the Governments of the 
Central Powers oppose the realisation of this idea after this 
war, they will act just as criminally as they did when they 
rejected and wrecked the peace-ideas of the Hague, which 
represented the unfailing means of preventing the present 
war. 



CHAPTER IV 

ENGLISH PACIFISM IN WORD AND DEED 

The pacifism of the Liberal English Government was mani- 
fested not merely in theory, but was also practically demon- 
strated on every possible occasion. I have dealt in detail 
in J' accuse (pages 99-114) with the efforts made by the Eng- 
lish Government after the failure of the second Hague 
Conference with the object of arriving at a direct agreement 
with Germany on the question of a mutual restriction of 
naval armaments and simultaneously at a political under- 
standing, and to these points I propose to return later. The 
"slanderer," of course, makes no mention of any of the facts 
which are relevant to this subject. For the Prussian his- 
torian the speeches and the actions of the friends of peace 
in the English Ministry — and this description may be ap- 
plied to all its members without exception, to Campbell- 
Bannerman, Asquith, Grey, Lloyd George, Haldane, etc. — 
have simply no existence. 

Quite apart from the unwearying intervention of the Eng- 
lish Ministers with a view to securing a restriction of arma- 
ments and a political understanding with Germany, it is 
worth while considering how many European wars which) 
threatened to break out in the years following the second 
Hague Conference — and indeed at an earlier date also — 
were prevented owing to the energetic participation, and in 
fact, in most cases under the leadership, of the English 
Government. There is complete harmony between the ac- 
tions of the leading men of England and the views and 
aspirations expressed by them. I would merely recall the 
Moroccan confusions of 1909 and 191 1 which on both oc- 
casions, with the help of England's mediation, led to a 

233 



234 THE CRIME 

treaty-agreement between Germany and France, as had al- 
ready happened on a previous occasion in the Algeciras 
Treaty (1905-6). I would recall the crisis of 1908-9 in 
connection with the annexation of Bosnia in which England 
on March 25th, 1909, took the lead in recognising the situa- 
tion created by Austria and Russia and Serbia followed the 
English example. I would recall the Crete conflict of 1908-9, 
in which war was prevented between Greece and Turkey 
by the mediatory intervention of the protecting Powers, in- 
cluding England; I would above all recall the leading part 
played by Sir Edward Grey during the Balkan conflict of 
1912-13, which was prevented from developing into a Euro- 
pean war only by the pacific co-operation of England and 
Germany. Finally, although it is unnecessary that I should 
again enumerate the points involved, I would recall — and 
this, of course, is the cardinal point of all my demonstra- 
tions — all that Grey, as Foreign Minister in Asquith's Cabi- 
net, did to prevent the present war. These facts prove Eng- 
land's desire and love of peace, and furnish a striking ref- 
utation of the lying invention of Schiemann and his com- 
rades to the effect that England for years had prepared and 
desired war. 

ENGLAND'S ACTION DURING THE BOSNIAN CRISIS AND THE 
BALKAN CONFLICT 

(Duel between Grey and Bethmann, May — June, 1916.) 

Inasmuch as German and Austrian writers have lately 
thrown doubt on the efforts for peace made by England dur- 
ing recent European crises, it is necessary that I should here 
enter somewhat more fully into this point. This doubt has 
been intentionally suggested with a view to questioning, by 
means of examples drawn from the past, the sincerity of the 
efforts in the cause of peace made by England in the summer 
of 1914. The discussion of the past is thus intimately con- 
nected with the present question of guilt. The question at 
issue is England's behaviour during the crisis in connection 
with the annexation of Bosnia in 1908-9 and during the Bal- 



ENGLISH PACIFISM 235 

kan conflict of 1912-13. The discussions on this question were 
conducted with the utmost energy between the German and 
the English Governments and their semi-official writers in 
May and June, 19 16. 

In an interview with Bell, an American journalist, rep- 
resenting the Chicago Daily News, Grey gave a short sum- 
mary of the points of the indictment which suffice to lay the 
responsibility for the war on the German and Austrian Govern- 
ments. The points constituting the arraignment are in entire 
agreement with the considerations tending to incriminate the 
Central Powers which are emphasised by me in J' accuse and 
in this second book. Grey rightly attached special weight to 
his conference-proposal, and to its rejection by Germany and 
Austria : 

If the Conference in London in the Balkan crisis in 1912-13 
had been worked to the disadvantage of Germany or her allies 
the German reluctance for a conference in 1914 would have been 
intelligible, but no more convincing pledge of fair play and sin- 
gle-minded desire for fair settlement than the conduct of that 
Conference in London was ever given. 

The ensuing discussion between the German and the Eng- 
lish Governments hinged on this sentence of Grey's. Herr 
von Bethmann was likewise interviewed by an American jour- 
nalist and advanced on this occasion those untenable rea- 
sons against Grey's conference-proposal which he has in- 
cessantly produced ever since the conference was refused 
(July 27th, 1914). I have elsewhere already sufficiently criti- 
cised these threadbare reasons which in reality were merely 
pretexts, and I need not return to the subject here. I shall in 
this place submit to investigation only the new excuses put 
forward by the German Chancellor. 

Bethmann's Reasons for Refusing the Conference 

The following are the new reasons which the Chancellor 
urges against Grey's conference, reasons which are suspect if 
only by reason of the fact that they did not occur to him 



236 THE CRIME 

until so late in the day, after the lapse of almost two years' 
warfare : 

1. "How could I accept this (Grey's) proposal in view 
of the comprehensive measures of mobilisation of the 
Russian Army which were then in full swing? Not- 
withstanding official Russian denials and the fact that 
the formal order of mobilisation was not issued until 
the evening of July 30th, we knew quite well (and the 
fact has since been confirmed) that the Russian Govern- 
ment, in accordance with a resolution taken on July 25th, 
had already begun to mobilise when Grey's conference- 
proposal was put forward. . . . With two frontiers 
to be defended, Germany could not enter into any dis- 
cussions of which the outcome was highly problematical, 
while the enemy made use of the time to mobilise the 
armies with which it was intended he should fall upon 
us." 

2. "In the critical days of July, 1914, Grey himself 
recognised that my counter-proposal of a direct discus- 
sion between the Cabinets of Vienna and Petrograd was 
more calculated to arrive at a settlement of the Austro- 
Serbian conflict than a conference, and after overcoming 
many obstacles the discussion thus urged by Germany 
was making favourable progress when Russia made war 
inevitable by the sudden mobilisation of her entire forces, 
an action which took place against the express assurances 
given to us." 

3. The Chancellor appeals to the behaviour of Eng- 
land during the Bosnian crisis of 1908-9 in order to 
confirm the suspicion that just as England on that occa- 
sion had done nothing for the maintenance of the peace 
of Europe, but on the contrary had expressed in Petro- 
grad her discontent that a peaceful solution had been 
reached, so on this occasion (1914) also she had ob- 
viously not pursued peace with sincerity of purpose but 
had only sought to gain time with a view to being better 
prepared for the attack. 



ENGLISH PACIFISM 237 

The Russian Mobilisation as a Reason for Refusing 
the Conference 

Point i. The reference to the Russian mobilisation in justi- 
fication of the refusal of the conference is a complete novelty; 
it appears here for the first time after almost two years of 
war. Previously only two explanations had been advanced, 
one by Germany, the other by Austria. There was the familiar 
reason put forward by Germany, that they could not sum- 
mon their ally before a European tribunal. There was the 
equally familiar reason advanced by Austria, that Grey's pro- 
posal had arrived too late, and had been "outstripped" by the 
declaration of war against Serbia which had already taken 
place. I have already explained in detail in many places in my 
first and in this my second book what view must be taken of 
these explanations. 1 In particular I have already pointed out 
in my first book the contradiction which exists between the 
reasons furnished by Berlin and by Vienna, and demonstrated 
the incredibility of the one as well as the other. 

And now Herr von Bethmann comes along with an entirely 
new explanation, which is even more foolish and untenable 
than the previous ones. Now suddenly we are told that the 
Russian measures of mobilisation constituted the decisive fac- 
tor in leading to the refusal of the Conference. Herr von 
Bethmann appears to have forgotten his own White Book and 
all his previous statements, which never cast any doubt on the 
fact that Russia's partial mobilisation took place on July 29th, 
and her general mobilisation on July 31st. On the other hand, 
as I have proved beyond dispute in my first and second books, 
Grey's conference-idea emerged as early as July 24th, im- 
mediately after the Austrian Ultimatum became known, and 
from that time it was never again lost sight of. It was for- 
mally declined by Germany on July 27th, and by Austria on 
July 28th, for reasons which have not the remotest connec- 
tion with the Russian measures of mobilisation. As we know, 
these measures were, no doubt, resolved upon on July 25th 

1 See J'accuse, pages 148 et seq., 327-331 ; The Crime, Vol. I., Chap. I. 



238 THE CRIME 

when Austria broke off diplomatic relations with Serbia, but 
were only carried into effect in the form of a partial mobilisa- 
tion on July 29th. This partial mobilisation was nothing more 
than the consequence of the intransigent diplomatic attitude of 
Austria and Germany. This consequence must now suddenly 
be falsified into the cause. Russia carried out the partial 
mobilisation on July 29th because the conference as well as 
the direct negotiations with Petrograd had been abruptly re- 
fused and no independent proposal for mediation had been 
made by the Central Powers, notwithstanding the urgent re- 
quest of the Entente Powers. The Russian partial mobilisa- 
tion was the consequence of the diplomatic attitude of the 
Central Powers (and at the same time of the military action 
of Austria against Serbia) and not conversely. 

It is an obvious invention on the part of Herr von Beth- 
mann when in the spring of 19 16 he asserts for the first time 
that the Russian mobilisation had already begun when Grey's 
conference-proposal was put forward. No one who reads the 
exact determination of the time when Grey's proposal first 
appeared and the account of its further fate contained in 
J' accuse and in this work, and compares with these results 
my close investigation into the time at which the Russian 
mobilisation took place, no one who consults the passages cited 
by me from the diplomatic publications of all countries in- 
cluding the White and the Red Books will find anywhere the 
slightest hint that Russia had already begun her measures of 
mobilisation on July 27th when Germany declined the confer- 
ence, or on July 24th when Grey first communicated his con- 
ference-idea to Prince Lichnowsky. The most recent excuse 
of the German Chancellor thus comes to nothing, like all its 
predecessors. 

When Herr von Bethmann further points out that Ger- 
many could not have entered into problematical discussions, 
because the result of such a course of action would have been 
to give the enemy time for sufficient preparation for the at- 
tack, it appears to me to be superfluous to devote any closer 
attention to this illogical objection, which is void of any 



ENGLISH PACIFISM 239 

foundation in fact. That Bethmann's objection has no 
foundation in fact has already been sufficiently explained else- 
where. It is also, however, illogical in the highest degree, in- 
asmuch as it furnishes a classical example of a petitio prin- 
cipii. That the other countries meant to attack Germany is in 
fact the very proposition which is to be proved. Grey's con- 
ference-proposal is one of the many pieces of evidence which 
can be urged against the existence of aggressive intentions. 
If the existence of such intentions were proved, Herr von 
Bethmann would of course have been quite right not to allow 
his enemies time to put themselves in a better state of prepa- 
ration. Since, however, the aggressive intention is first to be 
proved, and the whole discussion of the question of guilt is 
merely directed to this one aim, it is a violation of the funda- 
mental laws of logic to represent as already demonstrated the 
proposition to be proved, and to draw further conclusions 
from it. 

Point 2. Herr von Bethmann's further assertion that in the 
critical days of 19 14 Grey himself recognised that the Ger- 
man counter-proposal of a direct discussion between Vienna 
and Petrograd was preferable to the conference is one of those 
legends which I have already completely demolished elsewhere 
(see The Crime, Volume 1, Chapter 1, Grey's Proposal for a 
Conference, pages 77-82). I may refer the reader to what 
I have there said. 

England's Behaviour during the Bosnian Crisis and 
the Balkan Conflicts 

Point 3. It was more particularly Bethmann's revelations 
with regard to the Bosnian crisis that gave rise to the further 
discussions (in May and June, 191 6) with regard to the role 
which England had played in the earlier Balkan conflicts. 
First of all Grey, in the sitting of the House of Commons of 
May 24th, sharply attacked the Chancellor's historical ac- 
count which he described as entirely new and as "a first-class 
lie." He added the very significant words which are true not 
only of the more remote but above all of the immediate ante- 



240 THE CRIME 

cedents of the war: "You cannot reason with the German 
people so long as they are fed with lies and know nothing of 
the truth." He also spoke of a "laboratory" in Germany 
which was constantly at work on behalf of the Government 
providing such falsified accounts of history as might be re- 
quired. He did not mention the Manager of this laboratory. 
But we know that his name begins with Sch and ends with nn. 
And in saying this, I do not mean to commit any indiscretion. 
At any rate I find fully prepared in the writings of this 
Sch. . . .nn all the dishes which the Chancellor and his Press 
are thereupon in the habit of serving piping hot to the Ger- 
man Reichstag and the German people. In a former passage 
we even found carefully prepared in the writings of the 
Kreuzzeitung professor the alleged "disappointment" and 
"embitterment" experienced by the English diplomatists on 
account of the pacific settlement of the Bosnian crisis, al- 
though, certainly, without any proof. I was therefore all the 
more interested to see the evidence which would now be pro- 
duced by the German Government, after the outbreak of the 
official battle of the newspapers. 

And now the evidence is before us. Two reports from 
Count Pourtales of April ist and April 5th, 1909, have been 
published by the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung (May 
27th, 19 16). There is no more. These two reports are the 
foundation of Bethmann's assertion that England never la- 
boured for peace but always for war, and that therefore the 
conference of 191 4 also was not intended to serve the mainte- 
nance of peace. 

What, then, is contained in these epoch-making reports of 
Count Pourtales which, according to the most recent account 
of the Chancellor, justified an attitude of suspicion towards 
Grey's last conference-proposal? In the first place it is very 
interesting to observe the manner in which the attempt is made 
to confuse the real subject to 1 be proved. Grey had pointed to 
England's attitude at the London Balkan Conference, 1912- 
13, as proof of the general pacific intentions of English policy; 
Herr von Bethmann, on the other hand, in order to throw 
suspicion on England's love of peace, quietly interposes the 



ENGLISH PACIFISM 241 

Bosnian crisis of 1908-09 in place of the Balkan Conference. 
The Chancellor passes in silence over the real question at 
issue, England's attitude at the Balkan Conference, for the 
simple reason that in such a case where the point in dispute 
relates to an official conference of all the Ambassadors con- 
cerned assembled in London, a falsification of the position was 
impossible, whereas the events of 1908-09, which were en- 
acted in the oldest forms of secret diplomacy, could at will be 
falsified, perverted and embellished with all sorts of gossip- 
ing and back-stair stories. Herr von Bethmann entirely 
passes over the London Conference of Ambassadors. His 
colleague, Herr von Burian, however, who at a later stage 
also intervened in this discussion of diplomatists, cannot avoid 
bearing witness to Grey's activity at the London Conference 
of Ambassadors in the words: "Grey showed good faith, in 
so far as he was sincerely anxious to promote the solution of 
the questions pending." 

What, then, is the accusation which Count Pourtales brings 
against English diplomacy in connection with the Bosnian 
crisis? I can only recommend the reader to peruse in the 
original the two reports which were printed in the Nord- 
deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung in order that he may again real- 
ise by what kind of people and by what methods diplomatic 
business is conducted, on what absurd gossip the vital des- 
tinies of the nations are only too often made dependent. After 
a settlement had been arrived at with regard to Bosnia, that 
is to say, after the Russian and Serbian recognition of the 
Austrian annexation, Count Pourtales heard "from Russian 
acquaintances and friendly diplomatists" that Sir Arthur 
Nicolson, who was then English Ambassador in Petrograd, 
had given expression to "inciting" views on the conflict which 
had then been settled between Russia and Austria. These 
observations were said to have been expressed in the salons of 
Petrograd, and also at a large dinner at the German Embassy 
in the presence of ladies. Nicolson is also said to have stated 
frigidly to the German Ambassador that it was by no means 
certain that his Government would express their concurrence 



242 THE CRIME 

in thi; solution. At the Yacht Club members of the English 
Embassy had uttered words to the effect that "Germany hid 
stamped with the cuirassier's boot," etc. It could be "plainly 
seen that Sir Arthur Nicolson was chagrined at the solution 
of the Bosnian crisis which resulted from our action, and is 
now most zealously endeavouring to propagate the legend of 
the German menace in order in this way to poison the rela- 
tions between Russia and Germany." So much for the first 
report of Count Pourtales. 

The second report (of April 5th, 1909), which is based on 
"entirely confidential communications received from a well- 
informed source," speaks of grave reproaches which Nicolson 
had brought against M. Isvolsky, who was then Minister for 
Foreign Affairs, on account of his conciliatory attitude in the 
question of annexation. Isvolsky, we are told, declined the 
invitation of the English Ambassador to postpone the Russian 
answer until the English Government had decided on the atti- 
tude they would assume. (How is this to be reconciled with 
the role assigned to Isvolsky as the contriver of war and the 
worst of Germany's enemies, the man who only nine months 
before had completed the aggressive conspiracy in the road- 
stead at Reval?) Not only Nicolson, however, but Grey him- 
self was also very much chagrined at the supineness of Rus- 
sian policy, and had reproached the Russian Ambassador in 
London on the subject; indeed he had even gone so far as to 
state that public opinion in England would at that time have 
approved Great Britain's intervention in a war on the side of 
Russia. 

These are the documents which are supposed to justify 
Bethmann's distrust of England's "alleged" peace policy in 
the summer of 1914. Since the defectiveness of this evidence 
was clearly perceived in Berlin and Vienna, Herr von Burian, 
the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs, now came forward 
with revelations in support of his ally. In the first place a 
semi-official article was launched in the Pester Lloyd which in 
many respects is of the greatest interest, and at a later date 
a report by Herr von Burian, which was intended to throw 
some more light on the incidents of 1908-9, was read in the 



ENGLISH PACIFISM 248 

Hungarian House of Deputies. The article in the Pester 
Lloyd of May 27th which may without hesitation be regarded 
as an expression of the views of the Austro-Hungarian Gov- 
ernment, establishes first of all the following decisive point in 
connection with the London Conference of Ambassadors: 
"The general impression gained at the conference was that 
English diplomacy was anxious to avoid war and maintain 
peace." When the further statement is added that this main- 
tenance of peace took place at the cost of Austria and in 
favour of Serbia and her supporters, I need only refer in 
this connection to the historical facts which are familiar to 
every reader of the newspapers, as I have already done at 
great length in J'accuse. The completely egotistical insatia- 
bility, the blindly brutal selfishness of these Austrian states- 
men, their unparalleled disregard of the interests of other 
peoples and of the peace of Europe are once more revealed 
in the assertion now made by the semi-official Hungarian 
organ that the decisions then reached by the London Confer- 
ence took place at the expense of Austria. I need only recall 
the evacuation of Scutari, the foundation of the Albanian 
principality, the enforced removal of the Serbians from the 
Adriatic Coast which they had conquered — I need only refer 
to these and to all the other concessions made to the Austro- 
Hungarian Monarchy in order to demonstrate the empti- 
ness of the complaint now raised that Austria was obliged to 
bear the cost of the settlement. But this additional observa- 
tion is of minor importance. The essential point lies in the 
confession that on the occasion of the London Conference of 
Ambassadors English diplomacy honourably and sincerely 
desired to avoid war and to maintain peace. That is the 
salient point in the whole of this discussion. At the begin- 
ning of the discussion this was what Grey had pointed out as 
an auspicious prelude to the intended Conference of Ambas- 
sadors in 19 14. This was what Bethmann in his reply passed 
over in silence, when he quietly substituted the question of 
the Bosnian crisis of 1908-9 in place of the Conference of 
Ambassadors. This is now confirmed by the Austro-Hun- 
garian Government in their semi-official organ, and this fact 



244 THE CRIME 

completely disposes of Bethmann's objection to the confer- 
ence of 1914. If in 1912-13, as Burian testifies personally 
as well as through his semi-official organ, Grey sincerely de- 
sired the maintenance of peace, he was certainly entitled to 
refer to this fact now and to prove by reference to it his love 
of peace in 19 14. 



An Article in the Pester Lloyd — A New Self-accusation 

of Austria 

The article in the Pester Lloyd of May 27th, 19 16, is, 
however, also of great importance from other points of view. 
It contains, for example, the following sentence directed 
against Grey's conference idea: 

His conference-proposal was intended to cement the concert 
of the Great Powers until a time which appeared to him to be 
better fitted for striking against Germany; it aimed at a re- 
nunciation by Austria-Hungary of her right to regulate, accord- 
ing to her own needs, the most important questions connected 
with the defence of her frontier, and it was consequently directed 
from the first against the basis of our existence. ... In the 
question of the conference the monarchy had to decide, and it 
was the monarchy which arrived at a decision against the con- 
ference. . . . The refusal of the conference was nothing more 
than an obvious affirmation of the monarchy's will to live as a 
great Power. . . . For us his conference-proposal was and is 
one of the facts which prove that England was interested in 
weakening us and in keeping us in a perpetual state of inse- 
curity by Serbian machinations, in depreciating for Germany our 
strength as allies, in deceiving Germany by diplomatic tricks and 
in postponing the settlement with Germany until the time when 
Russia should be completely prepared for war. Grey, the con- 
ference-politician, was no peace-politician. For this reason the 
monarchy did not accept his conference. It is neither Austria- 
Hungary nor Germany that is responsible for the failure of the 
conference-idea, but another : Sir Edward Grey. 

These sentences of the semi-official organ of Budapest con- 
tain in the first place the unvarnished confession that Ger- 



ENGLISH PACIFISM 245 

many and Austria were not attacked by their opponents in 
the summer of 19 14, but that they provoked a so-called pre- 
ventive war against a future attack. If Grey wished to choose 
"the time which appeared to him to be better fitted for strik- 
ing against Germany," if he wished "to postpone the settle- 
ment with Germany until the time when Russia should be 
completely prepared for war," this can only mean that at any 
rate the English Secretary for State did not wish for war in 
the summer of 191 4. And thus the hostile attack is semi- 
officially disowned by the Austro-Hungarian Government 
itself. 

When the article further goes on to state that the monarchy 
declined the conference because it desired to decide on its 
vital interests according to its own standard, it proves that 
the reasons for refusal advanced by Count Berchtold to the 
effect that the proposal had arrived "too late," and that it was 
"outstripped" by the declaration of war against Serbia were 
merely pretexts. This is also in agreement with all the other 
facts and evidence. Austria in fact was no more desirous 
than Germany of accepting any form of mediation in the 
Austro-Serbo-Russian dispute. It was resolved, because it 
was instigated and protected by Germany, to choose the Eu- 
ropean war rather than accept any form of mediation. I 
need not again speak in this place of the vacillations of Aus- 
tria at the last moment. Even if they had been dictated by 
the most sincere desire to promote an understanding, they 
were no longer adapted to preserve peace in view of the in- 
transigence of the Central Powers in the earlier stages of the 
crisis, the stipulations contained in the last statements ema- 
nating from Vienna, and the unconditional will for war which 
was increasingly manifested by Germany. The criminal de- 
termination to refuse every European mediation, even in the 
friendly form of mere advice in Vienna and Petrograd such 
as Grey had proposed, is admitted in as many words in the 
semi-official statement in the Pester Lloyd. Herein is con- 
tained a new self-accusation of the Austrian Government, to 
be added to the many others of which I have already convicted 
her. 



246 THE CRIME 

Most incriminating of all is the following 1 sentence from 
the article in the Pester Lloyd. It is significant that I am 
unable to quote this sentence from German papers but am 
obliged to translate it from the Humanite of June 5th (cor- 
respondence of the Swiss representative Homo). It may be 
presumed that this sentence subsequently appeared so incrim- 
inating to the Austro-Hungarian Government that the Vien- 
nese Correspondence Bureau and Wolff's Telegraphic Bureau 
have quite inadvertently "forgotten" to communicate it to 
the German Press — which is all the more reason why I should 
insert it here. 

If Sir Edward Grey wishes to judge how profound and ir- 
revocable was our desire to find a solution of the conflict with 
Serbia in a way which would once for all remove the criminal 
menace to peace which came from this side, he can form his 
conclusions from the fact which we assert in all sincerity, that 
even if the Russian Government had refrained from completing 
the mobilisation which it secretly continued notwithstanding all 
its hypocritical promises and assurances, indeed even if it had 
broken off the mobilisation which it had begun, Austria-Hungary 
would still have refused to agree to any conference, but would 
have insisted in settling her affair with Serbia in correspondence 
with the needs of her future security and without permitting 
herself to be prevented by a third party. 

This is the most significant passage in the article in the 
Pester Lloyd of May 27th, which, as I say, I have found nei- 
ther in the version reproduced by the Viennese Correspond- 
ence Bureau nor in that given by Wolff's Telegraphic Bureau, 
but have had to translate from the Humanite. It is impossible 
to express more distinctly than in this passage the cynicism 
with which the authorities in Vienna, no doubt instigated and 
supported by Berlin, conjured up the European conflict on 
account of their rancour against Serbia, blind and deaf to the 
incalculable consequences. The semi-official Budapest paper 
in no way conceals the fact: 

1. That all the objections put forward in the past and 
the present by Vienna and Berlin against Grey's confer- 



ENGLISH PACIFISM 247 

ence-proposal were mere "bunkum" : that they did not 
wish the conference for the simple reason that in fact 
they did not wish it. Austria's entry into the path of the 
Conference (Red Book No. 51, July 31st) was therefore 
only specious, it was intentionally couched in so indefi- 
nite expressions and veiled with so many stipulations and 
reservations in order to make the conference impossible 
or in any event fruitless. 

2. That the Russian mobilisation had no bearing what- 
ever on the decision of Austria-Hungary, but that the 
fact is rather that the Austrian Government would never 
have agreed to a conference, even if Russia had not mo- 
bilised or if she had broken off the mobilisation which 
had been begun. 

This latter point is in flagrant and irreconcilable contra- 
diction with the above mentioned reason for refusing the con- 
ference which is now advanced by Bethmann for the first 
time, the reason, namely, which attributes it to the Russian 
mobilisation. Herr von Bethmann says: The Russian mobi- 
lisation (which he suddenly dates back to July 25th) made it 
impossible for us to accept the conference. Herr von Burian 
says : Even if Russia had never mobilised, or had broken off 
her mobilisation, we should still have refused to agree to the 
conference. As in the case of so many other inconsistencies 
and self-accusations expressed by the two accused parties this 
irreconcilable contradiction also proves their guilt and their 
consciousness of guilt. Yet it remains astonishing how the 
two accomplices even in an action agreed upon in detail, as 
was that of May and June, 19 16, are unable to achieve agree- 
ment. This is evidence not only of the badness of their cause, 
but also of the inferiority of their intelligence. 

2|< 5p 5p 3fC 3JS 5JC 

After this interesting digression on the incidents of 1914 
we shall now return to the Bosnian crisis of 1908-9. In ob- 
vious pursuance of a plan of operation agreed upon with 
Berlin, Herr von Burian endeavours, with the aid of certain 
reports written by Austrian Ambassadors in Paris and Petro- 



248 THE CRIME 

grad (dating from November, 1908, and March, 1909), to 
support Bethmann's assertion that England was "disap- 
pointed" by the pacific solution of the crisis then reached, and 
had done what she could to render the conflict more acute. 
These Austrian Ambassadorial reports speak of evil counsels 
inciting to war, which the English Government had imparted 
to the French authorities at the end of 1908. They further 
emphasise the support which Nicolson had accorded in Petro- 
grad to Isvolsky's "policy of bluff," but they are nevertheless 
unable to conceal the fact that Isvolsky, without the consent 
of his British adviser, persuaded his ruler to express his 
"adhesion sans reserve" to the deletion of Article 25 of the 
Berlin Treaty — thanks to the firm attitude adopted by Aus- 
tria-Hungary and Germany, for the other Powers when con- 
fronted with this attitude "lost the courage to allow matters 
to proceed as far as a breach." After the settlement of the 
conflict had taken place, the evil Nicholas (or should we 
rather say the evil Nicolson?) is then said to have been at 
pains to exploit for his own purposes the dispute which had 
subsided : 

Sir Arthur Nicolson, as well as his official and non-official 
State, now proceed to appeal to sentiment and thus endeavour to 
widen the breach which the development of events taking place 
in the near East has occasioned between the Central Powers and 
Russia.' 

This is all that the Viennese Government can produce 
against England by way of contribution to the Berlin Gov- 
ernment's register of sins given in a preceding paragraph. 
In all there are four ambassadorial reports, two from Count 
Pourtales, and one each from the Austrian Ambassadors in 
Paris and Petrograd. The reports of Count Pourtales are 
said to be complete, as published in the N orddeutsche All- 
gemeine Zeitung. The reports of the Austrian Ambassadors, 
on the other hand, I have only come across in the German 
Press in a fragmentary form as circulated by the Viennese 
Correspondence Bureau. 



ENGLISH PACIFISM 249 

What now is the reply of the English Government to the 
charge that in 1908-9 it was not a peaceful solution that they 
sought but strife. In an official statement published by Reuter 
on May 29th, the English Foreign Office denies all the charges 
brought against the English Government. Sir Arthur Nicol- 
son states that the communications with regard to his con- 
versation at table are "gossip" and "not true." The English 
Foreign Office publishes a report addressed by Nicolson to 
Grey on March 9th, 1909, in which the English Ambassador 
asserts the complete falseness of the reports which even then 
were in circulation to the effect that he had invited Isvolsky 
to assume an anti-German and anti- Austrian attitude: "I 
have never urged him to adopt a line which might widen the 
breach between him and Vienna." 

With equal definiteness Grey denies that he had even in 
the remotest manner held out the prospect of a war in which 
England would participate on the side of Russia. On the 
contrary, in a review sent to Nicolson on February 27th, 1909, 
the leading English Minister expressly declares that at a 
meeting with M. Isvolsky in October, 1908, he had expressly 
given him to understand that England 

would support Russia in getting what could be obtained by diplo- 
matic support, but that we would not press things to the point of 
war. We are of opinion that to risk for Serbian territorial 
claims a war which might eventually involve the greater part of 
the Continent of Europe must be out of all proportion to the in- 
terests at stake. 

This is the state of affairs: there is a charge brought by 
the Central Powers against England, and a defence submitted 
by England. The impression made by these documents on 
any unprejudiced reader must be that the German and Aus- 
trian statesmen make use of gossip and backstair stories, con- 
versations at dinner in the presence of ladies, the tittle-tattle 
and the talk of the Yacht Club, whereas the English Govern- 
ment produces documents, positive statements from Nicolson, 
positive instructions from Grey — both dating from the time 
in question and consequently not fabricated ad hoc — which 



250 THE CRIME 

completely dispose of the alleged English incitement to war 
in Paris and Petrograd. Let anyone compare the sober mat- 
ter of fact statements of the English diplomatists with the 
grandmotherly gossiping stories which Count Pourtales dishes 
up for Prince von Biilow — mere third-hand statements rest- 
ing on hearsay — and then let him judge whether a leading 
German statesman is to-day entitled to deduce from these 
eight-year-old incidents in the salons of Petrograd the con- 
clusion that England's intervention has always been directed 
to rendering European conflicts more acute and has never 
been aimed at their settlement, so that even in the summer of 
1 9 14 it was impossible to give credence to England's sincere 
desire for peace. This conclusion would be preposterous even 
if it rested on more weighty and better proved facts than 
those brought forward by Herr Bethmann and Herr Burian. 
It is refuted by the mere fact of England's attitude at the 
London Balkan Conference, an attitude which, according to 
Burian's express admission, was entirely designed to promote 
peace, and for this very reason Herr von Bethmann passes 
over it in silence. I have already pointed out above that the 
starting point of the whole discussion was England's attitude 
at the Balkan Conference, and that since Herr von Bethmann 
can allege nothing against the attitude then assumed, having 
regard to the historical facts and the express testimony given 
by his Secretaries of State, Kiderlen and Jagow, he unosten- 
tatiously alters the subject-matter and interposes the Bosnian 
crisis in place of the Balkan Conference. To his misfortune, 
this crisis also yields an absolutely negative result so far as 
his thesis of accusation is concerned. 

But how can Herr von Bethmann answer to his conscience 
for his action in drawing from these long- forgotten events 
conclusions pointing to the malice of England — the very Herr 
von Bethmann who in many places in his White Book, and 
even in his declaration of war against Russia, conscientiously 
chronicles and mentions with praise the uninterrupted efforts 
made by Grey in the cause of peace at the end of July, 1914? 
In J' accuse (page 248) I collected together all the laudatory 
testimonies which the German Chancellor bore to the English 



ENGLISH PACIFISM 251 

Secretary of State. In view of this, what are we to under- 
stand and what is proved by the fact that Herr von Bethmann 
now digs out old papers and wants to make us believe that in 
1909 England gave expression in Petrograd to "her dissatis- 
faction with the pacific solution of the existing crisis" ? This 
dissatisfaction, which is concocted in the laboratory of Herr 
Schiemann, evaporates at the first breath of documentary in- 
vestigation. Yet even if the winter of 1908-9 had indeed 
been for the English Government a "winter of discontent," 
this attitude of mind would have been entirely explicable; for 
it can in fact have been no pleasure to the other European 
Powers to see in all the violent actions and demands of Aus- 
tria the mailed fist of the German Emperor constantly raised 
behind his ally. 

In any event the discontent which then existed proves noth- 
ing whatever in connection with the question of guilt to-day; 
for according to Germany's own acknowledgment on the 
occasion of the Balkan Conference, four years after the Bos- 
nian crisis, England had co-operated with Germany in the 
maintenance of peace in the most honourable and successful 
manner. It is to this activity in the cause of peace that Sir 
Edward Grey appeals, and he rightly considers that it should 
have afforded a good omen for the success of the conference 
of 19 14. That is the question around which the discussion 
turns. The German Chancellor will not succeed in diverting 
us from this subject by his red herring of 1908 and in making 
us suspicious now in the summer of 1916 of England's sin- 
cere desire for peace, to which he himself in the summer of 
1 91 4 paid as glowing a testimony in his White Book as did 
his predecessors in the years 191 2 and 191 3. 

A Falsification of the Norddeutsche Allgemeine 

Zeitang 

What has been said above would be sufficient to dispose of 
the most recent charges against Grey's conference. I must 
still, however, devote a few words to a concluding article in 
the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung of June 4th which, so 



252 THE CRIME 

far as I know, represents the last statement of the German 
Government in this dispute. As a matter of course the semi- 
official organ seeks to defend the reports of Pourtales against 
the English dementis and refers on this occasion to a state- 
ment made by Grey in his famous speech in the House of 
Commons on August 3rd, 19 14, on the attitude assumed by 
England towards the French Republic during the Moroccan 
crisis of 1906. Grey considers the possibility which then ex- 
isted of an outbreak of war between Germany and France 
and gives the following statement of the attitude which he 
then assumed : 

I said then that I could promise nothing to any foreign Power 
unless it was subsequently to receive the whole-hearted support 
of public opinion here if the occasion arose. I said, in my opin- 
ion, if war was forced upon France then on the question of 
Morocco — a question which had just been the subject of agree- 
ment between this country and France, an agreement exceed- 
ingly popular on both sides — that if out of that agreement war 
was forced on France at that time, in my view public opinion in 
this country would have rallied to the material support of France. 

This statement of Grey's is quoted by the Norddeutsche 
Allgemeine Zeitung which then adds the observation: "This 
statement is so much in agreement with Pourtales' report on 
Grey's utterance that its authenticity is beyond dispute." This, 
be it observed, means that Grey promised Russia his military 
support during the Bosnian crisis. Grey energetically denies 
this and produces documents in support of his statements. 
Now, however, the probability of the German accusation is 
supposed to be proved by a statement which, by Grey's own 
admission, he gave to the French Government during the Mo- 
roccan conflict of 1906. This would all be very fine and 
very ingeniously contrived, if there were not a snag in the 
business. The snag is that Grey's statement, as given in the 
Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, is falsified in the most de- 
cisive point on which the whole matter depends. They have 
in fact, neither more nor less, omitted the interpolated clause 
quoted above "a question which had just been the subject of 



ENGLISH PACIFISM 253 

agreement between this country and France, an agreement 
exceedingly popular on both sides." It is on this interpolated 
clause that the whole matter turns. This is the salient point 
of Grey's statement. It should be remembered that during 
the critical days of 19 14, in all his conversations with the 
Ambassadors of the Entente Powers, Grey had constantly 
emphasised the difference between the previous Franco-Ger- 
man Moroccan conflict and the existing Austro-Serbo-Rus- 
sian dispute. The English Minister constantly emphasised 
the following point of view: The situation, he said in effect, 
was then entirely different, then the question was one of a 
conflict which directly affected France, a conflict on account 
of Morocco which t>y the Treaty of 1904 we had granted and 
guaranteed to the French Republic as a sphere of interest. 
At that time we were obliged, should the worst come to the 
worst, to support France by force of arms in the vindication 
of her interests in Morocco. That was the situation then. 
To-day, however, the question is one of a dispute in which 
France is primarily in no way interested, a dispute arising 
out of the rivalry between Russia and Austria in the Balkans 
in which France may ultimately be involved merely as the 
ally of Russia. In this dispute England at the outset does not 
feel called upon to take sides, much less to lend France her 
military support; England is free from any obligation, and 
in any decision she may take, she will be guided only by Eng- 
lish interests. In various places in my first book and in this 
my second book I have elucidated the attitude thus adopted 
by Grey, and have cited many documents confirming it (see 
F accuse, page 253 et seq.; The Crime, Volume 1, Chapter 
II.; Blue Book, Nos. 87, 116, 119). 

The same distinction between the Moroccan question and 
the Balkan question, which appeared in the conflicts of 1906 
and 1 9 14, holds, of course, for the conflicts of 1906 and 1908 
as well. In 1906 there was a Moroccan conflict; in 1908 a> 
Balkan conflict. It is therefore a deliberate falsification when 
the attempt is made to draw from Grey's attitude in 1906 
conclusions as to his attitude in 1908, as Herr von Beth- 
mann's semi-official organ endeavours to do. No one would 



254 THE CRIME 

venture to make such an attempt unless, counting on un- 
critical readers, he suppressed the above decisive intervening 
sentence which definitely points to the special peculiarity of 
the case of Morocco, and unless he thus feigned an identity 
between the Moroccan and Balkan conflicts which Grey ex- 
pressly rejected in all his statements. This suppression, be- 
yond doubt deliberate and intentional, is now nailed down. 
And this suffices to dispose of the alleged demonstration that 
it is probably a true statement that in 1908 Grey promised 
Russia his military support. Indeed, the contrary proposi- 
tion is rather proved, and Grey's assertion that in 1908-09 
he promised Russia only his diplomatic support is fully con- 
firmed by Bethmann's quotation — that is to say by the com- 
plete and not the mangled quotation. Looked at from the 
point of view of the true situation of affairs Grey's action 
appears entirely consistent from 1906 to 19 14; in 1906 there 
was a Moroccan conflict, and therefore military support 
might ultimately be extended to France on account of the ob- 
ligations imposed by the Treaty of 1904; in 1908 and 1914 
there were Balkan conflicts, and therefore diplomatic support 
merely was extended to Russia and France, full freedom of 
action being reserved for England, and intervention, should 
it take place, would only be in accordance with the demands 
of English interests. 

3fC if. 3f* 5f! «|E 3}C 

Prince Btilow in his most recent book, Deutsche Politik, 
also expressly points out (page 34) that "from the time of 
the Crimean war until the outbreak of the world- war, Eng- 
land entered into no alliance with any continental Power," 
and adds with reference to Grey's speech in the House of 
Commons on August 3rd, 1914 (which he erroneously as- 
signs to August 4th) : 

Even on the eve of this war English Ministers still declared 
that England must not make her position dependent on alliances 
which would fix definite obligations upon her. . . . The speech 
in which the English Minister sounded the tocsin of war is chiefly 
devoted to proving that up to the last England had kept a free 
hand. With such care and prudence did England up to the last 



ENGLISH PACIFISM 255 

moment pursue a policy, even towards France, which rendered 
it possible for her to act in accordance with the logical conse- 
quences of her hitherto friendly relations with that country or 
not, as she thought expedient under the circumstances. 1 

It is precisely to Sir Edward Grey's attitude in the Balkan 
crisis of 1908-09 that Bulow appeals in verification of this 
English system of pursuing a non-committal policy, espe- 
cially in regard to military matters. He quotes Grey's words 
in the speech in the House of Commons above mentioned, 
which show that even at that time the English Minister as- 
sumed towards Isvolsky the same standpoint in Balkan af- 
fairs which he maintained in the last Balkan crisis down to 
the outbreak of war between Germany and Russia on August 
1st, 1914: diplomatic support of the Entente Powers? — yes, 
certainly; military support? — unconditionally, no, because 
public opinion in England would never have approved Great 
Britain's participation in a war on account of Balkan interests. 

By the classical testimony thus furnished by his predecessor 
in office, Herr von Bethmann's assertion that Grey even at 
that time (1908-09) pursued a "militaristic" policy directed 
to war is again most cogently refuted, as indeed it is by all 
the other proved facts of the case. At the same time the 
above sentences of the former Chancellor contain a confirma- 
tion of the interpretation which every one of impartial judg- 
ment must place upon the correspondence between Grey and 
Cambon in November, 19 12, namely, that the consultations 
of French and English military experts were not in any way 
intended to alter the fundamental principle of English policy 
of maintaining entire freedom of action in any European con- 
flict that might arise. This confirmation, coming from so 
authoritative a source, is of great significance. It completely 
takes the wind out of the sails of German apologetic litera- 
ture, which unanimously insists on seeing in the correspond- 
ence of 1912 a proof of the Anglo-Franco-Russian aggressive 
conspiracy. Even Herr Helfferich devotes no fewer than 
three pages to this correspondence, and draws from it the 

1 [English translation : Imperial Germany, pages 32, 33. Cassel & Co.] 



256 THE CRIME 

conclusion "that the British and French general and naval 
staffs had for years elaborated and agreed upon plans for 
common action by land and by sea. There can be no doubt 
against whom these common plans could alone have been 
directed." x As will be seen, Herr Helfferich quietly changes 
these military consultations into an intention to give effect 
ultimately to an offensive action, whereas Grey in reality, 
according to the sense and the text of his letter of November 
22nd, 19 1 2, did not even promise defensive assistance against 
an unprovoked attack by a third Power, but even in this case 
maintained freedom of decision: 

It has always been understood that such consultation does not 
restrict the freedom of either Government to decide at any fu- 
ture time whether or not to assist the other by armed force. We 
have agreed that consultation between experts is not, and ought 
not, to be regarded as an engagement that commits either Gov- 
ernment to action in a contingency that has not yet arisen and 
may never arise. 

In this passage the view is clearly expressed that the con- 
sultation between the experts was not in any case to impose 
any obligation on the two Governments to any course of ac- 
tion. Nevertheless Herr von Helfferich, making use even 
of the same words, speaks of "a common action by land and 
by sea." Does the astute German Secretary of State con- 
sider that the equally astute English Secretary of State is 
really so foolish as to communicate verbatim to his parlia- 
mentary colleagues a document to prove that he had not com- 
mitted himself, when in fact the document contains such a 
commitment? The mere fact that the correspondence was so 
communicated in that critical hour on August 3rd, and the 
fact that at the same time Grey observed that on the preced- 
ing day (August 2nd, Blue Book No. 148) a certain condi- 
tional and restricted obligation had for the first time been 
assumed by Great Britain, in themselves prove the erroneous- 
ness and the arbitrariness of the enlarged interpretation 
adopted by Helfferich and his comrades. Billow's account 

1 Helfferich: The Genesis of the Great War, page 25. 



ENGLISH PACIFISM 257 

gives the quietus to Helfferich's thesis. According to Bulow, 
England had to the last maintained a free hand. England 
therefore was not pledged to give any military support, either 
in 1914, or in 1912, or in 1908. She pursued, not a policy 
of war, but a policy of peace. 



The Chancellor with the Iron Forehead 

The Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung has the temerity to 
conclude its falsifying article with a bombastic apostrophe 
to the English Minister, to brand "his policy which has been 
proved by the Chancellor to have been militaristic ... as 
expressed in the whole policy pursued by the Entente against 
Germany during his ten years' conduct of the Foreign Of- 
fice" and to attach to him the stigma: 

"Thus Grey remains in history as one of those who 
are chiefly guilty of the war. No protestations of his 
love of peace and of his good intention can free him 
from this." 

The man who ventures to write this by the instrumentality 
of his semi-official hacks is the man who, as the responsible 
leader of German policy, had personal experience of Grey's 
activity in the cause of peace during the London Conference 
of Ambassadors; he is the man whose Secretary of State, 
Jagow, emphasised in extremely cordial terms the Anglo- 
German action on behalf of peace, which was then carried 
through in complete agreement and mutual trust; he is the 
man who received the repeated attempts made by England to 
arrive at an understanding in political and naval matters, the 
man who was a witness of the desperate efforts of the Eng- 
lish Minister in the summer of 1914 to maintain peace and 
recognised this in his own official publications. This man 
dares to accuse the English friend of peace of pursuing a 
militaristic policy, representing him as one of those chiefly 
guilty of the war. 

Verily for this an iron forehead is required. 



258 THE CRIME 

As we must before long take up the question of providing 
historical descriptions for the leading actors in this world 
drama; — we have already got "the Victor of Longwy," the 
"Conqueror of Warsaw" — I should like to propose for the 
Chancellor, Herr von Bethmann Hollweg, on the pattern of 
Gotz von Berlichingen of the Iron Hand, the honorary title 
of "the Chancellor of the Iron Forehead." 



CHAPTER V 

THE ANGLO-GERMAN NEGOTIATIONS FOR AN 
UNDERSTANDING. (1909-1912) 

From the foregoing chapter we have seen the futility of 
the charge that in the European conflicts in the last stages of 
history before the war England did not sincerely labour on 
behalf of peace. 

A similar charge has recently been brought by writers on 
the side of Germany with reference to the direct Anglo- 
German negotiations for an understanding which took place 
between 1909 and 19 12 and, as is well known, ended in fail- 
ure. I have already discussed this subject in detail in J' accuse 
(pages 99-114), but I am obliged to return to the question 
here, as new facts calling for renewed treatment have mean- 
while become public. 

I may claim for myself the credit of having been the first 
in the war-literature of Germany to emphasise the true sig- 
nificance of the Anglo-German negotiations of 1909-12 in 
connection with the answer to be given to the question of 
guilt and to subject them to a critical examination. While 
Asquith, the English Premier, had already touched upon 
these negotiations in his speech at Cardiff on October 2nd, 
1 914, and while Sir Edward Cook had discussed these mat- 
ters in detail in his pamphlet How Britain strove for Peace} 
a wilful silence was preserved on the subject in Germany. 
In no speech of the Chancellor, in no official or semi-official 
pamphlet written in justification of Germany's cause was 
there any mention of the Anglo-German negotiations, simply 
for the reason that they could not serve to justify but only 
to condemn Germany. The silence in the German newspaper 

1 London, 1914, Macmillan & Co. 
259 



260 THE CRIME 

world was only broken by the documentary treatment of the 
subject in my book, and this led to a lively campaign in the 
official and semi-official Press on both sides of the channel 
and to a series of official statements by the leading' ministers. 
Herr von Bethmann Hollweg as well as Sir Edward Grey, the 
German and the English Foreign Offices, by means of their 
telegraphic agencies and their Press, fully discussed the sub- 
ject and enlightened public opinion — which until then was 
completely ignorant in Germany — on this important part of 
the historical antecedents of the war. Even Herr Schiemann 
cannot avoid mentioning the Anglo-German negotiations in 
his pamphlet on the slanderer, in inviting the accuser to peruse 
the observations on the subject contained in his pamphlet on 
the understanding between England and Germany. 1 I have 
complied with this invitation, but without deriving from it 
any corresponding profit. Schiemann's observations on the 
prolonged negotiations for an understanding are alike super- 
ficial and tendencious, being written with the object of trans- 
forming the truth that England, in fruitless endeavours ex- 
tending over many years, sought a political understanding and 
an agreement with Germany as to armaments into the untruth 
which constitutes the subject of Schiemann's pamphlet: How 
England prevented an understanding with Germany. 

Course of the Negotiations 

In my book (pages 90-98) I have fully dealt with the first 
part of the negotiations from Herr von Bethmann Hollweg's 
assumption of the office of Chancellor (summer, 1909) down 
to Haldane's mission (February, 1912), and I have scarcely 
anything to add to what I have there said. The object of the 
negotiations was the proportional restriction of naval arma- 
ments on both sides ; the presupposition of this restriction was 
a political agreement, which would as far as possible exclude 
a war between the two countries and thus reveal as purpose- 
less the preparations on both sides. As England, under the 

1 ScKiemann : How England Prevented an Understanding with Ger- 
many, pages 20-25 (Berlin: George Reimer, 1915). 



ANGLO-GERMAN NEGOTIATIONS 261 

Unionist Ministry, and to a much greater extent under the 
Liberal Ministries of Campbell-Bannerman and Asquith, had 
already taken on every occasion the initiative towards a re- 
striction by treaty of naval construction in England and 
Germany, but had always failed owing to the opposition of 
all those in authoritative positions in Germany (to Prince 
Biilow must be ascribed a large measure of the responsibility 
for the increasing naval competition), the primary point after 
the change in the occupancy of the Chancellorship was to 
ascertain what concessions Germany would be prepared to 
make on the subject of a restriction in naval construction. 

Now these concessions were unfortunately of an exiguous 
character. It is clear from the material which so far has 
become public that Germany was at no time prepared to re- 
duce by an agreement with England her naval programme 
which was fixed by law, and was constantly being increased 
in short stages. Nor was she even prepared to give the prom- 
ise of a suspension, that is to say that there would not be a 
further increase in her naval power. This is asserted and 
proved with the utmost definiteness in Cook's pamphlet, which 
is compiled from official English material, and it has not been 
denied in any of the German official or semi-official state- 
ments, nor even in the Chancellor's speech of August 19th, 
19 1 5. The only offer which Germany made as an equivalent 
for an English obligation to maintain neutrality was a post- 
ponement in the building of new ships, that is to say a tem- 
porary retardation in construction, which, however, was to be 
compensated by a later acceleration, so that the total number 
of ships to be constructed under the naval law, as well as the 
length of time required for their construction, remained the 
same. In his speech in Parliament in July, 19 10, Asquith 
summarised the existing position of the negotiations by stat- 
ing that the German Government could not modify or repeal 
their Naval Law without a resolution of the Reichstag, and 
that a proposal to restrict the naval programme would, ac- 
cording to the assertion of the German Government, arouse 
the opposition of public opinion in Germany. Herr von 
Bethmann Hollweg's reply to Asquith's speech (December, 



262 THE CRIME 

1910) entirely confirmed its contents: the German Govern- 
ment could not restrict the construction of their fleet; at the 
most they could enter into a discussion with reference to a 
temporary retardation. 

Even this entirely insufficient promise of a delay in naval 
construction, which after all in no way offered any alleviation 
of the enormous burden of armaments on both sides nor any 
security against the later increase in the state of the navy, 
was withdrawn later (in May, 191 1) on the frivolous ground 
that the shipbuilding industry which had already arranged it- 
self on the basis of a definite sequence of Government or- 
ders, must not be embarrassed by a cancellation or retarda- 
tion of orders. The Emperor William at that time declared 
to the British Ambassador that he would on no account ever 
consent to any agreement binding Germany not to enlarge her 
programme. 1 In the spring of 191 1 the German Government 
declared to the English Government its readiness to examine 
proposals for a mutual reduction of expenditure on arma- 
ments, but made the express reservation that these proposals 
should not involve any departure from the requirements of 
the Navy Law. 

This offer of a retardation in naval construction was, as 
has been observed, also withdrawn. In the spring of 191 1 
there was therefore nothing left remaining of the subject of 
negotiations which constituted the immediate practical object 
of the Anglo-German discussions, namely, the general prob- 
lem of armaments. There was no suspension, much less a 
reduction, in the German naval programme; there was not 
even a retardation in its execution. It is a self-evident fact 
that under these circumstances the efforts for a general po- 
litical understanding were also void of content. The imme- 
diate practical object of the negotiations which the English 
Government had pursued for years was to procure for both 
countries an alleviation of the ruinous burdens of armaments. 
The political understanding was the natural presupposition 

a Cook, page 25. 



ANGLO-GERMAN NEGOTIATIONS 263 

of the attainment of this end. At the moment when the end 
pursued by England (an end, however, equally in the inter- 
ests of Germany) became unattainable owing to Germany's 
opposition, the political presupposition of the agreement as to 
armaments was also under consideration. It would indeed 
have been insane or absurd, as Haldane rightly pointed out 
in his later visit to Berlin, to establish by treaty a guarantee 
of peace between the two countries, and at the same time to 
continue the struggle of armaments with unabated energy, 
as if war were every moment at the door. 

The negative attitude assumed by Germany in the ques- 
tion of armaments, though no doubt interrupted by many 
vacillations, is not merely confirmed by English sources, but 
was unreservedly admitted by the Chancellor in his speech 
of March 30th, 191 1. While in a speech in Parliament on 
March 13th, 191 1, Grey had rightly referred to the paradox 
that on the one hand assurances of friendship were ex- 
changed, but on the other armaments were constantly being 
piled up against each other, Herr von Bethmann Hollweg did 
not hesitate to declare that the whole idea of a restriction of 
armaments was impracticable, since it would be impossible 
to control the observation of the agreement by the other 
party, and in consequence nothing but continued distrust and 
perpetual friction could arise from such a treaty. 

Even Schiemann is so far in agreement with Cook's "ten- 
dentious pamphlet" — as the professionally tendencious his- 
torian dares to call the English book — that he describes as 
the utmost concession of the German Government their readi- 
ness "to retard the tempo of the construction of our war- 
ships." Thus even Schiemann does not maintain that we 
ever professed our readiness to agree to a suspension or a 
diminution of our armaments. He is silent, however, on a 
point which Cook asserts with the utmost definiteness, namely, 
that even the offer of a temporary retardation in naval con- 
struction was withdrawn in May, 191 1. 



264 THE CRIME 



"A Couple of Dreadnoughts, more or less" 

In view of all that we know with regard to Anglo-Ger- 
man negotiations, of all the actions of the German Govern- 
ment and the statements of German statesmen in the course 
of these negotiations, it is not too much to assert that Ger- 
many never sincerely intended to submit to the least restric- 
tion in her naval armaments, and still less, of course, in her 
preparations by land, that it was thus merely the advantages 
of a political understanding with England, the neutralisation 
of Great Britain in all European conflicts that Germany en- 
deavoured to secure, and that she never intended to concede 
the equivalent asked by England, the restriction of naval 
armaments. Even Herr von Bethmann Hollweg, in his 
speech of August 19th, 191 5, lets this be understood as dis- 
tinctly as in the clear words used in his speech of March 30th, 
191 1, mentioned above: 

"I asked him (Haldane) — so said the Chancellor — 
whether an open understanding with us, an understand- 
ing which would exclude not merely an Anglo-German 
war but every European war, was not of more value 
than a couple of German Dreadnoughts, more or less." 

Superficially read, this sounds quite harmless, but in real- 
ity it quite turns things upside down. The suggestion for an 
agreement as to armaments which England continued to put 
forward for many years did indeed rest on the correct 
thought, that in fact the question at issue turned on "the 
couple of Dreadnoughts more or less" on both sides, with all 
that that involved; or to express it more plainly, that the 
question involved was the competition in naval armaments 
on both sides, that this competition from the English point 
of view was meaningless, since England did not intend to 
attack Germany, and that this meaninglessness must be rec- 
ognised on the side of Germany as well, if the same pacific 
intentions existed there. 

The purpose of the constant English suggestions was an 



ANGLO-GERMAN NEGOTIATIONS 265 

agreement on naval construction, under which England would 
maintain her actual superiority on the special grounds which 
are well known, and would leave the German Empire her 
position as the second greatest naval Power. England re- 
garded the ratio of 16 : 10 as appropriate, and moreover as 
more or less in correspondence with the existing position of 
the two naval Powers. The German Government made the 
counter-proposal of a political understanding as the basis of 
an ultimate agreement as to armaments — in itself an entirely 
reasonable suggestion, and one calculated to serve the cause 
of general peace. Gradually, however, during the progress 
of the negotiations, the German Government showed itself 
so refractory and so much opposed to all positive proposals 
put forward by England for a restriction of armaments on 
both sides, so vacillating in her own proposals and decisions, 
and finally so definite an attitude of refusal was assumed 
that the purpose pursued by England in the negotiations com- 
pletely receded into the background, and negotiations were 
really conducted only on the question of the German demand 
for an agreement as to neutrality. The essential original pur- 
pose of the negotiations was pushed into the background by 
the gentlemen in the Wilhelmstrasse with juggling dexterity, 
and in its place was substituted another subject of negotia- 
tions, which had a powerful interest for Germany, but was 
of no interest whatever for England. What was the value 
for Great Britain of a German pledge of neutrality? If 
England were the aggressor, the agreement would not in any 
case be binding, since obviously the pledge of neutrality to 
be given by both parties only contemplated the contingency 
in which the other side was not the aggressor. The reverse 
case, that England should herself be attacked, was and is, in 
view of the existing constellation of European Powers and 
the geographical situation of Great Britain, so improbable 
that England had not the slightest motive to take special pre- 
cautions to meet this contingency. England's interest in the 
treaty negotiations with Germany in fact centred exclusively 
in the "couple of Dreadnoughts more or less." Herr von 
Bethmann was therefore guilty of an egregious perversion 



266 THE CRIME 

of the basis of the negotiations when he endeavoured to rep- 
resent to Haldane, the English Minister, that this question 
of naval armaments was unimportant. The avoidance of a 
European war was certainly the final goal of English policy, 
as it was also the feigned end of German policy. England, 
however, desired at the same time to put an end in peace to 
the financial ruin of both States. 

Germany's Last Word: Retardation, but not 
Reduction of Naval Construction 

The negotiations were prolonged, with every conceivable 
oscillation on the part of Germany, from 1909 to the summer 
of 191 1, and they were then abruptly interrupted by the re- 
newed acute outbreak of the Moroccan conflict. Meanwhile 
King Edward had died, and the Liberal Government was 
confirmed in its peace policy by a new General Election. The 
Moroccan conflict had scarcely been definitely settled by the 
Franco-German treaty of November 4th, 191 1, when Grey, 
in his well-known speech of November 27th, 191 1, mentioned 
above, returned to the Anglo-German negotiations and gave 
expression to a lively hope for a friendly rapprochement be- 
tween the two Powers. This rapprochement appeared to 
have the most favourable prospects of succeeding when Lord 
Haldane came to Berlin in February, 191 2, not for the pur- 
pose, as Schiemann again falsely states, of pacifying the 
sentiment in England which was pressing for an understand- 
ing, though "in reality to reconnoitre," but with the honour- 
able and sincere purpose of promoting as far as possible the 
prolonged efforts for an understanding made by the Liberal 
English Government. 

I have already given in my book (pages 106-111) an ac- 
count of the course of Haldane's visit. The efforts of the 
English Minister most amicably disposed to Germany had 
perforce to come to nothing, since once again the essential 
purpose of the English rapprochement, that of bringing about 
an agreement as to armaments, encountered in Berlin the 
same resistance as formerly. In view of recent experiences 



ANGLO-GERMAN NEGOTIATIONS 267 

on the outbreak of war and afterwards, it may be asserted 
with confidence that an Anglo-German agreement as to arma- 
ments found its chief opponents not in the office of the Chan- 
cellor but in the Admiralty. Just as the influence of the gen- 
erals provoked the precipitous and portentous declaration of 
war against Russia, just as the Tirpitz party — notwithstand- 
ing the intervening inactivity of its leader — was finally in a 
position to give effect to the ruthless prosecution of the sub- 
marine war, exclusively on military grounds, regardless of 
the public opinion of the world and the probability of war 
with America, 1 just as in the whole manner of German war- 
fare from great decisions down to the smallest incidents (see 
e.g., the shooting of Miss Cavell, Captain Fryatt, and similar 
" 'Lusitania' incidents by land") it is exclusively the military 
point of view that is decisive, and it is the statesman who 
must always give way to the generals — so we may venture 
to assert that then also, on the occasion of the Anglo-German 
negotiations, there may have existed in the civil government 
a sincere will to arrive at an agreement as to armaments, 
but that this will was shattered on the resistance offered by 
Herr von Tirpitz and his followers. It is only on this as- 
sumption that it is possible to explain the everlasting oscilla- 
tions between concessions and withdrawals, between propos- 
ing and refusing the basis of an agreement as to armaments ; 
only thus is it possible to explain the later watering down of 
what had already been positively promised at an earlier stage, 
only thus the difficulties and the contradictions in the attitude 
of the Chancellor, who on the one hand sincerely pursued a 
political understanding with England, but on the other hand, 
in consequence of the resistance of naval circles, was not in 
a position to make any kind of concession in the question of 
armaments. 

The German offer of a temporary retardation in naval con- 
struction is characteristic of this everlasting oscillation. That 
any more far-reaching concession on the part of Germany 
was excluded is expressly admitted by Schiemann, who 

1 Which has meanwhile become a reality. 



268 THE CRIME 

speaks of "the definite refusal of Germany to give up the 
naval programme approved by the Reichstag." I have al- 
ready pointed out that the promise of the temporary retarda- 
tion in naval construction was withdrawn in May, 191 1. It 
was, however, renewed on the occasion of Haldane's visit 
and afterwards, although now with the further restrictive 
addition that in the first place the most recent naval law must 
be taken as the basis of the agreement, and secondly that there 
could be no question of a binding or a written agreement but 
only of an oral understanding. 

From my knowledge of the diplomatic material (which is 
restricted to what has become public property, since I have 
no special information at my disposal) the last word which 
Germany spoke in the question of the restriction of armaments 
was the following offer of an oral agreement (with a refusal 
to give it in a written form) : 

No reduction in the size of the German fleet as pro- 
vided for by the most recent Naval Law of 191 2. 

No guarantee against this being increased at a later 
date. Adherence to the prescribed time for total com- 
pletion and only a temporary retardation in the con- 
struction of new units. 

England's Neutrality as an Equivalent 

Proceeding from this basis, it is now necessary to consider 
the equivalent which Germany demanded from England with 
reference to her neutrality in European conflicts. The ques- 
tion of these equivalents has been so fully and extensively 
discussed in the official and semi-official Press in both coun- 
tries as well as in the statements of leading statesmen that 
there can now scarcely be any doubt as to the state of affairs. 
Since, in contradistinction to Herr Schiemann, I am accus- 
tomed to the methods of scientific investigation, I cite here- 
with the sources on the basis of which the position must be 
determined. 



ANGLO-GERMAN NEGOTIATIONS 269 

1. Sir Edward Cook's pamphlet: How Britain Strove for 
Peace (Macmillan & Co.). 

2. J' accuse (pages 106-111). 

3. Lord Haldane's speech, July 5th, 19 15. 

4. Answer of the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung to 
this speech, July 18th, 191 5. 

5. Speech of the Chancellor, von Bethmann Hollweg, 
August 19th, 191 5. 

6. Sir Edward Grey's answer, published by Reuter's Bu- 
reau on August 26th, 191 5. 

7. Publication of the English Foreign Office of Septem- 
ber 1st, 191 5 (Reuter's Bureau). 

8. Answer of the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung to 
this publication, September 8th, 191 5. 

The preceding summary shows that a considerable part 
of the publications bearing on this question had already taken 
place before the appearance of the Slanderer pamphlet. Nev- 
ertheless, the man of the "method of scientific investigation" 
in no way considers the crucial points of the dispute and its 
important details. He entirely ignores the real grounds 
which caused the failure of the negotiations, and is content, 
in his now familiar method of falsification, to tamper and 
remodel the text of the English proposal for an understand- 
ing, until he succeeds in producing the reverse of its true 
meaning. 

The following is the position as revealed by the accounts 
of the two Governments concerned, which in this case are 
for once in agreement in essential matters. 

I 

The first proposal made by the Chancellor von Bethmann 
Hollweg to Lord Haldane (beginning of February, 1912) 
was unrestrictedly to the effect that in every war in which 
one of the two contracting parties became entangled with 
one or more Powers, the other contracting party would ob- 



270 THE CRIME 

serve at least a benevolent neutrality and would use its ut- 
most endeavours for a localisation of the conflict. 

This proposal was rejected by Lord Haldane in Berlin 
as too far-reaching, since it obliged the contracting parties 
to neutrality; and that, moreover, a benevolent neutrality, 
even if the other contracting party had intentionally pro- 
voked war. It does not require any further proof that by 
accepting this German proposal England would have deliv- 
ered herself over to Germany with bound hands, and that 
merely by concluding such a treaty she would have repudi- 
ated France and Russia, her Entente friends. Germany, in 
alliance with Austria, would have been able to let loose on 
the Continent any war that served her purposes; she would 
have her back free on the north. Indeed, in a certain sense, 
within the limits of benevolent neutrality, England would 
even have had to side with Germany; she would have been 
politically isolated, excluded from the concert of European 
Great Powers, and she would have made it possible and even 
assisted Germany, her rival for world-power, to become in 
the first place all-powerful on the Continent, so that she 
might later undertake the famous decisive struggle with 
Great Britain, the "settlement of the account" with England, 
of which Treitschke and his disciples have dreamed and writ- 
ten for a generation. This was the reason which led Lord 
Haldane without consulting the London Government, to re- 
ject the first German proposal for neutrality. 

II 

In consequence of Haldane' s refusal the Chancellor modi- 
fied his formula for an understanding, and in this modified 
form it was submitted by Haldane to his colleagues in the 
Ministry in London. The modified German proposal was 
published verbatim by the English Foreign Office on Sep- 
tember ist, 19 1 5, and discussed in detail by the Norddeutsche 
Allgemeine Zeitung on September 8th, although the English 
text was not in any way disputed or impugned. 



ANGLO-GERMAN NEGOTIATIONS 271 

The second German formula runs as follows: 

i. "The high contracting parties assure each other 
mutually of their desire of peace and friendship. 

2. They will not either of them make or prepare to 
make any (unprovoked) attack upon the other, or join 
in any combination or design against the other for pur- 
poses of aggression, or become party to any plan or 
naval or military enterprise alone or in combination 
with any other Power directed to such an end, and 
declare not to be bound by any such engagement. 

3. If either of the high contracting parties becomes 
entangled in a war with one or more Powers in which 
it cannot be said to be the aggressor, 1 the other party 
will at least observe towards the Power so entangled a 
benevolent neutrality, and will use its utmost endeavour 
for the localisation of the conflict. If either of the high 
contracting parties is forced to go to war by obvious 
provocation from a third party, they bind themselves 
to enter into an exchange of views concerning their 
attitude in such a conflict. 

4. The duty of neutrality which arises out of the pre- 
ceding article has no application in so far as it may not 
be reconcilable with existing agreements which the high 
contracting parties have already made. 

5. The making of new agreements which render it 
impossible for either of the parties to observe neutrality 
towards the other beyond what is provided by the pre- 
ceding limitation is excluded in conformity with the 
provisions in Article. 2. 

6. The high contracting parties declare that they will 
do all in their power to prevent differences and misun- 
derstandings arising between either of them and other 
Powers." 

This proposal also was refused by the English Govern- 
ment as too far-reaching, chiefly because paragraph 4 would 

1 [The German text gives here : "in which it is not the aggressor."] 



272 THE CRIME 

have made it possible for the German Government, which 
was united with Austria and Italy by positive alliances, to 
refuse her neutrality on the ground of the obligations im- 
posed by these alliances, whereas England on the other hand, 
which was not united to any European Power by an alliance, 
would have been compelled in all European conflicts to ob- 
serve neutrality in favour of Germany. As the storm centre 
of Europe, from which the hurricane of war constantly 
threatened to break, was the south-east, more especially the 
Balkans, and as in all these questions it was Austria that was 
primarily interested, England had to reckon with the possi- 
bility, or indeed the probability, of an outbreak of war in 
which Austria would be involved and Germany would be 
pledged to give Austria military support. Any war of this 
nature would present the danger of European complications 
in which England — notwithstanding .that her own interests 
might be affected — would be obliged to stand aside as an 
inactive spectator, if she had accepted the German proposal 
of neutrality. 

Ill 

The English Government now made the following counter- 
proposal (March 14th, 1912) : 

"England will make no unprovoked attack upon Ger- 
many, and pursue no aggressive policy towards her. 
Aggression upon Germany is not the subject, and forms 
no part of any treaty, understanding or combination to 
which England is now a party, nor will she become a 
party to anything that has such an object." 

The German Government in their turn now found this 
proposal unacceptable, and for the remarkable reason, ad- 
vanced by the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung and the 
Chancellor alike, that the English assurances represented 
"what was self-evident in the mutual relations of civilised 
States," and that consequently "the promise to refrain from 
such attacks could not very well furnish the substance of a 



ANGLO-GERMAN NEGOTIATIONS 273 

solemn treaty." This is indeed a remarkable reason — a rea- 
son which, if true, designates the whole competition in arma- 
ments as an act of insanity, the whole of the German chau- 
vinist literature as humbug, and, above all, shows that the 
explanation of the present war as a preventive or defensive 
war is a criminal invention. If in fact unprovoked attacks 
are neither customary nor conceivable among civilised States, 
why have the States of Europe, which surely must all be 
counted among the civilised States, been arming against each 
other for half a century on this enormous scale? Why did 
Germany break all records in these military preparations by 
land, besides being on the point of approaching English naval 
power on sea? I thought that Germany and her allies were 
entirely lovers of peace. If it is "self-evident" that this was 
also true of other civilised States, what was the meaning of 
the military preparations, of the financial ruin of all nations, 
of the everlasting friction and tension which in a large 
measure originated in these military preparations? 

To pursue the argument, did not our Pan-German and 
militaristic Press — and similarly the corresponding Press in 
other countries — constantly make use of the danger of an 
attack from the opposing group of Powers? Is it not the 
fact that all the constantly increasing demands for the army 
and the navy were explained by reference to this danger? 
Is not the present war officially described as a defence against 
a present attack, although semi-officially and confidentially 
it is deceitfully presented to the unfortunate German people 
as a war of prevention against a future attack? How is all 
this to be reconciled with the present assertion of the Chan- 
cellor that an English guarantee against an attack given by 
treaty was of no value, because such an attack "was not cus- 
tomary among civilised States"? The naval preparations 
made on both sides by Germany and England would indeed 
have been meaningless if their purpose was not security 
against the contingency of war. If, then, the contingency 
of war were excluded by treaty, this would not have been 
something that was self-evident, but would have constituted 
the removal of the presupposition on which armaments 



274 THE CRIME 

rested; it would have created the ground, on which alone an 
agreement as to armaments could be concluded, the tension 
between the two countries removed and a peaceful rapproche- 
ment made possible. 

IV 

Meanwhile the German Government had modified their 
first proposal and — as it appears (it is not possible on the 
existing material to arrive at an exact determination of the 
position on this point) — they omitted the clause providing 
for exceptions in the first German proposal, which had 
rightly caused offence in London. The new German pro- 
posal was as follows: 

"Should one of the high contracting parties be en- 
tangled in a war with one or more Powers, in which it 
cannot be said to be the aggressor, the other party will 
at least observe towards it a benevolent neutrality, and 
will use its utmost endeavour for the localisation of the 
conflict. The high contracting parties pledge them- 
selves to arrive mutually at an understanding as to their 
attitude should one of them be compelled to a declara- 
tion of war by the open provocation of a third party" 
(see the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung of July 18th 
and the Chancellor's speech of August 19th, 1915). 

Observe the peculiar and surprising phraseology, pro- 
duced in the same terms by the semi-official paper and the 
Chancellor : "A war in which it cannot be said that the other 
contracting party is the aggressor." What does this mean? 
It means something negative, not positive: England is 
pledged to neutrality (and conversely Germany in the like 
case) in every war in which it cannot be definitely said that 
Germany has attacked, but in which with just as little cer- 
tainty it can be stated that Germany has been attacked, in 
other words, in which the question, attack or defence, must 
be answered with a "non liquet." While England wished 
to guarantee her neutrality in every unprovoked attack on 
Germany by other Powers, Germany's efforts were directed 



ANGLO-GERMAN NEGOTIATIONS 275 

to extending this guarantee to the case in which the question 
whether Germany had been attacked or was herself the ag- 
gressor, remained unanswered or undecided. 

The extension thus desired by Germany was of enormous 
importance. The question of responsibility in connection 
with the origin of a war, the question which of two bellig- 
erent parties is the aggressor and which is the party at- 
tacked, is not always so obvious and so easy to determine 
as it is in the present war, which Germany and Austria, 
without any provocation and without any compelling reason, 
intentionally and wantonly provoked by two declarations of 
war, the one against Serbia and the other against Russia. 
In most wars it is very difficult to decide who is the aggressor 
and who is the defender, since both parties are interested in 
appearing to the world as morally innocent; they conse- 
quently seek to obliterate the question of guilt so far as 
possible, acting on the celebrated recipe of "mixing the 
cards" which Bernhardi recommended so candidly and so 
naively to the German Government. It is not every Govern- 
ment that is so clumsy in deceit as the Berlin and the Vien- 
nese Governments have shown themselves to be. A man like 
Bismarck would have been hard to convict of the famous 
falsification of the Ems telegram if he had not himself, with 
the brutality of genius, made it known to the world. In 
short, the wars in which the question of guilt remains ob- 
scure and in doubt are more numerous than those in which 
it can be determined as clearly as in the present war. Ger- 
many would, however, have got the advantage of all these 
doubtful cases on Bethmann's formula: "a war in which it 
cannot be said." In all those cases in which it could not be 
definitely asserted and proved that Germany was the ag- 
gressor, in all doubtful cases, England was to observe a 
neutrality and, moreover, a benevolent neutrality; only in 
the few cases in which the question of guilt had to be de- 
cided clearly and unambiguously against Germany, would 
England have been justified in departing from her neutrality. 

It need occasion no surprise that the astute English Gov- 
ernment did not accept this proposal. It is, however, re- 



276 THE CRIME 

markable that Herr von Bethmann endeavoured to entice 
them into this trap. This is an illuminating fact. If the only- 
object, then, pursued by the Berlin Government was really 
to obtain protection against aggressive wars in which Eng- 
land might participate, the English formula of neutrality 
was bound to have satisfied them. But if they themselves 
had unconfessed aggressive designs and at the same time the 
intention "so to shuffle the cards that we may be attacked by 
France," 1 if the German Government were thus endeavour- 
ing to construe one, of those obscure cases in which aggres- 
sion and defence cannot very well be distinguished, they 
could not have adopted a better course than to propose the 
formula relating to the war "in which it cannot be said," 
etc. But, on the other hand, England also could pursue no 
better course than politely to decline this formula with 
thanks. 

V 

The negotiations thus returned to the English proposal 
cited above in Section III, which was merely amplified by 
an introduction corresponding to No. I of the second Ger- 
man proposal. This English formula, which represents the 
final point and the further step in English conciliation, I 
quoted in my book (page 109) verbatim as given by Cook 
in English, and in this case Schiemann also makes an hon- 
ourable departure from his usual behaviour, inasmuch as he 
neither suppresses not falsifies an official document but re- 
produces it textually. But here again the leopard cannot, 
of course, change his spots. The falsification comes later 
in the commentary which he adds to the text. 

The following is the formula of the English proposal as 
it was given by Grey to Count Metternich in London : 2 

"The two Powers being mutually desirous of secur- 
ing peace and friendship between them, England de- 

1 Bernhardi : Germany and the Next War, page 280. 

2 In the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung of July 18th, 1915, the 
formula is inaccurately and incompletely quoted. The reproduction in 



ANGLO-GERMAN NEGOTIATIONS 277 

clares that she will neither make nor join in any unpro- 
voked attack upon Germany. Aggression upon Ger- 
many is not the subject, and forms no part of any 
treaty, understanding, or combination to which England 
is now a party, nor will she become a party to anything 
that has such an object." 

I have already explained in my book and in the preceding 
observations that Germany might well have been satisfied 
in every way with this English offer. The English formula 
contains a promise of non-aggression in the widest sense of 
the word. England promised that she would neither her- 
self make an attack upon Germany nor would she take part 
in any such attack; she declared that she had concluded no 
treaty, agreement or understanding which aimed at or per- 
mitted an attack on Germany; she declared that she would 
never be a party to any combination of this character. The 
oral explanations which Sir Edward Grey gave to Count 
Metternich in handing him this document again expressly 
emphasised that British policy pursued no aggressive plans 
against Germany whatever, that France was fully conscious 
that in the event of any attack upon Germany she would 
receive no support from England, but that on the other hand 
England could not bind herself to be an unmoved spectator 
of a German attack upon France, and to promise in advance 
her neutrality in all cases, even in the event of the violation 
of countries whose neutrality was guaranteed. 1 

Only those who themselves possess Schiemann's profes- 
sional habits of falsification could speak of the Machiavellian 

the speech of the Chancellor (Berliner Tageblatt of August 20th) is 
also incorrect and incomplete, although in such documents every word 
and every shade of meaning is important. If these German publications 
of decisive documents were tested by the standard applied by Helfferich 
and his companions to individual insignificant subsidiary points in large 
collections of diplomatic documents produced by the other side, we would 
everywhere — a course I refrain from following — presume the existence 
of malice and falsification, where in fact there is merely inaccuracy and 
carelessness. 
1 Cook, page 32. 



278 THE CRIME 

phraseology of the carefully-conceived English formula, or 
maintain that the all-comprehensive words "treaty, under- 
standing, or/ combination" and even the most general word 
that a language contains, "anything," that is to say, "any- 
thing whatever it may be," were intended still to leave open 
ways of escape for perfidious Albion. According to Schie- 
mann the oral conversations of Reval, the discussions be- 
tween experts on the English and French General Staffs, 
were not intended to fall under the above formula. It is 
self-evident that these oral discussions do fall under the 
formula, for they cannot be anything that does not come 
under the phrase a "treaty, understanding, combination or 
anything." The discussions of the General Staffs clearly do 
not fall under the formula, since they neither represented 
negotiations between the Governments, nor were they di- 
rected to an aggressive war against Germany, with which the 
English formula is exclusively concerned. If the Anglo- 
Russian conspiracy, which the German chauvinists have in- 
vented for their purposes, had been concluded at Reval, the 
English formula of neutrality would have been a lie. As, how- 
ever, the alleged Reval agreements are a lie, the English for- 
mula was in correspondence with the truth. The discus- 
sions between the General Staffs, directed to meet the con- 
tingency of a defensive war, in no way committed the two 
Governments, as we have seen above, and they did not even 
impose an obligation to furnish support in the event of an 
attack by a third party; they had, therefore, obviously noth- 
ing whatever to do with the formula of neutrality proposed 
by England. 

The English formula in its all-comprehensive generality 
excluded any possibility of a secret action, any possibility 
of an interpretation which would have afforded a loophole 
for aggressive intentions on the part of England. England 
is not a party, nor will she become a party, to anything that 
has for its object an attack upon Germany. I invite Messrs. 
Schiemann and Bethmann, who consider that a hidden in- 
terpretation of the English formula is possible, to suggest to 
me any phraseology which could better and more compre- 



ANGLO-GERMAN NEGOTIATIONS 279 

hensively than the English formula exclude every possibility 
of an attack by England or her participation in such an 
attack. When Herr von Bethmann says : "England considers 
it to be a mark of special friendship, worthy of being sealed 
by a solemn treaty, that she will not without reason attack 
us, but she reserves her freedom as to what she will do 
should her friends decide to do so," I can only characterise 
this observation of the leading German statesman in the 
words which he applies to Asquith's speech of October 2nd, 
1914: "It is to me incomprehensible . . . how a high states- 
man . . . can give so incorrect an account of an incident 
which is accurately known to him, in order to draw from 
it conclusions which are opposed to the truth." Bethmann's 
interpretation of the English formula is flagrantly opposed 
to the truth; England did not reserve her freedom of action 
in those cases in which her friends determined to attack us. 
Even apart from the special statement given orally by Grey 
to Count Metternich in amplification of the proposed formula, 
it was clear from the unambiguous phraseology of the formula 
itself that England was pledged to neutrality in the event of 
France or Russia, or both together, attacking Germany. 



VI 

It is well known that the English formula did not satisfy 
the German Government. Count Metternich was commis- 
sioned to submit an additional clause to the English Secretary 
of State, which is given as follows by the Chancellor, in 
agreement with the Norddeutsche AUgemeine Zeitung of 
July 1 8th: 

"England will therefore, as a matter of course, ob- 
serve a benevolent neutrality should war be forced upon 
Germany." 

In the event of the English Government taking offence 
at the promise of benevolent neutrality, the Berlin Govern- 
ment appears to have suggested to Count Metternich that 



280 THE CRIME 

he might be content with the promise of mere neutrality. 
The Chancellor does not mention this possible proposal; the 
Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, however, in agreement 
with the London Foreign Office, also speaks of this contin- 
gent formula. This point, however, whether it should be 
benevolent or simple neutrality, is in this question of less 
importance. The cardinal point lies in the German demand 
that England should also remain neutral in the event of a 
war being forced on the German people. So far as the ques- 
tion of England's entering into a treaty was concerned, it 
was on this point that the negotiations failed." Even if the 
English Government had agreed to the enormous demand in- 
volved in the acceptance of the German additional clause, the 
negotiations would still have failed, as we have seen above, 
on the other aspect of the problem — on the question, that is 
to say, of what agreement as to armaments Germany would 
then have been prepared to approve as a return for English 
neutrality. The difficulties to be overcome were twofold in 
their nature : on the one hand Germany demanded from Eng- 
land enormous concessions in political matters, but on the 
other hand she was only prepared to make quite trivial con- 
cessions in the question of naval armaments. 

What was the significance of the additional clause pro- 
posed by Metternich? It meant neither more nor less than 
that England would be obliged to remain neutral in every 
war in which Germany might be involved. By a circuitous 
path it led back to the first formula which had already been 
proposed to Lord Haldane in Berlin and flatly refused by 
him, to the effect that England should play the part of an un- 
concerned spectator in all European conflicts in which Ger- 
many participated, that she should give to German Imperi- 
alism carte blanche for the attainment of a position of he- 
gemony on the Continent and for the later attack on England's 
position as a World Power. 

What is the meaning of a war that is "forced upon" a 
country {aufgezwungener Krieg) ? Such a war is an ag- 
gressive war to which the aggressor has been forced by cir- 



ANGLO-GERMAN NEGOTIATIONS 281 

cumstances which, in his personal view, laid upon him the 
necessity, the "compulsion" (Zwang) of beginning war. The 
view that such a necessity, such a compulsion, existed is, of 
course, entirely subjective. In view of the fact that the 
Hague Tribunal failed, in consequence of German opposi- 
tion, to become a compulsory court of decision (even for less 
important disputes), there existed and exists no authority 
in the world which would be justified or competent to decide 
in a binding manner the question whether there existed for 
the attacking State a necessity, a compulsion, urging him to 
attack. The subjective decision of the aggressor that such 
a case exists may be based upon the most diverse motives 
or, since no one is in a position to examine these motives, on 
the most diverse pretences. The most fashionable of these 
motives, or pretences, is the assertion : The other party was 
going to attack me; in order to frustrate his attack I am 
bound to anticipate him. France was on the point of violat- 
ing Belgian neutrality; in order to prevent the disadvantages 
which would ensue for Germany from such an action we were 
obliged to anticipate her. England, Russia and France had 
been for years resolved to attack us on a favourable op- 
portunity; in order to anticipate this dangerous attack, we 
were obliged to strike at the moment most favourable to us. 
Serbia was on the point of making the Serbian parts of our 
territory disloyal by Pan-Serbian propaganda; in order to 
prevent the dismemberment of the monarchy we had to crush 
Serbia. Austria declares war against Serbia and Germany 
against Russia; both are formally the aggressors, and con- 
sequently the authors of the European war. This authorship, 
however — so runs the argument of those who contend that 
the war was "forced upon us" — was only a formal one, for 
in substance both States were compelled to play the role of 
an anticipator, Austria to avoid dismemberment, Germany to 
avoid an annihilating attack. The Austro-Serbian, like the 
Russo-German and consequently the European war, were 
thus wars which were "forced upon" the two Central Powers. 
A much more effective reason for a war is of course to 
be found if it is represented not as a preventive war but 



282 THE CRIME 

directly as a war of defence against an actual attack which 
has taken place. If we were dealing with a real, honest 
war of defence on the part of Germany, England, on the 
formula proposed by the English Government, would have 
been unconditionally pledged to neutrality. England had in- 
deed given a promise that she would neither herself make an 
attack upon Germany, nor would she join in such an attack. 
As is well known, the German Government has succeeded 
in inducing in the German people the false belief which still 
prevails to-day, although it may be hoped that it will not 
prevail much longer, that the Imperialistic war of aggression 
is not merely a preventive war forced upon the country by 
the duty of anticipation, but a war of defence brought about 
by a predatory attack. From this example it will be seen of 
what an unscrupulous Government is capable when it de- 
spises the truth and the true interests of a nation, when it is 
misled by Junkers, reactionaries and militarists. If the Im- 
perial German Government, with the personal assistance of 
the ruler, has been able to reveal dishonestly to the Ger- 
man people as a new war of liberation, after the pattern 
of 1813, the war that has been long planned and pre- 
pared, the war for world-power which has been pursued and 
openly preached for decades by the Pan-Germans, how much 
easier would it have been for them to bring any war, no 
matter from what cause it had arisen, under the formula 
of the war "forced upon" them which was to pledge Eng- 
land to neutrality. If it was found possible to falsify the 
present war of aggression into a war of defence, what war 
might not be baptised with the name of a war "forced upon" 
the nation — forced upon them by any strategic, political or 
economic necessity? 

For, be it observed, the addition desired by Herr von 
Bethmann relating to the war "forced upon" a country was 
not restricted or specified in any direction. A war may be 
forced upon a country, not merely by the duty of anticipat- 
ing a future attack (the war of prevention), but also by the 
necessity of a further national consolidation, of the develop- 
ment of new industrial markets, the acquisition of new har- 



ANGLO-GERMAN NEGOTIATIONS 283 

bours and approaches to the sea, of new colonies for settle- 
ment, of new territorial possessions in Europe for the strategi- 
cal improvement of the frontier, and so on. It may also be 
"forced upon" a country by reasons for expansion of an 
idealistic nature, for example, by the "national duty" (de- 
scribed in Italy as sacro egoismo) of uniting unredeemed 
kindred provinces to the great community of speech and 
race (irredenta, Russian Baltic provinces, etc.). In short, 
there is no war arising from Imperialistic tendencies and 
serving Imperialistic ends which could not be brought under 
the formula of wars "forced upon" a country by strategic, 
economic, national or preventive reasons. 

A classical example of this manner of giving reasons for 
a war is furnished by Bulgaria, the most recent ally of the 
Central Powers. Just as the characteristic qualities of an 
individual are best recognised by his caricature, so the nature 
of the German and Austrian reasons for war are reflected 
in quite a diverting manner in the Bulgarian caricature. As 
Rizoff, the Bulgarian Ambassador, openly stated in a long 
article, 1 the entry of Bulgaria into the European war took 
place with the object of realising the national and political 
unity of the Bulgarian people, of preventing Serbia from be- 
coming greater than Bulgaria, and of keeping Russia away 
from Constantinople. Herr Rizoff does not shrink from stat- 
ing openly that nothing is more natural "than the attitude of 
Bulgaria since the outbreak of the European war; she long 
remained neutral, because she had to make military prepara- 
tions and could only intervene towards the end of the war." 
In the first place, the King and his Government therefore en- 
tered into negotiations with the quadruple alliance in order to 
obtain recognition of "Bulgaria's inalienable rights to Mace- 
donia." As the quadruple alliance, however, had guaranteed 
the maintenance of the treaty of Bucharest, these negotia- 
tions failed and Bulgaria, for the same grounds as France, 
had taken up arms against Serbia in order to regain her 
Alsace-Lorraine, that is to say, Macedonia. 

1 Berliner Tageblatt, Nov. 2, 1915. 



284 THE CRIME 

The language here used is, I should say, plain enough. 
Bulgaria began the war with the object of attaining national 
unity and the extension of her power, and she adhered to 
the party which offered her the greatest chance of attaining 
her ends. This is what is in reality called an Imperialistic 
war, exactly like that now waged by Germany, although in 
the case of Bulgaria it assumes a certain national aspect. 
When now King Ferdinand saw, by reference to the famous 
examples of Germany and Austria, that true popular en- 
thusiasm could only be kindled for a "war of liberation," he 
thought to himself : Why should the Bulgarians be any 
better off than the Germans? Let us also quickly transform 
the war of conquest into a war of defence, and the matter 
will go on swimmingly. No sooner said than done. A royal 
manifesto' was issued to the Bulgarian nation in which the 
nation and the army were summoned "to the defence of their 
native soil defiled by a malicious neighbour, to the libera- 
tion of their brothers who were groaning under the Serbian 
yoke." The manifesto recalls the efforts made by the King 
and the Government for the maintenance of peace, which, 
alas ! had been in vain, since an attack by Serbian troops at 
Koestendil, Trn and Bjelogradschik on October 14th at eight 
o'clock in the morning had brought about a state of war be- 
tween Bulgaria and Serbia (see the telegrams from Wolff's 
Telegraphic Bureau from Sofia and Berlin of October 14th, 

I9I5)- 

There, then, we have the caricature. The puny one imi- 
tates the great, and by the malaglroitness of his parrotry re- 
veals to all the world the tricks and the wiles of his ex- 
emplars. The national-Imperialistic war of conquest, openly 
confessed by the Bulgarian Ambassador, after sufficient mili- 
tary preparation and wearisome barter on both sides, is over- 
night transformed into a war of defence against Serbian 
attack, because of the "defilement" of their native soil by a 
malicious neighbour. These hapless Serbs! It will be re- 
called that it was they also who began the war against 
Austria by a malicious attack. See the telegram of the Ger- 
man Ambassador in Vienna to the Chancellor, July 28th, 



ANGLO-GERMAN NEGOTIATIONS 285 

1 9 14 (White Book Exhibit 16, Count Berchtold observes 
"that after the opening of hostilities by Serbia . . ."). 
Truly they are a base tribe. Firstly they opened hostilities 
against Austria, and thus provoked the European war, and 
now when Austria and Germany with their combined forces 
have invaded their impoverished and exhausted country, con- 
sumed by three wars, they have still the impudence to fall 
upon their Bulgarian neighbours and make war upon them! 
The thing is in fact monstrous! In such a case there is no 
remedy but extirpation! And the Austrians and Germans 
in their various invasions of the unfortunate country have 
not failed in this direction. 



The case of Turkey is exactly similar to that of Bulgaria. 
Turkey also, which for years was united with Germany and 
Austria to meet the contingency of a European war, and 
in fact undertook the first act of war against Russia, main- 
tained that she had been attacked by Russia and was waging 
a "war for the holiest rights of the nation." 

From these examples, which could be indefinitely increased 
— from the other side as well — we see how the thing is done. 
There is nothing easier than to present an Imperialistic war 
of conquest to a deluded people under the guise of a war 
"forced upon" them, in the most various shades from the 
pure war of defence through the war of prevention to the 
war for national unity or for the liberation of unredeemed 
provinces. Austria and Bulgaria were both attacked by Serbia. 
There we have the most diverting comedy which interrupts 
the agonising cries of this gigantic tragedy. Germany is at- 
tacked by Russia and France, and menaced by a long-standing 
offensive conspiracy between England and Belgium ! So here 
again there is a war of defence against aggression. -This is 
indeed less diverting because it is much too tragic, but it is 
none the less a mask and an invention in order to cover their 
criminal plans of aggression in the eyes of their own people 
and of the world with the seemly mantle of the defence of 
the Fatherland. 



286 THE CRIME 

And having regard to the possibility and the capacity to 
falsify which has been revealed in this war and in many his- 
torical precedents, was it to be expected that the English 
Government should give a promise of neutrality in the event 
of a war being "forced upon" the German Empire? The 
English Ministers would either have been fools or traitors to 
their country if they had complied with this German de- 
mand, which, in fact, amounted to a neutrality in every Euro- 
pean Continental war. If the war of to-day can be given the 
imprint of a war of German defence, what war could not 
be made into a war "forced upon" Germany? Germany was 
united by Treaties of Alliance with Austria and Italy, in con- 
tradistinction to England which had concluded no alliances. 
The fourth paragraph of the second German proposal sub- 
mitted to Lord Haldane, which excluded the duty of neu- 
trality "in so far as it may not be reconcilable with existing 
agreements" (with other States) was no doubt not con- 
tained in the new additional formula submitted by Metter- 
nich, but it could conveniently be read into the formula. If 
Austria or Italy, or both at the same time, became involved 
in a war with one or more European Great Powers, and thus 
the casus foederis contemplated in the treaties of alliance 
arose for Germany, this also would have been a compulsion, 
a necessity, a war forced upon the German Empire. If Eng- 
land had subscribed to Metternich's clause, she would also 
have had to remain neutral in such a war, regardless of its 
origin and its aims. The question whether the casus foederis 
did or did not exist was withdrawn from the judgment and 
the decision of England. If Germany answered this ques- 
tion in the affirmative and gave military support to her allies, 
England would have been constrained to be an inactive spec- 
tator of such a war "forced upon" Germany, even if the 
interests of England or of her partners in the Entente were 
profoundly affected, even if one or both her partners in the 
Entente were themselves involved in the war, even if the 
war led to a violation or an injury to the small neutral States 
of Europe. England was thus eliminated from the Euro- 
pean concert, for there would have been no war which Ger- 



ANGLO-GERMAN NEGOTIATIONS 287 

many could not describe directly or indirectly as forced upon 
her — directly if she were the party primarily entangled in 
the war, indirectly if she were secondarily involved by her 
obligations as an ally. 

The meaning and the purpose of the whole of the negotia- 
tions between England and Germany for a political under- 
standing were inverted by Metternich's additional clause. 
The purpose of the negotiations was to spare both States the 
insane continuation of armaments by the mutual assurance 
that neither would attack the other nor participate in such 
an attack. Grey's formula corresponded to this end in the 
fullest measure. Metternich's addition, however, was di- 
rected to obtaining for Germany security against English in- 
tervention, even when Germany was the aggressor under the 
guise of a war forced upon her. This England neither could 
nor dared accept — all the less so because the equivalent of- 
fered by Germany in the matter of naval armaments was, 
as we have seen above, entirely worthless. 

Why was Germany Unwilling to Restrict her Naval 

Armaments? 

When we survey in retrospect the course of these negotia- 
tions, it becomes clear why Germany could make no material 
concession in the matter of the restriction of armaments. On 
the one hand Germany desired to be protected against Eng- 
land in the event of wars "forced upon" her, that is to say, 
in the event of concealed wars of German aggression. On 
the other hand she neither would nor could restrict her naval 
armaments, since these aggressive wars on the Continent — as 
had been proclaimed a thousand times by our Pan-Germans 
and Imperialists — could in the last analysis have no other 
object than the subsequent great settlement with England. In 
the first place we desired to be lords of the Continent and 
then to become lords of the world-seas. 

For the first step on this ladder to world-power we needed 
the neutrality of England; for the second step, the dispos- 
session of England, we needed a powerful navy. Conse- 



288 THE CRIME 

quently it had to be the task of our diplomacy to unite the 
immediate object with the more remote, that is to say, 
to obtain England's neutrality in all Continental wars, but 
on the other hand to submit to no restrictions in our naval 
preparations. I repeat what I have already said above, that 
I have nowhere found in the German publications and 
speeches on this question any readiness on the part of Ger- 
many to sacrifice even a single ship of those already approved 
by law or to renounce obtaining new legal sanction to others. 
According to the official documents before me, the maximum 
German concession in the matter of naval preparations was 
to be a certain retardation of completing the construction of 
the vessels already approved, which, however, was to be made 
good by an acceleration later on, and was not even to be 
committed to writing. The maximum, and at the same time 
the minimum, English concession in the political domain 
was, according to Bethmann's demand, to be an English 
pledge of neutrality, which in fact in a veiled form 
amounted to an attitude of complete and absolute passivity in 
all European conflicts. 

On the ground of the facts here expounded I can bring 
no reproach against Asquith, the English Prime Minister, 
for having briefly characterised the German demand in the 
following words : "They asked us to pledge ourselves ab- 
solutely to neutrality in the event of Germany being en- 
gaged in war." This is not, as Herr von Bethmann accuses 
his English colleague, a misrepresentation of the situation, 
but in substance entirely corresponds to the German demand. 
In his pamphlet which has been mentioned several times, 
Cook also characterises the German proposal in exactly the 
same way as Asquith does. Both hit the nail on the head. 
There are three kinds of war which call for consideration in 
the present discussion : 

Firstly, a pure war of defence; 

Secondly, a pure war of aggression; 

Thirdly, an aggressive war concealed under the description 
Of a war "forced upon" the country in question. 



ANGLO-GERMAN NEGOTIATIONS 289 

In the event of a purely defensive war on the part of 
Germany England wished to remain neutral. In the event 
of a purely aggressive war she wished to retain a free hand. 
By the formula proposed Germany wished the war "forced 
upon" her to be treated in exactly the same way as a war of 
defence. But since, as I believe I have proved, every aggres- 
sive war can be brought under the formula of a war "forced 
upon" a State (and would, without doubt, be so brought by 
Germany by the same methods as are employed to-day), Eng- 
land declined to put on the same basis the war of defence and 
the war "forced upon" a country. Had the English Gov- 
ernment complied with the German demand, England would 
have been pledged to neutrality in all German aggressive 
wars, and there would have been no case left in which she 
could have departed from the neutrality which she had un- 
dertaken by treaty. To this the English Government neither 
would nor could agree, and this is what the English Premier 
expressed in the words quoted above. 

The contrary assertion of the Chancellor rests on the 
illusory distinction between a war of aggression and a war 
"forced upon" a country — a distinction which in practice is 
without any significance. 

This is the true situation with regard to the Anglo-Ger- 
man negotiations for an understanding. These are the rea- 
sons why they were bound to fail, and why this failure con- 
stitutes a new item of guilt in Germany's account. 

An. Anglo-German Agreement Would Have Prevented 

the War 

The publications bearing on these negotiations are also of 
interest in another direction. They again prove how hon- 
ourably and sincerely Sir Edward Grey at that time, as, 
indeed, he had always done before and afterwards, sought 
for an understanding with Germany, a removal of the ten- 
sion existing between the Triple Entente and the Triple 
Alliance and a cessation of the pernicious competition in 
armaments. I will not reject the possibility that up to a cer- 



290 THE CRIME 

tain date at least the Chancellor, Herr von Bethmann Holl- 
weg, was animated by similar ideas. The difference be- 
tween the conditions in England and in Germany was un- 
fortunately this, that in England there were no Pan-English- 
men, no military and war-party, no reactionaries and Junk- 
ers, who laid subterranean mines against those in authority 
and thus counteracted the efforts for peace and understand- 
ing made by the leading statesmen. Mr. Churchill, the First 
Lord of the Admiralty, had no tendencies and desires other 
than those entertained by the Prime Minister, the Foreign 
Secretary and all the other members of the Cabinet. In 
England there was no Prince of the Royal Household who 
stood at the head of the party that intrigued for war and 
celebrated in his words, his writings and his actions a gay 
and a jolly war as the goal of his innermost longing. There 
was no defence or navy league which directed its efforts in 
the direction of the "inevitable" war as a steel-bath for the 
relaxed nerves of the nation, who were supposed to have 
become effeminate in the comfort of life and in the acquisi- 
tion of wealth. There was no leader among the authorita- 
tive parties who gave expression to an attitude of contemptu- 
ous refusal towards a political and naval understanding be- 
tween the two kindred nations. 1 No high admiral had the 

1 Even in April, 1917, after the war has lasted for thirty-three months, 
after the entry into the struggle of America and other countries hitherto 
neutral, after the proclamation of Wilson's war-aims which primarily 
represents as the aim of American intervention the establishment of a 
community of States for the organisation and enforcement of an endur- 
ing peace and, corresponding to this, a diminution of the armaments of 
individual States — even now after the upheaval of all these great events 
Bassermann, the leader of the National Liberal Party, can still write the 
following sentences : 

"I do not believe that the brotherhood of nations will come after 
the world-war. I believe the call will be : After the victory bind 
the helm faster. We shall have to support a heavy burden of 
armaments; a powerful army must protect us, and the completion 
of our fleet is a necessity. For these tasks a strong monarchy is, 
in my opinion, a surer means than a form of parliamentary Gov- 
ernment which never rests from party struggle. ... it was thus, 



ANGLO-GERMAN NEGOTIATIONS 291 

ear of the ruler or had at his disposal the influence of those 
surrounding the ruler to such an extent that he could con- 
stantly give priority to the further technical development of 
the costly mechanism of the navy as against all political and 
economic considerations. 

All these counter-currents against any action aiming at 
an Anglo-German understanding existed in Germany, but 
not in England. The Chancellor may honourably have de- 
sired a political understanding, which of course was only 
to be achieved by complying with England's chief object, by 
an agreement as to armaments. His efforts may have been 
frustrated on the one hand by the war-intriguers who de- 
sired war as such, and to whom as reactionaries nothing was 
less desirable than an understanding with democratic Eng- 
land, and on the other hand by those connected with the navy, 
to whom the unhampered further development of their tech- 
nical masterpiece was an object of passion and a necessary 
preparation for future naval world-power. Nevertheless, the 
charge must still be brought against Herr von Bethmann 
that he either did not attempt, or was unable, to overcome 
the inner resistance to his policy of an understanding, that 
he did not choose to demit his office rather than subordinate 
political to military interests. 

in struggle against the power of Parliament, that the Prussian army- 
was created, the glorious instrument of German unity. Inasmuch 
as we are a national party, do not let us overlook this important 
point of view." (National-liberate Rundschau, quoted from the 
Berliner Tageblatt, of April 17th, 191 7.) 

That is what is still written to-day by the leader of one of the most 
influential "liberal" parties ! It is possible to imagine how matters 
appear to the politicians who stand further to the right. Even if the 
continuation of this so-called assurance of peace, which is entirely of a 
one-sided military character, were in itself desirable, the fact that the 
new creation of a powerful army, the further extension of our navy, 
would fail on the sheer impossibility of imposing anew such a burden 
of armaments on the exhausted nations has not even yet been grasped 
by a liberal politician in Germany, a man who in the event of imperial 
policy turning in any way to the left would be amongst the first candi- 
dates for the office of a Minister. 



292 THE CRIME 

The pernicious results to which this unpardonable weak- 
ness in a statesman leads are seen in the present war. Had 
Herr von Bethmann in 191 2 defeated the Pan-German and 
militaristic opposition to an agreement as to armaments which 
was of value for both parties, this internal victory would 
have made it possible for him to rest satisfied with the prof- 
fered English guarantee against any aggressive war, and to 
give up the reservation of a German aggressive war under 
the title of a war "forced upon" Germany. The victory of 
the statesman over the military party would have mitigated 
the zeal and the success of the inciters to war in depriving 
them of the possibility of constantly increasing and strength- 
ening their arms of aggression. The victory of Bethmann, 
then, in 19 12 would have prevented his defeat, now, in July, 
1914. The Anglo-German agreement would have become a 
means of preventing the European war. The final conclu- 
sion of our observations is therefore that the German Chan- 
cellor remains responsible for the failure of the negotiations 
for an understanding in 1912, because, although originally 
perhaps animated by honourable intentions, he subordinated 
himself in the course of the negotiations to the views and 
the intentions of the military and the war party, exactly as 
he did in the critical days of July, 19 14. 

Metternich's Reports of February-March, 19 12 

Metternich's reports of February and March, 1912, pub- 
lished in the N orddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung of Septem- 
ber 8th, 191 5, confirm in every respect Grey's attitude as I 
have explained it in my book, page 101, following Cook. 
According to Metternich's report Grey emphasised England's 
earnest desire to live in peace and amity with Germany and 
also to give a firm form to this friendship, by a political and 
naval agreement without thereby calling in question the 
friendly relation which united England to France and Russia : 

His policy is directed to avoiding a renewed grouping of the 
Powers into two camps, and this will in time bear its fruits (Met- 
ternich's report of March 17th, 1912). 



ANGLO-GERMAN NEGOTIATIONS 293 

Grey rightly pointed out that an absolute pledge of neutral- 
ity — even with the addition relating to the war "forced 
upon" a State — had not ever been entered into by the Eng- 
lish Government with regard to France and Russia. If Ger- 
many insisted on such an obligation, but on the other hand 
desired to maintain for herself more or less a free hand with 
regard to the construction of her fleet, Grey observed : 

Any advance (by Germany) beyond the existing naval law 
would preclude . the English Government at this moment from 
entering into a political agreement with us (Metternich's report 
of March 29th, 1912). 

This report from our German Ambassador, immediately 
before negotiations were broken off, proves once more that 
the German Government was not prepared to make any sin- 
cere equivalent in the matter of naval construction, but re- 
served for themselves the right to advance further beyond 
the limits of the existing naval law. My assertion, for which 
I have endeavoured to adduce proof above, that the max- 
imum that Germany offered was merely a temporary re- 
tardation in naval construction, is thus confirmed. Had any 
definite restriction, either in the extent of the naval prep- 
aration or in the expenditure involved, been offered by 
Germany, the German Government would not have failed to 
emphasise in plain words this important counter-offer. This, 
however, has never been done, not even in the Chancellor's 
speech of August 19th, 191 5. From this it follows, as from 
all the other facts of the case, that Germany, under the pres- 
sure of its naval experts and the enthusiasts for sea-power 
who are concentrated in the German Navy League, desired to 
retain a free hand for the further development of her navy, 
and that thus she made any political and naval agreement 
with England impossible. 

The negotiations thus remained without result. Both sides 
remained free to continue their fatal competition in arma- 
ments. But even this disappointment did not discourage 
Grey. He expressed to Metternich the hope that in spite of 
the failure of the present negotiations a further attempt 



294 THE CRIME 

might be made to reach an understanding on colonial and 
territorial questions, and that when such an understanding 
had in time exercised its effect on public opinion in both coun- 
tries the question of a political agreement and of an agree- 
ment as to armaments might again be approached (Metter- 
nich's report of March 29th, 1912). 

Thus, notwithstanding their lack of success, the Anglo- 
German negotiations for an understanding did not end on 
a dissonant note, but with a propitious outlook into the 
future, which later on became a reality in the common work 
in the cause of peace carried on during the Balkan crisis and 
in the conclusion of agreements with regard to Asia Minor, 
the Baghdad line, etc. Grey's action during the negotiations 
of 1912 and during the years that followed until the out- 
break of the war proves in every particular phase that the 
English statesman sincerely sought, with all the means at 
his disposal, for peace and friendship with Germany, and 
that he is not responsible for the failure of his efforts. 

Haldane 

Herr Schiemann, the man of the "scientific method of in- 
vestigation," does not in fact consider the most important 
point at issue in the Anglo-German negotiations. He writes 
a pamphlet for the purpose of proving How England Pre~ 
vented an Understanding with Germany, and does not de- 
vote so much as a word to the central point of the question, 
the German addition with regard to the war "forced upon" 
them. For him the matter is disposed of by mentioning the 
English proposal, which he states is deceitful and Machia- 
vellian, and he further seeks more particularly to cast sus- 
picion upon it by referring to Haldane's speech of July 
5th, 191 5, which he likewise garbles. 1 

The sense of Haldane's speech, which I have before me 
only in the form of a report in a German newspaper, was 
unambiguously to the effect that on the occasion of his visit 
to Berlin in February, 19 12, he gained the impression that 

1 Slanderer, page 47. 



ANGLO-GERMAN NEGOTIATIONS 295 

there was an influential war-party in Germany, who were 
themselves pressing for war on the pretext that Germany 
was menaced by an attack from England and her friends in 
the Entente. These war-intriguers had unfortunately ob- 
tained the upper hand over the great mass of the pacific 
German people, and as they had by their influence caused the 
failure of the negotiations then undertaken with a view to 
arriving at an understanding, so also they had brought about 
the outbreak of the present war. The experiences and the 
observations which he had made in February, 1912, and 
which had been confirmed in March by the failure of the 
negotiations for an understanding, had then induced him 
and his colleagues in the Ministry to continue further their 
preparations by land and by sea, since it was clear that 
Berlin was not to be moved to an effective restriction of her 
armaments. 

This is what Schiemann calls an "extremely important 
confession on the part of Haldane," a confession of a "war- 
policy." In reality it was a confession of the hopelessness 
of arriving at an understanding with Germany on the ques- 
tion of armaments on the basis of a political agreement. 
That such an undertaking had no prospect of success was 
clear from all the negotiations which Haldane conducted with 
the Emperor, the Grand Admiral von Tirpitz, the Chancellor 
and other leading personalities. The Chancellor sought a 
political agreement which would guarantee him England's 
neutrality in the widest sense ; the Grand Admiral von Tirpitz 
and the Emperor William themselves declared with the utmost 
definiteness that "in return for an acceptable political agree- 
ment there could be no reduction in the increased naval pro- 
gramme, but that there might be some temporary retardation" 
(Cook, page 30). Need it cause surprise that after these ex- 
periences Lord Haldane returned with the resolution that the 
English Government must now also be left to make further 
military preparations? I have already pointed out in my book 
the curious fact that just two days before Haldane' s arrival in 
Berlin a large new increase in the navy and the army had been 
announced on the occasion of the opening of the Reichstag. 



296 THE CRIME 

Germany would not even allow herself to be moved from this 
new increase which was not yet definitely decided upon. Need 
it cause surprise that after his return Haldane energetically 
intervened for the extension of English preparations by land 
and by sea, notwithstanding the continuation of the negotia- 
tions between Grey and Metternich, the success of which must 
have appeared to Lord Haldane, of all men, to be more than 
doubtful after what he had observed in Berlin? 

Thus the argument inferred from Haldane' s speech of July 
5th, 19 1 5, for the existence of an English war-policy also falls 
to the ground. 

Voluntary Reduction of Naval Construction — Naval 

Holiday 

How much the English Government, even after the failure 
of the negotiations for an understanding, sought an agreement 
with Germany appears from their attempts to move Germany 
to enter into reasonable paths to the advantage of both peo- 
ples as seen in the course they actually pursued in the question 
of armaments. I refer to the method adopted in 1906 by the 
Government of Campbell-Bannerman of making a voluntary 
reduction in the construction of ships already approved in the 
hope of moving Germany to adopt a similiar step. The at- 
tempt in 1906 failed. Germany not only did not follow the 
good example, but bluntly refused any discussion of the ques- 
tion of armaments at the Hague Conference which was then 
pending. This did not deter Churchill, the First Lord of the 
Admiralty, from putting forward twice — in 1912 and in 19 13 
— the well-known proposal of a naval holiday, in promising 
that any retardation or reduction in German construction 
should be followed by a proportional retardation or reduction 
in English construction. Churchill even went so far as to agree 
to a complete cessation in naval construction in any given 
year, if Germany pledged herself to a similar course. 

As a matter of course Germany neither answered nor ac- 
quiesced in this proposal, and as the German Government 



ANGLO-GERMAN NEGOTIATIONS 29? 

passed it over in silence, so to-day the German war-Press is 
also silent on the subject. In Schiemann's pamphlet on the un- 
derstanding between England and Germany I am unable to find 
a single word on the naval holiday. In the Slanderer 
pamphlet I find it simply mentioned (page 65), but no detailed 
account or explanation is given. How does the disciple of the 
truth, who accuses me of slander, justify this unparalleled 
suppression ? Whatever judgment he may pass on Churchill's 
proposal, however he may falsify or distort it, he is not in any 
case justified in passing it over in silence. 

The proposal of the naval holiday represents the crowning 
act in the efforts of the English Government to put a stop 
to the competition in armaments. It rests on the acute states- 
manlike idea that if two people cannot come to an agreement 
together, this is no reason why they should ruin each other. 
The English proposal did not require any negotiations, but 
merely the adoption of a corresponding course of action by 
the other side. It was elastic in every direction. It could be 
restricted to definite types of ship, to a greater or shorter pe- 
riod of time, to a diminution of naval expenditure, in short 
to every possible individual aspect of the question of arma- 
ments, and since the English Admiralty were ready for any 
modus Vivendi, it depended merely on Germany to determine 
the nature and the scope of this modus. As so often hap- 
pens, in this question of vital importance for the two nations, 
it was all a question of the first step. If this were taken, 
the favourable consequences for the future would have auto- 
matically followed. This first step Germany declined, in the 
same way as she had caused the failure of all the earlier 
negotiations for an understanding by her exorbitant demands 
and the worthless concessions she offered in return. This 
again is a heavy debit item in Germany's account. Because 
it is so, and because any perversion of English intentions in 
this question is impossible, the incident is either suppressed 
or, as happens in the case of Schiemann, it is passed over 
with the slanderous assertion that this proposal of a naval 
holiday, like so much more, was also intended merely to keep 



298 THE CRIME 

alive in Germany the illusory idea that she had nothing to 
fear from England. 



I should like to conclude this section with the words which 
summarise in a leading thought the whole of Grey's policy 
of understanding from 1905 to 19 14, a policy which obtained 
final expression in his celebrated peace proposal of July 30th, 
1914 (Blue Book No. 101). I refer to the words of peace 
with which Grey in his speech in the House of Commons on 
July 10th, 19 12, a few months after the failure of the nego- 
tiations for an understanding, opened a prospect into a better 
future for Europe : 

"Whatever separate diplomatic groups there are, I do 
not think that ought to prevent frankness in the ex- 
change of views when questions of mutual interest arise, 
and if that takes place separate diplomatic groups need 
not necessarily be in opposing diplomatic camps." 

I would, however, recall to Herr Schiemann, the German 
Deroulede, the words which Jules Cambon shortly before his 
departure from Berlin on August 2nd, 19 14, spoke to Paul 
Krause, the representative of the Lokalanzeiger, and which are 
applicable to no one better than to the Rreuzseitung professor : 

Quelle guerre stupide! Quelle guerre idiote! Do not speak 
to me of conferences ; no conference can lead to anything unless 
we succeed in all countries in muzzling a certain section of the 
Press whose mischievous influence is responsible for all modern 
international conflicts. I only know of one kind of conference 
which might produce something that would be extremely use- 
ful, and that would be an international congress which would put 
an end to exaggeration and excitement in the discussion of in- 
ternational affairs. For the Governments always find means of 
arriving at an understanding so long as the Press does not poison 
public opinion. I am well aware that it is a difficult task to 
achieve this without violating the liberty of the Press ; but the 
Hague Conference will not be able to create real guarantees of 
peace until it finds means of striking this evil at the root. 



ANGLO-GERMAN NEGOTIATIONS 299 

In these words a profound truth, worthy of being taken to 
heart, was uttered by the French statesman who, as the Ger- 
man newspaper reporter confirms, never wished for war, but 
always laboured honourably for the maintenance of peace. 
In these words he indicated and branded those who are really 
guilty of the murder of the nations. It is not we who have 
always placed our ringer on this wound, who have always 
pointed to the. fearful consequences of professional and habit- 
ual incitement, it is not we who are the traitors to our country. 
No, it is the Derouledes, the Derouledes on both sides. 
Amongst us it is primarily the man who, swimming in 
safety in the stream of public opinion, dares to deny the love 
of the Fatherland in those who at the greatest personal sac- 
rifices and dangers, struggling against gigantic waves of 
mud and slander, have wished to tell the German people the 
truth — the truth whose mutilation and distortion has for 
years been the dishonourable pursuit of those who have in- 
trigued for war. These true traitors to their country, who 
have nowhere raged more mischievously against the well- 
being of their own people than in Germany, must be made 
innocuous in future and handed over to the punishment they 
deserve. Only thus is an enduring peace and an understand- 
ing possible among the nations who all, without exception, 
are desirous of peace. 



CHAPTER VI 
THE SPOKESMEN OF MILITANT GERMANY 

Bernhardt 

As I have already pointed out in an earlier passage, the at- 
tempt is now made in Germany to shake off General von 
Bernhardi in every possible way, inasmuch as he chattered 
much too indiscreetly out of school and too openly revealed 
the aggressive plans of the German Imperialists. Herr Schie- 
mann twists and wriggles to get rid of the inconvenient Gen- 
eral ; on one page he maintains that Bernhardi's writings were 
inconvenient and unwelcome to the Government because they 
foresaw the misuse to which they might be put by malicious 
minds; on another page he confirms that the bold leader of 
the Imperialists had rightly seen and recognised the position 
of affairs, and that his brave books had rightly pointed to 
the necessity of "seizing the sword before the conspiracy 
which threatened Germany proceeded to action." Elsewhere 
again, he seeks to explain Bernhardi's writings by reference 
to the time in which they originated, the European situation 
in 1 9 12 when "we would have to reckon sooner or later with 
a coalition of England, Russia and France, the aim of which 
would be at least the political humiliation which would be 
followed as a logical consequence by the destruction of Ger- 
many's power." 

Herr Schiemann here commits an error which, like all his 
errors, is an intentional one; he confuses the Imperialism of 
Bernhardi with Preventionism. I recommended him to read 
no more than the quotations from Bernhardi given in my book 
(pages 26-32) — he might even content himself with the mere 
headings of the chapters — and he will find that there is noth- 
ing of which Bernhardi was less apprehensive than a coali- 

300 



MILITANT GERMAN SPOKESMEN 301 

tion of the Entente Powers for the "destruction of Germany's 
power," that on the contrary such a coalition would have been 
highly welcome to him, since it would have removed from 
Germany the necessity of herself acting as an agent provoca- 
teur, and of provoking the war for world-power which in his 
view was necessary for Germany's development. Bernhardi 
is an unadulterated Imperialist, an Imperialist without any 
figleaf. He has no fear of war; on the contrary, he longs 
for it as a necessary means for the fulfilment of Germany's 
historical mission. Herr Schiemann is also an Imperialist, 
and precisely in the foreign Press, as I have already pointed 
out, he is described as the journalistic leader of the German 
Imperialists. But, as distinguished from the honourable, 
plunging General, he is a shamefaced Imperialist, who nerv- 
ously seeks to hide his shame under the figleaf of Preven- 
tionism. If we had to choose between the honourable and 
dishonourable Imperialists, I for my part should prefer the 
former. They at least show character; they say openly what 
they want, and in openly acknowledging their own aggressive 
intentions they disdain any deception of the German people 
as to the alleged aggressive intentions of the others. 

THE FOUR GROUPS OF THE DEFENDERS OF GERMANY 

The defenders of Germany might be divided into the fol- 
lowing four categories : 

Upholders of the Doctrine of Defence 

I. At the head of these stand the Rulers, the Governments, 
the official and semi-official Press not only in the capit?l but 
also the provincial Press supplied from Berlin. In the train 
of Herr von Bethmann Hollweg and Dr. HelfTerich, the 
leaders of this party, may be found the largest section of the 
so-called Liberals, of the Democratic Party (or what was so 
until the war), of the right wing of the Social Democratic 
Party who are now the Social Imperialists, and above all, 
unfortunately, until the present day the overwhelming ma- 
jority of the German people. All these persons and groups 



302 THE CRIME 

still maintain intact the thesis of the hostile attack and of the 
war of defence, in the truth of which, however, it is only the 
flock and not the shepherds who believe. The standpoint of 
this group is in principle incontestable, since every nation has 
the natural right and the duty to defend itself against ag- 
gression. The error here rests on the question of fact; the 
attack was carried out not against Germany, but by Germany. 

Imperialists 

2. The Imperialists. This group is organised in the "Pan- 
German Union," in the "German Defence League," the "Ger- 
man Navy League," and similar bodies. Its most conspicu- 
ous leaders and propagandists are generals and admirals, 
either retired or on half-pay; their groups count hundreds of 
thousands of organised members; apart from the Alldeutsche 
Blatter, their influence in the Press is less expressed in their 
own organs than in the influence which they exercise on an 
important and much-read section of German newspapers and 
magazines. Almost the whole of the Conservative, the free 
Conservative, the agrarian, and a large part of the National 
Liberal Press stood, and still stands, at the disposal of Ger- 
man Imperialism, which primarily, of course, comprises the 
military and Junker circles, but also makes its influence felt 
in the Liberal and Democratic and recently even in the Social 
Democratic strata of society. 1 

That the Press connected with the manufacture of muni- 
tions in the provinces of the Rhine and in Westphalia should 
act in concert with the Imperialists is self-evident. It is the 
great manufacturers of armaments and their unions who have 
supplied the abundant means with which the Pan-German 
Imperialistic agitation has for years been conducted in word 
and in writing. Pan-Germanism and Imperialism have more 

1 For confirmation of this the reader should refer to the comprehensive 
collection of facts contained in the distinguished work of S. Grumbach, 
which only appeared after the completion of my work, Annexationist 
Germany (Payot & Co., Lausanne, 1917). [Abridged English Edition: 
Germany's Annexationist Aims: Murray.] 



MILITANT GERMAN SPOKESMEN 303 

and more overleaped many of the former party barriers, and 
have united in a war-chorus the Kreuzzeitung, the Post, the 
Deutsche Tageszeitung and the Tdgliche Rundschau with the 
Milnchener Neueste Nachrichten, the Lokalanzeiger, the 
Magdeburgische Zeitung, the Kolnische Zeitung, the Rhein- 
isch-W estfdlische Zeitung, etc. I am not speaking here of the 
period of the war, which for reasons which are quite explica- 
ble has produced an unnatural field grey uniformity in the 
whole of public opinion, but of the prolonged development 
before the war. I shall in a later passage illustrate the prog- 
ress of this development to an apparently complete national 
harmony during the war. 

Preventionists 

3. The third category of the defenders of Germany is rep- 
resented by the preventionists. I have already demonstrated 
above the reprehensibility in principle of their views as well 
as the absence in fact of any presupposition of prevention. 
There are certainly very few persons in Germany who are 
among the "Empire-Builders" and who yet believe in an in- 
tended attack by the Entente Powers on Germany. There 
are innumerable indisputable facts which speak too plainly 
against the thesis of aggression to make it possible to admit 
the good faith of those who advance it. In my book and in 
this work I have collected a large part of these facts, and 
therefore it is unnecessary that I should here return to the 
subject. The course of the war itself proves the untenabil- 
ity of the doctrine of aggression; in particular England, the 
alleged instigator of the conspiracy, was so little prepared 
for a war against the first military Power of the world that, 
as is well known, it was only after the war had lasted a year 
and a half that she began to think of a serious organisation 
and extension of her territorial army on the basis of compul- 
sory service; that before the outbreak of the war she had not 
even prepared an effective protection against aerial and sub- 
marine attacks. To account for the military inferiority of 
the enemy (in the first period of the war) it is true that they 



304 THE CRIME 

have now prepared in Germany the excuse that their oppo- 
nents had not intended to strike until two years later, and 
that until then they wished to complete their preparations. 
That there is no evidence whatever in support of this asser- 
tion, that on the contrary the maintenance of peace was then, 
and later, the object most ardently pursued by those who are 
now the enemies of Germany, are facts which, I believe, I 
have sufficiently demonstrated in my book and in the course 
of this work. 

Nevertheless it cannot be denied that a large section of the 
German people have been taken in by the deceitful view : we 
were to be attacked later, and we were therefore bound to 
anticipate this attack at the right time. The great bulk of 
those in the lower and middle classes in Germany believe in 
the war of defence, which it was more easy to make compre- 
hensible to them, and for which they could more successfully 
be stirred to enthusiasm than for a preventive war. The high 
classes, however, the upper middle classes, the intellectuals, 
professors, barristers, doctors, artists, etc., all those who 
could not be impressed by the crude artillery of the preda- 
tory attack, but were accessible to the subtler suggestion of a 
devilish plan in the future — these people believe in the evil 
intentions of their opponents and praise their foreseeing Gov- 
ernment for having anticipated these dangers. People of this 
sort, who are ordinarily little concerned with politics, do not 
enter into a more detailed study of the more remote antece- 
dents of the war; they remember that they have heard in the 
papers of King Edward's "encirclement," of Delcasse's re- 
vengeful designs, of the party of the Grand Dukes at the Rus- 
sian Court whose delight was in war, of the intrigues of the 
Montenegrin women and other similar blood-curdling stories 
— and that is enough for their modest needs in the matter of 
political instruction. 

Grey-headed men of learning, who have spent half a life- 
time in deciphering a few monumental inscriptions in Latin, 
in order to obtain for themselves and others definite informa- 
tion regarding the life and the deeds of some Roman Consul 
or Egyptian Pharaoh who died thousands of years ago, never 



MILITANT GERMAN SPOKESMEN 305 

think of devoting an odd hour to the study of the documents 
relating to the history of most recent times which intimately 
affects their vital interests — indeed, they would consider such 
an occupation as a waste of time and trouble. The greatest 
masters of the German world of culture are political illit- 
erates. The most eminent mathematicians have not yet 
grasped the secrets of the political multiplication table. Pio- 
neers in embryology have remained on the intellectual level 
of an embryo in the political history of their country. Only 
thus is it possible to explain the famous appeals of the "intel- 
lectuals" with their ignorance of the actual course of events 
and the consequent untenability of their conclusions. The 
reason for this divergency between scientific knowledge and 
political ignorance, which appears only in Germany, is to be 
found, apart from certain qualities inherent in the German 
Philistine of culture, in the lack of popular influence on the 
Government, in the exclusion of a parliamentary system. 

Nearly all those professors who are constantly speaking of 
the war, of the question of guilt, of war-aims, etc. — acting 
on the motto "Everyone makes as great a fool of himself as 
he can" — nearly all these inquirers into origins have refrained 
from approaching the origins of this war with the zeal which 
usually marks their inquiries. The diplomatic material has 
for them remained completely, or almost completely, a book 
with seven seals. They read the foreign Press only as re- 
produced and elucidated in their daily paper; they only learn 
of what happens in other countries in the same prejudiced 
form. And thus it happens that it is precisely among the 
educated classes that a few catch-words influence public opin- 
ion, and that it is just in these circles that inventions like that 
of the war of prevention find the most credulous hearers. As 
anyone in Germany may convince himself, the belief in a 
preventive war is the special privilege of the most educated 
classes of the German people, whose members are accus- 
tomed to retort to the astonished questioner, without entering 
into any further discussion or proof : "It is, after all, better 
that we should now be in Russia, Belgium and France than 
that the Cossacks should be in Berlin in two years' time." 



306 THE CRIME 



Preventive Imperialists 

4. The fourth category of the defenders of Germany 
might be called the "half-and-half party" ; they are half pre- 
ventionists and half imperialists. They are not to be con- 
fused with the pure imperialists who assume a preventive 
covering only from a feeling of shame and expediency. The 
half-and-half politicians strive for a position of world-power 
for Germany, if possible by peaceful development, but if needs 
must be, by the violence of war. As they fear and foresee that 
their aim, like every Imperialistic effort, may provoke friction 
with competing Powers and may lead to warlike complica- 
tions, they are not averse from exploiting, for the purpose of 
striking the blow, a particularly favourable moment, when 
Germany has the upper hand in a political and military sense. 
They are thus distinguished from the pure imperialists of 
the school of Bernhardi, inasmuch as they do not regard war 
as a beneficent "iron cure," but as a necessary evil, which is 
to be avoided as far as possible. They are distinguished from 
the preventionists, inasmuch as they do not believe in a future 
attack by hostile Powers directed to the annihilation of Ger- 
many, but only in a possible or probable hampering of Ger- 
many's Imperialistic development. This complicated variety 
is, of course, not represented in the people, either in the higher 
or in the lower strata ; it is a species which only appears among 
the "Empire-Builders." Paul Rohrbach and his adherents 
appear to me as characteristic representatives of these pre- 
ventive Imperialists. 



Of these four categories of Germans, it is only those who 
believe in the war of defence and the pure Imperialists who 
are honest. Among the upholders of the doctrine of defence 
this applies, of course, not to those who merely make use of 
the thesis of defence as the most appropriate instrument to 
the attainment of their ends (that is to say, the leaders and 
rulers), but only to those who really believe in it, that is 



MILITANT GERMAN SPOKESMEN 307 

to say, the great bulk of the middle and lower classes of the 
people. 

Among the preventionists those are honest who believe in an 
intended attack; those are dishonest who, against their better 
knowledge, have instilled this belief into their adherents. 

The smallest measure of honesty is found among the pre- 
ventive-imperialists, this small group of the initiated who 
stand in general on a lower moral level than the pure im- 
perialists. These opportunists in popular deception adopt no 
uniformity in tactics; they are accustomed, as the occasion 
may require, to make use of the theory of defence or of the 
theory of prevention; at one moment they portray to the 
German people the fact of the present attack by the enemy, 
at another they represent the danger of future annihilation. 
But they are constantly silent as to their true aims, which in 
the last analysis are directed to war, because these imperial- 
istic ideas of extension of power would appear to the great 
mass of the people incomprehensible and unworthy of any 
sacrifice in substance or in life. Of course the leaders of this 
preventive-imperialist movement are themselves quite aware 
of the fact that we were neither attacked nor threatened 
either with any attack or even with any economic restriction 
or restraint; they know that it is much truer to say that we 
were enjoying a period of uninterrupted economic prosperity, 
quite phenomenal in character, and that it was only their 
schemes for hegemony and world-dominion that provoked 
the resistance and the opposition of competing countries. 

It is particularly when contrasted with these half-and-half 
politicians that there is something attractive in the brutal can- 
dour of the honesty of the pure imperialists, who are to a 
large extent drawn from the Prussian Junker and military 
classes. These East and West Prussian and Pomeranian sol- 
diers and agrarians do not belie their origin and their history 
(it may be remarked, in passing, that they are wrong in af- 
fecting to be of ancient German extraction, since to a large 
extent they have Slavonic blood in their veins, as many of 
their names ending in "itz" and "ow" indicate). For them 



308 THE CRIME 

there has always been only one object of pursuit: the en- 
forcement of the privileges and the advantages of their caste 
in political and in economic matters. They were not always 
by any means the loyal vassals of the Margraves and the 
Electors of Brandenburg, those Hohenzollerns who, as South 
German Burgraves of Nurnberg, notwithstanding the impe- 
rial investiture, appeared only as parvenus and upstarts to the 
hereditary landed proprietors of Prussia. Everyone knows 
the difficulties which the rulers of Brandenburg experienced 
in subjecting this stubborn Junkerdom to their will and to 
political order, and how the Quitzows, the Rochows, and all 
the rest of them continued from their castles to devise revo- 
lutions against their new masters, and that it was only by 
siege artillery that they could be compelled to obedience. 

This spirit of revolutionary independence is still alive in 
the Prussian Junkers, and it is to it that they are indebted 
for their success in the history of Prussia and of Germany. 
Any political and economic development was and is right in 
their eyes, if it proves to their advantage. Absolutism or 
parliamentary system, Prussianism or German Empire, it is 
all the same to them, if their thirst for profit is thereby sat- 
isfied. 

May our monarch's will be done 

If his will and ours are one. 1 

As soon as a Brandenburg Margrave or Elector ventured 
to oppose the will and the interests of the Junkers there was 
evoked a violent opposition, which shrank from no weapon 
of resistance, not even, from revolutionary force. As against 
this perverse Junker oligarchy even a Prussian King had to 
raise the sovereignty of the State as a rocher de bronze. Even 
a Bismarck was called upon to fight the most bitter struggles 
of his life against those of his own class, the Prussian Junk- 
ers. During the first ten years after the creation of the Ger- 
man Empire, when the great statesman appeared definitely 
to have departed from the reactionary conservative views of 

1 [Und der Konig absolut 

Wenn er unsern Willen tut!jf 



MILITANT GERMAN SPOKESMEN 309 

his past, the Kreuzzeitung Party persecuted him as a renegade 
with the most poisonous weapons of insinuation and slander, 
resorting to the weapons of cunning in place of the earlier 
open and direct weapons of revolution. The German Empire 
was at first an abomination to the Prussian Junkers. They 
believed that the royal complaisance was still for a long time 
secured within the narrower bounds of the Prussian military 
monarchy with its Junker Parliament, and so long as their 
Prussian King did what they wished they had not the least 
desire to exchange him for a German Emperor who, as they 
well realised, must, in Uhland's well-known phrase, "be 
anointed with a drop of democratic oil." This explains their 
original aversion for the German Empire and their violent 
assault on the creator of the German Reichstag and of uni- 
versal equal suffrage. At a later date they became reconciled 
to the new conditions and made themselves quite comfortable 
within the German Empire also. Bismarck's conversion to a 
policy of agricultural protection, the constant increase in the 
agrarian tariff under successive Chancellors, none of whom 
dared to kick against the pricks (even a Chancellor without 
an ear or a stalk of corn had to confess himself as a good 
agrarian), the unfettered position of power within the Em- 
pire which the Junkers derived from their predominance in 
Prussia, from the reactionary constitutional position of the 
leading confederate States, and from the personal union of 
high Prussian and Imperial offices — all these circumstances, 
which preserved their influence and their social position and 
constantly improved their economic situation, finally recon- 
ciled the Junkers to the Empire, according to the proverb: 
ubi bene, ibi patria. 

Gradually, however, peace began to be too enduring for 
them. The authority of their class requires from time to 
time to be renewed by a "jolly war." It is in the soldier's 
profession that they chiefly excel, and it is there that they 
prove themselves to be the most meritorious class among the 
citizens. When the call of war resounds, the arts of peace 
are silent; then the merchant, the manufacturer, the exporter, 



310 THE CRIME 

the man of learning, in fact every civil profession, becomes 
subordinate to the soldier, and not only do the old Junker 
families bind new wreaths of glory around their escutcheons, 
but new ingots find their way into their safes as a result of 
the gigantic increase in the price of all agrarian produce, 
which cannot be imported from abroad and must consequently 
be acquired at any price within the country. 

What in the eyes of these imperialists is the imperium, the 
domination of the world? It is for them merely a means, 
merely an emblem, to bestow a new period of prosperity on 
their own imperium, that is to say, their domination in Prus- 
sian Germany and their social and economic authority. War 
as such, with its repression of all civil rights and interests, 
with the glorious distinction it confers on military ability, 
with the strict regulation and control of all the impulses of 
civil and human liberty, with the suppression of all guaran- 
teed constitutional rights, accompanied by the economic en- 
couragement of the agrarian class (to whom it is exclusively 
due that the nation is saved from starvation, and who must 
therefore be protected and encouraged in future, even more 
than in the past) — it is war as such, as an end in itself, as a 
means to train the nation in all that is good and fair, all that 
is lofty and worthy of pursuit, that constitutes the ideal of 
our Prussian Junkers. That is their Imperialism, which they 
openly confess under that name, but its inner motives they 
prudently conceal. 

Nevertheless, among the inspirers of war this powerful 
group is still the most "sympathetic," because it is relatively 
the most honest. Only a few of this class conceal themselves 
behind the theories of defence or prevention. Most of them 
manifest undisguisedly their enthusiasm for war "for the 
sake of war," and are proud that at last they have reached 
the end of the path to war which for years, notwithstanding 
contempt and ridicule, notwithstanding opposition from above 
and from below, they have undeviatingly pursued. 

In all the other groups of the war-intriguers and of the 
chauvinists the tendencies and the methods adopted are much 



MILITANT GERMAN SPOKESMEN 311 

less sharply marked than in the case of the Prussian Junkers 
and militarists. In the others the doctrines of defence, pre- 
ventionism, and preventive-imperialism are constantly inter- 
woven; even in the same speech or the same article of any 
of the spokesmen of these various classes all these keys are 
touched alike according to what at the moment is to be proved. 
The crudest contradictions are in this way to be found in the 
chauvinistic nationalistic literature. On the one page the war 
for world-power is advanced as the unconditional postulate 
for the internal and external development of the German peo- 
ple (Imperialism). On the next page we find depicted the 
conspiracy of the enemy to compass the speedy annihilation 
of Germany (Preventionism). On a third page the ascent 
to world-power is described as our historical mission; but 
as this mission cannot be fulfilled without war, war is de- 
clared to be necessary (Preventive-imperialism). And to 
all these motives there is, of course, added after the outbreak 
of war, as the mainspring and the Leitmotiv of the doctrine 
of defence, the duty and the necessity of "defending home 
and hearth against a predatory attack." 

Our chauvinists have thus at their disposal a large selec- 
tion of "modes," almost greater in number than the appren- 
tice David could enumerate in the Meister singer, for these 
four main methods permit of a wealth of permutations and 
combinations; they can, as occasion requires, be combined 
to form a pot-pourri from which the trumpets of war re- 
sound in every register. That the most appalling dissonances 
arise in the process, that the one theory completely disposes 
of the other, that more particularly the war of defence — the 
trumpet which is blown the hardest — completely excludes the 
possibility of the imperialistic and preventionist war, are facts 
which are quite within the range of observation of the wily 
shepherds, although they refrain from so informing the cred- 
ulous flock. If the attack has now taken place (doctrine of 
defence), we had no occasion to anticipate it at a later date 
(preventionism). If we have been attacked, no more need 
be said to show that we were justified in undertaking the 
war. If, however, we were only going to be attacked, it has 



312 THE CRIME 

still to be proved that we were justified in attacking, t 
have elsewhere shown that this cannot be proved, or at any 
rate that proof has not yet been produced. The two hy- 
potheses — of the war of defence and of prevention — cannot 
be true at the same time, since they are mutually exclusive. 
Anyone therefore who advances the two assertions simul- 
taneously contradicts himself and undermines both theories. 
He who endeavours to couple or unite the war of defence 
or the war of prevention with the imperialistic war entangles 
himself in even greater contradictions. Whoever supports 
the theory of the war of imperialistic expansion, in other 
words, admits aggression. But whoever admits aggression 
cannot speak of defence or prevention. All these explana- 
tions are thus mutually contradictory, and form an unpalata- 
ble ragout, by partaking of which every sound stomach is 
bound to be upset. 



THE GERMAN CHAUVINISTS 

In the following pages I propose to give a series of utter- 
ances from German chauvinistic speeches and writings, de- 
signed to show that the European war has for years been the 
goal to which our Pan-Germans, Chauvinists, Imperialists 
and Militarists have deliberately and intentionally directed 
their energies; that General von Bernhardi was only one 
among many, one among countless others, and that it is only 
as a typical example of a ruthless plunger that he merits 
special consideration. The utterances collected below all date 
from the period before the war; they move without exception 
on imperialist and preventionist lines, that is to say, the train 
of thought which they represent is that the war, no matter 
on what grounds, must be begun as an aggressive war by 
Germany and her allies. The influence of the circles from 
which these utterances emanate was, until the outbreak of 
war, underestimated in Germany, in contrast to foreign coun- 
tries. And as German chauvinism was underestimated, so 



MILITANT GERMAN SPOKESMEN 313 

that of foreign countries was overestimated. French chau- 
vinism, which was a favourite subject of discussion in Ger- 
many, was practically powerless in France ; the few nationalist 
and Bonapartist jingoes, who attracted attention on the far 
side of the French frontier by their speeches and writings, 
had in their own country no semblance of authoritative influ- 
ence on the Government. The dominant parties, the Rad- 
icals, the Socialists and the Radical-Socialists, were absolutely 
pacific in sentiment, and more particularly on the outbreak of 
the present war they gave practical proof of their love of 
peace by the fact, as I have elsewhere shown, that they in- 
fluenced and guided every individual step taken by the Gov- 
ernment for the promotion of peace. 

With us in Germany the reverse was the case. Here Chau- 
vinism from the outside was perhaps less conspicuous, but 
it was for this reason all the more powerful within and 
beneath the surface. The activity of the "Pan-German 
Union" throughout a quarter of a century has borne rich 
fruit. To this Union there belonged a series of eminent men 
from the leading classes of the German people, not merely 
generals and admirals like Keim, Liebert, Breusing and 
others, but chief burgomasters, large manufacturers, uni- 
versity professors, territorial magnates, high judicial officials, 
parliamentarians and editors. A staff of capable orators and 
effective writers were at the disposal of the Pan-Germans. 
In all kinds of affiliated societies, in the "German Defence 
League" and the "German Navy League," in the "Young- 
German Union," and in the great number of German War 
Leagues, indeed even in the German gymnasia of black-red- 
golden memory, they had their leaders and their recruiting 
officers. A number of widely-read newspapers disseminated 
their ideas in the higher ranks of civil society as well as in 
the middle classes of the nation. Even semi-official organs 
of the Government opened their columns to them, when from 
time to time the Government were concerned to send a douche 
of cold water in one direction or another. But above all 
they had the ear of those in power; the Court and the mili- 
tary circles, the immediate entourage of the Emperor, were 



314 THE CRIME 

permeated with those who were in open or concealed connec- 
tion with the Pan-German Union and who acted as links be- 
tween the Union and the Court. The chief of the Imperial 
Admiralty moved entirely in the paths of the Pan-Germans; 
this is the explanation of his temporary opposition to the 
Wilhelmstrasse, but it also explains the strong support which 
for eighteen years has made his position impregnable. 1 

The Crown Prince 

The chief pillar of support of the Union and of its efforts 
was, as we know, the German Crown Prince. This young 
hero of war, who was haunted by the laurels of his ancestors, 
longed for war for his own glory and for the greater increase 
of the power of the Empire over which he is one day destined 
to rule as German Emperor. In my book I have endeavoured 
to show, by reference to his own writings, in what an ata- 

1 While this manuscript was in preparation the Grand Admiral von 
Tirpitz has been relieved of his office. The reason for this is to be found 
in the opposition between the followers of Bethmann and of Tirpitz in 
the submarine question. Tirpitz has gone, but the Tirpitzians remain. 
When the "naval victory" over England became known, the enthusiastic 
cry of "Tirpitz! Tirpitz!" which resounded in the Reichstag from those 
on the right, from the National Liberals and the Centre, as well as 
other similar manifestations, prove that the spirit of the great "torpedist" 
continues to inspire his adherents and that his role is in no way exhausted. 
So long as the adherents of the Medici hastened through the streets of 
Florence exclaiming "Palle, palle!" the influence of the princely mer- 
chant family remained unbroken; it could still work its way back to 
power, until finally it became the mistress of Tuscany. 

Meanwhile, in the beginning of 1917, the unrestricted submarine war- 
fare has been decided upon, entirely in correspondence with the wishes 
and the aims of the Tirpitzians, with the result that Germany's moral 
and material isolation in the world has been completed. In view of the 
brutal violation of the assurances given her by the German Government, 
America has abandoned the role of the peace-maker, and has entered the 
ranks of Germany's enemies. Other neutral States have followed Amer- 
ica's example, and it may be presumed that more will follow. The 
Tirpitz party can again boast of another glorious internal victory, namely, 
that the absent Grand Admiral has shown himself to be stronger than 
the present Chancellor. 



MILITANT GERMAN SPOKESMEN 315 

vistic circle of ideas this young man moves. One wonders 
whether he still believes that "the sympathies of the world 
are with the sturdy and the bold fighting armies" ; whether 
to-day, when millions of corpses fertilise the battlefields of 
Europe, the "real thing" is still the object of his deepest 
yearning? I believe it is, if I judge aright the psychology of 
our rulers. For them it appears a law of nature that the 
prince in uniform seated on a fiery steed — like naked "War" 
in Stuck's famous picture — should ride about over fields 
strewn with corpses. Their hearts do> not appear to be 
moved, when the setting sun illumines in the redness of 
blood thousands and thousands of faces and of bodies con- 
torted and disfigured in the struggle of death, when the 
trenches are filled to overflowing with the dead and the 
wounded, when the subterranean mines explode, and project 
into the air a jet of human limbs, heads, arms, legs and 
blood-stained rags, when thousands of innocent ones, praying 
women and moaning children, are swallowed up in the gur- 
gling whirlpool through the "heroic act" of a U-boat com- 
mander, when millions of hapless beings are driven out of 
burning villages and towns on to the wintry highways. These 
things must be. It is for these things that we are what we 
are by the "grace of God." The same prince, whose eyes may 
grow moist when his wife at home writes to him of the fever- 
ish cold of one of his young progeny, remains cool and com- 
posed, his appetite and his slumber undisturbed, when a 
frontal attack which he has ordered in the morning, com- 
fortably seated at the coffee-table lighting a cigarette, stretches 
low on the blood-stained battlefield thousands of sons, of 
brothers and of fathers. . . . 

The other "August Personages" 

In his acute book, Germany Before the War, of which I 
will speak at some length elsewhere, Baron Beyens, the last 
Belgian Ambassador in Berlin, observes with regard to the 
murdered Archduke Francis Ferdinand, whom he depicts as 
an exemplary father: "He was one of those princes who 



316 THE CRIME 

adore their own children, but, under the spur of political am- 
bition, are very prone to send the children of others to the 
shambles." * The Belgian diplomat also mentions of the 
German Empress that she is an admirable German mother, 
but unfortunately "more absorbed in her children than in her 
subjects." 2 

These words serve to characterise in the aptest manner 
the psychology of our princes. If the six sons of the Em- 
peror, or only some of them, had to fight in the trenches, 
exposed every day and every hour to the drum-fire of the 
enemy, exposed to death or mutilation, we should have peace 
to-morrow. But since there is no danger of this, since all six 
sons occupy positions in the higher command where they are 
safe from bullets and far removed from the firing line, the 
work of murder may calmly pursue its course — until the 
"victory" of the Hohenzollern dynasty, or at any rate, if 
this time victory is not to be bought even by the sacrifice of 
millions of lads and of men in the flower of their years, then 
until the attainment of what is called an "honourable" peace, 
which will leave the path to new victories open to the future 
scions of the Hohenzollern race. There is nothing to indi- 
cate that the mother of the Imperial family uttered so much 
as a word or gave a gesture to restrain her husband from the 
appalling decision. On the contrary! We know, also on the 
authority of Beyens' book, that on the occasion of the Mo- 
rocco conflict of 19.11 she was of the same mind as her 
eldest son and that she said in a tone of reproach to Herr 
von Kiderlen, whom she disliked: "Are we always going to 
retreat before the French and put up with their insolence?" 3 
For the august lady war, so long as it spares her house, her 
husband and her children, has nothing repulsive in it, and 
even her strict Christianity does not appear to rebel against 
the organised wholesale carnage. Only if her mother's heart 
were to make her a fellow sufferer would she perhaps exert 
her considerable influence on the decisions of her imperial 
husband. The millions of broken-hearted mothers — other 

1 [English Trans., p. 272.] a [P. 58.] 8 [P. 61.] 



MILITANT GERMAN SPOKESMEN 317 

mothers! — do not appear to cause her to endure sleepless 
nights. 

On the occasion of the birthday of the Empress — on Octo- 
ber 22nd, 19 16 — the Emperor issued a decree from General 
Headquarters to the Minister of the Interior, in which we 
find the following words : 

"This year I celebrate the birthday of Her Majesty 
the Empress and Queen, my Consort, with special grati- 
tude to God the Lord, whose grace has preserved un- 
diminished the prosperity of our House by preserving 
until now our sons who are in the field." 

The prosperity of our House ! That is the thing that mat- 
ters. Millions of other houses may miserably come to grief; 
whole families, whole generations, may be extirpated, but no 
sacrifice is too dear to purchase the prosperity of the House 
of Hohenzollern, the prosperity of the family and of the 
dynasty. 

When the first news of victory rushed through the capital 
in August, 19 14, one might with admiration have observed 
the august ladies, the Empress and the Crown Princess, on 
the balcony of the Imperial Palace in Berlin, as their radiant 
countenances received the homage of the crowd inflamed to 
patriotism, as in deep emotion they kissed one another and 
sank into each other's arms in the sight of all. Since then, 
since "William's first victory," the ladies have become some- 
what more reticent, when it was found that this victory was 
followed by many counter-strokes, and above all by the great 
failure of Verdun. Yet, notwithstanding this, they cannot 
refrain from trumpeting throughout the Press every visit to 
a hospital, every inspection of a soldiers' home, and if it is 
possible they convey their homely acts of heroism by photo- 
graph or by cinematograph to their contemporaries and to 
posterity. Go to the picture-palaces, open the illustrated pa- 
pers, and observe how these august personages have always a 
pleased and contented air; see how the young heir to the 
throne in his coquettish Hussar uniform takes the arm of 



318 THE CRIME 

General von Mudra before the assembled warriors, and by 
some droll phrase or other moves to laughter the whole of the 
surrounding company of soldiers and officers; observe how, 
in contradistinction to his father who generally looks grave, 
there is nothing to be read in the face of this Crown Prince 
but the most cheerful good humour, jest and high spirits, not- 
withstanding the human butchery which he must daily at- 
tend ; see how the exalted ladies present themselves before the 
camera or the cinematograph operator in the hospitals and 
institutions for the blind, amidst the unfortunate wounded, 
the maimed, and the unseeing, arrayed in dazzling spring or 
summer toilets, frequently surrounded by their young sons, 
but always with radiant smiling countenances. It is just as 
if they were taking part in a light-hearted frolic, a bean-feast, 
or some society charitable entertainment, and not the darkest 
tragedy in the history of mankind. The august ladies have 
a predilection for being photographed close beside the sick- 
bed and in the hospital wards in order to convince the faith- 
ful people of their unwearying exertions in alleviating the 
horrors of war. The Austrian Archduchesses appear to be 
particularly addicted to these good-Samaritan photographs 
which present them to their admiring contemporaries in their 
effective costumes, models of chic, designed by the most emi- 
nent costumiers in Vienna, with their graceful toques and 
long streaming ribbons. What a novel, exciting, interesting 
emotion such a war is! What a wealth of new laurels thus 
shoots aloft in the garden of the Hapsburgs and the Hohen- 
zollerns already so richly blessed! What indelible impres- 
sions are received by the souls of the young princes, who 
still remain at home, impressions of heroism and of the im- 
perishable glory of their fathers and grandfathers, impres- 
sions which will continue to exercise their influence on their 
young minds and will spur them on to greater and ever 
greater acts of heroism. . . . 

How great a contempt for mankind — incomprehensible to 
ordinary mortals — must fill these great ones, who look upon 
these enormous hecatombs in human life and human happi- 
ness as a reasonable tribute approved by God (they are all 



MILITANT GERMAN SPOKESMEN 319 

believing Christians!) for their greatness, their glory, the 
extension of their power. Tears spring to the eyes of us 
simple men, when, for example, we see in Vorw'drts the enor- 
mous daily lists of obituary notices, in which the various trade 
unions intimate the deaths of their members, young and old 
mixed together, half of them boys, and half old men; when 
we read the moving notices which bereaved wives, children 
and parents, in halting but all the more touching verses, de- 
vote to their dear ones, tumbled into promiscuous graves in 
alien soil, no one knows where; when we receive memorial 
cards in which parents, brought down in sorrow to the grave, 
announce the departure of their second or their third son, 
who have followed the first, all of them, one after another, 
slaughtered for "higher" aims, which are no concern of 
theirs, which cannot increase their prosperity or well-being, 
which cannot alleviate the grief of those who are left behind, 
— for the ambition and the greed of power of their rulers. 

Mercenary Armies — Universal Service 

This is indeed the appalling anachronism of the present 
war, which unfortunately has not yet dawned on the con- 
sciousness of the nations. In old days, in the Middle Ages 
and down to more recent times, the prince went out to battle 
in person, and in his own person staked life and limb. At the 
head of a mercenary army which he paid, it was at his own 
danger and expense, as was fit and proper, that he sought to 
gain glory and power for himself and his house. To-day the 
prince and his young sons remain far behind the front, in the 
security of Headquarters; they enjoy all their accustomed 
comforts, and leave others to fight and die for them — others 
who, unlike the mercenaries of earlier times, have not adopted 
the occupation of arms voluntarily and professionally, but 
are compelled to risk their lives in the interests of the power 
of the great. War in antiquity and in the Middle Ages was 
a barbarity as it is to-day, although of course to a much 
smaller degree, corresponding to the less perfect development 
of the means of destruction. But it was in itself logical, in 



320 THE CRIME 

so far as it exposed to the greatest personal dangers those 
men or those groups of men who were most interested in the 
issue of the war, and it left it open to everyone else to decide 
whether in return for corresponding advantages he would or 
would not furnish them support. War to-day, with general 
compulsory service and the personal security of the dynasts 
and their adherents, is a thing void of meaning, since it leaves 
those who are really interested untouched and free from dan- 
ger, but leads to the slaughter-house in their millions the un- 
fortunate nations who can expect no manner of advantage 
even from a victorious issue of the war. 

If the Emperors, the Kings, the Princes and the Dukes 
could be placed in the front line of the trenches, the war 
would at once come to an end — or rather it would never have 
broken out. Prestige and world-power, prestige and world- 
power! If the life of the great were at stake, if like the 
insignificant they had to fear death or dread that they might, 
throughout their whole life, crippled or maimed, blind or 
lame, helpless and pitiful, trail about with them the remem- 
brance of the "great time"; if in addition to this they were 
further plagued by the anxiety, which in their case is in any 
event excluded, of having to leave behind in a state of beg- 
gardom their wives and children, robbed of their bread- 
winner — then indeed wars would soon be at an end, then the 
enduring peace, so ardently desired, would soon prevail 
among the nations. 

Policy of Brag 

General compulsory service was introduced into Prussia 
by Scharnhorst and Gneisenau at the time of the French 
foreign domination, as a measure of defence to shake off the 
Napoleonic yoke. It is for the purpose of defensive wars 
only that general compulsory service has any meaning, not 
for wars of aggression and conquest. "The German is not 
made for a policy of conquest or of brag, that is not the pur- 
pose of our militia, and of our heads of families; they would 
defend themselves like bears if attacked in their lair, but 



MILITANT GERMAN SPOKESMEN 321 

they are as destitute of a desire to conquer as bears are." 
These are the words addressed in 1895 by Bismarck to Ger- 
man students who visited him in Friedrichsruhe. By "a pol- 
icy of brag" he understood what on another occasion he called 
"working for prestige," or "viewing international disputes 
from the standpoint of Gottingen traditions or the honour 
involved in the student's duel." 

In an article in the Hamburger Nachrichten in October, 
1 89 1, he violently attacked the nationalists and the expan- 
sionists who asked of Germany that "she should assume a 
challenging attitude in Europe, and play the part of a man 
who having suddenly come into money jostles against every- 
one as he jingles the dollars in his pocket." In expressing 
these and other similar views Bismarck constantly emphasised 
the distinguishing feature of the national war resting on uni- 
versal compulsory service; that it can be waged only as a 
defensive war or for the attainment of justifiable national 
aims, but can never be waged for purposes of prestige or for 
the extension of power beyond the national frontiers. It 
amounts to a perversion of the meaning and significance of 
universal compulsory service, when it is made subservient to 
Pan-German, imperialistic and expansionist aims as has been 
done in this war. The last political step compatible with the 
idea of universal compulsory service was the union of Ger- 
many in the formation of the new German Empire. What 
our Pan-Germans and their executive organs, the rulers and 
governments of Germany (on the principle "We are the lead- 
ers and consequently we follow"), seek to attain beyond this 
point is something for which our sons, our brothers and our 
fathers, the men of our Landwehr and Landsturm, are too 
good. Their blood and their lives are too precious for such 
an undertaking. If there are any who wish to pursue these 
ends, let them seek to attain them at their own cost and dan- 
ger. Let them engage mercenary armies, as was done by the 
Margraves and Electors of Brandenburg, a practice which 
was still followed by the first Kings of Prussia. Let them 
place themselves with their sons at the head of these troops, 
and then, so far as I am concerned, they may raise the cry 



322 THE CRIME 

"To Teheran ! To Baghdad ! To India and the Suez Canal !" 
But let it be without the German Landwehr man; let him 
remain at home with his wife and children. 



The Chauvinists and the German Nation 

I spoke of the German chauvinists and their exalted pro- 
tectors. I stated that for years they had willed and prepared 
this war, and explained in what way they had done so. It 
has been the misfortune of the German people that it had 
no idea of the existence, the power and the influence of chau- 
vinism in Germany during the period before the outbreak 
of the war. The war-generals, the leaders of the Pan-Ger- 
mans, men like Keim, Wrochem, Bernhardi, Eichhorn, and 
all the rest of them, the war-politicians like Reventlow, Bas- 
sermann, Schiemann, Rohrbach, Harden and all the name- 
less editors and collaborators of the widely-extended and well- 
organised Nationalist Press of Germany, were able by their 
skilful and effective demagogy to represent to the German 
people French Chauvinism and Russian Panslavism as the 
bogey, but at the same time they were able to conceal the fact 
that the alarmists themselves in no way believed in the exter- 
nal dangers which they portrayed, but only exploited them 
as a pretext to instigate the German people to war. 

For these intriguers the war was an end in itself; in the 
case of one group, the soldiers, as the result of a natural de- 
sire to test and set in motion the machinery of war which for 
half a century had been elaborated and brought to the highest 
pitch of perfection, and finally threatened to become rusty, 
if it were not at last provided with the work for which it was 
designed. In the case of others it was regarded as a neces- 
sary means of educating and strengthening a nation which 
had sunk in the slough of an unduly prolonged peace. In the 
case of a third section it was looked upon as the strongest and 
most striking expression of the development of the power of 
Germany, who could no longer allow herself to be satisfied 
with the peaceful conquest of the world's markets by her 
achievements in technical science, in trade and in industry, 



MILITANT GERMAN SPOKESMEN 323 

but was called upon to subject foreign countries and peoples 
to her dominant will. All these motives led to the same end, 
to the decision to begin at the appropriate moment an ag- 
gressive, a predatory war, which at the cost of other Powers 
would procure for Germany new territories over which to 
exercise dominion, and would at the same time restore the 
old Germanic spirit of war in the place of "the vile worship 
of Mammon." 

That these tendencies to war are violently opposed to all 
the dictates of modern civilised life and to all the demands 
of humanity, that the development of modern interchange in 
intellectual and material affairs, linking the nations together 
and bridging over all frontiers, unmistakably points to the 
pacific organisation of the civilised world, and not to the 
struggle of arms and to suppression by war, are facts which 
in the restricted circle of their professional ideas may not 
always have been present to the consciousness of these gen- 
erals and admirals who dabbled in politics. On the other 
hand the politicians who dabbled in military matters, who al- 
lowed themselves to be taken in tow by the generals, can have 
been in no doubt that their war intrigues were opposed to the 
spirit of civilisation, and therefore it is they, the men like 
Bassermann and his companions, who are doubly and trebly 
responsible for the stupendous consequences which have now 
befallen the whole world. 

Otfried Nippold; "German Chauvinism" 

The German people were in complete ignorance of the dan- 
ger evoked by the chauvinistic intriguers. Under the sys- 
tematically pursued suggestion of these reactionary dema- 
gogues it saw the dangers on the other side of the frontier, 
while in fact the dangers on this side, in their own country, 
continued to become darker and more threatening. 

By their demagogic tactics, particularly in the Defence League, 
the political generals have to-day become a national danger. 
No one in Germany is playing so fatal a role as General 
Keim. . . . 



324 THE CRIME 

The only thing that could really bring the German Empire in 
danger would be if the chauvinistic movement were to gain the 
upper hand. This and not the Triple Entente is the enemy of 
Germany. . . . 

What else, indeed, is the "act" of which the chauvinistic papers 
are constantly writing but a "gay and jolly war," which is the 
same thing as a campaign of plunder. 

So wrote Professor Otfried Nippold in his book which 
appeared in 191 3 under the title German Chauvinism, the 
perusal of which cannot be too strongly recommended to 
everyone who desires to be informed regarding the true 
origin and the really guilty authors of the present war. Nip- 
pold gives an extremely copious selection from German chau- 
vinistic literature and restricts himself to a short commentary, 
every word of which, however, hits the nail on the head. His 
pamphlet is all the more valuable, inasmuch as it does not 
emanate from a Revolutionary, nor even from a Social Dem- 
ocrat, but from a member of the Central Committee of the 
"League for Promoting International Understanding" (of 
which it is one of the official publications), and, further, it 
is the work of a neutral, a Swiss citizen. 

It is highly interesting to read to-day the list of the Direc- 
tors and Members of the Committee of this League. It con- 
sists entirely of famous and eminent names in the German 
intellectual, official, commercial and industrial world. There 
are twenty-seven Professors, ten Privy Councillors, a number 
of Bank Directors, ecclesiastical magnates, General Consuls, 
retired admirals, public prosecutors, and presidents of the 
upper district courts — in short an elite of German notabilities. 
Alongside political leaders like Payer, Spahn, Naumann, 
Bachem, Trimborm, we find men of learning like Lamprecht, 
Liszt, Meurer, Natorp, Laband, Amira, Martens, Mittermaier, 
Zorn, Fleischmann, etc. Alongside bank directors like Gwin- 
ner, Maier ( Frank furt-am-Main), we find retired admirals 
like Galster and Glatzel (Kiel), the syndics of the college of 
elders and of the Berlin Chamber of Commerce (Apt and 
Dove), bankers like Ladenburg and Dr. Paul Stern (Frank- 
furt-am-Main). All these excellent citizens must at that time 



MILITANT GERMAN SPOKESMEN 325 

have occupied the same standpoint as Nippold's pamphlet, if 
they agreed to its publication in the name of the League which 
they represented. The fact that they did so, shows that they 
must have approved and considered as apt Nippold's pointed 
and well-founded accusations against our professional war- 
intriguers, men like Keim, Liebert, Bernhardi, and Class, the 
editors of the Post, the Tdgliche Rundschau, the Deutsche 
Tageszeitung, the Berliner Neueste Nachrichten, the Magde- 
burgische and the Kolnische Zeitung, the Rheinisch-W est- 
fdlische and the Kreuzzeitung. 

What, however, are the accusations preferred by Nippold? 
Let us take only a few striking sentences: 

These people do not merely incite to war from time to time, 
but they systematically train the German people to take pleas- 
ure in war. And this is done not merely in the sense that it 
ought to be efficient in war and equipped to meet all contingen- 
cies, but in the much wider sense that it needs war. War is 
represented not merely as a possibility which may come, but as 
a necessity which must come, and indeed the sooner it comes the 
better ! In the eyes of these intriguers the German people needs 
a war ; for them a long peace is regrettable in itself, whether or 
not a reason for war exists, and consequently, if need be, war 
must simply be provoked. These men, whose task is to bring 
happiness to the nations, are not wanting in motives which are 
held before the German people with this end in view. . . . 

The quintessence of their teaching is always the same, 
namely that the European war is not merely a contingency 
against which it is necessary to arm, but a necessity, and indeed 
a necessity for which one must be grateful in the interests of the 
German people. . . . 

And thus to begin with they have put forward the dogma 
that war must come. Of course they do not say that the only 
reason why war must come is that they wish it, and that it will 
come only if they are able to give effect to this wish. They 
merely put forward the dogma and assert its indisputability. 

And from this dogma it requires only a small step to arrive 
at the next chauvinistic doctrine which is so much after the 
heart of the political generals whose delight is in war — to the 
proposition, that is to say, of the aggressive or the preventive 



326 THE CRIME 

war. If war must come some day, then let it be at the moment 
that is most favourable to us ; in other words, do not let us wait 
until a cause for war exists, but let us adopt the simple course 
of striking when it suits us best. . . . 

What is international law ? Mere bunkum ! What is the sig- 
nificance of modern intercourse, of trade, industry, science and 
the technical arts? They merely render the German nation ef- 
feminate, and alienate it from war which is its true end. All 
other pursuits are fundamentally without value, unless they serve 
directly or indirectly as an education for war. No hesitation 
is felt in simply turning all ideas upside down. These people re- 
gard war not as a necessary evil, but as the highest good. . . . 

It would certainly have been a preferable and also a more 
honest procedure if these war-generals, instead of putting the 
whole machinery of the Defence League into motion, had frankly 
admitted that the fact that the Army had had peace for forty 
years was distasteful to them, and that they wanted once more to 
have a war. But recourse to such an argument would have made 
it difficult to gain many adherents. Consequently it was neces- 
sary to pursue by other means the task of inciting to war. For 
the aim was only to be attained by first of all creating among 
the people the sentiment necessary to lead to war, and then by 
going to the Government and demonstrating to them: "The 
German people wants war." . . . 

In chauvinistic circles they have already proceeded from the 
defensive war waged for a compelling reason, and with the ut- 
most facility they have arrived at the aggressive war without 
any reason at all ; and they flatter themselves .that the German 
people has shared in this change from a pacific nation to a quar- 
relsome nation eager for war. 

As a further consequence they quite frankly no longer trouble 
to maintain the correctness of the principle si vis pacem, para 
helium, a principle which has long been outstripped in the eyes 
of these exalted politicians. For the chauvinists, as we have 
seen, the antecedent clause has long since lost its validity; they 
do not wish for peace, they wish for war, and with all the power 
at their disposal they work to secure it as speedy an arrival as 
possible. The equipment for war is not in their eyes meant to be 
subservient to the maintenance of peace ; God forbid ! The Ger- 
man people needs a war, and, moreover, one could not but be 



MILITANT GERMAN SPOKESMEN 327 

sorry for the beautiful army so ready for battle, if it were not at 
last made use of once more. . . . 

The fact that the Pan- German political phantasts direct their 
attention to the conquest of colonial territory is admirably suited 
to the purposes of the war-generals, but it is for them merely a 
means to the end. War itself is for them the essential mat- 
ter. . . . 

Among the arguments by means of which "mass suggestions" 
are pursued to-day special mention may be made of the parallel 
with 1813. The attempt is made to construe artificially a similar- 
ity with 1913, for which no real basis whatever exists. . . . 

In the absence of real causes for war and of natural political 
antagonisms to the other States of Europe, they now find it nec- 
essary to seek to create artificial causes. This, however, can only 
be done by the creation of an artificial excitement in the popula- 
tion, by inflaming national feelings, and by systematically foster- 
ing a bellicose spirit — all tasks which are undertaken to-day to 
the best of their power by the war-generals in the Pan-German 
Union, in the Defence League, and in similar organisations. . . . 

The chauvinists consequently do not shrink from attacks on the 
present Government, or on the present system in politics and 
diplomacy. We have, indeed, experience ot the fact that they 
have even directly attacked the Emperor because of his peace 
policy. . . . x 



x This has again been shown during the war in connection with the 
question of submarine warfare, in connection with the struggle between 
the ultra-annexationists and the Chancellor .who is merely annexationist, 
and in connection with the opposition now emerging on the part of the 
reactionaries against every democratic development in the Empire and 
in Prussia. Monarchy suits these people just so long as they can do 
good business with, and in, the monarchy. If the monarchy ventures to 
wish to pursue a path other than that which appears expedient to the 
Pan-Germans, the militarists and the Junkers, they also become, as the 
occasion may require, anti-monarchical and, indeed, revolutionary. Cer- 
tain correspondence which took place in May, 1915, between the Pan- 
German leader, General von Gebsattel, and the Chancellor is specially 
characteristic of this revolutionary "monarchism." In this the monarchy 
was threatened with its downfall and with "Revolution (it is necessary 
to speak the word)," should the "certain German victory" not be "ex- 
ploited" to secure the familiar gigantic annexations in every conceivable 
direction. (See Vorwarts, May 22nd, 1917-) 



328 THE CRIME 

The story of the intended encirclement of Germany has for 
all innocent minds something that is so uncommonly plausible. 
And thus large sections of the nation are to-day really suffering 
from what in non-political life is ordinarily described as a "fear 
of apparitions," or let us say, from political nervousness, weak- 
ness of nerve or hysteria. As a result of this condition there is 
perhaps more talk about war in Germany to-day than there is 
among the people of any other country. Confronted with this 
everlasting gossiping about war in Germany one gets the feel- 
ing of living in an atmosphere pregnant with war. With those 
who have once been infected and who are under the influence 
of the suggestions emanating from this hysterical milieu, nothing 
would be achieved by saying that no occasion for a war existed. 
They refuse to give up the idea that Germany is in danger. 

These striking sentences from Nippold confirm in every 
word the observations contained in J' accuse regarding the 
responsibility of German Chauvinism and Pan-Germanism 
for the war. Nippold's work was unknown to me when I 
wrote my book ; it only came to my notice shortly before go- 
ing to press. 1 Further, I did not have at my disposal the 
material collected by Nippold from newspapers and from 
journals, on which he bases his condemnatory judgment on 
German Chauvinism. Certainly I also was aware of the crim- 
inal intrigues of Pan-Germany; I knew where the criminals 
were to be found, in what places they had laid their dragon's 
eggs, out of which to hatch the changeling of war. But I 
was too much of an optimist, I believed too much in the calm 
blood and the unperturbed vision, in the sound judgment and 
the love of peace of the German people, to expect that this 
war-intrigue would attain success with those occupying au- 
thoritative places and with the great bulk of the people of 
Germany. I was guilty of the same error as numberless Ger- 
mans in all ranks of the population, the error which was com- 
mitted by the great majority of the German people: I under- 
estimated the dangers of German Chauvinism : in spite of all 
intrigues I believed in the healthy understanding and the 
moral resisting power of the German people. 

* See J'accuse, p. 132. 



MILITANT GERMAN SPOKESMEN 329 

Like all the others, I was deceived. I did not realise that 
the ground of peace had for years been undermined in every 
direction by the sapping activities and by the underground 
galleries driven by the war-intriguers, and that it only re- 
quired the laying of a match to lead to the most appalling 
explosion. I knew that "Keim" 1 was a poisonous germ, but 
I did not assume that he would be so appalling a germ of 
disaster as he has in fact become. Good old Father Keim! 
The father of the Fatherland! The father of this war for 
the Fatherland, who, nevertheless, after he has longed for it 
for years, prepared and finally provoked it, still appears to sit 
comfortably on some "rond de cuir" (as Governor of Lim- 
burg has recently reported), refraining from risking his bones 
in the trenches, but far behind the front, in a post secure 
from fire, gladdens his soldier's heart with the distant sound 
of the cannon. Nothing has yet been heard of any warlike 
deeds performed by any of these braggarts, whatever their 
names may be. Didce et decorum est pro patria mori! How 
lovely it is — for others! — to die for the Fatherland. But 
how much more lovely it is to remain alive for the Father- 
land. How glorious is the real thing, instead of the ever- 
lasting wearisome peace-manceuvres. More glorious, how- 
ever, if it is left to the others to experience the real thing, 
while the braggarts and the heroes of the pen, instead of 
pouring out their blood, need only shed saliva and ink. . . . 

I underestimated Keim and his followers; I did not con- 
sider it possible that a German Emperor with his Chancellor 
could capitulate to these uncultured, narrow-minded, and bar- 
baric corrupters of the people, to his immature son, whom 
nothing will ever mature, and to his son's adherents, that he 
could criminally gamble with the labour and the success of 
half a century of peace. I considered that there was no pos- 
sibility of a modern universal war with the unspeakable con- 
sequences for the whole world, of which we have now been 
for almost three years the horrified witnesses, with its bar- 
barities, its terrors, and its devastations. Least of all did I 

1 ["Keim" in German means a germ or bud.] 



330 THE CRIME 

consider that such a war was possible without any compel- 
ling reason, from frivolous pleasure in war, from greed of 
glory, honour, and power. 

Because I considered that the possibility of Pan-Germany's 
success was excluded, I neglected to follow the tracks of the 
movement, which was well known to me in its general out- 
lines although I did not consider that I was called upon to 
attach any particular importance to its individual expres- 
sions and actions. I had compiled no collection of newspaper 
extracts, after the manner of Schiemann, I had gathered to- 
gether no pamphlet-literature. Consequently, when the out- 
break of war with all its accompanying phenomena brought 
to light the unimagined success of the prolonged preparatory 
labour of the Pan-Germans, I could only refer to a few books 
to supply information on this point. From these the con- 
nection between the "war of liberation" which had stirred 
the nation to enthusiasm and the carefully prepared staging 
on the part of the Pan-German Union and its affiliated or- 
ganisations could be plainly recognised, but only insufficiently 
proved. The copious wealth of material with which Nip- 
pold's highly meritorious work has supplied me has now af- 
forded me the satisfaction of finding confirmation of all that 
I could then collect from the writings of Bernhardi, the Ger- 
man Crown Prince and a few other documents. It is now 
impossible to reproach me with a one-sided selection of "un- 
authoritative" phenomena — although I must repudiate the 
assertion that the statements of a Prussian General and of a 
German Crown Prince are unauthoritative as a crude expres- 
sion of disrespect which outrages my Prussian-monarchical 
feelings. I am now in a position to produce so long and so 
complete a list of German chauvinist leaders and chauvinistic 
writings that the charge of partiality falls to the ground, and 
the picture, which was then drawn, though correctly, with a 
few lines only, is furnished with the most striking blood-red 
background. 

In my own defence and for the edification of the German 
public, which is still sunk, and apparently sinks more deeply 
every day, in the delusion that its Pan-German war of con- 



MILITANT GERMAN SPOKESMEN 331 

quest is a war of defence (see the consistent utterances re- 
peated every hour and every day by the rulers, the Govern- 
ments, the civil parties and the social patriots) for the en- 
lightenment of the German people (the rest of the world no 
longer needs to be enlightened), I propose in the following 
paragraphs to produce a series of utterances from German 
chauvinistic literature, which deserve a wider circulation than 
they have hitherto obtained. 

The League for Promoting International 
Understanding 

I recommend the perusal of these extracts to all those 
Germans who are earnestly concerned to recognise their true 
enemies, and to protect their people from catastrophes simi- 
lar to that which we are now experiencing. Above all I rec- 
ommend their renewed perusal to those German notabilities 
who in their capacity as presidents and members of the com- 
mittee of the "League for Promoting International Under- 
standing" (thus sharing, so to speak, the responsibility for 
the publication of Nippold's pamphlet) must have known the 
efforts made by the German chauvinists in the direction of 
war, their criminal insistence on an aggressive war, although 
they have now nearly all, with a few honourable exceptions, 
fallen victims to the lie of defence, proclaiming the defensive 
war against the shameful attack made upon Germany, and 
recommending the most fatal annexations and measures of 
violence as a protection against future attacks. In what 
camp must we look to-day for men like Payer, Spahn, Liszt, 
Natorp, Naumann, Zorn, Dove, Laband and Gwinner? They 
are in the camp of those who preach defence and annexation, 
which indeed is logically the same thing; for anyone who be- 
lieves that an attack has taken place must necessarily direct 
his thoughts to the problem of protection in the future. 
Nearly all, with but few exceptions, have become perverts, 
and among these exceptions the most honourable is Professor 
Nippold, the author of this pamphlet. 



332 THE CRIME 

The German chauvinists have desired and wanted war ; this 
emerges from all their utterances dating from the period be- 
fore the war, and it is a fact which neither can nor will be 
denied by any of these gentlemen belonging to the League 
for Promoting International Understanding. But it is the 
others, the chauvinists on the other side, who provoked the 
war — that is what has now become the battle-cry of the 
"patriots" with whom these men of the League for Promot- 
ing an Understanding have almost without exception allied 
themselves. German chauvinism, which at an earlier date 
was recognised and combated as the greatest national danger 
of Germany, has suddenly disappeared in the eyes of these 
gentlemen, and, as happens in the fairy tale, in place of the 
wolf which was submerged there has appeared on the surface 
a peaceful lambkin to which Neighbour Fox, the wily and 
ferocious beast, would gladly put an end. Neighbour Fox is 
represented by Delcasse, Poincare, Grey and Sazonof, those 
dangerous highway robbers who have ambushed and attacked 
the poor innocent Germania as she wandered in the paths of 
peace. Do these men of experience really believe these fables 
and tales of robbers, which they have now for more than two 
and a half years endeavoured to induce the inexperienced peo- 
ple to believe? Are they not rather convinced from the his- 
tory of the twelve critical days, from the collections of diplo- 
matic documents (which cannot surely be a sealed book for 
these intellectuals), from the staging of the whole clap-trap 
about the "war of defence" with the indispensable popular 
enthusiasm, the speeches from the Palace balcony, the phrases 
about "forcing the sword in our hand," the "treacherous at- 
tack," "no longer any parties," etc., etc. — are these gentlemen 
not convinced that all this is merely the enactment of a pro- 
gramme, outlined long ago, that every act and every actor 
were long ago determined in advance, and that the generals' 
speeches during recent years were merely the general rehears- 
als for the real festal eve of battle? 

I personally am convinced that scarcely one of these men, 
who at that time laboured to bring about an international un- 
derstanding, believes in the attack of the enemy and the war 



MILITANT GERMAN SPOKESMEN 333 

of defence. They are much too intelligent to do so; they are 
too well acquainted with the active forces who have worked 
in Germany in the direction of war, and who have been 
branded as war-intriguers by these men themselves in this 
publication of the League. All the greater, however, is their 
apostasy and their hypocrisy. They take their part in dis- 
seminating the great lie because they do not have the courage 
to swim against the stream, because they dare not resist the 
Pan-German train of thought which on the outbreak of war 
developed into a terrorising and overbearing force, because 
they are apprehensive of the resulting disadvantages in their 
civil life should they confess what they recognise to be the 
truth, and because, on the other hand, they have no desire to 
miss the advantages which a good patriotic sentiment yields, 
especially in these troubled times, in the form of the handful 
of silver and the ribbon to stick in the coat. 

Pan-Germany — All Germany 

The action of all these men and of the strata of society to 
which they belong is morally more reprehensible and has 
been accompanied by almost worse consequences than the 
year-long incitement to war carried on by the chauvinists. 
These intellectuals and notabilities belong in preponderating 
measure to the Liberal parties — from the left wing of the 
"Freisinnige Volkspartei" to the extreme right wing of the 
National Liberals; members of the Centre and of the Free 
Conservatives are also included. But not a single one of 
the directors or of the members of the committee of that 
League, which had taken for its object to pave the way to a 
peaceful understanding among the nations, stood before the 
war in any kind of connection, whether internal or external, 
with these Pan-German and chauvinistic circles whose task 
was the intellectual, the political, and the military preparation 
for a European war. Nippold rightly protests in his book 
against the inciting effects of the attitude assumed by Basser- 
mann, the leader of the National Liberals, who by the insatia- 



334. THE CRIME 

bility of his demands for armaments, by his constant insist- 
ence on an active policy, that is to say a policy of war, by his 
blunt refusal of the pacific endeavours of the Hague Confer- 
ences, by his rejection of an agreement with England as to 
armaments, which would have afforded relief to both parties 
— in short by his whole pernicious attitude — played into the 
hands of the war-generals and gave rise to the erroneous im- 
pression that in general the National Liberals were identical 
with the Pan-Germans and the members of the Defence 
League. 

At that time (in 191 3) this was in fact an error. With the 
beginning of war it became the truth. The Press belonging 
to the democratic, the freethinking (freisinnige), the Na- 
tional Liberal, the Free Conservative and the Centre parties, 
as well as the Press of the social patriots, was, apart from a 
few exceptions, scarcely distinguishable from the Pan-Ger- 
man and the Chauvinist Press. All the catch-phrases about 
the policy of encirclement, about the attack and the struggle 
for German freedom and independence — all the lying phrases 
coined long before the war, which, on the occasion of the 
memorial celebrations of 1913, had already inflamed the hol- 
low enthusiasm for a new "war of liberation," overflowed on 
August 1st, 19 14, as at a stroke from the Pan-German to the 
whole of the German Press, and proceeded to inundate the 
soil of public opinion in so fertilising a manner that the most 
phenomenal cabbage-heads of national pride and infatuation 
have sprouted in abundance from the journalistic fields. 1 

1 The Berliner Tageblatt of April 30th, 1917, makes it clear that even 
at that date, that is to say, after thirty-three months of war, the Pan- 
German propaganda in the Press and on the platform, which before the 
outbreak of war had prejudiced and united the whole world against Ger- 
many, inspired after the outbreak of war with the "Pan-German nation- 
alistic spirit" a large section of German journalists and politicians who 
had not previously belonged to the Pan-Germans: 

"The majority of the Conservatives, the right wing of the National 
Liberals, with the "General-Secretary" group, even some of the Pro- 
gressive party, and many persons who have no well-defined party con- 
nections, speak and write more or less in the tone which prevails in 



MILITANT GERMAN SPOKESMEN 335 

Today, when the war has continued for two and a half 
years without bringing victory, the enormous sacrifices in 
life and in wealth, and the troubled prospects for Germany's 
position in the world later on, have produced many disillu- 
sionments and much chastening of spirit. To-day, when the 
origin of the war, with regard to which the majority of Ger- 
mans still linger in their former blindness, has somewhat 
receded into the background in public discussion and has made 
way for the consideration of the aims of the war and the 
internal development of Prussia and Germany, the old polit- 
ical antagonisms are again beginning gradually to emerge 
under the monotonous field-grey; the old varieties of colour 
are again becoming visible. But at that time, when war broke 
out, and in the whole of the first period of the war which was 
crowned with apparent success, all political distinctions were 
obliterated as at a stroke, and the Emperor, instead of say- 
ing, "I no longer know any parties, I know only Germans," 
might more appropriately have exclaimed, "I know only Pan- 
Germans." 

All the ideas and the phraseology of the Pan-German gen- 
erals and writers became the common property of German 
Liberalism, of the German intellectuals, of official German 
policy, the process being effected overnight, coming, so to 
speak, like an illumination at dawn. Laband and Liszt, Payer 
and Naumann, suddenly wrote and spoke in exactly the same 
way as Keim and Class, Bernhardi and Wrochem had writ- 

the Alldeutsche Blatter. It would be unjust to deny that the guilt 
which lies on the Pan-Germans attaches to them all." 

The Berliner Tageblatt of June 2nd, 1917, writes in the same strain: 

"that the Pan-German spirit is to be found not merely in the real 
Pan-German Union and its supporters. It has confused many minds 
in circles which otherwise have no political colour affecting even the 
ranks of the Liberals on the left." 

For the sake of completeness the Berliner Tageblatt might also have 
cited a series of social patriots who since August 4th, 1914, have likewise 
been scarcely distinguishable from the Pan-Germans in the spoken and 
the written word. 



336 THE CRIME 

ten and spoken in the past. It may even be asserted that in 
part the new Pan-Germans surpassed the old in the violence 
of their speech and in the orthodoxy of their militaristic sen- 
timents, as, indeed, apostates are as a rule worse than those 
whose faith is of longer standing. Men of learning, clergy- 
men, and other sedentary livers, suddenly mounted the "har- 
nessed steed" more keenly than the oldest troopers who had 
sat all their lives on horseback. What Naumann in the 
course of this war has accomplished in exaggerated chauvin- 
ism or in chauvinistic exaggeration — what Payer and Spahn, 
the South-German democrat and the ultra-montane member 
of the Centre (in the good old times the sharpest antipodes, 
now linked in a loyal comradeship of arms and in community 
of sentiment) , have declaimed and expressed in their political 
actions on the subject of the "Fatherland in danger," the 
necessity of protection against future attacks, the unity of 
the German nation and the sanctity of the civil truce, in no 
way falls short of the train of thought and the demands of 
the Pan-German generals. (Among many other examples 
reference may be made to the declaration issued by Spahn on 
December 9th, 191 5, in the name of all the civil parties, in 
favour of the acquisition of territories requisite for Ger- 
many's protection.) In particular it will always be remem- 
bered to Herr Dr. von Payer's credit that he discharged a 
glorious act of patriotism in acting as reporter to the Com- 
mission for the surrender of Liebknecht to the military au- 
thorities, that he moved in the matter of the charge of treason 
against his parliamentary colleague, 'that .he was instrumental 
in carrying through the first violation of the principle of im- 
munity. What has become of this former South-German 
democrat, the bitterest opponent of Prussia, of this Dr. Payer, 
once the democratic tribune of the people (without "excel- 
lency" and without "von"), in the enervating and emasculat- 
ing atmosphere of the Court and the Government? . . . 

The German people had in fact become one. Unfor- 
tunately so! Apart from a few honourable exceptions, the 
opponents of Pan-Germanism had gone over to the enemy 
with flying flags, intellect abased itself before the sabre, 



MILITANT GERMAN SPOKESMEN 337 

democracy before autocracy, the civilian element before Junk- 
erdom. The most disconcerting feature in this distressing, 
and one would have thought impossible, occurrence is that, 
notwithstanding the gradual re-emergence of slight shades of 
difference, it will not remain restricted to the period of the 
war, but will continue operative far on into the times of peace. 
It is easier to fall into slavery than to gain deliverance from 
such a condition. The state of intellectual bondage to the 
Pan-Germans, the Junkers and the Militarists, into which the 
educated classes, and unfortunately even a section of the 
working classes, have fallen will remain for many years to 
come as heavy fetters about their limbs; it will defer for many 
years yet the democratic and social liberation of the German 
people. 

^ * H« sfc * * 

On the occasion of the recent celebration of its twenty-fifth 
anniversary the Pan-German Union could rightly and proudly 
make the following intimation through the instrumentality 
of the Tdgliche Rundschau : 

Twenty-five years ago to-day, on the invitation of Karl Peters, 
a Union was founded in Frankfurt-am-Main, which, though de- 
spised and attacked in every hour of its existence, has neverthe- 
less developed into a powerful creative force in our political life, 
which has not merely imposed its ideas on its opponents, but 
has frequently prescribed to them the laws of their action. It 
has been ridiculed, reviled, persecuted ; but its ideas were proved 
to be correct, and to-day in the midst of the world-wide hurri- 
cane, when it surveys in retrospect its twenty-five years of ac- 
tivity, it can address almost all its opponents as "Pan-Germans." 
For this war has taught the whole of our people to feel and to 
act as Pan-Germans. 

The extracts which follow will confirm the accuracy of 
this sweet-smelling self -eulogy. They will prove that the 
manner of thinking, of speaking, and of writing in Germany 
after the outbreak of war corresponds almost without excep- 
tion, down to the minutest details, to the train of thought, 



338 THE CRIME 

indeed in many cases to the phraseology, of the Pan-German 
chauvinistic literature current in the years immediately pre- 
ceding the war, and that in great measure it still conforms 
to that pattern to-day. 

Stages in the Policy of Force 

Macaulay once said : 

"Principles which the most hardened ruffian would 
scarcely hint to his most trusted accomplice, or avow 
without the disguise of some palliating sophism, even to 
his own mind, are professed without the slightest cir- 
cumlocution, and assumed as the fundamental axioms 
of all political science." * 

He who has once lent his support to such a robber-policy, 
which like all other policies can be carried out only by the 
means to which it owes its origin — he who has once lent his 
support to such a policy of blood and of violence as has led 
to this war, will continue, whether he wishes it or not, to 
be dragged still further down the slippery slope, until finally 
he ends in the mediaeval stronghold where Prussian military 
autocracy dictates the law. He who says A, must also say 
B.— 

Defensive war against attack — 

Security against future attacks — 

Annexation of the territories requisite to afford se- 
curity — 

Suppression and enslavement of the annexed popu- 
lations — 

Renewal of military armaments accompanied by an 
increase in their strength in order to maintain the con- 
dition of force — 

A strengthened militarism within, and what amounts 

1 [From the Essay on Macchiavelli, to whose writings the passage in 
the text refers.] 



MILITANT GERMAN SPOKESMEN 339 

to the same thing, a more vigorous struggle against 
Democracy and Socialism — 

Increased encouragement of industries connected with 
munitions, which will have to supply us with arms in a 
future war, and of agriculture, which will be called upon 
to protect us against starvation — 

These are the stages which the Pan-German chauvinists and 
the reactionaries have prescribed in internal and external 
politics to German democracy and, unfortunately, to the ma- 
jority of social democracy as well. These represent the log- 
ical consequence of the first step on the downward path. 
C'est le premier pas qui coute. 

Deliverance from this fatal entanglement is only possible 
by a determined change of front. The first step on the down- 
ward path must be retraced, if we do not wish to be dragged 
down to the last halting place. The first step, however, is 
the recognition and admission of the facts: 

that Germany is waging not a war of defence, but a war 
of aggression; 

that this war, prepared long ago in all its details, was 
intended to serve the materialistic extension of power; 

that consequently the intended acquisitions of terri- 
tory are not measures of security, but pure acts of con- 
quest ; 

that these acts of conquest must necessarily lead to 
new conflicts and to new military preparations; 1 

that an enduring peace can be attained in Europe only 
by the renunciation of conquests on all sides, by the 
sharpest protective measures against the chauvinistic en- 
emies of the people within the country, and by a pacific 
organisation of the European family of nations, without 
the formation of separate alliances. 

1 These sentences of course are also true of intentions of conquest on 
the other side. For more on this subject see the concluding section on 
War-aims. 



340 THE CRIME 

To bring these truths home to the German people is the 
purpose I have had in view in writing my books. In the 
present situation in Germany no hope can be placed in any of 
the parties other than democracy and social democracy, but 
not until these are convinced of these truths, and have taken 
the first step away from the path they have hitherto followed, 
will there be a dawning of new hopes for the free develop- 
ment of Germany, and at the same time for the peace of Eu- 
rope. If this is not done, the principle of force within and 
without will continue to triumph in the future, and the god- 
desses of reason and of freedom will for ever veil their 
heads. . . . 

The preceding section was written long before the Impe- 
rial Easter Message of 19 17 — before that monarchical proc- 
lamation, which issued not from an unfettered act of volition 
directed to the happiness of the nation, but from a feeling of 
involuntary terror, born of the fear of the nation, the pale 
reflex of the flaming celestial sign in the East. Prussia has 
been promised a better electoral law — in the future. We 
know to satiety these messages in Prussian history: "The 
message I can hear; 'tis faith alone I lack." 1 They are the 
favourite drafts on the future drawn by Prussian kings. So 
far they have never been redeemed. 

"It is bad enough for the German nation that the fear of 
its kings is its only hope, their terror is its only consolation" 
■ — so wrote Ludwig Borne, when a breath of freedom was 
wafted from Germany to France after the July Revolution, 
evoked by the western storms coming from France. The 
whispering of the zephyrs soon passed away in Germany when 
the fear of the French storm had been extinguished. And 
now when the hurricane has arisen in the East, the same 
thing will happen again to the long-suffering Michel, unless 
he at last awakes and dons the Phrygian cap in place of his 
white linen night cap, unless he proceeds with the necessary 
energy to immediate action, instead of allowing himself to 

1 [Faust.] 



MILITANT GERMAN SPOKESMEN 341 

be deceived by distant promises. Those parties and sections 
of the people who have once bent their backs before the 
Hohenzollern system of government by bayonet, who have 
lent it their support in the perpetration of the greatest crime 
in the world's history, will at any rate be incapable of such an 
energetic rally. 

"For all who scoff at fetters are not free." 1 But hardest 
of all is the task of deliverance in the case of those who have 
themselves forged and riveted their own fetters. 

ANTHOLOGY FROM GERMAN CHAUVINISTIC LITERATURE 
BEFORE THE WAR 

For the following compilation of utterances from Pan- 
German and chauvinist sources, I have made use of the fol- 
lowing excellent works in addition to material of my own : — 

1. German Chauvinism (Der Deutsche Chauvinismus) , by 
Professor Dr. Otfried Nippold (Stuttgart, 1913). To this 
work, to which I desire to express my deep obligations, I am 
indebted for a large number of valuable extracts, which, how- 
ever, give a wholly insufficient idea of the general impression 
produced by Nippold's comprehensive collection (extending 
to 130 closely printed pages). I would again recommend the 
perusal of this extremely instructive pamphlet to everyone 
who prefers the study of documents to the repetition of empty 
catchwords. 

2. What would Bismarck have Done? {Was t'dte Bis- 
marck?), by Count von Leyden (published by the Neues 
Vaterland, Berlin, Jannasch). 

3. Driving Forces (Treibende Krdfte), by Kurt Eisner 
(Vol. II of the 33rd year of issue of Neue Zeit). 

4. The Prophets (Die Propheten), by Wilhelm Herzog 
(Forum, July, 191 5). 

1 [Schiller.] 



342 THE CRIME 

I 

THE PRESS 

DIE POST 1 

January 28th/ 19 12. Psychiatry and Politics, by Dr. W 
Fuchs. 

In Germany to-day no reasonable person any longer doubts 
that the Triple Entente is getting ready to annihilate us. We 
all know that blood will certainly be shed, and the longer we 
wait, the more blood will flow. But few venture to advise that 
the example of Frederick the Great should be followed. And 
the deed itself no one dares. . . . 

And yet our people fail to make the practical application. 
Everyone knows, the whole nation feels, that only in the at- 
tack does safety beckon to us — and yet this cry for the attack 
is not heard. In a kind of whisper it passes round the card- 
table. 

For Germans to act on the defensive is suicide. Peace means 
not only shame, but the end. That also is known to many, 
and perhaps felt by all. And yet ! And yet ! . . . 

These men of genius were not swayed purely by cold calcu- 
lation, — Frederick began the first Silesian war out of cavalier 
love of glory — but they never avoided a necessary deed, and they 
never committed the mistake, weak in nerves and weak in thought, 
of treating a war differently from any other move on the political 
chess-board. For these heaven-sent men the blood of war was 
exclusively a by-product, the by-product of a necessity, of a 
duty. . . . 

What the writer says about the aggressive war for preventive 
purposes appears to us to be absolutely correct; for every war 
that is waged to anticipate a threatened and inevitable attack is, 
in the last analysis, a war of defence just as much as a struggle 
on which a nation enters only after there has been an open mili- 
tary attack. . . . When, speaking generally, we consider that 

1 The organ of the Free Conservative party, also called the "Ambas- 
sadors' party" because most of the diplomatists and many other high of- 
ficials belong to it. 



MILITANT GERMAN SPOKESMEN 343 

war, involving as it does the greatest exertion of national strength 
of which a people is capable, is in the interest of our nation, we 
are moved solely by the consideration that it represents the only 
means which to-day can still save us as a nation from the physical 
and psychical effeminacy and enervation which inevitably await 
us. . . . Whether, in the event of an undue prolongation of this 
situation, we should still be able to summon up enough strength 
to enable us to rise again is uncertain. The soul and the body 
of the German people are too nervously sensitive to be able to 
offer a permanent resistance to the destructive influences which 
are doubly operative during long periods of peace and repose. 

January ist, 19 13. The turn of the year — the turn of 
Fate? 

To-day at the end of the year it appears to be a plain duty to 
point out how the two Central European Empires, and the Ger- 
man element which is contained in them, are constantly being 
more strongly and deliberately cut off from the way to the south, 
and how at the same time the circle drawn round us by the 
Slavonic and Latin races, supported by our erstwhile cousins in 
England, becomes more and more stringent. . . . 

The present turn of the year stands under the ensign of the 
proud memory of a hundred years ago. . . . Then also the thir- 
teenth year of a new century brought deliverance from a heavy 
dead-weight of pressure, and we could not wish for anvthing bet- 
ter from the coming year. Should war be necessary for this 
purpose, as it was then a hundred years ago . . . the German 
nation will show that, as in the past, so now it is still capable of 
defying a world of enemies. The German people has not yet 
fulfilled its mission ; the achievement of the last and greatest part 
of its historical task still lies in the future. ... It is a hard 
school through which we are at present passing, but the quiet 
struggle for purification within ... is a necessity for us which 
could in no way be spared. Once we are the victors here, we will 
bear in mind the saying that we must either rule or serve, that we 
must either be the hammer or the anvil, * and with the will for 
decisive action we will seize the hammer in order to fulfill the 
saying of another poet, that the world will one day find healing 
in the German mind. 2 

1 [Goethe.] * [Geibel.] 



344 THE CRIME 

March 2fth, 19 13. "They lisp in English." 1 

This proposal (restriction of naval armaments), which is 
primarily calculated to bring grist to the mill of those elements 
in Germany who vapour about peace, and to cause difficulty to the 
Government in the Reichstag as well as among the people, is as 
clumsily grotesque as it is absurd. . . . Who will give us a 
guarantee that England is not shamelessly deceiving us in the 
matter ? 

April yth, 191 3. 

The longing for the times of a largely conceived Bismarckian 
policy, to which Herr Bassermann gave expression, extends far 
beyond National Liberal circles and is shared by almost the whole 
of the German nation; equally widespread is the view advanced 
by Bassermann with regard to the unfavourable nature of our 
present international position, and on the other hand with regard 
to the necessity for a national imperialistic world-policy, to which 
we are irresistibly impelled by the development of events. 

April i$th, 1913. 

Amongst those who know the French national psychology there 
has never been any doubt that, apart from a few superficial 
achievements in civilisation, deeper moral and cultural capacities 
were inherent in the French people only so long as it was covered 
and determined in its preponderant Celtic elements by a strong 
Germanic upper stratum. The weaker this upper stratum be- 
came, the more did the cultural capacities of the French nation 
recede. 

April 2 1st, 19 13. (Referring to the incidents of Luneville 
and Nancy.) 

A German paper recently described the French quite correctly 
as the worst-mannered people in Europe, and there is, indeed, in 
the whole of Europe no half-civilised nation which possesses so 
base, deceitful, contemptible and cowardly an attitude of mind 
as the French taken in their entirety. . . . 

Certainly, there is no doubt that France has had times of 

1 [Adaptation of line in Faust: Sie lispeln englisch wenn sie liigen, 
"They lisp like angels when they lie".] 



MILITANT GERMAN SPOKESMEN 345 

political greatness ; but that is a thing of the past, and it has 
meanwhile sunk to such a depth in all the virtues which dis- 
tinguish a strong and proud nation, that from the military point 
of view it can only be a very doubtful pleasure to have one day 
to fight with such a nation. 

April 25th, 19 1 3. The Army Law and the International 
Position. 

Can such a position, however, remain permanently in force? 
Can a great and rapidly increasing people like the German per- 
manently resign all claim to further development, and to the ex- 
tension of its political power? Can we be permanently satisfied 
with our present insufficient colonies and our endangered situa- 
tion in Central Europe ? Dare we run the risk that the increase 
in our population may, as in the past, be lost to our country, and 
that it should flow as a further addition of power to States that 
are inimical to us ? Is not the duty imposed on us of opening up 
for the excess of intellectual power which exists in Germany, 
and which frequently seeks everywhere for employment in vain, 
fields of activity which will be serviceable to the interests of our 
Fatherland? . . . 

From a policy of renunciation and abdication such as we have 
for years pursued we shall be compelled under the pressure of the 
national will to advance to such a policy as pursues positive aims : 
the strengthening of our position in Central Europe, the final set- 
tlement with France and England, the extension of our colonial 
possessions in order to provide new German homes for the 
excess of our population, the energetic protection of Germans 
abroad, the acquisition of points of support for our fleet, the 
further development of our active power in proportion to the 
increase of the enemy forces. These are the tasks which must 
be placed before the immediate future for attainment. . . . 

It is therefore quite a mistaken idea when the increase in the 
strength of our army is, as constantly occurs, spoken of as an 
insurance-premium against war, when, as again and again hap- 
pens, the maintenance of peace is emphasised as the most es- 
sential duty of the State, in the fulfillment of which no sacrifice 
can be regarded as too great ; for that is not true, and is only cal- 
culated to poison the mind of the people with false and enervat- 
ing ideas. 



346 THE CRIME 

RHEINISCH-WESTFALISCHE ZEITUNG 1 

January 12th, 1912. The coming war. 

Yes, it is coming . . . not the war for Morocco, . . . but the 
war of revenge for 1870, the war for Alsace-Lorraine. It is 
nearer than ever to-day. 

According to the moving sermon of the Chancellor, the Moroc- 
co-Congo treaty was to be a bond of peace. As a sign of the 
depth of degradation of which a German Government was capa- 
ble after the heroic year of 1870, future historians will date the 
origin of a new Franco-German war from the day on which 
this baleful agreement was signed. . . . 

The situation calls for immediate action. What is proposed 
with regard to the equipment of the navy and the army must 
as far as possible be prepared and executed at once. 

March 12th, 19 13. 

General Keim has, however, been completely successful in his 
unwearying educational task. If the statements contained in the 
Berlin Lokal Anzeiger of two days ago, "based on special 
information," are true, the Government has adopted all the de- 
mands which the Defence League, in agreement with the Gen- 
eral Staff, has for months been publicly fighting for in the most 
explicit manner. 

BERLINER NEUESTE NACHRICHTEN 

December 24th, 1912. War as a factor in civilisation, as 
the creator and maintainer of States. 

Under this promising title Dr. Schmidt has issued a pamphlet 
which it is earnestly to be hoped will have as wide a. circulation 
as possible for the services it will render in combating the pacifism 
which, unfortunately, is already disseminated in our midst, and 
in promoting the military spirit of our people. 

Here it is proved with unusual completeness and finality that 
war is not only a factor, but the main factor, that it is not merely 
the creator but the preserver of true genuine culture, that with- 
out it an ordered society, a powerful State, can neither arise nor 
be permanently maintained. . . . 

1 The organ of the Rhenish and Westphalian munitions industry. 



MILITANT GERMAN SPOKESMEN 347 

He then points out the dangers of excess of culture on the one 
hand and of excess of civilisation on the other, and convincingly 
points out that these dangers are only to be avoided by the out- 
break of war at the right time. . . . 

While the author in this way recognises war as a link in the 
divine order of the world, he in no way denies the blessings of 
peace, as the other chief factor of true, genuine culture, peace 
being to a certain extent complementary to war. He understands, 
however, under peace only a real, honourable peace, not that 
doubtful intermediate condition which can neither be called a 
true war nor a just peace. True war and true peace in healthy 
alternation and duration of time are for the author the condi- 
tions indispensable for the genesis and the maintenance of all 
that is good, beautiful, great, and lofty, not only in nature, but in 
true, genuine culture. 

March 29th. (From the weekly supplement "Deutsche 
Welt.") Germanism Abroad, by Karl Tolle. 

An entirely peaceful acquisition of land has in the general 
struggle for the "places in the sun" no prospect of success or 
permanency ; its reward has always been ingratitude ; its fate has 
been to go under. The desperate position of the Germans in 
Slav and Magyar territories, — further, the slow, if certain, dis- 
appearance of the German elements in the Anglo-Saxon Empires, 
in North America, in South Africa and Australia, teach us the 
urgent lesson that such an acquisition cannot be accomplished 
by peaceful kultur-efforts alone. The harvest is merely one 
of misunderstanding and suppression, when the kultur-bringers 
neglect, through disingenuousness and indifference, to unite 
themselves at the right time in a national sense, and to carry 
through their objects politically, if need be, even by the develop- 
ment of warlike activity. 

TAGLICHE RUNDSCHAU 1 

November 12th, 1912. 

Every true friend of humanity, everyone who means well to 
humanity, could not but feel satisfied if there were something in 

1 An influential and much-read organ of a Pan-German Conservative, 
anti-semitic tendency. 



348 THE CRIME 

the world to urge mankind and the nations forward, and thus 
prevent them from sinking in indolence and sloth. . . . 

If there were not something of this sort, the true friend of 
humanity would have to invent it, and, cost what it might, place 
it at the service of mankind. But, in fact, there is something 
which answers this purpose. . . . 

This something to which we refer is nothing else than war and 
the constant readiness for it. Woe to the nation which in this 
respect does not stand abreast of the time ! Woe to the whole of 
humanity, if it ever believed that it could dispense with this, its 
greatest benefactor, this the only trustworthy searcher and 
guardian of the all-round efficiency of each individual and each 
nation. 

Should the Gdtterd'dmmerung which has hung for so long over 
the European race and European civilisation at last be dispelled, 
and give place to the light of dawn, we Germans must no longer 
see in war our destroyer, . . . but we must recognise in it the 
redeemer, the physician which alone is in a position to save us 
from all the evils of body and of soul. 

DER REICHSBOTE 1 

January yth, 191 3. Germany and England. 

Indifference and irresolution in our diplomatic circles as well 
as eager desire for peace at any price not only, as is inevitable, in 
financial circles, but also, unfortunately, throughout wide classes 
of the nation — that is what arouses the indignation of us old cam- 
paigners of 1866 and 1870-1. Yes, indeed, "bliss was it in 
that dawn to be alive." To-day one could almost believe that 
we were back in the time before 1806. . . . 

There can be no doubt that there is in England a war-party 
which systematically works for a struggle against Germany, and 
that the most authoritative men belong to it. 

March 14th, 191 3. 

Above all it is an erroneous idea that the future will see eco- 

1 Christian Conservative newspaper, especially affected by ladies distin- 
guished for piety and high social position, who constantly speak of Chris- 
tianity, but by their actions and tolerances support the worst forms of 
anti- Christianity. 



MILITANT GERMAN SPOKESMEN 349 

nomic wars only. As at present the Balkan Peninsula is wit- 
nessing a racial struggle, so every German war of the future will 
be a racial war, a struggle for national-racial might and inde- 
pendence, for ground for Slavonic or Germanic settlement. Ger- 
many, indeed, will not of her own will enter on such a war until 
the work of settlement in her own territory has come to a con- 
clusion. But it is equally certain that in the event of a new vic- 
tory over France there will be, merely on strategic grounds, an 
appropriation of parts of French territory; in the same way it 
may be prophesied that there will be imposed on France the 
duty of buying out and accepting all the inhabitants of these terri- 
tories, who are unwilling to become German citizens on the 
ground of their historical German extraction. 

May 8th, 19 13. Oderint dum metuant. 

The manly words which the Crown Prince utters in his new 
book, Germany in Arms, have in these times of the worship of 
Mammon the stimulating effect of a refreshing breeze in a sultry 
atmosphere. Stimulating, indeed, only for a German manly heart 
which with new life sees a better time drawing near, for, thank 
God, the thoughts of the Crown Prince are shared by the whole 
of the youth of Germany. A better time which will return to the 
old ideals is approaching after a quarter of a century of the 
"fiery pursuit of money" which suppressed them. Of this, of 
course, the Jews wish to know nothing; their Press continues to 
cry "Murder!" We, however, say with the Crown Prince: 
"Peace, peace at any price is necessary for the undisturbed ac- 
quisition of money. And yet the study of history teaches us that 
all those States which in the decisive hour have been guided 
by purely commercial considerations have miserably come to 
grief." ... 

But where, as most frequently happens, it suits its case better, 
capitalism cultivates the other extreme, an enervating love of 
peace. This has for many years been the case in Germany. Un- 
fortunately, under the influence of modern intercourse and the 
international nature of capital, there has developed in our country 
an international or cosmopolitan way of thinking which always 
puts business in the first place, and views unfavourably the em- 
phasis of national considerations. 



350 THE CRIME 

HAMBURGER NACHRICHTEN* 

March 8th, 19 13. 

As far as can be humanly foreseen, we shall not escape the de- 
cisive struggle. The Imperial Government should, with the ut- 
most candour, doubly and trebly underline this for the whole na- 
tion to see, and should at the same time emphasise the fact that 
in the end we shall have to rely upon ourselves, . . . that in the 
next war it will be a question of to be or not to be, and that, 
therefore, every exertion must be made to endure with honour 
and success the struggle forced upon us by our backbiters and 
our enemies. 

April nth, 191 3. {Referring to International Conference 
at Berne.) 

The mere suggestion that men belonging to the German Empire 
should undertake these well-meaning and friendly services, and 
should attend on foreign soil a discussion on Germany's military 
preparations, is so monstrous that we may be allowed to doubt 
not merely the sanity of those who have issued the invitations but 
also their good breeding. A German who should take part in 
this conference would insult his Fatherland. 

DEUTSCHE TAGESZEITUNG 2 
April 2.8th, 1913. 

Can those in authority be surprised if throughout the nation a 
lamentable depression is felt because again and again it is seen 
that those who govern us are controlled by a disinclination to as- 
sume responsibility, or to face conflicts? It is long since anyone 
in the German Fatherland believed that the governing authorities 
would at last think of their duty, and turn to the policy which 
can alone lead to the goal. But if the guardians of the Em- 

1 Bismarck's favourite organ after his demission of office. 
% Leading organ of Pan-German Agrarian Conservative tendency, 
specialising in hostility to England. Political leader : Count Reventlow. 



MILITANT GERMAN SPOKESMEN 351 

pire fail, the people itself must become the guardian of its destiny, 
and the Gneisenaus and the Nettlebecks, the Arndts and the 
Bluchers, must arise 

May $th, 19 13. {Referring to the Crown Prince's book.) 

No one can escape the compelling logic of these sentences, and, 
indeed, their consequence is the Army Bill now before the Reichs- 
tag. The dangers of a purely material view of the world, di- 
rected merely to pleasure, are truly and admirably portrayed. 
Indeed, our whole development as a people preaches the same 
insistent lesson, that we must never neglect or grow weary in the 
task of seeing that our sword is sharp and our people fit for the 
battlefield. 

May ityth, 1913. {Referring to Berne Conference.) 

Had these men been endowed with a spark of that patriotism 
which, when all is said, they claim to possess, they would have 
rejected the invitation as egregiously lacking in tact. Whether 
Liberal or Conservative, whether Democratic or Monarchical, no 
German who loves honour can be in any doubt that in the ques- 
tion of our armaments by sea and by land the only body called 
upon to decide is the German nation acting through its ordained 
authorities, the Bundesrat and the Reichstag. . . . 

Yet this tendency did not become fatal until, as a result of the 
agitations of the effeminate Press after the resignation of Bis- 
marck, that spirit of cowardly resignation and tremulous nerves 
which confuses a dull and miserable state of inactivity with 
a restful calm invaded a large section of our bureaucracy and 
our diplomacy as well. 



DEUTSCHE WARTE 

May nth, 191 3. Habitual Enemies. 

The good will of a hundred parliamentarians is not by a long 
way the will of the nation, and actions to arrive at an understand- 
ing between those who are "habitual enemies," such as France 
and Germany still are, cannot be carried through by means of the 
fine phrases of those possessed of no authority. 



352 THE CRIME 

DIE GERMANIAi 

March %th, 191 3. 

When the great world-war comes, and all the Great Powers 
count on the inevitability of its coming, then the Triple Alliance 
will have not only Russia, France, and England but also the 
Balkan League against it. . . . 

After the events of the last six months a settlement with 
Russia appears to be much more imminent and more threatening. 
The Eastern question has assumed another form, and now it is 
simply Germanism or Slavism. 

DER ROLAND VON BERLIN 

December 24th, 19 12. 

These distinguished men, who consult at the council table re- 
garding the destiny of the nations, appear to have no glimmering 
of the fact that it would be preferable to endure a war rather 
than this constant fear of war. . . . To this there is added the 
oppressive feeling that Germany has on this occasion again pro- 
fessed the policy of the strong man who courageously withdraws, 
that she has not noisily thrown her good gleaming sword into 
the scales, but has once more protested from day to day and 
given assurances of her passion for peace which has long been 
the laughing-stock of all the Cabinets of Europe. 

ALLGEMEINER BEOBACHTER 

June 1st, 1913. 

England's present readiness for peace springs exclusively from 
the fear of having to sacrifice her miserable expeditionary force 
for France, and in this way being prevented from having troops 
in readiness to subdue revolts in India and Egypt. . . . 

We are lacking in every capacity for an energetic policy of 
power for which the nation cries aloud. ... As the diplomatists 
fail us, the army must help, and for long its equipment has been 
insufficient. 

1 The official organ of the (Catholic) Centre Party, the second largest 
party in the Reichstag. 



MILITANT GERMAN SPOKESMEN 353 



LEIPZIGER TAGBLATT 1 

January 24th, 1913. What about our World Policy? by 
Max Kuhn. 

With all respect for the rights of foreign nations this further 
must be said : Germany has not yet got the colonies which it must 
have. The increase of population, the growth of the needs and 
the achievements of our population, compel us. The Empire can 
still maintain its 70 million inhabitants. But millions are already 
torn from the soil. The misery of the great towns is spreading. 
Whole tracts of the country are being transformed into the joy- 
less sea of houses, cut off from nature, which you find in the 
great cities. Millions are divorced from the love of the soil — 
attracted by the phantom pleasures of city joys. Is there any 
thinking German who does not see in this the approach of the 
greatest danger to our future ? What shall we do when we have 
over 100 million fellow-countrymen? And we must count on 
that in spite of the decline in the birth rate. 

Our development demands recognition. This is a right of 
nature. This is no policy of prestige — no policy of adven- 
ture. . . . 

The exclusive pursuit of the maxim of the open door has been 
shown to be the gravest error in our high politics : it is high time 
that we proceeded to demand territorial expansion — not, of 
course, in the sense of transference of territory in Europe. . . . 

A passive attitude, drifting with the stream, is unworthy of 
us. We need an active policy. 

DRESDNER NACHRICHTEN 

April iyth, 1 91 3. Our Foreign Policy and France. 

For there is one thing for which every German patriot longs : 
to emerge at last from the state of groping and uncertainty, to 
see clearly where the path ought to lead, and then to pursue this 
path to the end, without interruption and in full knowledge of 
the meaning of our actions, as is the German manner. The inci- 
dent at Nancy affords an opportunity of showing whether the 
Imperial Government is prepared resolutely to tread this 
path. . . . 

1 Influential paper of Pan-German National Liberal tendency. 



354 THE CRIME 

The "understanding between nation and nation" of which social 
democracy dreams and speaks is still as remote as the sky which 
for ever will remain unreached. To import such a tendency in 
our foreign policy or even to hint at its possibility would indeed 
be the gravest of all the experiments in State Socialism which 
are prevalent in Germany to-day. That would mean the sacrifice 
of the power which we must have in order to establish ourselves 
and to make effective our claims to equal rights in the world. 

KOLNISCHE ZEITUNG 1 

March 10th, 19 13. The Disturber of the Peace. 

The fair dream of the pacifists and the socialists that perpetual 
peace might be bestowed upon the world by means of arbitration 
and international fraternisation has vanished and dispersed with 
the smoke of the Balkan war. . . . 

Thus the twentieth century also will not belie the teaching of 
world history, and it will still remain a fact that only the strong 
can make his influence felt in the world. . . . 

Never has the relation to our western neighbours been one of 
such acute tension as to-day; never has the thought of revenge 
been thus manifested in so undisguised a form; never has it 
been so obvious that the Russian Alliance and the friendship of 
England have been claimed only for the purpose of regaining Al- 
sace-Lorraine. . . . 

We must not seek too far for the reasons of the increase of our 
army, but find them where they are obvious to everyone; we 
should plainly point to the west and with outstretched finger in- 
dicate where the disturber of the peace sits — in France. 

MAGDEBURG1SCHE ZEITUNG 2 

November 2.7th, 1912. 

More dangerous, however, appear to me the increasingly 
articulate efforts and the agitation of those people, no doubt very 
well-meaning, who hang on the apron-strings of a well-known 

1 A leading paper of a National Liberal tendency ; a semi-official organ 
of the Government. 

2 One of the most influential of provincial papers of National Liberal 
tendency, frequently inspired by the Government. 



MILITANT GERMAN SPOKESMEN 355 

lady, 1 and who preach perpetual peace, forgetful of the fact 
that the whole of life is a struggle and that organic nature it- 
self is constantly involved in struggle. These people with the 
utmost intolerance regard everyone as bound by base prejudice if 
he is unable to follow the Icarus flight of their thoughts and de- 
sires, and they would make us believe that we alone are re- 
sponsible if mankind do not fall in each other's arms in a re- 
newed spring-time of the nations. 

March 21st, 191 3. Days of Danger, by Paul Kastner. 

Will it be our joyful experience that 19 13 will be a year not 
merely of remembrance and of commemorative speeches, but also 
a year of national action ? There is a fresh breath of the wind of 
springtime in the air. 



II 
ORGANISATIONS 

A.— PAN-GERMAN UNION 

Meeting in Hanover, 1912 (Die Post, April i$th, 1912). 

In his opening address the chairman touched upon the political 
situation and mentioned in particular the French Protectorate 
over Morocco which sealed the defeat of the irresolute and in- 
competent foreign policy of the German Government. Amid the 
enthusiastic applause of the meeting, he expressed his conviction 
that the so-called Morocco question was not finally solved, but 
that it might any day again become a burning question in con- 
sequence of breaches of the treaty on the part of France. We 
continue to hold the view that West Morocco is to be a field for 
German colonisation in a future which we may hope is near at 
hand, and we are confident that the Pan- German labour of last 
summer was not in vain. Herr Class also mentioned the most 
recent failures of the policy of conciliation in the Reichsland, 
Alsace-Lorraine. . . . 

The fourth speaker, Herr von Strantz, discussed the attitude 
of hostility to Germany shown in the policy of Belgium during 

1 [Berta von Suttner.] 



356 THE CRIME 

the Anglo-Franco-German crisis of the preceding year, and spoke 
to the following effect: 

. . . Belgium, in spite of the fact that the preponderating part 
of her population is of Flemish descent, has nevertheless in her 
foreign policy fallen completely into line with Anglo-French 
policy. . . . Confronted with a Belgium that is inimical to Ger- 
many, the Empire would have no interest in protecting the neu- 
trality of the country, and a consequence of the suicidal policy 
of Belgium might be that the fate of this country will be sealed 
on the occasion of the next European conflict, if its foreign 
policy continues to be one of hostility to Germany. 

Meeting of Pan-German Union in Erfurt, 1912 (Erfurter 
Allgemeiner Anzeiger of September gth, 1912). 

The President of the Local Division, Freiherr v. Vietinghoff- 
Scheel, in his address of welcome, reminded the members of the 
glorious time of forty-two years ago. Since then our people has 
grown enormously in number, wealth, knowledge, and capacity, 
but recently the respect in which it is held in foreign countries has 
declined, while internal discontent has been prevalent. The 
ground of this discontent is that our frontiers are too narrow. 
We must become land-hungry, we must acquire new territory 
for settlements, otherwise we shall become a declining people, 
a stunted race. From motives of pure love we must think of the 
future of our people and of their children, even if we are ac- 
cused of taking pleasure in war and plunder. If the German 
people had been afraid of war, it would have died out. . . . 

General Keim from Berlin emphasised the fact that Germany's 
path to unity and power was not adorned with ink-bottles, 
printers' ink, and parliamentary resolutions, but was marked with 
blood, wounds, and deeds of arms. States, however, are only 
maintained by the means by which they were created. . . . 

The last speaker of the evening, Excellency von Wrochem, 
warned them to keep their weapons sharp, and to test the edge 
of the sword in peace. In the general prosperity which they 
had experienced gold had, unfortunately, become dearer to the 
Germans than iron. Sentimentality and empty vapourings about 
humanity and peace brought us face to face with the danger that 
a species of cosmopolitanism might overgrow our German char- 
acteristics, and that our Kaiser might even be offered the Nobel 
peace prize. 



MILITANT GERMAN SPOKESMEN 357 

Berlin District. (Berliner Neueste Nachrichten, October 
25th, 1912.) 

In this local division of the Pan-German Union Dr. Schmidt 
delivered a lecture on "War as the creator and maintainer of 
States," which was most enthusiastically received. 

It was proved beyond all doubt that regular warfare was not 
only, from the biological and truly cultural standpoint, the best 
and the noblest form of a struggle for existence, but that it 
was also from time to time absolutely necessary for the existence 
of the state of society. . . . 

In the discussion which followed a number of writers on naval 
and military questions took part and described the dissertation of 
the lecturer as a masterpiece in the ethics of war, indicating that 
a wider dissemination among the people of this admirable train 
of thought was desirable. 

Meeting of the Committee at Brunswick. (Leipzig ef 
Neueste Nachrichten of December 2nd, 1912.) 

The chief speech was delivered by Dr. Graf du Moulin Eckart, 
Professor in Munich. The Pan-German Union had, he said, been 
called the German conscience. That was, in fact, what it aimed 
at. . . . 

But few German Emperors have understood the German char- 
acter. The German people has, we may say, grown great in 
spite of its Emperors. . . . 

In the first place the President, Herr Class, discussed the 
political situation with special reference to the Balkan war. . . . 
It is our desire that the two Powers should not sacrifice inter- 
national respect to the need for peace, that they should not give 
way to exorbitant Slavonic claims. There is little to be gained 
in avoiding a war now, when who knows how soon a war may 
be forced upon us, under much more unfavourable conditions? 

Neueste Nachrichten (Braunschweig) , December ^rd, 191 2. 

After a short interval Lieutenant-General Liebert addressed 
the meeting: 

A miserable Philistine policy was being pursued in Germany. 
(Applause.) We must send three million soldiers to the West, 
and a million to the East. . . . When spring returns, matters may 
have got so far that the Great Powers will have come into 



358 THE CRIME 

collision. Therefore the German people must hold together 
and be strong. 

. . . There was a smell of blood in the air and no one could 
say when the torch of war might not blaze up. 

■Hamburg Division. {Hamburger Nachrichten, January 
igtK 1913.) 

General von Liebert spoke on foreign policy and tne will to 
power. . . . The nations which increase desire economic expan- 
sion; they are compelled to an Imperialistic policy, and on the 
other hand, they are urged to pursue a policy of power which 
is directed to the extension of the territory over which they ex- 
ercise power. . . . 

A nation, which has increased so much as Germany has done, 
is compelled to follow an unremitting policy of expansion. It 
must honestly be confessed that since Bismarck retired from of- 
fice the will to power has failed. 

Meeting at Munich. (T'dgliche Rundschau of April 21st, 
I9I3-) 

In the first place the President, Herr Class, discussed the po- 
litical situation. . . . 

If to-day we stand to a man behind the Government and thank 
it for its ample Army Bill, we will, nevertheless, venture to ex- 
press the view that the German forces should be made use of, 
should jealous rivals or neighbours stand in the way of our needs 
as a nation. Our rapidly increasing people must enforce its right 
to existence; it must take care to provide itself with new 
land. . . . 

The German Empire must be far-seeing in making its future 
secure, and this is only possible if it resolutely proceeds to an 
active policy. (Long-sustained and enthusiastic applause.) 

General Keim discussed the Army Law. The speaker, who 
was received with much applause, said: 

So far as the treatment of the Army Law in the Reichstag is 
concerned, effect had not been given to any new points of view. 
All the arguments that the Government and the speakers of the 
national parties had advanced in support of the Army Law 
had been urged both in word and in writing eighteen months ago 
by the Defence League and the Pan-German Union. Even the 



MILITANT GERMAN SPOKESMEN 359 

speech of the Chancellor occupied the same ground as the 
Pan-German Union, in so far as he himself indirectly helped to 
destroy the legend of a reconciled France and a well-disposed 
Russia. . . . 

The history of the world everywhere teaches that only those 
nations have maintained a position of strength in the world which 
have placed the will to power higher than the mere will to peace. 

B— DEFENCE LEAGUE 

Casseler Allgemeine Zeitung, February 6th, 191 3. 

Lecture by General Keim in the Cassel local division of the 
German Defence League. 

General Keim: Every good German ought to belong to the 
Defence League. The Defence League was a league which 
fought to maintain our nation's power of defence, and for those 
ideals which the German people must have. There was a smell 
of powder in the world, even where at the moment shots were 
not being exchanged. . . . 

The Defence League had an educational duty to perform, for 
the sleepy-headed German did not always grasp the situation as 
it really was. He was too much under the influence of an exag- 
gerated enthusiasm for justice against which Klopf stock warned 
him long ago. We could certainly not rely on a similar intoxi- 
cation for humanity in the case of our opponents. . . . People 
often asked about the why and the wherefore of wars. Kings 
did not want them, Governments did not want them, the people 
did not want them. Why, then, did they arise ? War, however, 
did not depend on human will and desire; it was in most cases 
an inevitable elementary occurrence, a demoniac self- imposing 
power, on which all written agreements, all humanitarian efforts 
and peace conferences miserably came to grief. . . . 

When all was said, what practical purpose was served by the 
Hague Conferences which had been so much vaunted? He was 
sorry for the five thousand pounds that the palace for the 
Conferences had cost ; the money would have been better applied 
for the relief of indigent veterans. 

Hessische Post of February Jth, 191 3. 

General Keim then spoke. The speaker discussed in the first 
place the present general political situation. Within a time that 



360 THE CRIME 

could be foreseen a dangerously threatening war was inevitable, 
and we must be armed to meet it. The decision with regard to 
war and peace no longer depended on rulers and individual per- 
sons, but exclusively on the interests of the nations, and these 
interests pressed urgently for a settlement by war. . . . 

The peace movements and the labours and speeches of peace 
conferences were all nonsense. The speaker uttered a word of 
warning against the enervation of the German youth. 

Are we prepared? (Hannoverscher Courier, February 20th, 
I9I3-) 

General Wrochem endeavoured to answer this question which 
is so decisive for Germany's future. 

This situation could not be permanently defended; it pressed 
for a decision. The longing for an everlasting peace could not be 
satisfied, and it exercised a weakening influence. A just war 
would be better than that; yes, it would even be better to have 
fought and lost than never to have fought at all. They need not 
lack a great national aim ; in the division of the world among the 
other Great Powers, Germany had come out almost empty. Ger- 
many, however, needed new ground for settlements for its con- 
stantly increasing, inexhaustible wealth of men. 

Dansiger Neueste Nachrichten, March 6th, 19 13. 

Professor Hillger welcomed the meeting, recalling the days of 
a hundred years ago when the nation, glad in arms, arose to set- 
tle matters with its oppressor, the days in which the idea of 
compulsory service arose. 

General von Wrochem said our people longed after great na- 
tional aims. Our present policy appeared to be restricted to 
the maintenance of our position, but a people which, like ours, is 
developing and striving forward, needs new territory for its 
energy, and if peace does not bring that, there remains only war. 
To awaken the recognition of this fact is the mission of the De- 
fence League. 

The appeal to arms remained a holy right of the people. The 
Defence League demanded from the Government military prep- 
arations which would enable us to gain the victory quickly and 
without an excessive sacrifice in life. 



MILITANT GERMAN SPOKESMEN 361 

Tdgliche Rundschau of March 13th, 1913. 

Appeal of the German Defence League. The General Commit- 
tee issues the following appeal : 

The issue of the war signifies a perpetual serious menace to 
Austria. It may be that at first peace will be restored; but the 
Hapsburg monarchy will not be spared the struggle for ex- 
istence. Our existence, however, depends on hers. . . . 

Germany cannot be suspected of wishing war. A peace for 
forty-two years, entirely without precedent in the history of 
Europe, has shown that it means to make its power subservient to 
no other end than the maintenance of its independence and free- 
dom of motion. It covets none of its neighbour's possessions. He 
who asserts otherwise is a slanderer. But there must also be no 
doubt that it is resolved to maintain what it has. . . . 

Come then, all you Germans, who believe in the future of our 
people and wish to make its position secure, come and assist 
the Defence League in its good and great task. In devotion to 
the Fatherland let there be no distinction of party or of creed. 
The happiness and well-being of us all depend on it. It was only 
in virtue of this sentiment that our fathers a hundred years ago 
were able to free themselves from foreign pressure. 

Darmstadt er Tageblatt, April 23rd, 19 13. 

The President of the Darmstadt division, Dr. Bopp, spoke to 
the following effect: 

Let us at last learn this lesson from history, that an enormous 
wave of prosperity follows war, and rests upon war, that without 
warlike capacity the golden age of a nation can never endure, and 
that when enervation sets in, even economic ruin follows. . . . 

General Keim said that the fact that the Defence League was 
necessary, and on the right path, that it had only demanded what 
was absolutely necessary, was shown by the third Army Law, 
which demanded everything that the Defence League had con- 
sidered necessary. . . . 

The German people by its history and by the existence of its 
unprecedented culture has a well-founded claim to be heard in the 
world. With modesty we do not get very far. It is often neces- 
sary to give the answer with the sword. 



362 THE CRIME 

III 
INDIVIDUALS 

A.— GENERAL KEIM 

The Will to War. {Der Tag, October 16th, 1912.) 

They had, in fact, the will to war, and when such a will had 
struck its roots into the soul of a people, all diplomatic acts were 
powerless permanently to root it out. . . . 

With the will to war there must also be bound up the resolution 
to adopt a ruthless offensive, because it was only an offensive that 
guaranteed the victory. It is, and remains, the most effective 
method of transforming political will into military deeds. For 
this reason it is a phenomenon which brings little gratification 
when we observe that in Germany ... it has become the official 
and parliamentary custom constantly to speak of the "defence" 
on the part of Germany for which it must be prepared. No, Ger- 
many must be armed for the attack just as in 1870, and in ac- 
cordance with this her preparations must be strong enough to 
enable us with far superior forces to transform, as in 1870, the 
will to war into military action, should it be necessary to do so. 

Der Tag, November 8th, 191 2. 

Manliness and a sense of duty, these are primarily the qualities 
which bring a nation to the front, and assure its success in the 
struggle for existence, and war is the most portentous struggle 
for existence. And for this reason the words of the great war 
philosopher v. Clausewitz should to-day receive more considera- 
tion than ever in Germany : "Only that nation which is full of a 
martial spirit will have an assured position in the world." 

Der Tag, March $th, 191 3. 

This protection can only be effectively secured by an offensive, 
should the temple of peace ever be closed, and it is thus entirely 
a mistaken view, and, indeed, a danger to peace, to speak con- 
tinually of the "defence" of our country against foreign Powers. 



MILITANT GERMAN SPOKESMEN 363 

There is here a public affectation arising from a feeble tempera- 
ment, which refuses to look the seriousness of the situation in 
the face. 

Der Tag, April 12th, 1913. 

After all the last and decisive word will one day be spoken by- 
war, and when that comes, no one will be able to plead in excuse 
previous peace considerations, be they what they may. . , . 

Everything else, on the other hand, is evanescent, including talk 
about a good conscience, justice, humanity, world peace and the 
sacrifice of the German people. . . . 

Der Tag, May 10th, 191 3. 

For we have already got so far — we might even say we have 
sunk so low — that national pride and a manly spirit, which re- 
gards efficiency in war as the most valuable basis of national life, 
are described as chauvinism, used almost as a term of abuse. 

The French have never been a peaceful nation and they cannot 
be so, because it contradicts their innermost character, their thirst 
for glory, their national vanity, and, since 1 870-1, their hatred of 
Germany. 

B— GENERAL BERNHARDI 

"Our Future." (Die Post of December 23rd, 1912.) 

His essential purpose was to bring home to the masses the idea 
that we shall be forced to fight within a measurable time, and that 
therefore we must labour, by every possible means and by every 
attainable exertion, to have all the decisive trumps in our hand 
for such a contingency. 

As Excellency von Bernhardi has frequently expressed in the 
articles published by him in our paper, he is firmly convinced 
that the settlement with England can only take place by resort to 
war. . . . 

England must accord us an absolutely free hand in European 
politics and must approve in advance any extension of Germany's 
power on the Continent, such as might obtain expression in a 
Central European Alliance or as a result of a war with France. 
It must no longer seek to prejudice us diplomatically in the de- 



364. THE CRIME 

velopment of our colonial policy, so far as this is not designed to 
take place at the expense of England. It must consent to any 
modifications in the territorial possessions of Northern Africa 
that may be proposed in favour of Italy and Germany. 

We must therefore make up our minds to recognise the fact 
that a treaty-understanding with England cannot be attained 
either in the sense of an enduring friendship or in that of a 
temporary agreement. . . . 

This conclusion, however, signifies war, and war not only 
against England, but against the combined forces of the Triple 
Entente. 

1813-1913, by Bernhardi {Hannoversches Tageblatt of 
December 28th, 1912). 

The war which appears to be imminent will be decisive for our 
whole future. For us the question is whether we shall be able 
to maintain our present political position and develop into a world- 
Power, or whether we are to be thrust back into the position of a 
purely continental State of the second rank. May every German 
keep these alternatives in view; may our Government be in no 
doubt as to the great issues at stake ! To-day everything else 
must be subordinated to the will to power and to victory. In 
every individual there must be a living determination to achieve 
this victory, even if its attainment should prove arduous ; in that 
case our people will advance to a great future and will gain a po- 
litical position of world-wide authority in correspondence to its 
importance as a Kultur-people and to its great achievements in 
every field of peaceful competition. Then we shall experience 
days as glorious as those which fell to our forefathers a hundred 
years ago. That is the hope and the faith which beckon me in the 
new year. 

Bernhardi s "Present-day War' 3 (Konservative Monats- 
schrift, May ist, 19 13). 

. . . Materialism and dogmatism, in which we are sunk to-day 
and which manifest themselves in the crudest forms, especially 
in the industrial and the internal political life of the nation, in the 
pursuit of gain, in our trivialities and our obstinacy, in our red 
tape and our pedantry, in political bickering and cosmopolitanism, 



MILITANT GERMAN SPOKESMEN 365 

and in cowardly vapouring about peace which mocks at all the 
laws of nature. 

Here there is only one remedy, and that lies in art and in 
war. 

C— GENERAL EICHHORN 

Frankfurter Zeitung, November 26th, 1912. 

General von Eichhorn, the newly-appointed Army Inspector 
of the 7th Army Corps, delivered an address at a "Bierabend" 
given by the town of Saarbriicken, in the course of which he em- 
phasised the gravity of the time; he repeated that everything 
depended on being ready and he attacked pacifism. . . . 

The effect of these doctrines was to deceive the people, to com- 
mit a crime against them, and to deprive them of their manliness. 
In Saarbriicken every step recalled a higher frame of mind, a 
nobler point of view. 

With this "general" march I conclude the first part of the 
programme of the German chauvinistic concert, and I shall 
refrain for the present from any further criticism until I 
reach my general concluding observations. Any commentary 
would merely weaken the overwhelming impression of the 
music of kettledrums and of trumpets which I have presented 
to the hearer. It is sufficient to have presented plainly to the 
reader such productions of bloodthirsty warlike megalomania, 
of systematic unscrupulous incitement of the nations. It is 
to those who have so written and spoken that we are in- 
debted for the European war. 

Sapienti sat! 

B 
THE PAN-GERMAN UNION 

Before the War 

In 1 9 12, notwithstanding all the signs that pointed to peace 
and a diminution of tension ; notwithstanding the Potsdam 
agreements, the meeting between the Tsar and the Emperor 
William in Baltischport, the English readiness for an under- 



366 THE CRIME 

standing which received expression in Haldane's mission to 
Berlin and the negotiations which thereafter ensued; not- 
withstanding the definitive settlement of the Moroccan ques- 
tion, the Pan-Germans were even then wholly engaged in 
pointing with increasing passion to the "inevitable" Euro- 
pean war. They would clearly have preferred that the ques- 
tion of a Serbian harbour on the Adriatic which emerged 
towards the end of 19 12 should have led to the desired war. 
The policy of accusing the Entente States of hostility towards 
Germany and of bellicose intentions was at that time — for 
the sake of variety — chiefly directed against Russia, and less 
against England and France. The whole register — Pan-Slav 
hatred of Germany, the misleading of German diplomacy, 
secret agreements for the purpose of a coming attack on Ger- 
many, dismemberment of Austria, struggle of Slavonic races 
against Germanism in Central Europe, the party of the Grand 
Dukes, etc. — in short, the whole litany which is now daily 
intoned to us in German war-literature, was even at that time 
the eternally repeated theme of Pan-German announcements. 
These generals, admirals, professors, presidents and attor- 
neys may very well be proud to observe how skilfully and 
successfully they prepared for the whole German intellect, 
even for the Liberal and Social Democratic Press, the ideas 
and even the phraseology which since the beginning of the 
war have been devoutly repeated by the whole of Germany, 
which is now identical with Pan-Germany. 

Even on July 27th, 191 2, the Alldeutsche Blatter scoffs at 
the confidence of the German Press, as shown in the way 
in which it had received the Potsdam agreements and the 
meeting in Baltischport : 

They speak of "rapprochement," of a continuation of the neigh- 
bourly policy, which was initiated two years ago in Potsdam, and 
show themselves highly satisfied with the result of the discussions 
in Baltischport; the summit of satisfaction is reached by the 
leader of our foreign policy — no doubt in partibus infidehum — 
when he innocently and honestly considers it expedient to talk 
to a deputation of the magistrates of Kissingen of the success of 
the Chancellor exceeding all expectation. 



MILITANT GERMAN SPOKESMEN 367 

As against this spirit of confidence the Alldeutsche Blatter 
declares that "feeling in Russia was never so passionately 
hostile to Germany" as it is now : 

Never have preparations for a war against the West been un- 
dertaken with so much zeal; never has opinion in the nation and 
in the army been so much occupied with this war; never has 
the Government been in greater agreement with the national in- 
clinations in regard to war than at this very moment. 

In the general meeting of the Pan-German Union in De- 
cember, 19 12, the President, Herr Class, openly confessed 
the theory of the preventive war : "There is little to be gained 
in avoiding a war now, when who knows how soon a war 
may be forced upon us under much more unfavourable con- 
ditions? The moral impression of diminished respect must 
not be disregarded." 

The Committee of the Pan-German Union identified itself 
with the views of its President in the following resolution, 
which was passed unanimously: 

The political events of the last weeks have revealed the gravity 
of the position of the whole of Germanism in Central Europe, 
and have made it clear that it will not be spared the struggle for 
its existence. . . . Proceeding from this conviction the General 
Committee of the Pan-German Union is of the opinion that the 
German Empire must not permit Austria-Hungary to be 
weakened or defeated; it sees in the Serbian attack against the 
Danube-monarchy the first step towards a comprehensive attack 
of Slavism on Germanism, and it is from this standpoint that it 
views the question of the endeavour to obtain a harbour on the 
Adriatic. 

It is interesting to observe how the Pan-German Union in 
its criminal longing for war would have liked to make the 
petty question of a Serbian harbour on the Adriatic the start- 
ing point of a European war. This question of a Serbian 
harbour was also one of the "vital questions for Austria" — 
like the Skutari question, like the establishment of the Al- 



368 THE CRIME 

banian principality, like countless other questions, on which, 
as was then alleged, the existence of the Austrian monarchy 
depended, but which later on in the course of the war, when 
matters were going badly for Austria, they would gladly have 
made the subject of a compromise, if they could have received 
in exchange a separate peace with the Serbs or a promise of 
neutrality from the Italians. The question of the Serbian 
harbour was also one of those concerns which the Viennese 
Government, in its egotism and narrow vision, pursued to 
such lengths that even then a European war was within an 
ace of breaking out on account of such a bagatelle. For the 
Pan-German Union this harbour question represented a 
"Serbian attack" directed to the overthrow of the Danube 
monarchy! In short, even at that time they gave expression 
to the same train of thought, and indeed even made use of 
the same phraseology advanced later in his White Book by 
the docile Chancellor (p. 406), when he depicted the "men- 
ace to the existence of Austria-Hungary," and the "position 
of the Teutonic race in Central Europe." 

The real significance of this Austro-Serbian harbour dis- 
pute for the European nations, who were even then to be led 
to the slaughter-house on account of this trifle, was clearly 
enough expressed in the peace-manifesto of the International, 
agreed to at Basel on November 25th, 19 12, that is to say a 
few days before the resolution of the Committee of the Ban- 
German Union: 

The Balkan crisis, which has already produced such a terrible 
tale of horror, would, if extended still further, constitute the 
gravest danger for civilisation and for the proletariat. It would 
also be the greatest crime in history in view of the glaring con- 
trast between the magnitude of the catastrophe and the insig- 
nificance of the interests involved. . . . 

A war between the three great leading civilised nations on ac- 
count of the dispute about a harbour between Serbia and Aus- 
tria would be an act of c^piinal madness. The workmen of Ger- 
many and France cannot recognise that there is any obligation, 
resting on secret treaties, to intervene in the Balkan conflict. 



MILITANT GERMAN SPOKESMEN 369 

In these two resolutions, that of the International at Basel 
and the National at Brunswick, there is expressed the whole 
antagonism between the general standpoint of the war-party 
and the peace-party. The war-intriguers show themselves as 
the representatives of a small minority, who place their power 
and the interests of their profits above the true well-being of 
the nations, who are resolved to pursue their egotistical ends 
through blood and murder, and would willingly exploit every 
insignificant incident for the welcome purpose of enkindling 
the world-conflagration. On the other hand, we see the 
representatives of the labouring people on both sides, full of 
a sense of the triviality of all these questions, of territory and 
of power, placing the high end of the maintenance of peace 
before all other interests, defending as against the criminal 
madness of the war-intriguers the right of the nations to life 
and to peaceful labour. Who, however, gained their point? 
The Pan-Germans, of course. The greatest crime in the his- 
tory of the world became a reality. The hurricane burst 
forth in the very storm-centre in which, according to the 
wishes of the Pan-Germans, it was even then, in 19 12, meant 
to break. 

With the incendiary instincts peculiarly their own, the Pan- 
Germans have since that time never desisted from accumu- 
lating new combustible material in the very place where the 
greatest amount of inflammatory matter was already heaped 
together. Since it was not possible easily to provoke a Franco- 
German or an Anglo-German conflict, they continually pointed 
faute de mieux to the antagonism between Russian and Aus- 
trian interests in the Balkans. 

At a meeting of the Committee in Munich on April 20th, 
1913, Herr Class, the President of the Union, summarised 
the political situation of Europe to the following effect: 

According to all the reports of trustworthy informants, we are 
convinced that a settlement between Russia and us will take 
place in the immediate future, whether it be in connection with 
the antagonism between Austria and Russia, or in the form 
of a direct collision. 



370 THE CRIME 

In the Alldeutsche Blatter of January 31st, 1914, we read 
the following warning against the Russian danger: 

And in view of this will people speak about the prospect of a 
peaceful development? This would show all the greater lack of 
consideration inasmuch as there is among the Great Powers one 
whose action indicates that in Eastern questions it will in no way 
shrink from an extremely active, not to say an aggressive, role. 
That Power is Russia. We have been able to trace her joy in ac- 
tion not merely in military matters ; her love of action is thereby 
in no way exhausted. The concentration of troops on the 
Armenian frontier, the almost feverish accumulation of war ma- 
terial against our frontier and that of Austria, the systematic 
preparations against Sweden, gravely point to the fact that wide 
Russian circles once more appear to have succumbed to that desire 
for conquest which for a long time has been accustomed to break 
out in the Empire of the Tsar with great regularity every two or 
three decades. 

In April, 1914, Admiral Breusing at the meeting of the 
Committee of the Union in Stuttgart delivered a speech to 
which I have already referred elsewhere: France, he said, 
had reached the summit of her hatred; Russia was heaping 
up one on another official unfriendly acts against Germany: 

The military measures taken on the German and Austrian 
frontiers are extremely menacing; mobile masses of troops are 
directly before our doors. ... In place of England, Russia has 
stepped into the first rank of our enemies, and France is at 
her disposal as unconditionally as she has followed England in 
the past. 

It is enough for us to note Russia's threatening attitude, her 
military measures, her unconditional understanding with France, 
and France's desire and readiness for war. 

In weighing these carefully calculated cries of alarm, des- 
tined for the gallery — which simulate the doctrine of defence, 
but are in reality emanations of an aggressive imperialism — 
it should be observed that in the preceding year the German 
Government had obtained approval of the greatest military 
proposals ever granted to a Government; that her navy, ad- 



MILITANT GERMAN SPOKESMEN 371 

vancing with gigantic strides, emulated that of England ; that 
Germany was in advance of all other nations in the construc- 
tion of the heaviest siege artillery, of Zeppelins and of sub- 
marines, as has now been made clear; that the meetings be- 
tween the Emperor William and the Archduke Francis Ferdi- 
nand constantly became more frequent, and took place at 
shorter intervals, the last meeting in Konopischt being held, 
in fact, in the startling presence of Admiral von Tirpitz ; that 
the Austro-Serbian war which had long been contemplated 
by the Pan-Germans as the starting point of the European 
war would in all probability have been provoked in 191 3, 
after the failure in 1912, if Italy had not refused her sup- 
port, and if that refusal had not at the same time given rise 
to the danger of a revelation of Austria's frivolous aggressive 
intentions. (For this reason Italy was not consulted before- 
hand in 1914.) All these facts should be borne in mind in 
order to appreciate at its true value the ostensible anxiety of 
Pan-Germany with regard to Russian attack. 

If Russia were, in fact, mobile, ready for war, and eager 
for the attack in 19 13 and the beginning of 1914, it is and 
must remain a matter of astonishment that in the critical days 
of July, 1914, she advised the Serbs to adopt a spirit of com- 
pliance towards the Austrian Ultimatum, that she proposed a 
decision by the Hague Tribunal, accepted the London Confer- 
ence, submitted all possible formulae of understanding to the 
Central Powers, sought and conducted direct negotiations 
with the Viennese Government, and neither declared war nor 
embarked on any aggressive action. Why did Russia as- 
sume this pacific and conciliatory attitude just at that mo- 
ment when her aggressive plans, so long nourished and pre- 
pared, could at last be realised? Perhaps Herr Attorney 
Class, the President of the Pan-German Union, who knows 
so much more than the modest writer of these lines, will be 
able to give an answer to this question also. 



On March 14th, 1914, the Alldeutsche Blatter announced 
the inevitability of a warlike settlement between the Central 



372 THE CRIME 

Powers and their neighbours on the east and west in the fol- 
lowing solemn words : 

We held, and to-day we hold more than ever, that Germany 
and Austria-Hungary, even with the most sincere intention to 
preserve peace, will be unable to avoid a warlike settlement with 
their neighbours on the east and west, but that rather a fearful 
decisive struggle will be forced upon them. . . . Anyone who in- 
tentionally seeks to conceal the grave position of a not remote 
future because he thereby fears a "weakening of the conjunc- 
ture," commits an unspeakably grave sin against the German peo- 
ple ; he stands convicted of high treason against the German na- 
tion. 

In the same sense we find on April 4th : 

Thus a not insignificant part of our people . . . are deceived 
with regard to the gravity of the situation, and are continually 
being led about in a political fool's paradise. If one day that 
which is drawing nearer to us from year to year, one might even 
say from month to month, becomes a reality, then we shall have 
a people that is as fitted to overcome hard times victoriously as a 
company of Berlin tea-aesthetes is for agricultural employment. 

In the number of the Alldeutsche Blatter of April nth, 
1 9 14, certain observations on our external enemies Russia, 
England, and France are submitted by General von Gebsattel, 
from whose pen we shall later read some highly significant 
statements appearing in the periodical bearing the equally 
significant title the Panther. He fastens on to the saying coined 
by a writer inspired for "war for the sake of war" to the 
effect that the German people had overcome with comparative 
ease the consequences of the Thirty Years' War, but that it 
appeared questionable whether it would survive the conse- 
quences of a further forty or fifty years of peace. According 
to Gebsattel, the German nation would run no danger of so 
enervating and effeminating a peace. England, Russia, and 
France with their hatred, their hunger for revenge, and their 
trade rivalry would at the right time provide the interruption 
of this "slothful time of peace." 

Even at that time, that is to say before the murder of 



MILITANT GERMAN SPOKESMEN 373 

the Archduke, Gebsattel, in a discussion of the strategical 
situation in the imminent world-war, counted on the attack 
to be made by Austria against Serbia; though, for this in- 
deed, no special gift of prophecy was required, since we 
know to-day (from Giolitti's revelation) what the omniscient 
Pan-Germans who managed affairs behind the curtain must 
certainly have known then, namely, that Austria in the sum- 
mer of 191 3 had already intended that "attack against Ser- 
bia," and that it was in no way to be counted as righteous- 
ness to the Viennese Government that the Austro-Serbian 
war did not on that occasion come off, and that the Euro- 
pean war so long desired by the Pan-Germans was thus once 
again postponed. 

In April, 19 14, on the occasion of a meeting of the Com- 
mittee of the Pan-German Union, the Munich professor, 
Graf du Moulin-Eckart, could no longer restrain his im- 
patience : "The day of destiny draws near," he exclaimed, 
"and even if we should have hanging over us Ragnarok, 
veiling the end of the world, it would be better to plunge into 
the tumultuous battle than endure a lingering malady." 

In his report on the foreign political situation Admiral 
Breusing of Berlin, ascribed the diminution of the Anglo- 
German tension, which he was so good as to confirm, not by 
any means to the friendly sentiments of England, but only to 
our constantly increasing naval power. England was still 
ready 

to participate in the hostile machination of other States against 
our Fatherland . . . We have long been convinced that the 
unnatural conditions in Europe, the desire of our opponents to 
eliminate us in any large political activity of world-wide im- 
portance, must lead to a warlike settlement ; that for us it is no 
longer a question of bending, but of breaking. The reproach 
which we bring against the responsible persons in our midst is 
that they are leaving to our opponents the decision as to when 
the settlement shall begin. We have characterised this position 
in the watchword that we have ceased to be the subject of high 
policy, that we have become the object, merely the object. We 



374 THE CRIME 

demand that there shall be a break with this policy of the uncer- 
tain will and the faltering decision; we mean to be the masters 
of our decisions, and not to> have them forced upon us from 
without. 

The pugnacious Admiral refuses to know anything about 
colonial agreements, no matter in how conciliatory a manner 
they may be treated by England, France, or Russia. The 
delimitation of spheres of interest in Asiatic Turkey is for 
him "of no interest and must not mislead us. Our fate will 
be decided in Europe ; we know how matters here are pressing 
for a decision, and we must not allow ourselves to be de- 
ceived as to the necessity of this decision by the fact that 
under compulsion negotiations may be conducted with us re- 
lating to matters outside Europe." 

From this point of view, that it is not the pen but the 
sword that will be called upon to decide with regard to our 
interests within and without Europe, the Admiral rejects 
in advance any result that may follow from the Anglo-Ger- 
man negotiations which were pending with regard to the 
Portuguese possessions in Africa. The sea-hero hungers for 
land: "What we need are lands of our own on which to 
settle." Political influence and commercial exploitation are 
not sufficient. As if, notwithstanding our relatively small 
colonial possessions, we did not already have land in wealth 
and abundance outside our own frontier, more land than we 
shall be able to colonise in many generations, but above all 
much more land than we can make use of, according to the 
statistics of our population and emigration! I have already 
pointed out in my book that our emigration is exiguous; that 
we are on the point of becoming a country of immigrants; 
that we have indeed long ago already arrived at this posi- 
tion, if we include in our calculations as immigrants the 
hundreds of thousands of Polish and Russian agricultural 
labourers who are required for agriculture in our eastern ter- 
ritories. A calculation on such a basis would, in fact, be 
correct, since the need of foreign workers on the land is a 
constant recurring factor in our foreign statistics. 



MILITANT GERMAN SPOKESMEN 375 

As a matter of course, the Pan-German Union was not 
content with the gigantic provision for the army in 19 13, 
but demanded new military preparations forthwith. In order 
to furnish grounds for these demands, resort was had to the 
familiar tactics of ascribing to the Entente Powers bellicose 
intentions against Germany and Austria, and of painting the 
European situation as black as, for their own purposes, they 
wished it to be, and as they had endeavoured to make it by 
all the means in their power. Anyone who by painstaking 
study has gradually penetrated into the train of thought and 
the tactics of our Pan-Germans, chauvinists, and imperialists 
will find everywhere, throughout all the speeches and writings 
before and during the war, the same method as that which 
I have already described in disposing of Schiemann — the 
method, that is to say, of taxing others with their own in- 
tentions, of laying at other people's doors the tension which 
they themselves have engendered and still keep on engender- 
ing, of representing the defensive alliance of others as an 
offensive conspiracy, of falsely representing the resistance 
offered by the other side to German efforts to achieve hegem- 
ony and world-power as an intention to compass Germany's 
annihilation. It is the subtle mixture of preventive, defen- 
sive, and imperialist-aggressive ideas — the latter the true ideas 
of the leaders, the former designed to deceive the great mass 
of the people — that we encounter everywhere in the announce- 
ments of the Pan-German Union. 

The resolution adopted by the meeting at Stuttgart in April, 
1914, also contains this twofold appeal: 

The General Committee of the Pan- German Union records the 
fact that the diminution of tension in the foreign European po- 
litical situation expected after the termination of the Balkan war 
has not taken place; that, on the contrary, the tension has been 
rendered more acute by the extraordinary military preparations 
of France and Russia, by the sentiment of hostility towards Ger- 
many prevailing in authoritative circles in both our neighbouring 
countries, and by unfriendly actions on the part of their Govern- 
ments. From all these facts the Committee draws the conclu- 
sion that France and Russia are preparing for the decisive strug- 



376 THE CRIME 

gle against the German Empire and against Austria-Hungary, and 
that both intend to strike as soon as they consider that a favour- 
able opportunity has arisen. The Committee is further convinced 
that this struggle will for a long period to come, and perhaps 
for ever, be decisive regarding the fate of the German people, 
and that with it there is most intimately connected the destiny of 
the other Germanic nations in Europe. Recognising this fact, the 
Pan-German Union regards it as its duty to urge our people to 
go forward to meet the great time warily and resolutely. 

On July 18th, 1914, a leading article in the Alldeutsche 
Blatter gives expression to the following views regarding 
France's alleged war intentions: 

The nation (France) believes after forty years that she is at 
last reaching the goal of her desires and bears the uttermost in 
the sure hope of a speedy solution. The decision must come 
quickly; in 1915 and 1916 it is intended that the dice should be 
cast regarding the fate of Europe. 

A weighty admission to make, fourteen days before the 
outbreak of war! It is an admission that France did not 
at any rate want this war of 19 14. That is to say, it is a 
proof against the predatory attack and the war of defence. 

it s|c jfc ^t s)s jjs 

The tone against Serbia assumed by Pan-Germany after 
the murder of the Archduke, — the manner in which advan- 
tage was taken to exploit this favourable opportunity to strike 
the blow at last, when Germany enjoyed a significant military 
superiority and had also by the completion of the Kaiser 
Wilhelm Canal secured her position at sea against all con- 
tingencies, — how the attempt was made to urge the Foreign 
Office, which was much too pacific to suit these intriguers, to 
remain firm on this occasion, more favourable than any that 
was likely to occur again, to refuse every advance, to render 
war inevitable, and how this attempt was attended with suc- 
cess — all this is familiar and does not require to be supported 
by many examples. Sheer jubilation thrilled through the 
Alldeutsche Blatter when Austria pulled herself together to 
the adoption of political measures "which were as coolly and 



MILITANT GERMAN SPOKESMEN 377 

skilfully prepared as they were impressively, indeed gloriously 
and resolutely, executed." What a gorgeous prospect of 
world-conflagration and world-war was opened by the vigor- 
ous action of the Viennese Government! . . . 



After the Outbreak of War 

And now, after the world-conflagration had really broken 
out: 

We hear the tread of the world's history ... It will be a 
struggle for life and death . . . It is a joy to be alive. . . . 

This is the hour we have longed for . . . Now the holy hour 
has come . . . The Russians false and tricky up to the last mo- 
ment — the French — confronted with the surprising reality — quak- 
ing and suddenly forgetting their thirst for revenge, — England 
coldly calculating and hesitating, — the German people, however, 
are jubilant. 

Since Algeciras, but more especially since the months follow- 
ing the spring of the Panther at Agadir, we have known that the 
Powers of the Triple Entente have grudged us the air we breathe, 
that they have meant us to choke in our stifling confines while 
they divide the world among themselves. That was an inde- 
fensible position. . . . Now everything is at stake. The pos- 
sibility of the German people's existence in Europe and across the 
sea must be made secure for all future time. Russia, deluded for 
her own destruction, forced the sword into our hand. Well for 
us that she did so! (Alldeutsche Blatter, August 3rd.) 

It need occasion no surprise that after the outbreak of the 
war which they had accurately foreseen in all its details, in 
its origin and complications, — or rather which they had de- 
termined in advance — the Pan-Germans pointed with pride 
to their prophetic gifts. Thus the Alldeutsche Blatter writes 
on October 24th, 1914, with justifiable triumph: 

The event to which we have for many years pointed with in- 
creasing defmiteness as something which approached with the 
inevitability of a law of nature, and of which the time of occur- 
rence was calculated with almost mathematical nicety by officers 
intimately connected with us, came like a thief in the night. All 



378 THE CRIME 

the apostles of peace, all the lukewarm Laodiceans who could not 
sufficiently decry the "Pan-German war-intrigue" as the "off- 
spring of an overheated imagination," have modestly stepped 
aside and concealed themselves in an embarrassed silence. The 
progress of their much vaunted civilisation, which in their view 
was bound even now to make any war between European nations 
an impossibility, has apparently not shown itself strong enough 
to prevent the attack on Germany, devised and executed on ban- 
ditti principles. 

We have never taken seriously these peculiar enthusiasts who 
in a world bristling with arms have wandered about botanising in 
search of the blue flower of world peace; for this reason also 
we have never chafed under their strangely "other-worldly" and 
unreal attacks, and nothing is further from our intention to-day 
than to contrast our position with these apostles of culture who 
have been so miserably disillusioned, and to bask in the glory of 
a policy of greater vision which has been justified by events. 
Here history has decided in our favour; they are weighed in the 
balance and found wanting. 

Father Keim, the general and the leader of the Pan- 
Germans, sees in the war which has broken out the realisa- 
tion of the ideal which for so long has been the object of his 
passion. He is glad that "the dogs which so far have only 
barked are now at last beginning to bite." (This refers to an 
alleged saying of King Edward with regard to the German 
Emperor and the German Government; before the war the 
phrase was hawked about by the Pan-Germans in order to 
spur on the "weak-kneed" Imperial Government to the "act 
of liberation," and to play off the "biting" son against the 
father who merely "barked.") In the Tagliche Rundschau 
of August 29th, 1914, the valiant general, in a free imita- 
tion of Nietzsche, sings the praise of the "men of force" who 
are now needed : 

The minor key of recent German policy, which has so long 
helped to lull us in the security of peace, must give way to the 
major key of large and ruthless determination. ... In these 
hours of destiny we need "men of force." Others cannot achieve 
the task ; for them the hammer is too weighty. 



MILITANT GERMAN SPOKESMEN 379 

Even now, after the outbreak of war, the unfortunate and 
only too docile Chancellor, and his Ambassador, Prince Lich- 
nowsky, along with him, are ridiculed and attacked in the 
Alldeutsche Blatter because they did not accept soon enough 
the doctrines of Pan-Germany which alone possess the power 
to save, and because they believed too long in the pacific in- 
tentions of the Entente Powers, more especially of England. 
If it had not been for Father Keim, Germany would have been 
lost: 

Without the last Army Law there would have been no German 
victory, and the Army Law itself would not have existed without 
Keim. 

Father Bliicher — Papa Wrangel — Father Keim : who will deny 
that it is in the very best company that the voice of the people, 
with a sure instinct for personal worth, has placed the in- 
defatigable protagonist of Germany's new fighting forces ? {All- 
deutsche Blatter, April 24th, 1915.) 

At one time it was customary to mention Goethe, Schiller, 
and Lessing as the three most precious stars in the German 
firmament. To-day Bliicher, Wrangel, and Keim have taken 
their place. Beyond all question we are getting on. Wrangel 
especially as a German national hero — the man who no doubt 
victoriously knocked the haughty Danes on the head, but who 
was continuously engaged in an unsuccessful struggle with 
the German language — Wrangel as a national hero! I have 
never laughed so much in my life ! 



Herr von Bethmann and the Pan-Germans 

Pan-Germany has been extremely ungrateful towards the 
Chancellor. Instead of receiving and accepting his penitent 
conversion to Pan-German doctrines with marks of approval, 
they have added to their previous derision an embittered cam- 
paign — a campaign without pardon on the principle of "no 
prisoners taken." 

After prolonged hesitation and delay, the Chancellor in the 



380 THE CRIME 

end not only allowed the main lines and the aims of his action 
to be dictated by the Pan-German Union, but in the perpe- 
tration of the deed, in the provocation of the war, in the 
reasons which he devised for it pour la galerie, above all in 
his treatment of England, he also acted on every point accord- 
ing to the procedure prescribed by this small but powerful 
party. 

The Pan-Germans had always openly proclaimed that their 
main object was the final settlement with England, the shak- 
ing off of the "political tutelage of the Triple Alliance," as 
the paralysis of England's position as a world-Power was 
euphemistically called; they had always claimed for us the 
"German right" of "guiding the ascent of humanity as a 
perpetually enduring master-nation," and with this end they 
constantly sought to drive home to the German nation the 
harsh exhortation that "Britain must be destroyed." Yet 
now these same Pan-Germans during the critical days from 
the ist to the 4th of August seized the hand of their English 
cousins with velvet gloves; they made appeal to the "common 
blood, the common conception of honour, the existence of 
common opponents in the form of Slavs," and they depicted 
the odious fraternal murder which would result, should Eng- 
land become the ally of Serbia, of Russia, and of France. 

Pan-Germany did not yet wish for war with England. 
First the harvest on the Continent against France and Russia 
had to be garnered, and then they had to sow the seed of 
dissension against their English rivals; then the time would 
come to climb the last rung in the ladder to world-power. 
This was the watchword of the Pan-Germans, and the Chan- 
cellor (from July 29th in his bid for English neutrality) 
trod with docility the path that was thus pointed out to him. 

Herr von Bethmann was not always so tractable a pupil 
of the Pan-Germans. Long embittered struggles and cun- 
ning laying of mines were required before the responsible 
Government were completely subjected to the word of com- 
mand of the irresponsible intriguers for war. After the 
Kiderlen Treaty the intrigue which had already been con- 
ducted against the excessively pliable Imperial Government 



MILITANT GERMAN SPOKESMEN 381 

and against the Emperor, who constantly rattled his sabre 
without ever striking a blow, proceeded at high pressure. The 
world-war was the constantly recurring theme in the speeches 
and writings of the Pan-German Union; the position of 
world-power was the lofty German aim which was to be 
attained by means of the world-war. The "driving forces" 
of our national life were contrasted with the pusillanimous 
unmanly methods adopted by the Government, which showed 
an excessive regard for industrial interests. Dr. Ritter, the 
leader of the Pan-German lecture and recruiting department, 
conducted the intrigue for war in wandering about the coun- 
try, and could not sufficiently laud the moral purifying power 
of war and the enervating effect of too prolonged a period 
of peace. 

Every trifling frontier incident, such as the affairs of 
Nancy and Luneville, was eagerly seized by the Pan-German 
Press in the hope that by such sparks they might be able to 
enkindle the European conflagration. The French national- 
istic movement of the protesting party in Alsace was, although 
wrongly so, attributed to French chauvinism, whereas in 
reality it was merely a reaction caused by the miserable Prus- 
sian Junker system of government in the Reichsland. The 
incidents at Zabern inevitably supplied grist to the mill of the 
German chauvinists. Lieutenant Forstner and Colonel Reuter 
were marked out as national heroes, and in numberless resolu- 
tions and telegrams they were congratulated on account of 
their heroic deeds against peaceful citizens. It was inevitable 
that in this case, as in all manifestations of the national spirit, 
his Royal Highness the Crown Prince of Prussia and of the 
German Empire should have been at the head of the move- 
ment. The more this exalted gentleman assumed an attitude 
of open conflict towards his father's Government, the greater 
was the jubilation with which he was answered by the chorus 
of his Pan-German retinue. "Let us rather creep into a 
mousehole than reel from one failure to another !" — exclaimed 
the Alldeutsche Blatter to the responsible leaders of foreign 
policy, when they still refused to turn right-about- wheel at 
the word of command of the pan-German generals. 



382 THE CRIME 



Pan-German War-Aims 

At the beginning of August, 191 4, they had at last arrived 
at the goal of their desires. War was resolved upon in Berlin. 
The civil power had finally capitulated to the military party 
and the Pan-Germans. According to the prescribed plan 
war against France and Russia, the national German war for 
world-power, had been provoked, and the attempt had been 
made, also according to plan, although unfortunately in vain, 
to keep England aside for the present. The violation of Bel- 
gian neutrality had brought in its train war with England as 
well. Now the whole issue was at stake. Now the mask had 
to fall. Now the question was to wage the war in such a way 

that we shall secure for ourselves peace from our neighbours for 
the purpose of settlement with England: France, Russia, and 
Belgium must be placed in a position of impotence so that they 
will be unable to disturb us in this task. It is, however, absolutely 
impossible to achieve this unless we impose on these opponents 
peace-conditions corresponding to the end we have in view; it 
cannot be done if we satisfy the wishes of the friends of the so- 
called "Kultur policy," and allow our enemies to get off with a 
moderate war-indemnity without loss of territory. (Alldeutsche 
Blatter, September 12th, 1914.) 

It will be seen that this represents exactly the war-aims 
already described in my book in the words : "an attempt to 
establish a hegemony on the Continent and, as a later sequel, 
the acquisition of England's position of power in the world 
according to the principle ote-toi de la que je m'y mette!" 
Will it be possible to shake off all these Pan-German writers, 
orators and agitators, above all their high protector and leader, 
in the way that is now attempted with General Bernhardi ? 

What our armies, our brothers and our sons are fighting for 
out there is the greater Germany which for a long time to come 
will assure a new generation of the possibility of settling and of 
working, and that implies frontiers which will promise us 
security against an attack by footpads such as we have just ex- 
perienced. 



MILITANT GERMAN SPOKESMEN 383 

This may be read in the Alldeutsche Blatter of November 
2 1 st, 1914. Such a pele-mele of defence and imperialism is 
indeed quite priceless. "My Fatherland must be greater" — 
that is the aim of the war. They would, however, never have 
taken steps to realise the aim thus constantly proclaimed — 
oh no! never! it had never been more than a pious wish — ■ 
had not the "footpads" by their rapacious attack forced us 
to realise it in war. But now, instead of thanking our oppo- 
nents on bended knee for thus providing the welcome oppor- 
tunity — for, indeed, in their unselfishness they hold the ladder 
to facilitate our ascent — we revile them in every key, and 
transform our greatest benefactors into the most evil male- 
factors. It will again be seen in what a logical blind-alley 
these people fall who endeavour to combine the incompatible 
and contradictory doctrines of defence and imperialism. The 
two series of ideas cannot exist together, they are mutually 
destructive, and of the two one must necessarily retain pos- 
session of the ground. 

An aggrandisement of Germany merely in Africa or in 
other remote quarters of the globe is violently rejected by the 
Pan-Germans on the ground of its insufficiency. France, Bel- 
gium and Russia must bleed in Europe, they must furnish 
territories and a war-indemnity, they must be permanently 
"placed in the position of impotence." The Foreign Office is 
protected against the suspicion that it could only have been 
thinking of compensation in Africa: 

Does it not almost amount to an insult to the German Foreign 
Office to believe that for such aims as these it led the German 
nation into war? 

Please observe: "led into war"! Here again the cat has 
been let out of the bag, as so often happens in the chauvinistic 
Press. This is again the involuntary admission of the impe- 
rialistic war of expansion. 

The Pan-German Union may well look back with pride 
upon its successes in the past. It may say of itself with satis- 
faction that "in all its predictions, exhortations, and warn- 



384 THE CRIME 

ings it has carried its point," that it has "in truth shown itself 
to be the conscience of the German nation." Lack of con- 
science struts about in the guise of conscience, just as false- 
hood so frequently assumes the mask of truth. Woe to the 
German people if it does not in the end tear the mask from 
these Tartuffes of patriotism, if it does not recognise behind 
the manliness of these braggarts, which simulates strength, 
the mocking, grinning skeleton of the most contemptible greed 
of profit and of power. 

The Pan-Germans will endeavour to make their influence 
prevail on the conclusion of peace, just as they have mastered 
and misled the peace-loving German nation in the preparation 
and the provocation of this, the most terrible of all wars. 

Vorwdrts of May 22nd, 191 7, published a very interesting 
and significant correspondence (to which I have already 
briefly referred) between the Chancellor and the general com- 
mittee of the Pan-German Union, represented by General 
Freiherr von Gebsattel. The Pan-German Union submitted to 
the Chancellor a memorial dated May 5th, 191 5, addressed 
to General Headquarters (where Bethmann was at the time), 
setting out the war aims of the Union, which we already know 
to satiety. It did so, however, in a form so threatening, and 
indeed so revolutionary, that the memorial deserves special 
consideration as a characteristic sign of the still undiminished 
power and ruthlessness of the Pan-Germans. The document 
contained an urgent warning against any renunciation of the 
forceful aims of the Union, which demanded the most gigantic 
extensions of territory on the east and west and in every quar- 
ter of the globe, and protested against any disclaimer of the 
"exploitation of our assured victory." 

It would be the most fatal political mistake that could be com- 
mitted and its immediate consequence would be revolution. It is 
necessary to speak the word. . . . An enormous disillusionment 
and embitterment will be the result ; there will be no steadying in- 
fluence, and the nation, deceived after having achieved so much, 
will rise. The monarchy will be imperilled and indeed over- 
thrown. It is the monarchical basis of the Empire and of the 
Confederate States that is at stake. 



MILITANT GERMAN SPOKESMEN 385 

Bethmann's answer to the preceding memorial (dated May 
13th, 1915) is also of interest in many ways: 

The demands put forward by the Pan-German Union as to 
the aims of the war will receive consideration after the complete 
defeat of all our enemies. For the moment the interests of 
foreign policy and of the defence of the country, which must take 
precedence of all other considerations, do not permit a discus- 
sion of the substance of these proposals. . . . 

I recognise the merit to which the Pan-German Union may lay 
claim in having raised the national will to power and in having 
combated the idea of international brotherhood before the war. 

It should not be concealed that Herr von Bethmann 
emphatically repudiates "the attempt of a minority to impose 
its will on those who are called by the Crown to conduct the 
Empire's affairs." He protests against the "threatening hints 
of revolution." But, nevertheless, he does not fail to empha- 
sise once more that "the war and its experiences have made 
the national will to power, the elevation of which is the 
justification of the existence of the Pan-German Union, a 
common possession of the German people." 

This interchange of correspondence makes the following 
points clear: 

1. The hardy confidence, the consciousness of power, of 
the Pan-Germans who could dare to address a memorial of 
this sort to the Chancellor, threatening revolution and the 
downfall of the monarchy, more particularly during his pres- 
ence at General Headquarters. 

2. The extravagance of Pan-German war-aims, which is 
already sufficiently familiar. 

3. The fact that the Chancellor did not on principle reject 
these war-aims, but merely postponed their discussion until 
the moment of "the complete defeat of all our enemies." 

4. The recognition by the leading German statesman that 
the Pan-German Union had by its activity before the war 
made the national will to power the common possession of the 
German nation. 

5. The confirmation, on the part of the Chancellor, of the 



386 THE CRIME 

fact that one of the efforts of the Pan-German Union had been 
to combat the ideas of "international brotherhood," that is 
to say, to oppose all pacifist efforts in Germany, and that this 
effort was as meritorious as it had been successful. 

These five facts are of extreme importance in arriving at 
a judgment on the situation in Germany, so far as war-aims 
are concerned, in recognising the inner streams and the relative 
strength of various forces and in determining their reaction 
on the policy of the responsible Government in connection 
with the aims of the war. The correspondence thus inter- 
changed shows once more — as indeed we already know and 
as will be proved in detail in the last section of this book on 
War-aims — that the Chancellor, despite his pacifist paroxysm 
in November, 1916, was never in reality "Bethmann the Pac- 
ifist," but that on the contrary, during the whole of his career 
until the present day, he has been the most determined 
opponent of all pacifist efforts, of all ideas of the brotherhood 
of the nations. As he is on this point in complete agreement 
with the Pan-Germans, so also is he in principle entirely of 
their opinion on the question of the so-called "security of the 
future of Germany." "Bethmann the Annexationist" does 
not differ in kind, but only in degree, from his Pan-German 
assailants. This point also we shall find confirmed in the 
later section. 



A peace according to the Pan-German prescription would 
be no peace, but merely an armed truce. It would be nothing 
more than the prologue to new tragedies. On this point also 
the wire-pullers of the Pan-German movement are entirely 
clear. But the idea does not alarm them; on the contrary it 
appeases them. It is to an iron age that we are to advance, 
one war is to follow another until the foundation-stone of 
German world-power is immovably laid and the saying is 
fulfilled: 

"For the world will one day find 
Healing in the German mind." 



MILITANT GERMAN SPOKESMEN 387 

In an article in the Alldeutsche Blatter of June 5th, 1915, 
entitled, "The Laying of the Foundation-stone of a Greater 
Germany/' the cheerful prospect of a further series of wars 
is opened in the following words : 

So long as England exists as a world- Power, it will and must 
see its mortal enemy in a strong Germany, and it will in conse- 
quence constantly endeavour to scheme for the formation of 
a numerical superiority of opponents to accomplish its defeat. 
War between England and us does not turn on such narrow 
geographical aims as that between France and Germany; but 
the question is that of the predominant position at sea, and the 
incalculable value inherent in such a position. The existence to- 
gether of the two States, of which nany Utopians dream, is here 
as absolutely excluded as was the co-existence of Rome and 
Carthage. 

The antagonism between England and Germany will therefore 
remain until one of them is finally forced to the ground, and 
whether we shall be able so to crush England in this war is a 
matter which may well be doubted. 

In view of such claims as Jiese, who will venture to dis- 
pute the accuracy of the thesis advanced in my book that this 
is a German imperialistic war for world-power? Such 
expressions are not by any means isolated; on the contrary, 
they represent the key-note to which for many years the whole 
of our "national" literature has been tuned. Cost what it 
may, we must fight our way through until we have succeeded 
in crushing England; until we have attained a position of 
predominance at sea. Why should the German people in the 
twentieth century fare more easily than other nations have 
done at other times? Was there not more than one Persian 
War between Greece and Persia — more than one Punic War 
between Rome and Carthage? Did not the European wars 
which followed the French Revolution last for twenty years? 
Did not the great war of the seventeenth century last for 
thirty years? Did not the struggles of the Great Prussian 
king against his adversaries continue for seven full years? 
"What care I for child or wife, if they lack for bread, let 
them beg through life?" What care we for the life and 



388 THE CRIME 

well-being of the nations of Europe, our own included? What 
care we for the labour and the works of peace? What care 
we for humanity, culture and civilisation? "To the devil 
with all this talk about culture!" It is power we want — 
power! It is power resting on cannons and bayonets; it is 
the vigorous Prussian discipline with its calls of "Attention !" 
and "Fingers on the trouser seams!" We are born to be 
masters of the world, and masters of the world we mean to be. 
These are the wonderful visions of the future which Pan- 
Germany opens to us, — unspeakably appalling to men of the 
twentieth century, gifted with thought and sensibility, but 
quite logical and consistent for brutal "men of force" whose 
heads have been turned by ancient and mediaeval ideas of 
world-domination refurbished by the genius of Napoleon. 
These people believe that they are i?<?a/-politicians and they 
fail to observe that they of all people, suspended in the clouds 
of an unrealisable world of dreams, have completely lost 
touch with the real world of to-day. Befogged by hellish 
phantasies, they are blind and deaf to the signs of the times, 
to the first dawn of new centuries, to the bells that ring in a 
peaceful understanding between the nations, but, to their own 
undoing, they are also blind and deaf to the subterranean 
roar of those movements of rage among the people, which, 
like a devastating flood, will sweep away without discrimina- 
tion and without mercy those who have criminally reawakened 
the barbarism of a long-gone age. 

Pan-Germans, Liberals, Social-Democrats 

It would be superfluous to offer any further commentary 
on the outbursts of war-intrigue and of war-mania printed 
above. These extracts, drawn from newspaper articles, from 
pamphlets and from speeches, speak for themselves ; they fur- 
nish a faithful picture of the mental state of the ruling classes 
and parties in Germany, as they existed before the war, and 
as they have still further developed in the course of the war. 
Apart from the powerful associations specially founded to 
prepare for war, such as the Pan-German Union, the Navy 



MILITANT GERMAN SPOKESMEN 389 

League, the Defence League, the Union of Young Germany, 
etc., the speakers and writers quoted in the preceding para- 
graphs belong to all the political parties from the Extreme 
Right to the National Liberals, that is to say, they belong to 
those very groups which, when they act in concert, command 
a majority in the Reichstag. A much more important point, 
however, is that these groups occupy or control by their 
influence the places of authority in the Government of Prussia 
and of the German Empire. 

The progressive popular party and the social democracy 
of blessed memory were the only groups which did not take 
part, or at any rate, did not take part to the same extent 
as the parties on the Right, in inciting to war, in pressing for 
an "active" policy, that is to say, a policy of war, and in 
combating the "cowardly vapouring about peace, which mocks 
at all the laws of nature." It was the Press of these parties 
alone, representing, however, both in number and influence 
a mere minority contrasted with the groups on the Right, 
which for a time pointed in grave words to the stupendous 
dangers which German chauvinism might bring upon Ger- 
many and Europe. Before the war German democracy was 
still endowed with clearness of vision; it still recognised the 
seat of the evil, it still pilloried the so-called national Press 
as "mixers of poison" and as enemies of the people. Then 
there were still democrats in Germany; there were still true 
and sincere friends of the people who are always at the same 
time friends of peace as well. To-day that time appears to 
lie a hundred years behind us. 

"Pan-Germany here and everywhere!" was the call that 
resounded from the whole of the German Press at the begin- 
ning of the war. The blare of the national trumpet had 
deafened the most sensitive ears; the wine of national bombast 
had intoxicated the sanest minds; the "will-o'-the-wisp" of 
the lie of national liberation had blinded the clearest vision. 
Democracy had been caught in the snare of the Junkers and 
the militarists. They were enticed into the mouse-trap, cun- 
ningly set years before, in which in place of bacon-rind, the 
attack on Germany had been suspended as bait. Then the 



390 THE CRIME 

trap-door was allowed to fall and now we may observe, sit- 
ting within, Herr Ludwig Thoma of Simplicissimns, in trusty 
companionship with his antipodes of Kladderadatsch, masti- 
cating those same true Prussian ideas and sentiments which 
he has lashed with biting satire throughout his whole life. 
Messrs. Ullstein and Scherl went arm in arm with Count 
Reventlow, while George Bernhard, the ex-Social democrat, 
blew the same war fanfaronade as Maximilian Harden. The 
Freisinnige Zeitung, the official organ of the Progressive 
Party, vied with every patriotic paper which sported 
the Prussian colours in falsifying the history of the origin 
of the war, in demanding better frontier defence against new 
"attacks," in defaming those who, true to their convictions, 
proclaimed the truth. It is scarcely necessary to speak of the 
great and once democratic weathercock in Frank fort-on-the- 
Main, which in the brave days of its youth, under its founder 
Sonnemann, was the leader in the struggle against Prussianism 
and Hohenzollernism ; to-day, however, it draws its political 
wisdom, well cooked, from the Wilhelmstrasse and has even 
gone through thick and thin with Pan-Germany, so long as 
the war-makers in the Wilhelmstrasse enjoyed the goodwill 
and the support of the Pan-Germans. 

Meanwhile the position of this journalistic "civil truce" 
has been temporarily modified. The sharp opposition offered 
by the reactionaries and the super-annexationists to Beth- 
mann's government (on the occasion of the conflict with 
America on the question of submarine warfare, on the ques- 
tion of the "new orientation" in Prussia and Germany, on the 
determination of the degree of annexation necessary for Ger- 
many's "security" and the extravagant attitude of the parties 
of the Right on all these questions have once more produced 
certain differences of view, so that the Liberals of the Left and 
the Social Patriots occupy almost alone the thankless position 
of defenders of the Government. As, however, this Govern- 
ment is still sufficiently reactionary and annexationist, little is 
gained by this slight rearrangement, especially as we know 
from experiences which are familiar to all, that so far every 
Chancellor who has flirted with the Left has soon been brought 



MILITANT GERMAN SPOKESMEN 391 

back into the "right" path, or else has been ousted from office 
by the "small but powerful party." 1 

Among Liberal journalists on the Left an honourable 
exception both before and after the outbreak of war is fur- 
nished by Herr Theodor Wolff, the astute and sagacious 
editor of the Berliner Tageblatt. Surrounded by collabora- 
tors tinged with imperialism, fettered by the lynx-eyed censor- 
ship of the general who commands in the Marches of Bran- 
denburg, at times even prevented from writing, he has never- 
theless succeeded in skilfully steering his editorial bark 
between the Scylla of his own convictions and the Charybdis 
of those prescribed for him. Consequently, the attentive 
reader who is able to read between the lines may easily recog- 
nise his real views as to the origin of the war and where the 
responsibility for it rests. Like a white raven in the midst 
of the Liberal Press which has assumed the black and white 
colours of Prussia, he possessed the sense of journalistic 
propriety to refuse admission in his paper to any attacks on 
J' accuse and its author, simply because he was not in a posi- 
tion to accept any defence. This indicates a degree of stead- 
fastness of character which is doubly gratifying at the present 
time, when inconstancy is epidemic in German countries, and 
as such it deserves to be honourably mentioned. The Berliner 
Tageblatt is one of the few Liberal organs which have resisted 
the pressure of new conditions — which, though they may have 

1 So far as submarine warfare is concerned, this enforced return into 
the "right" path has in fact already taken place, not long after I wrote 
the above prophecy. Here the opponents of Bethmann have been victo- 
rious along the whole line. So far as the question of war-aims is con- 
cerned they will be victorious in so far as the military course of events 
permits the execution of their aims. Potentially in this question also they 
have been victorious — whether they will be virtually so, depends on cir- 
cumstances. In the question of the democratic "new orientation" Fabius 
Bethmannius Cunctator remains, as always happens, suspended between 
the two poles; he may be said to follow his practice of sitting between 
two stools. To the democratising parties on the Left he promises electoral 
reform; he allows the anti-democratic parties on the Right to hope that 
the promise will never be carried out. In the effort to satisfy all, he satis- 
fies none. 



392 THE CRIME 

had at times to bend, have never been broken. In the August 
upheaval of 1914, nearly all the other Liberal and democratic 
papers completely collapsed beyond salvation, losing their 
virile sentiments and their political traditions. Nearly all, 
including even the greater part of the Social Democratic 
Press, submitted to the poisonous, truth-killing regime of the 
civil truce, that is to say, to the system of falsification and 
hypocrisy prescribed by law. Nearly all have done so, with 
the exception of the small group of Radical Socialists, the 
present "Independent Social Democratic Party," which with a 
violent wrench has liberated itself from the bondage of the 
civil truce and has fought its way to the open confession of the 
truth. 

The Liberal Press before the War and the Chauvinists 

In order to illustrate the contrast between then and now, 
between German democracy before the outbreak of war 
which severely condemned the heinous offence of the chau- 
vinists and German democracy after the war which acted in 
concert with them, I produce in the following pages a few 
extracts from Liberal papers, dating from the spring of 191 3, 
which appropriately characterise the campaign of the German 
chauvinists against France, which at that moment raged with 
peculiar violence. 1 Of the papers quoted the Welt am Montag 
and the Berliner Tageblatt have alone resisted the storm of 
war. 

The Vossische Zeitung wrote on March 13th, 191 3, under 
the title "The Alarmists" : 

But now look at the other side of the picture! If it is per- 
missible to draw inferences with regard to the intentions of a 
Government and the plans of a State from the utterances of cer- 
tain excited individuals, whether they be professional journalists 
or blustering generals, — what in that case are we to think of 
Germany? There are German papers which in the craziness of 
their Chauvinism are in no way behind the Matin and the Echo 
de Paris and which have surpassed all previous records in creat- 

1 For these extracts also I am indebted to Nippold's pamphlet. 



MILITANT GERMAN SPOKESMEN 393 

ing dissension ; there are also officers in plenty who in peaceful re- 
tirement regard it as a crime against the Fatherland to keep the 
peace, who regard it as their duty to portray day by day the 
existence of dangers that cry aloud to heaven, who accuse the 
Government of contemptible weakness, no matter how extreme 
its demands may be. These are the men who, as the Chancellor 
expressed it on another occasion, "carry their sword in their 
mouth." Certainly France has no monopoly of blusterers and of 
those who are in a state of arch-readiness. 

BERLINER TAGEBLATT 

April 16th, 191 3. The incident of Nancy. 

.... It is true that certain German newspapers, mostly of a 
low class, are exploiting the Nancy incident for the purpose of 
inciting to war. The Tdgliche Rundschau, for example, which is 
not a whit better than the most shameless and unscrupulous 
French chauvinist organ, discusses the incident in an incredibly 
vulgar tone of rowdyism, and declares that "anyone coming to 
Europe must avoid France just as in crossing the street one 
avoids the gutter." 

April 21st, 1913. 

It is impossible to get over the difficulties involved in this ac- 
tion of the Pan-German clique by reflecting that the question con- 
cerns merely a small group of fanatical chauvinists, who are 
negligible when compared with the mass of the pacific people. 
For it has recently been made clear that there are numerous 
connecting threads leading in both directions from these jingoes 
to the reactionary parties as well as to those occupying official po- 
sitions and to influential manufacturers of munitions. If the 
Government, the Reichstag and the people cannot muster up 
courage to make a clean slate between themselves and the Pan- 
Germans, the Empire must in the end be stifled in the slough 
of armaments; and when that happens, no official peace policy 
can help. 

STRASSBURGER POST 

March 13th, 1913. Germany, France and Alsace-Lorraine. 

"An Old Alsatian" writes to us: 

If it were possible to give France a guarantee that it would not 



394 THE CRIME 

be attacked by Germany, a French Ministry would not be able to 
remain a single minute in office should it attempt to give effect to 
an increase in military burdens. 

Ninety-five per cent, of all Frenchmen are extreme lovers of 
peace, and they do not want a war of revenge at any price . . . 

If Germany desires an understanding among the nations, it will 
assuredly find the best support in France and England. As the 
stronger among the strong, it would in no way compromise itself, 
if it were willing to take the initiative towards an understanding 
which would lead to restrictions. 

STRASSBURGER NEUE ZEITUNG 

March 13th, 19 13. Chauvinism, by F. Stehelin. 

My opinion is that in France the chauvinists, whose views are 
almost identical with those of the Nationalists, are the enemies 
of the Government. Having regard to the character of their 
aims they are bound to be so, and indeed they cannot but be bitter 
and irreconcilable enemies. For the final goal of their desires is 
the restoration of the monarchy. . . . 

The best proof of this fact is to be found in the nomination of 
Poincare, who at the present moment personifies the idea of peace 
in France, and in the reception accorded to this nomination among 
the French people. 

The fact that the inciters to war are on both sides recruited 
from the reactionaries has an entirely different significance in 
the two countries. In France it is for them an element of weak- 
ness, in Germany it is to their advantage. There they are the 
enemies of the Government; here they profess to be the de- 
fenders of the prerogative of the Government, the zealous 
guardians of the existing regime. 

April nth, 1913. Chauvinistic Sense of Responsibility, 
by F. Stehelin. 

At the German Women's Congress held at Berlin in 1912 the 
Rector of the University of Berlin referred to France as the 
"hereditary enemy." ... I have sought in vain for anything cor- 
responding to this on the other side. The reason is quite simple. 
A writer like Barres, any politician or man who has his own axe 
to grind, might indulge in such incitements. But this could never 
be done by those who occupy a responsible public position, such 



MILITANT GERMAN SPOKESMEN 395 

as that of a clergyman or a university lecturer. They would have 
been certain to encounter the severest disapproval, and this 
prospect would have deterred them from their purpose, before 
they took the first step to its realisation. 

July 1 2th, 191 3. Pernicious Efforts, by F. Stehelin. 

The chauvinistic Press in Germany is bent on widening the 
gulf which reasonable people in Alsace-Lorraine are seeking to 
bridge over. It brings the charge of treason against those mem- 
bers of the Government who show themselves conciliatory to the 
native population. It decries as enemies of Germany all who are 
not of one opinion, and it shrinks from no perversion in order to 
obscure the position as much as possible. 

FRANKFURTER ZEITUNG 

April 18th, 191 3. French Chauvinism, by F. Schotthofer. 

At the present moment there are in Germany people as well 
as a Press who are surpassed in no other country in the matter of 
national sensitiveness. . . . 

Moreover, the historian of unprejudiced vision cannot conceal 
from himself the fact that in a certain period we have become ac- 
customed in Germany to noisy and boastful announcements, such 
as were at one time regarded as characteristic of the second 
French Empire. . . . 

Gradually, the only possible explanation was found in the 
secret German intention to provoke the French to the utmost by 
a continual series of pinpricks. After the appearance of the Ger- 
man warship before Agadir, this feeling became a firm convic- 
tion. . . . 

Yet, on the other hand, the aversion from a world-war has 
increased. No success could be a sufficient reward for the sacri- 
fices and the losses of war. This conviction has to-day become 
a living and fruitful force in the majority of the French people. 
It prevents any daring desire of aggression from arising and 
spreading. If any are resolved on war, this is merely due to the 
fact that they believe that war is forced upon them. It is resigna- 
tion, and not a free and considered resolution. For this reason 
it may also be asserted that the pure idea of revenge is not suf- 
ficient to make any war in France popular. 



396 THE CRIME 



MARZ 

March 29th, 191 3. Poison Mixers, by Ludwig Thoma. 

No ! Let us give to the chauvinistic Press what is due to the 
Press. . . 

Let us leave this honour to the Yellow Press ! It is the petty 
work of 365 days in the year — a mosaic composed out of all man- 
ner of baseness, distortions and lies. It is the work, not of great 
minds but of puny people who flatter degraded instincts, who 
further criminal desires and who, nevertheless, reduce men of 
honour and of understanding to silence by the use of phrases and 
of nothing but phrases. 

By constant repetition these people . . . have been able to 
transform empty words and lies into indisputable truths, they 
have insidiously poisoned public opinion until in an excess of 
unhealthy excitement it has lost the power of resistance. 

This Press has conquered. Let us admit it ungrudgingly ! . . . 

In Germany also the constantly repeated intimation of the 
inevitable war produces a paralysing and a pernicious effect. 

Braggarts who in the event of a war would not even run the 
risk of catching a cold are allowed to parade as patriots when 
they blow the trumpet. 

Banquet speeches are now scarcely regarded as properly 
rounded off, unless they contain a reference to the coming day 
when "wealth and life" will be hazarded. . . . 

It is all poisoned, and this we owe to the nationalist Press. 

Honour to whom honour is due! 1 

DIE WELT AM MONTAG 

April 2ist, 1913. Unreason on Both Sides, by H. v. Gerlach. 

.... Psychological diseases are also infectious. The de- 
lirium had scarcely broken out among the chauvinistic madmen 

*And people who in the spring of 1913 still characterised the chauvin- 
istic mixers of poison in these terms, did not observe, and do not yet 
observe, that in the summer of 1914 they were themselves incurably poi- 
soned, infected with lying "patriotitis," and from being bitter accusers 
transformed into supporting pillars of the crime of war. The most re- 
grettable phenomenon in the general "perversion" of the intellectuals in 



MILITANT GERMAN SPOKESMEN 397 

of Nancy, when the attacks of insanity began among the Pan- 
Germans. In the twinkling of an eye the lousy knaves of 
Nancy were identified with the French people. France was a 
barbaric State! Anyone travelling to France goes into the 
gutter ! If the Frenchmen's hide is itching, we will tan it for 
them ! The French nation has become a rabble sunk to the level 
of the negroes of Central Africa. 

So the storm roared through the Pan-German Press. If any 
French chauvinist paper were to publish a compilation of the 
abuse of France published by the Post, the Deutsche Zeitung, 
the Berliner Neueste Nachrichten, the Deutsche Tageszeitung, 
etc., it could copiously add new nourishment to, the hatred 
against Germany which exists in certain quarters 

The attitude of a number of German papers must be de- 
scribed as a disgrace to German culture. 

In the most fair-minded manner the French Government 
has given the requisite satisfaction to German public opinion, 
and has thus shown that it is a fitting representative of a Kultur- 
nation. As soon as the French Press was convinced of the 
truly shameful nature of the events at Nancy, they drew in 
their authoritative organs, with the requisite emphasis, the line 
between the French people and the uncivilised rowdies. . . . 

Every occasion is exploited with the object of feeding the 
flames of war, less perhaps in order to provoke war than to 
promote their own base party ends in the bellicose sentiments 
so engendered. 

Every incident of this nature represents a certain danger of 
war. We have unfortunately no assurance that the reason of the 
majority will continue to keep the upper hand over the unreason 
of the minority. . . . 

The unfortunate treatment of the Moroccan question by Ger- 
man diplomacy has again imperilled all that had been achieved. 
In practice we have scarcely gained anything in the matter, but 
we have brought grist to the mill of the French chauvinists. 
The spring of the Panther at Agadir was the crowning mis- 
take. . . . 

Germany is the violent change of colour of the blue-white Bavarians of 
Simplicissimus, formerly hostile to Prussia, into dutiful worshippers of 
the Pickelhaube, displaying the Prussian colours. 



398 THE CRIME 

And now comes the enormous German military law. For 
years France has been unable to keep pace with German military 
preparations. She has simply not had the men to do so. Sud- 
denly, without any sufficient explanation, it is proposed that the 
German army should be again increased by 130,000 men. In 
order in some measure to parry the German stroke, the French 
Government in its need snatches at the desperate measure of 
prolonging the period of service from two to three years. The 
French people are asked to make the enormous sacrifice in- 
volved in the withdrawal of all their sons from their civil call- 
ings for a year longer than formerly. And this is done merely 
because Germany, without any compelling occasion, has taken 
the lead in setting the bad example of an increase of arma- 
ments. Need we be surprised if the feeling against us in France 
is constantly becoming more bitter? .... 

Jaures has gained for himself immortal glory by the fact that 
he has devoted a great part of his life's work to fighting against 
the ideas of revenge. This man, one of the most brilliant orators 
in the world, has used his enormous influence on the workers and 
the intellectual classes of France entirely in the service of the 
idea of peace. 

But when Jaures comes to Berlin to speak in the sense of 
reconciliation, the Prussian police prevents him from appearing 
in public. 

Hatred, by H. v. Gerlach (Die Welt am Montag of June 
2nd, 1913)- 

.... It is after all known that the Defence League founded 
and conducted by him (Keim) is the inspirer of the enormous 
German Army Bill. In this case his appeal to the hatred of the 
nations can produce only the most baneful consequences. 

Such speeches with the leitmotiv of hatred against other peo- 
ples constitute the gravest conceivable danger to the peace of 
the nations, and consequently, to the interests of Germany as 
well. All good and sane Germans would therefore do well to 
draw a distinct line of demarcation between themselves and ele- 
ments of so doubtful a character. 

In conclusion, I print a report from the Frankfurter 
Zeitung with regard to a meeting of the Central Committee 



MILITANT GERMAN SPOKESMEN 399 

of the National Liberal Party with the object of indicating, 
by reference to the criticism of the newspaper which follows, 
the then standpoint of this organ, formerly democratic but 
now degenerated to nationalism. 

Meeting of the Central Committee of the National Liberal 
Party. {Frankfurter Zeitung of February 10th, 1913.) 

The meeting to-day of the Central Committee of the National 
Liberal Party was presided over by Bassermann, the Reichstag 
deputy. Bassermann spoke also on foreign policy and described 
the foreign situation as grave ; he demanded new armaments and 
advocated an active policy. He described the factors which had 
led to a worsening in our situation, above all the dissolution of 
Bismarck's Treaty of Reinsurance with Russia as a result of the 
Franco-Russian alliance which afforded strong support to French 
policy and gave a new stimulus to ideas of revenge, further the 
grudging attitude of England which had reached its highest point 
in Edward VII's policy of encirclement. The present Balkan 
War concealed a whole complex of questions which require our 
most careful attention. The speaker touched upon the statement 
of von Tirpitz, the Secretary of State, according to which a 
ratio of 16:10 was to be considered for the naval construction 
between England and Germany, and pointed out that very grave 
difficulties stood in the way of an effective agreement as to 
armaments. The whole international situation compelled us to 
make powerful military exertions which were perhaps unique 
in history. The German people was sufficiently mature to 
claim that it should be allowed to examine independently whether 
the proposals of the Government were sufficient to maintain our 
readiness to strike in our defence . . . 

In the discussion which followed, attention was gravely drawn 
on all sides to the feeling of dissatisfaction which prevailed 
throughout the nation on account of the lack of any initiative in 
foreign policy among those occupying responsible positions. 

The Central Committee demands that effect shall be given to 
general compulsory service, and to all measures which may serve 
to accelerate our mobilisation and to secure an energetic offensive, 
and they welcome with satisfaction the decision of the Confeder- 
ate Governments to submit to the Reichstag a proposal in 
agreement with these points of view. . . . 



400 THE CRIME 

Leading Article of the Frankfurter Zeitung, February nth, 

I9I3- 

A grave danger, to which serious attention must be drawn, is 
involved when a party leader of Bassermann's rank hawks up and 
down the country delivering bellicose speeches in which he de- 
mands an increase of armaments, and reproaches the responsible 
authorities for not pursuing an active policy. A correspondent 
drew our attention to this point some time ago, observing that 
speeches of this nature encourage the fear of war on the one 
hand and the pleasure in war on the other. . . . 

.... It appears entirely otiose to continue to pour oil on the 
brightly burning fire. Equally objectionable, however, is the 
unremitting pressure for "action." The German people demands 
a firm and calm, but not an aggressive policy; it has no desire 
whatever for any warlike complications, and it is nothing ' short 
of monstrous to endeavour to persuade it to entertain desires in 
this direction by the use of the inconsidered catchword that a 
war is inevitable sooner or later, and that it would be better for 
Germany if it came sooner. . . . 



Such was the judgment which German democracy passed 
on German chauvinism before the war. To-day the two act 
in concert, in the harmony born of the civil truce. The 
chauvinists have undergone no change; they have not given 
up a single iota of their ideas and their aims. The democrats, 
however (with the few exceptions mentioned above), have 
promptly swung into line at the word of military command, 
they have obediently complied with the order "Eyes right"; 
and in future after this efficacious blood and iron cure it will 
be difficult for them once again to be "surrounded by the 
Left." 

"Spiritual Regeneration" 

The patient reader has turned over with me the pages of 
the criminal album in which are authentically recorded the 
finger-prints of all those miscreants who have willed, pre- 
pared, and finally provoked this wholesale European carnage. 



MILITANT SPOKESMEN 401 

Against these proofs there is no contrary evidence on the 
other side. The men of the Pan-German Union, of the 
Defence League, of the Navy League, and of all similar 
centres of incitement to war stand unveiled before us in their 
shameless nudity. Their own writings and speeches rise up 
against them as accusing witnesses to demonstrate that they 
considered that the desolation of corpses and ruins represented 
by Europe to-day was of all conditions that most worthy of 
pursuit, and that they longed for its realisation — that they 
considered it worthy of pursuit for the double purpose of the 
moral refreshment and the development of the material power 
of the German people. 

What has become of the "moral regeneration" of the nation, 
which was expected to result, not from the exercise of moral 
forces, from peaceful labour and from the ascent in civilisa- 
tion, but from blood and fire, from the habitual and profes- 
sional pursuit of murder, from all the horrors and barbarities 
of a modern war of machines? On the contrary, is it not 
rather the case that the fact of having been accustomed for 
years to the work of annihilation and destruction, to hack- 
ing, striking, thrusting, shooting, stabbing and burning, to 
the slaughter of our innocent fellow men who only by chance 
speak a different language from us, or wear another uni- 
form — must not this constant denial of every civilised custom 
and of all humanity coarsen the characters of these countless 
millions of combatants to such an extent that many years of 
discipline and of the restraint of law will be unable to repair 
the injury? What will be the good of all moral doctrine, of 
all religion, of police and of laws, when millions of men return 
to their homes, having been for years the daily spectators of 
death in a hundred guises, of the most appalling mutilations, 
of blood and wounds — having themselves inflicted all this 
agony on their fellow men? Can it be seriously demanded of 
all these psychically infected individuals that, having returned 
to their homes, they should now forthwith lead a life of law 
and of morality? 



402 THE CRIME 



The Law of Adaptation 

We read with horror and pity how the unfortunate sol- 
diers, who for two and a half years have now been wrenched 
from peace and home and thrust into war in foreign coun- 
tries, have gradually undergone a kind of intellectual and 
spiritual adaptation to the new condition. The man who in 
peace was perhaps frozen with horror on seeing the body of 
a suicide lying by the side of the road can to-day see, unmoved, 
hundreds of bodies of the enemy lying before or entangled in 
the barbed wire ; he can look on hundreds of his own comrades 
lying lacerated and mangled in the trenches beside him; he 
can hear without flinching the pitiful cries of the wounded 
who are still helplessly exposed to the inexorable shell fire; 
he can endure without nausea the pestilential smell arising 
from hundreds of bodies of men and of animals, unburied 
for days. It is the law of adaptation which has thus trans- 
formed the man of peace endowed with civilised sensibilities 
into the slave of war whose feelings are blunted. It is the 
iron weight of the thought: "I cannot alter it; like all the 
others, I too must play my part; as chance has struck these 
to-day, so it may strike me to-morrow" — it is the feeling, 
crippling all power of resistance, of a monstrous destiny, of 
a fearful higher Power which has pitilessly descended on 
humanity — it is this that in the end makes all concerned into 
inert tools in the hands of their superiors. A "transmutation 
of all values" takes place; men gifted with reason become 
automatically working machines; indeed, and this is the most 
remarkable of all, the cowardly and the timorous not infre- 
quently become reckless heroes and knights of the Iron Cross. 

Heroes 

The psychology of the heroism of war is by no means so 
simple as it may appear to many simple critics. Alongside 
the ambitious impulse to attain eminence before others and 
to gain distinction, alongside the patriotic enthusiasm, which 



MILITANT GERMAN SPOKESMEN 403 

has been kindled in unfortunately too many credulous souls 
by the gigantic lie of the defence of the Fatherland — alongside 
these, so to speak, sanguine grounds of military bravery, there 
is, it appears to me, also a phlegmatic ground, which springs 
from the feeling of "absolute indifference." It all comes to 
the same thing in the end, says the man of phlegmatic dispo- 
sition; whether I remain in the rank and file, or whether I 
rush on to the attack before the others, it is always a pure 
accident whether I shall be hit sooner than they. The shells 
and the machine-guns make no distinction; on the contrary, 
it may be presumed that these machines, designed for whole- 
sale carnage, will be turned on the dense masses rather than 
on the individual. If then it must be, so be it. Keep at it. 
These are they whose heroism springs from indifference, and 
of these, as appears from many soldiers' letters, there are 
not a few : 

"There came a bullet whistling. 
Which of us two should fall ?" 1 

He who has drawn death in the lottery, must die. He 
who has been destined to live, will live. This is the philosophy 
of bravery of the indifferent, the philosophy of those who 
have gradually become completely deadened by the unspeak- 
able horrors of war. These also are heroes, like all others 
who give their lives a sacrifice for their Fatherland — for that 
Fatherland which is misused by the great only as a brilliant 
cloak for their base egotistic instincts, for their ambition, their 
lust for glory, their greed of power. They are heroes every 
one of them, the poor young lads of eighteen, like the bearded 
fathers of forty, who credulously and unquestioningly allow 
themselves to be slaughtered for the furtherance of the power 
of those in authority. 

They only are no heroes on whom this title is by preference 
ordinarily conferred. The "heroes" of Longwy, of Liege, of 
Champagne, of the Masurian lakes, the princes and the 

1 ["Eine Kugel kam geflogen. 
Gilt's mir oder gilt es dir." — Uhland.] 



404 THE CRIME 

leaders of the army, who bind the wreaths of glory about 
their foreheads, are, on the most favourable interpretation — 
assuming that they do not get others to do their work and 
their thinking for them — skilful military chess players, who 
adroitly move about the knights, the pawns and the rooks, 
with the object of checkmating the king on the other side. 
They are tacticians and strategists — their glory in this respect 
need not be depreciated — but they are not heroes. It is the 
others who are heroes, the men who have to execute the chess- 
moves which have been devised, who have to press forward 
in exhausting marches, in frost and in heat, despite hunger 
and thirst and deadly exhaustion, who having arrived at the 
point indicated in advance are called upon to expose them- 
selves to the devastating fire, to the barbaric struggle at close 
quarters. It is for these men, for the unknown who are yet 
so great, that we will reserve the title of hero, which the 
rulers and leaders of the army, behind the front, have wrongly 
claimed for themselves. 

In other and earlier times this title of honour may have 
been properly their due, when the great excelled the humble 
in personal courage and bravery. Arminius, the Cheruscan, 
was a hero. The old German dukes, who were the "duces" 
of their men, were heroes. To-day the position has changed. 
To-day those in high positions express their courage, not in 
deeds, but in words. In pompous appeals they exhort their 
unfortunate soldiers to the struggle, they urge them to hold 
out. Their secure Headquarters are most carefully guarded 
by troops, by squadrons of aeroplanes and by anti-aircraft 
guns lest any surprise attack on their precious lives should 
be made from the air — by land no 1 such attack is possible. 
When they deliver their bombastic speeches in animation of 
their troops, who apart from this are already intoxicated by 
three years' patriotic exuberance, the air is so filled with the 
whir of the protecting aircraft — as is faithfully reported by 
the war correspondents in their stupidity — that it is often 
impossible to hear the truculent words of the august gentle- 
men. 

For the princes, the field-marshals and the General Staff, 



MILITANT GERMAN SPOKESMEN 405 

war is the final execution of a drama which has been long 
desired, a spectacular show — and not even a tragedy, but 
rather a comedy. For they shout aloud for joy that it has 
at last begun; now at last they are in their element, like the 
fish taken from dry sand and replaced in the water. The 
comedy would of course soon be changed into a tragedy, and 
the curtain would be rapidly dropped if these ingenious 
devisers of battles, instead of moving the uniformed chess- 
men to and fro, had themselves in their own persons to play 
the parts of pawns, knights or kings on the bloodstained 
chessboard, and had to risk their own valuable lives. Any 
poor peasant lad whose red blood dyes the white snow, whose 
body has been mangled, whose face has been torn by a 
jagged fragment of a shell, is more of a hero than all the 
Kaisers, the Crown Princes, the Hindenburgs and the Macken- 
sens taken together. 

Suum cuique! To each one his own part. To the kaisers, 
and the kings who have provoked the massacre the punish- 
ment which is due to such a misdeed. To the field-marshals, 
who exercise their craft, the recognition which is due to 
every efficient expert achievement. But it is admiration and 
the gratitude of the Fatherland which should be the meed 
of those millions of unnamed heroes whose courage in sacri- 
fice is not rewarded by wreaths of glory or monetary grants, 
who, under the hypnotic suggestion that their Fatherland, 
their home, their house were in danger have cast aside the 
plane, the chisel, the pen, and have left the bench, the students' 
room, the workshop — who have first of all sacrificed to their 
Fatherland their civil existence, their calling, the source of 
their families' support, and then in a far country have given 
their life and their health. They do not reap glory in war 
like the "war-lords"; unlike the generals, they are not exer- 
cising their profession. They have been suddently wrenched 
from all that makes up their life, from their occupation, their 
business, their intellectual and material pursuits, from all the 
bonds of peace; and even those who are fortunate enough to 
return home unscathed will need untold years to make good 
what has been lost, to cease to be the idlers of war and to 



406 THE CRIME 

become once more peacefully labouring and industrious 
citizens. 

Psychology of the Free-Lance 

It is not merely the daily vision, year in year out, of blood 
and fire, of death and devastation, but also the habituation 
to a certain freedom, above all, to the element of unemploy- 
ment in a soldier's life, to the sensation of adventure and 
of danger in the constant change of scene and of the way of 
living, the alternation of safety and of mortal peril, of the 
life of jovial comradeship and of the cruel work of slaugh- 
ter — all this, the longer the war lasts, must gradually more 
and more engender in the soldiers a kind of "free-lance psy- 
chology," a feeling of unbridled joy in life, so long as things 
go well, and of fatalistic contempt of death when dangers 
menace. It is, however, a feeling which, the more firmly it 
becomes rooted, is less calculated to prepare people for their 
future peacefully ordered life, spent in devotion to duty within 
familiar restraints. The warrior who has half become a free- 
lance will later on have difficulty in transforming himself 
into a good husband and father, a disciplined worker in the 
workshop or the office. It will be hard for him to cast aside 
the habits of the free soldier's life; even in the workman's 
jacket he will often be tempted to display the wearer of uni- 
form. The free life of the soldier is the worst conceivable 
preparation for the orderly civilian life which, after all, must 
come in the end. There will be little trace of a "moral 
revival." in the men who come back safe and sound; indeed, 
it will be easier to find in them a moral and physical coarsen- 
ing, which implies no reproach for the individual concerned, 
but is merely the necessary consequence of years spent in a 
life of war. Criminal statistics, which show a considerable 
increase in crime after every great war; medical statistics, 
which confirm the introduction of contagious diseases by 
prisoners and returning warriors, bear testimony to the moral 
and physical regeneration for which, according to the theory 
of our Pan-German generals, we are supposed to be indebted 
to wars. 



MILITANT GERMAN SPOKESMEN 407 

C 

HOUSTON STEWART CHAMBERLAIN 

Germany — the only Shield of Peace 

What the war-enthusiasts and the inciters to war meant 
for Germany — how comprehensive and powerful was the 
organisation at their disposal, in the Press and in the various 
associations and leagues — with what perseverance and unde- 
niable skill they made these auxiliary means subservient to 
the purposes of war — how, relying on the favour of their 
exalted protectors, they asserted themselves with increasing 
hardiness, and drew their snare more and more closely round 
the Emperor and his Government by means of their accom- 
plices at the Court, among the generals and at the Admiralty — 
all these facts must be obvious even to the most incredulous 
reader after the perusal of the extracts printed above, which 
are merely samples from the overwhelming wealth of chau- 
vinistic literature. He will therefore be in a position to 
appraise correctly the following sentences of Chamberlain : 

And now after the fabrication that Germany wanted war, take 
the truth, which is that Germany is the only shield of peace. On 
this point the testimony of a foreigner may possess some value. 
For forty-five years nearly all my intercourse has been with Ger- 
man people, for thirty years I have constantly lived in German 
countries. Love of German ways, German thought, German 
learning, German art, made my vision keen without making me 
blind; my judgment remained entirely objective; .... And my 
testimony is to the effect that in the whole of Germany in the 
last forty-three years there has not lived a single man who wanted 
war, not a single one. Anyone who asserts the contrary, lies — 
whether knowingly or unknowingly. 

It has been my good fortune to have become thoroughly ac- 
quainted with Germans from every quarter and from all ranks 
in society, from his Majesty the Emperor down to honest work- 
men, with whom I had daily business. Never have I met anyone 
who was warlike or, to speak more accurately, anyone who was 
eager for war ( War Essays, page 1 1 ) . 



408 THE CRIME 

On page y6 we find : 

Three great nations have been arming for years and have 
formed a criminal conspiracy to attack and to annihilate Ger- 
many, the peaceful, laborious country that threatens no one. 
Thanks to a kind Providence, so many secret documents have 
now come to light that no one of calm judgment can any longer 
be in doubt as to the fact that the so-called "policy of encircle- 
ment" simply signified a devilish attack, a plan of robbery and 
murder elaborated in all its details against an inconvenient com- 
petitor. 

Chamberlain {New War Essays, page 7) : 

The dominant fundamental feeling in Germany was an im- 
movable love of peace, a sincere friendship for England, and a 
lively desire to live openly with France in good relations. It 
can be proved beyond dispute that these sentiments animated 
all classes in the whole nation, so that no one until the last mo- 
ment was willing to believe in the possibility of war. 

In the same book (page 16) we find : 

For years the annihilation of the German Empire, which is 
under the leadership of Prussia, has been the acknowledged or 
the unacknowledged desire and the increasingly fixed intention 
of all Englishmen who dabble in politics, and every educated 
Englishman dabbles in politics from morning till evening. 

It is a characteristic fact that Chamberlain's writings have 
had by far the largest circulation in the whole of the war- 
literature of Germany and that they have been printed in 
editions running to many hundred thousand copies, and such 
violent views as those quoted above, the value of which is 
always in inverse ratio to the assurance with which they are 
expressed, are to be found at every step in this Englishman 
of German chauvinistic tendencies. The proofs furnished are, 
however, even more astonishing than the assertions them- 
selves. The author of The Foundations of the Nineteenth 
Century prefers to take as the basis of his thesis what he 
calls "evidence from daily life," that is to say, conversations, 
alleged letters from private individuals, personal observations 



MILITANT GERMAN SPOKESMEN 409 

in France and England, etc. — in short, evidence which it is 
utterly impossible to check, but from which this profound 
historian deduces the fundamental sentiments in the psychol- 
ogy of nations, the peculiarities of race, and finally, by a bold 
transition, the intentions of the various Governments. 

It is impossible within the scope of this work to cite all 
the monstrous assertions of Chamberlain on the intentions to 
annihilate Germany entertained by England and France, or 
to illustrate his method of demonstration in the way which it 
merits. The above assertion, that every educated English- 
man is haunted from morning to night by the idee fixe 
"Delenda est Germania" is, for example, proved by the letters 
of four ladies, one innkeeper and a "Maecenas of Art," all 
said to be correspondents of Chamberlain, who reproduce for 
him "the general sentiment of Englishmen .... with 
a startling simplicity and a revolting cynicism" — the feeling, 
that is to say, which is expressed in the words: "we must 
cripple Germany .... we must throttle Germany." 
The four ladies, as well as the Maecenas of art, are Germans 
who have made their observations in England. The inn- 
keeper, however, whose testimony is of special value for the 
writer of the War Essays, is a Swiss "whose house enjoys 
a European reputation." In the hall of his hotel he was 
enabled to listen to the conversations of English men and 
women, and these in his capacity as a voluntary spy, he then 
reported piping hot to Herr Chamberlain in Germany. He 
testifies "that he never met a single German who was anxious 
for war, but that, on the other hand, for ten years and more 
he had heard every Englishman as well as every English- 
woman discussing day after day in the hall of his hotel the 
necessity and the inevitability of an English war against Ger- 
many, which was bound to lead to the complete annihilation 
of the German Empire." 1 

This statement, taken with the four letters from the ladies 
and one from the gentleman, is sufficient to prove beyond 
dispute that Germany is innocent of the world-war of 1914, 

1 New War Essays, page 18. 



410 THE CRIME 

and that England, in union with her partners in the Entente, 
is the incendiary. What is the signification of all the diplo- 
matic volumes as against this overwhelming private testimony ? 
"Is not such an underlying sentiment, and the consequence 
which with mathematical certainty developed out of it, incom- 
parably more interesting than a Blue Book?" exclaims Herr 
Chamberlain in triumph at the close of his demonstration. 
The fundamental English sentiment is for him summed up 
in the application of brute forces, in the resolution "to crush, 
to annihilate, to cripple, to throttle." If the Englishman alone 
is not strong enough to achieve this, he calls other nations to 
his assistance, "Russians, French, Serbians, Portuguese, 
Canadians, Africans and Australians, Negroes, Arabians, 
Hindus and Japanese, and he urges them all on against the 
dreaded German." x The proof of this is furnished by four 
ladies, a Maecenas of art and an innkeeper. Thus the chain 
of evidence is completed whereby England is bound by her 
own son to the pillory of world-history. 

****** 

Do not let it be supposed that I have maliciously selected a 
solitary example. Anyone who reads through the whole of 
Chamberlain's war essays will everywhere be confronted with 
the same kind of demonstration. Indeed, he surpasses in this 
respect the apparently unsurpassable Schiemann. The latter 
at any rate operates by means of printed newspaper cuttings, 
the existence of which can be checked, however arbitrarily 
and unfairly they may have been selected. Chamberlain, 
however, prefers to work on the basis of letters, conversations 
and his own observations, which are incapable of being verified 
in any way, which must be believed to exist on his bare word, 
and which, even if their existence is granted, would prove 
nothing whatever on the matter in question. In the muddy 
waters of these unverifiable stories and anecdotes the dexter- 
ous Anglo-German plunges happily about like a lively fish; 
he knows that in the turbidity of the pool he runs no risk of 
being netted and caught. He intentionally avoids the limpid 

New War Essays, page 20. 



MILITANT GERMAN SPOKESMEN 411 

waters of documentary evidence. On this aspect he leaves 
anything that has to be said to Helfferich and Helmholt, these 
irreproachable inquirers into the sources of history, who "with 
German thoroughness and impartiality" have sifted and ap- 
praised "the material which is already so difficult to survey." 
In combining facts, in imputing motives, in construing 
theories, of all men in the world Chamberlain is the man — 
the man to whom nothing human, from Christ to Richard 
Wagner, is unknown, the man who can write with as little 
comprehension about Goethe as about Kant. There Herr 
Chamberlain is in his own sphere, there he feels himself in 
his element. Where, however, the question calls for study, 
for the digging out of information or the documentation of 
facts, where it is necessary to determine and explain the 
actual occurrences by reference to authentic documents, then 
Herr Chamberlain leaves it to his partner, he withdraws 
behind the protective works which others have raised and 
leaves to them the task of defence. 

Who is Responsible for the War? 

As I have elsewhere pointed out, the question of the respon- 
sibility for the war is for him also a "sacred and earnest 
question." "It is absolutely necessary that every thinking 
man should be fully and decisively clear on this point. 
Phrases may suffice elsewhere, in Germany they are not suffi- 
cient. He writes, in fact, an essay entitled : Who is Respon- 
sible for the War? but he prudently avoids — as also does 
Schiemann — entering with the requisite degree of thorough- 
ness into the question of the immediate causes of the war, 
which he calls the "innermost circle." This he trustfully 
leaves to others. I have already mentioned elsewhere the few 
points in the "innermost circle" which he discusses, and have 
appraised as it deserves his method of treatment. His favour- 
ite fields of research are the "outer" and the "middle" circles 
of the causes of the war, that is to say, the incidents drawn 
from the more remote and the more immediate antecedents 
of the war, which, when one does not rely on authentic docu- 



412 THE CRIME 

ments, as I did, can be capriciously grouped and used to elicit 
tendencious conclusions. 

To show that in this last respect anything is possible, a few 
examples may be taken from the "outer circle." We know 
that for Chamberlain, who in this differs from Helfferich, it 
is not Russia but France that is "the oldest, the most stiff- 
necked sinner." France wished war, and for years France 
prepared for war. It was France that instigated the other 
two miscreants and gained them for her purposes of revenge : 

A fact as certain as that the sun stands in the heavens is that 
the politically authoritative circles in France, Russia and Eng- 
land have for years planned and prepared for war against Ger- 
many. — {New War Essays, page 38). 

It is in this tone and in this apodeictic style of making 
unproved assertions the starting-point of all discussions, 
instead of placing them, in accordance with the requirements 
of logic, at the conclusion of a demonstration, that we are 
conducted through the whole of Chamberlain's twaddle re- 
garding the "outer" and the "middle" circle, mercilessly ad 
infinitum. 

English policy, this "robber policy," is explained by refer- 
ence to the English national character : 

This policy is a necessary consequence of the fact that the 
whole of life is adjusted to the brutal pursuit of wealth, at the 
cost of the sacrifice of agriculture and the renunciation of all 
higher education and all ideal efforts, and added to this the 
renunciation of all morality and humanity, as soon as the inter- 
ests of the money bag are in question (page 53). 

This is said by an Englishman about the English people, 
who have at all times, and not least in the last century, pro- 
duced pioneer minds in every field of human activity, in litera- 
ture, in natural science, in technical arts and in philosophy, 
who in the development of constitutional order and freedom 
have been the model for all other European countries. 

Similar judgments on the English people are to be found 



MILITANT GERMAN SPOKESMEN 413 

at every step in Chamberlain's war-writings. What would 
the German patriots have said of the accuser if he had uttered 
a single word in this strain regarding the German people? 
What have they said of him? How have they abused and 
slandered him, merely because he dared to arouse his people 
against the liars and seducers, who exploited the innate good 
faith of the German for this unspeakable swindle of libera- 
tion? The accuser is placed in the pillory! Herr Chamber- 
lain, however, who has beyond all measure and without any 
restraint, abused and slandered in the most disgusting man- 
ner not merely the Government of his native land, but also 
his own people, is permitted in Germany to enjoy the special 
favour of the Emperor, and, as the English saviour of the 
German Fatherland, is overwhelmed with honour and dis- 
tinction. 

England desires the downfall of Germany "because it rec- 
ognises the incomparable efficiency of Germany; it is a case 
of envy of trade, of wealth, of arms, of learning and of the 
spirit; it is the envy of a brother." But the envious dis- 
turber of the peace will receive his reward : "May God give 
the victory" — such is Chamberlain's prayer — "to him who 
alone has wished for peace. May God show that he who 
best wishes peace can also be most efficient in war!" With 
this blasphemous raising of the eyes, which represents merely 
a variant of the blasphemous Prussian doctrine that God is 
always with the strongest battalions, Chamberlain pathetically 
concludes his investigation of guilt. 



Chamberlain as Historian 

It may be imagined how this collector of anecdotes deals 
with the few historical facts which he considers worthy of 
any mention at all : 

At the very beginning of the war the Government contrived 
to have Jules Jaures shot by a hired assassin, for he was the 
only Frenchman who had the courage to say what thousands 
think. — {New War Essays, page 40). 



414 THE CRIME 

In the first place, if you will allow me to say so, Herr 
Chamberlain, Jaures did not answer to the name of Jules, but 
was called Jean, just as the famous French poet Rostand is 
not called Camille, as you name him on page 1 1 , but Edmond. 
Even if you should, as suits your whim, falsify and reshape 
all other facts, the least that can well be asked of you is that 
you should at any rate take the trouble to write correctly the 
names of men of European reputation. So then the French 
Government had "Jules" Jaures shot? How has this fact 
come to your knowledge ? I have elsewhere proved, what was 
indeed familiar to all acquainted with the facts, that from the 
beginning of the crisis until his death Jaures acted in concert 
with the French Government in endeavouring to secure a 
peaceful solution of the conflict, and that it was he who sug- 
gested the decisive steps for the maintenance of peace, not 
merely to the responsible Ministers, but even to the President 
of the Republic. We know how the Ministers and the Presi- 
dent of the Republic were stunned by Jaures' death on the 
evening of July 31st (the evening on which the German ulti- 
matum was delivered in Paris) — how they mourned in the 
man who had been murdered the irreparable loss of the 
strongest helper towards peace; we know how moving were 
the words of the Prime Minister, Viviani, and his colleagues 
in honour of the memory of the "friend of the people" who 
had been so abruptly called away ; we know how Jaures' work 
for peace, even after his death, was continued by his col- 
leagues in full harmony with the Government, although, unfor- 
tunately, without success. All this we know. We also know, 
or at any rate it is easy to imagine, from what camp the 
half-insane assassin came who fired the fatal shot at the 
Socialist patriot — not to be confounded with our social 
patriots. He came from the camp of those Royalists and 
reactionaries who, in France as well as in Germany and every- 
where else in the world, constitute the picked troops of the 
war-intriguers, because they hope to fry their own fish at the 
blazing international conflagration. Time will unveil the 
truth. But Herr Chamberlain knows it already, he knows 



MILITANT GERMAN SPOKESMEN 415 

it in advance: the French Government murdered "Jules" 
Jaures. The sage of Bayreuth says so — and that is enough. 



It is charming to observe how this conscientious historical 
investigator in one place advances an unproved assertion and 
in another place quotes himself in support of this assertion: 

The statesmen of England have for years prepared for this 
war with unrelenting consistency, and in all those classes of so- 
ciety which were in any way near to those who controlled the 
country's policy, discussion has for long taken place on the "in- 
evitable" war of annihilation against Germany. — See my Essay 
"Underlying Feelings" {New War Essays, page 55). 

We turn up "Underlying Feelings" in the hope of finding 
at last evidence of the aggressive intentions of England. And 
what do we meet ? Four ladies, an innkeeper and a Maecenas 
of art — the same witnesses for the Crown who have already 
been presented to us for the purpose of convicting perfidious 
Albion. 



Russia's Spirit of Compliance — A Question of Detail 

The following sentence is interesting and very significant: 

Whether in July, 1914, a Berchtold may perhaps have been 
maladroit, and a Sazonof may perhaps have inclined to compli- 
ance — these and all similar matters are questions of detail which 
concern our "innermost circle," but they in no way affect the 
great middle fact of the inevitability of the war (New War Es- 
says, page 60). 

Here we have presented to us in a nutshell the whole sys- 
tem of German defence against the accusation of guilt. All 
that happened in the days from July 23rd to August 1st in 
the way of "maladroitness" on the part of Austria (a mild 
word for the crassest criminal egotism that has ever exerted 
its influence on the history of nations), all that was done by 



416 THE CRIME 

Russia in the way of compliance, that is to say, in proving 
her desire for peace, are questions of detail which do not 
affect us. War was inevitable! — there we have the familiar 
phrase of the Pan-Germans which has been ridden to death 
for years. It is therefore a matter of no moment whether 
Russia endeavoured to prevent it, and whether Austria by 
her "maladroitness" provoked it. Here again we have the 
shy avoidance of the documentary demonstration of the 
"innermost circle," an action revealing a consciousness of 
guilt, and in place of this we have the floundering about in 
the dirty basin of the "middle" and "outer" circle, where it 
is possible to fish out at will all that is suitable, and to leave 
all that is inconvenient lying at the bottom. 

Of course Chamberlain also fails to observe that by means 
of sentences like the above he eliminates the thesis of the 
defensive war and involuntarily acknowledges himself as a 
disciple of the preventive war. If, as Chamberlain elsewhere 
points out even more emphatically, Russia "from the outset 
and throughout the whole course of the following days re- 
vealed a real desire and hope for peace" — if "Sazonof, be his 
motives what they may, . . . was sincerely anxious to 
avoid war," 1 why did Germany declare war against Russia? 
Why did the Berlin Government not allow the resumed nego- 
tiations between Vienna and Petrograd quietly to follow their 
course? Why did Berlin either refuse or ignore all the Rus- 
sian and English proposals for agreement? Why have the 
German people been induced to entertain the erroneous belief 
that the Tartars and the Cossacks had already broken over 
the Eastern frontier in order to make Germany a Slavonic 
State, or, as the familiar formula runs, to march to Con- 
stantinople through the Brandenburg Gate. 

Russia's compliance in the decisive moment was a question 
of detail! No, Mr. Chamberlain, that is the most important 
question of all, that is the cardinal point about which the 
tumult of charges and counter-charges turns, with which all 

1 Nezv War Essays, page 75. 



MILITANT GERMAN SPOKESMEN 417 

accusations of guilt against the Entente Powers, all Helf- 
ferich' s theories of incendiarism, stand or fall. If the Rus- 
sian Government wished to preserve peace, it follows that it 
did not entice the French Government to become an accom- 
plice in a warlike attack, and that the French Government on 
its part did not assure itself of the military support of Eng- 
land with a view to the annihilation of Germany. The whole 
construction of Helfferich and of his followers, among whom 
Chamberlain is one of the most zealous, thus miserably col- 
lapses. 

And yet Chamberlain, the disciple, appeals to Helfferich, 
the master, for the necessary demonstration in the "inner- 
most circle." How are these things to be reconciled? — I ask 
the English Teuton who constantly repeats this same question 
on another occasion, namely, when he discusses the inconsist- 
ency between Grey's noble peace message of July 30th and 
England's alleged war-intentions. In the sweat of his face 
Herr Chamberlain endeavours to dispose of No. 101 of the 
Blue Book, a highly inconvenient document containing Grey's 
celebrated Note, which is indeed very hard to reconcile with 
the assertion of an aggressive conspiracy. He fishes out the 
most diverse documents from the diplomatic books ; he throws 
and beats them together so that it is a pleasure to watch him ; 
he quotes them, in part incompletely and in part falsely, and 
behold at the end of pages of juggling, of perversion, and of 
reshaping he succeeds in harmonising them correctly : The 
note of peace is a swindle; "the whole thing is mystification." 

I may spare myself the trouble of considering in closer 
detail this historical hotch-potch. The proof of guilt given in 
]' accuse and in the first volume of this work, relying strictly 
on documents and pursuing the question into all its details, 
relieves me of the necessity of furnishing a further refutation 
specially directed to the tendencious superficialities of such an 
historian, or rather of such a story-teller. I confine myself to 
giving an example which may indicate the manner of proof 
pursued by this the most widely read and the most highly 
valued of all the war-writers of Germany, whose works are 



418 THE CRIME 

disseminated by German propaganda in all countries and lan- 
guages, even in the trenches, in a special edition i 1 

In no despatch (from England) is a word of censure to be 
found regarding the revolting crime of Serajevo — this is a highly 
significant symptom ! For the English the Serbians are merely 
the "valiant people," the "small heroic nation," etc. {New War 
Essays, page 69). 

This is the crudest falsification. The English Blue Book 
is full of assurances given by Grey and his Ambassadors 
stating that Austria was fully justified in demanding satis- 
faction for the murder of the Archduke and security against 
similar occurrences. This standpoint was also immediately 
represented by the English diplomatists to the Serbian Gov- 
ernment, who were urged to show an extremely conciliatory 
attitude. Further, English diplomacy promised in the most 
binding manner to give effective support to the Austrian de- 
mands at the Conference proposed by Grey. Similar declara- 
tions were repeatedly given by the Russian and French Gov- 
ernments in the most definite form. Even the Austrian Red 
Book cannot but confirm this fact. 2 I have nowhere found an 
English despatch in which the Serbians are described as "the 
valiant people," "the small heroic nation," or by any similar 
phrase. The only reservation — a perfectly justifiable one — 
which Grey and also Sazonof made regarding the Austrian 
claims was that; Serbian territory as well as the sovereignty 
and the independence of the State should be maintained. In 
the opinion of the Entente States certain demands in the Ulti- 
matum, particularly Articles 5 and 6, infringed the sov- 
ereign rights of an independent State. As had already been 
proposed by Serbia, it was suggested that these demands 
should be considered at a conference of the Powers, or dis- 
cussed before the Hague Tribunal. In any case the way 
ought to be paved to a solution which would prevent the out- 

1 Other examples of Chamberlain's method of writing history are given 
in Vol. I of this work, pages 220 et seq. 

*See J' accuse, page 350; also Blue Book, Nos. 5, 12; Orange Book, 
Nos. 4, 40, 42, 43 ; Red Book, Nos. 41, 47, 50. 



MILITANT SPOKESMEN 419 

break of a European war on account of this trifling Austro- 
Serbian question. The statesmanlike, humane, and pacific 
standpoint thus assumed by the Entente Governments and 
their peoples is what Chamberlain calls the "almost silent 
acceptance of the monstrous." 

By means of such arguments as these, and others to the 
same effect, the Anglo-German historian, still arguing from 
the proposition of England's war-intentions, arrives at the 
conclusion that Grey's peace proposal of July 30th is either a 
"subsequent invention" or "a Machiavellian attempt of a 
deceitful and lying diplomacy"; in any case, it was not seri- 
ously intended. Herr Chamberlain would have spared him- 
self much trouble and brain fatigue if he had adopted the 
converse course of proceeding from the genuineness and the 
sincerity of Grey's action for peace in the summer of 1914, 
qualities which are obvious to every unprejudiced reader from 
all that the English Minister said and did, and if he had then 
critically examined from this standpoint the alleged bellicose 
prelude of Great Britain in the preceding years. In that case 
he would very soon have found out that it was not the peace 
action of the present, but the war action of the past, that is 
a Pan-German invention and mystification. For Herr Cham- 
berlain is entirely correct in asserting that the prelude and 
the main action are irreconcilable. The one or the other must 
be an invention. But since the main action from July 23rd 
to August 4th is documentarily proved by all the diplomatic 
books and by the German Government's own testimony (con- 
tained in many passages of the White Book), it follows that 
the deception can only lie in the prelude for which no evidence 
whatever is extant but merely vague presumptions, arbitrary 
arrangements of facts, and imputations. Every earnest 
inquirer who seeks the truth is bound to apply the critical 
plumb-line to this alleged prelude. By doing so he would find 
that England has never entertained warlike intentions against 
Germany, that she has never forged or promoted aggressive 
conspiracies, and that therefore Grey's action for peace in the 
critical days is everywhere consistent with the earlier action 
of the English Government. 



420 THE CRIME 

Helfferich's thesis of "Russia as the Incendiary" can not, 
however, be reconciled with Chamberlain's doctrine of "Russia 
as the maintainer of peace." The one completely contradicts 
the other. It is for Chamberlain and Helfferich to arrive 
together at a settlement on this point. 

Chamberlain on the German and English Peoples 

I have elsewhere spoken of the treatment, or rather the 
maltreatment, accorded by Herr Chamberlain to the exchange 
of Notes between Austria and Serbia (Vol. I, pages 205 
et seq.). It would be necessary to write volumes if one 
wished to nail down all the conscious and unconscious "errors" 
of this Anglo-German "patriot," or if one wished to describe 
in appropriate terms his unlimited abuse not merely of for- 
eign Governments, but also of foreign peoples, and his re- 
pulsive bungled eulogies of German freedom, German intelli- 
gence, German language, German efficiency, etc. 

For example, this true-born Englishman says with regard 
to the English and the German people: 

Hand in hand with this sporting idiocy in England goes a 
complete neglect, indeed a scornful contempt for all spiritual 
goods. . . . 

Every highly educated man is in England an object of suspi- 
cion ; he is respected only from the moment when his intellectual 
activity brings him in money. Otherwise he is counted a fool. . . . 

I do not know whether the Englishmen of to-day regard Mar- 
tin Luther as a free man. I fear that the overwhelming majority, 
even among the so-called educated classes, know little more 
about him than his name. . . . 

An un-German freedom is no freedom. . . . This German 
freedom is a completely original product. . . . For the first time 
in the history of the world freedom is possible as a comprehen- 
sive, enduring phenomenon. . . . The continued existence and 
the further development of freedom on earth is inseparably de- 
pendent on the victory of German arms . . . 

What promise of freedom could be offered to us by poor, 
betrayed and demoralised France, the land of political corrup- 
tion and of empty phrases, needs no explanation. England, 



MILITANT GERMAN SPOKESMEN 421 

however, understands by freedom only club-law, and indeed club- 
law for herself alone. It would be impossible to point to a single 
spark of spiritual life in her immense colonial empire. Every- 
where there are merely cattle-dealers, slave-drivers, warehouse- 
men and exploiters of mines, and everywhere we find the domi- 
nation of that unrestricted arbitrariness and brutality which al- 
ways emerges where it is not permanently staved off by culture 
of the spirit. . . . 

All these grotesque views and much more of the same sort 
are contained in a single essay of nine pages on German 
Freedom (in the first volume of War Essays). It is possible 
to imagine what such a writer achieves in the several hundred 
pages of his collected essays. 

Let us take some more from the Essay on The German 
Language (War Essays, page 24). 

For Germany alone among all the nations still preserves a holy 
living possession capable of development. It is inscrutable like 
all that comes from God. . . . Among living languages German 
is beyond question unique in a majesty and a wealth of life which 
exclude all comparison. . . . 

Among the languages of Europe, German is the only living 
language. From this fact all else follows. . . . And on this rich 
soil the spirit has now revealed itself for centuries in such an un- 
broken wealth, that the content of the German language also is 
unique to-day. . . . 

A Montaigne living to-day would have to be silent or else learn 
German. . . . The French Revolution could destroy the outer 
Bastille, but not the inner. The spirit of this people is for ever 
imprisoned. . . . 

It is not, however, possible to think deeply and tenderly in 
English. 

The consequence is that England remains, as it were, cut off 
from the highest achievements of the last two centuries, inasmuch 
as it could not participate in the conscious and unconscious spir- 
itual life of Germany, the leading nation. . . . 

From this arises the compelling necessity that the German lan- 
guage and not the English should become the language of the 
world. . . . The moral corruption of England has been revealed 
in an appalling measure since the beginning of this war: lying, 



422 THE CRIME 

roughness, violence, boasting, accompanied by lack of restraint, 
dignity, sense of justice, manliness. It is a sorry spectacle ! . . . 
We perceive with horror what degradation we approach, the final 
degradation of the whole human race. For this reason it is the 
German and with him all that is German that must conquer. And 
when he has conquered — whether it be to-day or in a hundred 
years, the necessity of victory remains the same — there is no 
single task which is so important as this, to force the German 
language on the world. (Note. — What an agreeable prospect to 
wage war for another hundred years in order to put the whole 
world into the uniform of the German language. But who is then 
goirg to speak this language after everyone has been killed?) 

Men must learn to realise that whoever cannot speak German 
is a pariah. 

In the Essay on "England" (page 44) Chamberlain the 
Englishman gives his German readers a terrifying account 
of the coarseness of the whole English people. He describes 
the nature of the English Christmas, which is of course 
fundamentally different from that of Germany, and concludes 
with a cry of indignation: "It is thus that the birth of 
Our Saviour Jesus Christ is celebrated in England!" After 
citing further examples he affirms : 

This roughness has gradually penetrated through almost the 
whole nation working from below upwards, as always happens. 
Fifty years ago it was still considered an offence against the dig- 
nity of rank if anyone belonging to the nobility were to take part 
in industry, trade and finance. To-day the head of the oldest 
and greatest house in Scotland, the brother-in-law of the King, 
is a banker ! 

Think how terrible! What roughness, what decadence, 
when the nobility are already taking part in the pursuits 
of life. There can be no alternative: England must be 
annihilated! Gott strafe England! 

It need occasion no surprise that a country sunk so low 
as this could and indeed must produce such scum of humanity 
as Sir Edward Grey. 

For years he has always presided at conferences for the main- 
tenance of peace — in order that the intended war might come in 



MILITANT GERMAN SPOKESMEN 423 

time. For years he has sought a rapprochement with Germany 
— in order that the honest statesmen and diplomatists of Germany 
might not observe the intention to wage a war of annihilation 
which was all the time firmly resolved upon. Grey has in his 
pocket the military agreements with France and Belgium for the 
invasion of Germany from the North, all the details as to the 
landing and the conveyance of troops are written down in black 
and white, and yet he is able so to arrange matters that it is 
Germany which in extreme necessity "violates the neutrality." 
('Note. — There at last we have got to the point : It is not Ger- 
many but England that caused the breach of neutrality.) 

That is the political England of to-day. . . . Sneaks, hypo- 
crites, liars, tricksters. "England" the State is rotten to the bones. 
It is only necessary to grasp firmly. It is for this reason that I, 
as an Englishman, must have the courage to testify to the truth. 
It is only a strong, victorious, wise Germany that can save us all. 

Chamberlain's War-Aims 

In the New War Essays (pages 86-102) Chamberlain also 
offers us his views on the question of war-aims, and of 
course arrives at the conclusion that peace can only be a 
"German peace." This German peace must at any price be 
attained, whether at the end of this war or as a result of a 
series of other wars: 

It may require a series of wars so to overcome France, England 
and Russia, and to carry so far the remodelling of Europe, the 
opening of Asia, the settlement of Africa, the domination of the 
yellow and the black races, that there can be any question of a 
"German peace" in the sense in which I use the term. 

The German is entering into a struggle which for generations 
to come will demand the highest exertion of all his powers ; it is 
for this purpose that he must now equip himself. . . . What this 
war teaches us once for all is that we are face to face with a life 
and death struggle, and that that struggle is one between two 
ideals of humanity, between the German and the non-German. 
. . . The struggle will be waged between roughness and refine- 
ment, between lack of culture and culture, between the basest lust 
of gold and a view of life in which the value of wealth plays a 
subservient part, but in itself enjoys no respect. . . . Thus, the 



424 THE CRIME 

one party sows death, the other life. . . . Those States which 
would grow great by destruction must be opposed by that State, 
or that union of States, which in building up finds its happiness, 
and its right to rule . . . 

The guiding principle is to the effect that only he who rules can 
give freedom. What freedom has the German ideal of life to ex- 
pect from Anglo-Saxons, Muscovites, Franks and Mongolians? 
On the other hand, if the German Empire is predominant, it lies 
in the German character to leave to everyone his own customs, 
because the German is sufficiently gifted and sufficiently civilised 
to find his pleasure in every mode of life, to learn from each 
and to enrich himself internally. . . . 

I indicate only some of the thousand ways which lead to the 
German peace that will control the world. 

"Degenerate Sons" of the Fatherland 

With this pleasing prospect of a further series of bloody 
wars until the final attainment of the "German peace that 
will control the world," — with this panegyric of Germany 
which brings "life" into the world, whilst its opponents 
only "sow death," — with this unsurpassable fulmination I 
propose to conclude my collection of quotations from Cham- 
berlain. L believe that they afford a sufficient characterisa- 
tion of this, the most successful of all German war-writers. 

I should only like to ask one question at the conclusion 
of the review of the series of thoughts in unrelieved field- 
grey which I have placed before the reader. If a German, 
if the accuser, had written all that this Englishman writes 
about England — a German writing against the German 
people! — what would have been done with him? They have 
already morally so lynched the accuser — and would have 
lynched him physically if they could have got hold of him 
— because he wrote a book which was dictated by love of 
the German people, though also, it is true, by hatred of the 
seducers and corrupters of this people which is essentially 
brave, sturdy and peace-loving. They abuse the German 
friend of his own people, but the English defiler of his own 
nest, who denounces to the world a whole people, standing 



MILITANT GERMAN SPOKESMEN 425 

in the forefront of civilisation, as the basest example of 
moral brutalisation and spiritual imbecility, is overwhelmed 
in Germany with distinctions and honours, such as are scarcely 
accorded to any other writer. In England also they combat 
the opponents of the war, men like Shaw, Macdonald, 
Snowden, Trevelyan and Morel, but these men are not abused, 
they are not threatened, they are not persecuted. They are 
allowed to speak, to write, to agitate; their tongues are not 
tied; they are not compelled to purchase at the price of exile 
the freedom to express their own opinions. In Germany, on 
the other hand, the substantial reasons advanced by the ac- 
cusers are concealed in silence, and instead of answering 
these, their persons are discredited by base slanders. The 
few — unfortunately all too few — Germans who from abroad 
endeavour to do what these Englishmen in opposition are 
allowed to do in their own country without injury and with- 
out punishment are branded as traitors, and are exposed to 
universal contempt as disgracefully "degenerate sons of the 
Fatherland." 

For this they will be able to find consolation. There have 
already been on other occasions in history such degenerate 
sons who have later been shown to be the most regenerate, the 
proclaimers and the founders of a new age. What was Christ 
in the eyes of the Priests and the Pharisees but a degenerate 
son of Judaism? What was Luther but a degenerate son of 
the Church that can alone make blessed? Was Tolstoi any- 
thing but a renegade, excommunicated by the Holy Synod? 
Was Zola, the courageous proclaimer of the truth in the 
Dreyfus affair, not subjected as a degenerate son of France 
to the rage, the insults, indeed even the physical attacks 
of the excited Paris rabble, and exposed to the most con- 
temptuous slanders and aspersions of the whole patriotic 
Press? In all nations and in all epochs of history is it not the 
case that the proclaimers of the new have always been de- 
nounced, crucified, and burned at the stake by the repre- 
sentatives of the old as renegades, traitors, blasphemers, 
sorcerers and heretics? The degenerate sons of Germany are 
thus in good company; they will calmly await the hour when 



426 THE CRIME 

the misguided nation will erect in the Capitol memorials of 
honour to those whom once they cast down from the Tarpeian 
rock. 

D 

PREVENTIVE IMPERIALISTS 

Let us hear further the views of some open confessors of 
the imperialistic war of prevention, who as such, in contra- 
diction to the "preventive-defensionists," did not go so far 
as to believe in an intended attack by the Entente Powers — 
(they only sought for tactical reasons to induce this belief 
in the people) — but who ascribed to the policy of the Entente 
Powers, although wrongly, the intention to hamper systemat- 
ically Germany's world-historical ascent, and who were will- 
ing to put an end to these dark plans of strangulation by hack- 
ing with the sword through the net of restraint. 

Nearly all these adherents and confessors of the war of 
prevention for imperialistic purposes are at the same time 
convinced of the blessing and the necessity of a warlike re- 
juvenation of the German people. For them the professional 
and habitual pursuit of murder and burning, the wholesale 
destruction of material and cultural goods, the extinction of 
untold millions of existences, the awakening of all the bar- 
baric and the animal instincts which unfortunately still slum- 
ber in mankind, are a necessary means of disciplining and 
educating the nations, a healthy revulsion from the "vapour- 
ings about humanity" which become too common in times 
of peace, from the over-appreciation of the peaceful exchange 
of ideas and of goods between the nations, from the perni- 
cious and enervating influence of a cosmopolitanism which 
overleaps all national boundaries. 

Here, in fact, we meet the remarkable contradiction in- 
volved in the method of thought and in the efforts of those 
who are the very noisiest of the leaders of Pan-Germany. 
On the one hand they announce the claim which the Germans 
possess to the domination of the world; on the other hand 



MILITANT GERMAN SPOKESMEN 427 

they would not at any price have their Fatherland a Cos- 
mopolis — they would not, for the love of Heaven, have Ger- 
man "Kultur" (which for most of these people is identical 
with that of Prussia) influenced by the "Kultur" of France, 
England, Russia, or by any other in the world. The most of 
these blustering generals and admirals have not, of course, the 
slightest knowledge of any foreign culture. As the parlia- 
mentary orator observed, "I do not know the views of the 
hon. member for X, but I disapprove of them," so in the same 
way these men hate foreign cultures without knowing them, 
because they instinctively, and quite correctly, feel that any 
modern democratic cosmopolitan view of civilisation cannot 
but be dangerous to their national Prussianism. Those weap- 
ons of force, of which they make use to secure the overthrow 
of the armies of the enemy, they would also fain set in motion 
to secure the suppression of the democratic West-European 
views of their opponents, — they would make Prussian drill 
the taskmaster of the world, not merely in the military and 
political province, but in intellectual matters as well. Prus- 
sianism and World-Power — these are the two conflicting 
poles between which the fighting armies of Pan-Germany are 
called upon to establish a road of connection. The aim will 
never be achieved — even if all the seas of the world should 
be dyed blood-red — so long as the narrow Prussian spirit, that 
sharpest negation of a far-seeing world-spirit, directs German 
thought, — so long as the Prussian parade-march with its ludi- 
crous goose-step is aped by the whole German people, from 
the North Sea to the Alps, as the symbol of German power 
and energy, — so long as Weimar is forgotten and Potsdam 
is the watchword. 

Gebsattel 

One of those Pan-German generals — a South German, it 
is true, but, after the manner of renegades, almost more 
Prussian than the Prussians themselves. — who ruthlessly ac- 
knowledge the imperialistic war of prevention, and as a gen- 
eral proposition the educational necessity of war, is General 



428 THE CHIME 

von Gebsattel, already mentioned in another place. In an 
article in the Pan-German review The Panther (Vol. X, Oc- 
tober, 191 5) the Pan-German general admits that in the cir- 
cles in which he moved there had been a longing for war : 

because, having regard to the perverse development which our 
people threatened to take, we regarded it as a necessity, and 
because we were further conscious of the fact that a war is all the 
easier in its military progress as well as in the sacrifices involved, 
the earlier and the more resolutely a people, which in any case is 
forced to fight a struggle for existence, chooses the favourable 
moment for striking the blow. 

In the further course of his defence of the preventive war 
Herr von Gebsattel speaks of the "moral justification of the 
contemplated sacrifice of blood," of the special qualities which 
must be possessed by the statesman who has recourse to a 
preventive war, and then continues : 

Should such a one exist, and feel himself supported by the 
confidence of the whole nation, if he believes that he hears with 
the sensitive ear of the great statesman the footstep of God re- 
sounding through the history of the world, as Bismarck has so 
beautifully expressed it, he will seize in faith and confidence the 
corner of his mantle and will allow the confidence of the people 
still to support him, even if the way leads across the battlefields 
of a preventive war. 

This confession of a preventive war leaves nothing to be 
desired in the matter of candour. It is, of course, we, the 
Germans, who are the nation that is in any case compelled to 
fight a struggle for existence! The favourable moment for 
striking the blow was chosen by us, the Germans ! But what 
then has become of the attack, Herr von Gebsattel? What 
becomes of the words of the Emperor William in his appeal 
to the German people on August 6th, 1914: "In the midst of 
peace, the enemy falls upon us. Therefore to arms! . . . 
We will defend ourselves to the last breath of man and 
horse"? What becomes of the words which the supreme war 
commander addressed on the same day to the German Army 



MILITANT GERMAN SPOKESMEN 429 

and Navy: "We are called upon to defend our holiest pos- 
sessions, our Fatherland, our very hearths against an un- 
scrupulous attack"? Have you considered, Herr von Gebsat- 
tel, that your confession that the German nation chose the 
favourable moment for the attack gives the lie to your Im- 
perial master, his Chancellor and his Government? 

I do not propose to discuss further at this point the ques- 
tion of the preventive war. I reject it on principle, and I 
believe that I have proved that the presuppositions in fact 
which are advanced in its defence are deliberately invented. 
I am content to make it clear once more that whoever says 
that this is a preventive war thereby distinctly states that the 
German people has been shamefully deluded and deceived. 
An aggressive war has been palmed off upon it under the 
guise of a war of defence. 

Harden 

Maximilian Harden also has repeatedly admitted, in a 
veiled form as well as openly, that the war was deliberately 
and intentionally provoked by Germany and Austria, and he 
has even manifested his indignation that we lacked the cour- 
age openly to acknowledge an act which was no more than 
the pursuance of a right of domination, due to the German 
people by virtue of its capacity and its superiority. This is 
the idea to which I gave expression in my book when I re- 
ferred to the great conquerors and murderers in past epochs 
of history, whose brutal acknowledgment of their actions at 
least illuminated the fascination of a strong personality, 
whereas our cowardly action in creeping to the enormous guilt 
of blood behind the attack of the enemy adds to our other 
shortcomings the shame of a feeble disclaimer. 

On August ist, 191 4, Harden writes in the Zukunft: 

In the Note addressed by Vienna to Serbia, the rough harsh- 
ness of which is without precedent in history, every sentence 
makes it clear that Austria-Hungary wanted war, because it was 
convinced that it was constrained to want it. . . . The mere idea 



430 THE CRIME 

that Austria could suddenly compel us to face the strongest coali- 
tion in the history of the world must infuriate in thrice holy 
wrath the German feeling of self-respect, the German's right to 
control his own destiny. Why is the circulation of such danger- 
ous stories tolerated? Why is it not said that the fact is (because 
it must be so) that everything was arranged between Vienna and 
Berlin? 

In No. 45 of the Zukunft of August 7th, 1915, Harden 
writes as follows : 

No one would have wished to take from her (France) a clod 
of earth or the edge of a meadow. But since she planned ven- 
geance and reconquest, has she any right to complain that the 
country menaced by such plans as these and confronted by an 
overwhelming alliance chose for the settlement of the dispute the 
hour that was still convenient to her ? Is the German an infamous 
blackguard because his strength is not obvious to his neighbour's 
eye? 

In No. 4 of the Zukunft of October 23rd, 191 5, Harden 
writes as follows with regard to the policy of encirclement: 

Edward also was no enemy to us, and did not want war. As 
I was the first to speak of the intention to give effect to the "en- 
compassment and the encirclement" of the German Empire, as 
I was the first to apply these terms to the relation of the Western 
Powers towards us, I ought to know what warning meaning they 
were intended to convey. Edward was afraid that his nephew's 
empire, with which he had never been in sympathetic harmony, 
would extend over Europe in a position of predominance, that it 
would one day use its fleet, for which no other conceivable task 
could bring a sufficient reward, and its power over Islam to make 
an attack on England's sea-power, on Egypt and on India. From 
the reports of his friends as well as from his own agile observa- 
tion he knew it well enough to surmise that it would soon be 
capable of carrying out such a plan, that the armies of France 
and Russia would be powerless to hamper it, and he therefore en- 
deavoured to create a union of States, a powerful community for 
protection, the existence of which might in itself intimidate Ger- 
many, and compel her to renounce her impetuous onward move- 
ments. 



MILITANT GERMAN SPOKESMEN 431 

With these utterances from Harden I may rest content. 1 
In spite of the stylistic flourishes of this extremely obscure 
writer, who, however, just because of his obscurity, is better 
protected than others against the deletions of the censor, these 
extracts furnish a distinct picture of the methods of our na- 
tionalists. At one moment it is France that planned vengeance 
and reconquest and Germany that anticipated that country. 
Consequently the war is a preventive war waged for purposes 
of defence. At another moment we are told that neither 
France nor Russia nor England desired to provoke a war 
against Germany, whether sooner or later, but that they 
merely formed a community for defence in order to restrain 
the desires for hegemony entertained by their Imperial cousin 
and nephew. It was this pacific community for defence that 
we opposed with our warlike initiative. Thus we have a pre- 
ventive war for imperialistic ends ! In either case there is an 
unconditional denial of the attack by the enemy, and conse- 
quently of the German war of defence ! 

I claim Harden as my ally. Like all the preventionists he 
gives the lie to all who proclaim the war of liberation, no 
matter how exalted their station. 

1 Other quotations from Harden are to be found in Grumbach's Ger- 
many's Annexationist Aims (Payot & Co., Lausanne), [English abridg- 
ment: Murray] which appeared in February, 191 7, while my book was 
being printed — a highly valuable compilation, which is absolutely indispen- 
sable as a work of reference. This collection of annexationist views 
expressed in Germany during the course of the war forms a valuable 
supplement to my collection of chauvinistic, imperialistic, and Pan-German 
sentiments from the period before the war. The conductors of the chorus 
are almost exactly the same in both cases : in the period before the war 
they were concerned with the practices and the dress rehearsals for the 
national battle song, in the period of the war they were occupied at last 
with the performance before the world public for which they had so ar- 
dently longed. The aims, which before the war were represented to the 
enthusiastic hearers as a glorious future vision, are now, after the out- 
break of the war, shown to them as a tangible possession in the present 
which has in part already been seized. We see everywhere the same stage 
managers and conductors at work. The present completes and confirms 
the past. The chain is complete. 



432 THE CRIME 



PAUL ROHRBACH 

An inexhaustible supply of confessions of the preventive 
war (with its varying shades of prevention against future 
attack, or against the hampering of the imperialistic ascent) 
is to be found in the writings of Paul Rohrbach, the recog- 
nised leader of the German Imperialists, who, as such, deserves 
special consideration. I must here again rest content with 
some characteristic extracts from his book The Ascent to a 
World Nation {Zum Weltvolk hindurch). 

In the preface we read (page 4) : 

After returning from an American tour, I founded, with my 
friend Dr. Jaeckh, in the spring of that year, the magazine Greater 
Germany, with the intention of preparing our public opinion di- 
rectly for war. 

Rohrbach's resolution, reached in the spring of 191 3, to 
prepare the German people for war was brought to a head by 
the fact that Rohrbach, as he tells us, realised, from Russian 
newspapers and from personal reports from Russia, that the 
Russian war-party had then gained the upper hand. It is here 
again remarkable that the protagonist of a "greater Germany" 
should make his efforts, which were devoted to the necessary 
upward development of German power, dependent on whether 
the Russian war-party had the upper or the under hand. Are 
we to understand that greater Germany would remain smaller 
if Russia were peacefully disposed ? Was it only to pursue the 
ends it had in view, if Russia's intentions were directed to 
toar ? It will be seen how these German Imperialists with their 
mixture of diverse self-contradictory motives are constantly 
coming to grief. 

In the concluding sentence of the preface, written after the 
outbreak of war, the violent contradiction between the doc- 
trine of defence and preventionism is divertingly expressed: 

May the world-conflagration destroy those who have crimi- 
nally been its instigators, and may the new and greater Germany 
radiantly emerge from the furnace of this trial ! 



MILITANT GERMAN SPOKESMEN 433 

Thus on the one hand all the punishments of Heaven are 
called down on the criminal instigators of the war; on the 
other hand, however, the new and greater Germany is awaited 
as the future fruit of the blood that is shed. One is tempted 
to ask why the author did not supplicate the blessing of 
Heaven on those who are aiding Germany to so brilliant an 
ascent — after the example of the old and pious man who, sur- 
prised by the arrival of an heir after thirty years of childless 
marriage, inserted the following notice in the papers : "After 
thirty years of childless marriage my dear wife Elvira has to- 
day presented me with a strong and healthy boy. I thank the 
Lord who has aided me." Why does not Rohrbach thank 
Grey, Delcasse, and Sazonof that they have aided him and us 
to a greater Germany? Why does he not praise their kind- 
ness instead of accusing them of crime? 

In his essay on German World and Colonial Policy (of 
June 25th, 191 3) Rohrbach speaks of the "personally pacific 
and well-meaning character of the Emperor Nicholas II." He 
distinguishes three strata in Russia, of which two, the official 
(comprising primarily the Tsar and his Ministers) and the 
Muscovite, pursued no principle of enmity against their neigh- 
bours in the west, and only the third, that of the Pan-Slav, was 
dangerous to peace. According to Rohrbach, Germany must 
"count on the fact that passions in that country are in the high- 
est degree inflamed, and that the only bulwark against the 
deluge is to be found in the discretion and the nervous strength 
of the Tsar and of the statesmen who at the moment are at the 
head of affairs." As we all know, the events between July 
23rd and August 1st, 19 14, showed that the desire for peace 
entertained by the Tsar and his Minister formed a stronger 
bulwark against the alleged Pan-Slav war tendencies than did 
the desire for peace of the German Emperor and his Chan- 
cellor, unfortunately shattered for a number of years, against 
the criminal Pan-Germanism encouraged by the German 
Crown Prince in his very own person. 

With reference to England's attitude towards German co- 
lonial ambitions, Rohrbach in the same essay makes certain 



434. THE CRIME 

admissions which completely dispose of the theses elsewhere 
advanced by the Pan-Germans on the subject of English envy 
of German colonial and commercial development, the policy 
of encirclement and England's intentions to make an ag- 
gressive war: 

It is a proof of the practical and psychological insight of the 
English that in recent years they have more and more recognised 
Germany's need for colonies which formerly they were in the 
habit of disputing with unrestrained irony. One now finds fre- 
quent discussions in the English Press of the necessity which 
exists for Germany seeking "outlets" for her increasing excess of 
population. . . . Preliminary conditions of a fairly far-reaching 
nature on the question of a large general understanding between 
us and England in regard to African territory are in existence. 

It is well known that these intentions to effect an under- 
standing, the existence of which is confirmed by Rohrbach in 
June, 1913, led in the spring of 1914 to the agreement regard- 
ing Asia Minor and the Baghdad line, and further to an 
agreement, which was practically complete at the outbreak of 
war, although not signed, relating to the English and German 
spheres of interest, particularly in the Portuguese possessions. 
Like so many other things, the agreement as to the Baghdad 
line came to nothing in consequence of the war : the English 
are on the march to Baghdad, and when in the end, despite 
their first reverses, they succeed, in co-operation with the suc- 
cessful Russian army in the Caucasus, in gaining possession of 
this terminus of the gigantic railway undertaking which for 
many years has been in course of construction by means of 
German capital and German labour, they will then have ac- 
quired, in addition to the whole of our colonial possessions, 
an object for compensation which will have to be dearly re- 
deemed on the conclusion of peace. 1 This also constitutes an 
enormous item of guilt in the criminal account of our war- 
party. The peaceful labour of years of German merchants, 
engineers, and manufacturers, the expenditure of many hun- 
dreds of millions of marks, has been unprofitably squandered 

Baghdad has meanwhile been occupied by the British. 



MILITANT GERMAN SPOKESMEN 435 

because the Pan-Germans, the Junkers, the generals and ad- 
mirals, with the Crown-Princely colonel of the Danzig Hus- 
sars at their head, thirsted for the laurels of war and the 
exercise of arms, because these bearers of uniforms and mili- 
tary cloaks were of the opinion that the German people had 
been too long addicted to the pursuit of filthy lucre, to the 
accumulation of material wealth and its enervating enjoy- 
ment. Now these gentlemen have got what they wanted. 
When everything is taken into consideration — the direct and 
indirect cost of war, the loss in national wealth and remunera- 
tion of labour, the economic value of the millions of dead and 
wounded, the duty of supporting widows and orphans, etc. — 
a sum of much more than five thousand million pounds has 
been drained from the body of the German people in thirty 
months of war. This may well be enough to satisfy these 
gentlemen who despise material wealth when it enures to 
others, but who cannot get enough of it when the question 
involved is that of filling their own pockets. 

The Agrarian Patriots 

Observe the gigantic increase in the price of all agricul- 
tural products, of all the necessary means of sustenance for 
the people, — increases everywhere to double and treble the 
normal price; observe the starvation of the people, and then 
listen to the constant squeals of our agrarian patriots, how 
badly things are going with them, how the cost of production 
has increased, how far short the Government are failing in 
their duty in combating, not the high prices, but the com- 
plaints about high prices! 

As the Pan-German Union recently celebrated its twenty- 
fifth anniversary, so the same solemnity is awaiting the 
"League of Agriculturalists" on February 18th, 1.9 1 8. Both 
organisations originated from the same views and the same 
efforts, both primarily represent Junker and agrarian inter- 
ests, which have been amalgamated with militaristic, impe- 
rialistic, Pan-Germanistic tendencies for the purpose of more 
comprehensive activity and effectiveness. Both are composed 



436 THE CRIME 

essentially of the same persons, groups, professional and 
social classes. Junkerdom, Agrarianism, Pan-Germanism 
form an indissoluble amalgam which cannot be decomposed 
by the most careful chemical analysis. 

Thus the appeal which the "League of Agriculturalists" 
has already disseminated with a view to its approaching 
twenty-fifth anniversary is also an accurate counterpart to 
the proclamation, already mentioned, sent into the world by 
the Pan-German Union on the occasion of its recent twenty- 
five years jubilee. Let us take a few characteristic phrases 
from the agrarian appeal: 

The time is again gravely serious. What we learned in twen- 
ty-five years has been shown to be true. 

That we have succeeded in keeping German agriculture in a 
position to discharge its task is the sole factor which places us in 
a position to endure this war from an economic standpoint. 

Our people know this. 

And yet malice disparages German agriculturists, and coward- 
ice tolerates the criminal intrigue. 

This teaches us to recognise what awaits us after the war : 

A bitterer struggle than ever for the existence of German 
agriculture. 

A struggle for our ordered political existence, and for our 
throne against the impudently threatened Revolution. 

A struggle for the future and the greatness of our people. . . . 

Here we have the familiar litany! Agriculture has to its 
credit the fact that Germany has not starved in this war. 
This meritorious action requires its reward after the war, 
that is to say an even higher measure of protection than be- 
fore by means of legislation dealing with customs, taxes and 
finance, by the imposition of even greater burdens on the 
necessary means of life of the labouring classes in favour of 
the possessors of agricultural land, even greater exemption 
than before in the matter of taxes and imposts to the detri- 
ment of all other productive classes. 

All these egotistical profit interests are, however, amal- 
gamated with the alleged protection of the throne against the 
"impudently threatened revolution," and the struggle for 



MILITANT GERMAN SPOKESMEN 437 

Germany's greatness and future! Ruthless greed is thus 
effectively cloaked with ideal efforts! In these few sentences 
from its jubilee appeal the whole of agrarianism is repre- 
sented in a nutshell. 

When will these insatiable, brutally egotistical Junkers and 
Agrarians, who ruthlessly exploit the State and the people, be 
visited with the punishment which these corrupters of Prussia 
and Germany, these destroyers of the world's peace, have so 
long deserved ? When will the German people arise and drive 
these bloodsuckers and poisoners of springs from their warm 
and well-lined positions, and make them once and for all 
innocuous? After what we have experienced since August 
ist, 1914, I am of the opinion that there is no possibility that 
the bourgeoisie will ever arouse themselves to such an act of 
freedom. Never has Pan-Germanism, Junkerdom, and 
Agrarianism possessed greater power in Germany than at 
this very moment when it was in a position to provoke this 
appalling war. It would never have been held possible by 
those who know and can impartially judge the German peo- 
ple that this enlightened, aspiring, and peace-loving nation 
could have so fallen beyond salvation under the influence of 
the mediaeval ideas of this caste of marauding knights, as has 
in fact happened — that these few thousands of war enthusi- 
asts and jingoes could have instilled into the German people 
from one day to the next the intoxicating and stupefying 
poison of their warlike megalomania. Germany was never 
so far removed from freedom and reason as it is to-day; 
it was never so completely under the spiritual and material 
bondage of a criminal upper layer whose train of thought and 
whose efforts in the midst of an age of electricity, aero- 
nautics, and wireless telegraphy have still remained on the 
bloodstained field of the mediaeval law of feud. 

Prussian and Russian Reaction 

In a conversation which I had in the summer of 191 6 
with a Russian "intellectual," he expressed his astonishment 
and indignation at the uncritical attitude of the German peo- 



438 THE CRIME 

pie towards its leaders, which appeared to him as a symptom 
of intellectual decay. To my objection that after all matters 
were no better in Russia, he informed me that this was a mis- 
take. In Russia the people in all classes knew that it was 
suppressed and enslaved by a small oligarchy of despots; 
the war at any rate (this fact was also known to the people) 
they owed not to their own but to foreign despots. The 
Russian people feels itself enslaved and misgoverned inter- 
nally; but in the struggle with external forces it supports the 
Government, because it knows the truth about the origin of 
the war and the innocence of the Tsar and his Government, 
and above all because it has no desire to exchange Tsarism 
for "Kaiserism." The German people, on the other hand, — > 
and this was the distinction which he drew to the disadvan- 
tage of Germany — enthusiastically follows the flag of the 
Hohenzollern dynasty into a war which that dynasty has 
consciously and deliberately provoked. It has allowed itself 
to be cheated and blinded by the deceitful vision of a war of 
liberation; it has been ensnared by the Pan-Germans, the 
Junkers and militarists, and has never been so docile to the 
Government as to-day. In Russia a radical revulsion to 
democracy was possible and indeed probable any day. In 
Germany such a revulsion was more remote than ever, since 
Democracy had been caught in the snare of the reaction. 

At that time I was not in a position to refute this con- 
vincing account; it has meanwhile been verified more rapidly 
than I could have imagined. The Ides of March, 191 7, have 
swept away Russian Csesarism in a whirlwind and have set 
in place of the worst despotism that ever terrorised a people 
a democracy which at a stroke has surpassed all other democ- 
racies and republics in the establishment of civil freedom and 
equality. Never in the history of the nations has there been 
a more striking verification of the principle : Les extremes se 
touchent. 

In contrast to this, what is the outlook in Germany? As 
before, there is everywhere the blackness of night! There 
is no ray of hope for better times. On the contrary, what has 
meanwhile happened is a worsening of the existing condition. 



MILITANT GERMAN SPOKESMEN 439 

The "marinists" by the grace of Tirpitz have defeated the 
civilian Bethmann. Germany's conduct of the war by land 
and by sea has become more ruthlessly than ever subordinated 
to purely military considerations. The number of the ene- 
mies on the other side is constantly increasing ; the damnatory 
judgment in which the whole of the civilised world is united 
against the rulers and the governments of Germany becomes 
constantly more crushing. And within? There are promises 
— yes. But there is nothing more. Whether they will be 
observed remains for the future to reveal. But even if they 
should be kept, — which, in view of the experience of the past, 
is more than dubious, — they are merely the crumbs from the 
table of the rich man which are cast to the hungry, not the 
satisfying nourishment which a highly developed people has 
a full right to claim after such enormous sacrifices. 

To-day — to-day more than ever — it is still necessary to 
recall to the rulers of Germany Ludwig Uhland's words of 
warning and exhortation : 

No prince is in the world so princely, 
No one on all the earth so great, 
That when the nations thirst for freedom 
He should essay their thirst to sate, 

That he alone should have in keeping 

The wealth that should be each man's right, 

And dole out to the famished people 

So much as seems good in his sight. 1 

When will these manly words of the great national poet 
awaken an echo in the hearts and in the actions of the Ger- 
man people? Will that moment ever arrive? Now, when the 

1 [Noch 1st kein Fiirst so hoch gefiirstet, 
So auserwahlt kein ird'scher Mann, 
Dass, wenn die Welt nach Freiheit diirstet, 
Er sie mit Freiheit tranken kann, 

Dass er allein in seinen Handen 
Den Reichtum alles Rechtes halt, 
Urn an die Volker auszuspenden 
So viel, so wenig ihm gefallt.] 



440 THE CRIME 

great fire has burst out in the East, shall we not again find 
that the golden opportunity will be lost, and that only a spark 
will remain glowing under the ashes on the German hearth? 
Will everything again remain in the old grooves? Will it be 
thought sufficient scantily to refurbish the dusty and tarnished 
picture of the constitutional conditions of Prussian Germany 
by providing a new frame and by adding a few small touches 
here and there, instead of devoting it once for all to destruc- 
tion on the burning pile of the popular indignation? The 
prospects for such a radical change are unfortunately very 
gloomy. No doubt there is here and there a ferment under 
the surface, but nowhere has any sign emerged that the peo- 
ple have recognised or will recognise their true enemies who 
sit in their own country, that they will follow the example 
of their Russian neighbours and draw a line of division be- 
tween prince and people, taking their destiny into their own 
hands. 



ROHRBACH ON THE WAR PATH 

That Rohrbach should represent the Franco-Russian arma- 
ments as a preparation for aggression, but at the same time 
be silent on the fact that they were occasioned by previous 
German armaments, must be regarded as inevitable in a Ger- 
man nationalist. In his essay of June 18th, 1914, entitled "A 
Hard Necessity" — written, it will be observed, before the 
assassination of the Archduke — he paints in alarming colours 
the danger of a Franco-Russian attack. Why? Because 
France and Russia have to struggle with industrial and finan- 
cial crises and "their critical situation urges them more and 
more insistently to decide either to make the trial of strength 
at an early date or else to renounce it indefinitely." For Rohr- 
bach the Russian Army Estimates for 19 14, amounting in 
round figures to a hundred and twenty-five million pounds, is 
"nothing short of alarming," and makes it clear that "the deci- 
sion will be provoked at an early date." The imperialistic 
writer draws the same conclusion from the introduction in 



MILITANT GERMAN SPOKESMEN 441 

France of the three years' period of service. But he prudently 
conceals the fact that all these counter-measures were occa- 
sioned by the increase of the effective German peace strength 
by 140,000 men, and by the "Defence-contribution" of fifty 
million pounds. 

After the murder of Serajevo the stay-at-home warrior 
Rohrbach can find nothing better to do than to goad on the 
Hapsburg Monarchy to effect an entry into Serbia and to 
place the neighbouring kingdom under Austrian control. 
"Who would have a right to protest against this course?" 
is the concluding question in the article of July 8th, 1914. 
In the eyes of these people Berchtold's policy, which at least 
promised to secure the appearance of Serbian independence, 
is thus an unpardonable weakness. 

Over an article dated July 27th, 1914, Rohrbach places the 
characteristic words "Not a step backwards." Austria must 
show herself resolute, "if need be, even to accept war against 
Russia." The crowd which on the evening of July 25th sang 
"The Watch on the Rhine" before the Palace and the Aus- 
trian Embassy fills the German Imperialist with the most 
lively hopes for the future. We know how such demonstra- 
tions on the part of a few thousand persons are made, and 
how they are managed by the wirepullers behind the scenes. 
If the demonstrations are agreeable to those in high places, 
the police allows them free rein; if they are not, they are dis- 
persed with drawn sabre. This is what is then called "the 
will of the people," "a popular movement." Herr Rohrbach, 
however, finds in such demonstrations of people who are in 
part befooled, in part paid, in any case influenced, the assur- 
ance that "we are politically more mature than we ourselves 
had believed! It would appear that we feel to-day that it is 
really 'Greater Germany' that is at stake!" 

In the further course of this article Herr Rohrbach pro- 
ceeds in the most naive manner to uncover the card of the 
preventive war, to call in question the fact that Russia and 
France desired war, and to warn Germany and Austria in the 
most insistent manner against showing any spirit of com- 



442 THE CRIME 

pliance, against agreeing to any postponement of the moment 
for war which was so favourable to them. His gravest warn- 
ings, however, are directed against the avoidance of war : 

Russia and France have much more reason than we have to 
tremble at the opening of the temple of Janus. For more than 
half a century Russia has never been prepared to face the test 
of a great war from the military and financial point of view. 
The Russian soldier is brave, but the spirit of the Russian army 
is not equal to the enormous demands which a modern war makes 
on the national power of organisation, on the independent spirit 
of the men and the leaders, on the integrity and devotion which 
must mark every individual. Within there lurks the danger of 
revolution; a bad harvest brings a menace to 40 or 50 million 
men. If one or two great defeats take place, the internal bands 
of political order may again dissolve as in 1905. That France 
is very far from being completely prepared is revealed to us 
more distinctly than anyone could have expected. Something 
unprecedented happened in Paris, when the danger of war be- 
came acute : the rate of French rentes began to fall ! So uncer- 
tain are they of their own strength! They meant to compass 
our financial ruin, and behold — they themselves begin to totter! 
We have, however, shown for years that we have as little need 
to fear a war financially as from a military point of view. 

Consequently there must be not a suggestion of pliability; not 
a step must be taken from the side of our ally ! The greatest 
danger now is that we and the Austrians may allow ourselves to 
be kept back by Franco-Russian evasions until our opponents 
have armed. . . . The two allies on the Neva and the Seine did 
not give Austria credit for resolute action. They counted on 
her hesitation as in the past, and now terror has seized them; 
they want to gain time. We would be fools if we allowed them 
to succeed in this obvious game. 

The accuser himself cannot express more clearly than is! 
contained in these sentences the fact that it was not Russia, 
and France who wanted this war, but that Germany and 
Austria intentionally provoked it, because the moment ap- 
peared to them more favourable than ever for the purpose of 
striking the blow. 



MILITANT GERMAN SPOKESMEN 443 

There is a priceless confession by Rohrbach in his article 
of August 2nd, 19 14, that "twenty million Slavs belong to 
Austria and Hungary, about half the entire population of the 
Monarchy." What in that case becomes of the contest be- 
tween German and Slav, which is represented by our Pan- 
Germans as the essential cardinal point in the present strug- 
gle of the nations? What becomes of the protection of the 
"Teutonic race in Central Europe," which the German Gov-i 
ernment in its White Book (page 406) described as the real 
object of this war, as the reason for allowing Austria "a com- 
pletely free hand in her action towards Serbia"? Were the 
twenty million Austrian Slavs created by God for the pur- 
pose of massacring or of being massacred by their Slavonic 
brothers? Have these twenty million Austrian Slavs any in- 
terest in confirming the position of "the Teutonic race in 
Central Europe"? This example once again illustrates how 
all these antagonisms of race and of lineage, in violation of all 
logic and historical development, are impressed by a merely 
artificial process on the unfortunate befooled nations in the 
interests of the ruling classes and their followers. Bohemian, 
Croatian, and Slavonic regiments are hounded on like wild 
beasts against their Serbian kindred — for the sake of the Teu-< 
tonic race! If they desert or refuse to shoot — as has re- 
peatedly happened in the Austrian army — they are themselves 
shot, mown down in vast numbers, decimated ! The black and 
yellow patriotism of Austria is imprinted on their minds in 
blood-red colours. 

In the article on Guilt and Destiny, dated August 4th, 191 4, 
we again find in various places the acknowledgment of the 
preventive war : 

I have always estimated that the Russian plan of attack against 
us would take place after one or two years' preparation, — and 
the Russians as well as the French are sorry enough that they 
have not been given more time for preparation. 

In the article there is frequent mention of the trickery of 
the Tsar who deceived Germany with regard to the prepara- 



444 THE CRIME 

tions for an attack, and who behaved like a knave or a weak- 
ling. That this deception on the part of the Russian Tsar 
and his Government is a Pan-German invention, that the Tsar 
as well as Sazonof throughout the whole crisis sought hon- 
ourably and openly for an understanding, further that they 
in no way concealed the Russian mobilisation, the counter- 
stroke against the military and diplomatic action of Austria 
and Germany — all these are facts which I have proved beyond 
dispute in my first and in this my second book. 

Herr Rohrbach of course enters the war, or rather he in- 
duces others to enter, "in the consciousness that it is not our 
guilt, but a decision of fate forced upon us." He praises an 
"immeasurably kind destiny" for having provoked the strug- 
gle, while sparing us the "stupendous weight of arriving at a 
decision." He emphatically exclaims: 

Now comes the greatest test, whether we are capable of de- 
fending our future as a world-nation. 

There we again have the cloven hoof of imperialism, which 
treacherously peeps out from under the field-grey uniform of 
the defender of the Fatherland : the defence of our future 
"as a world-nation" is embellished and cloaked — for the stu- 
pid among the people! — with the defence against a present 
attack ! 

A wealth of interesting admissions which overthrow the 
whole body of Pan-German doctrines is to be found in an 
article entitled Our Opponents, dated August nth, 1914. In 
the first place, Rohrbach rriakes it clear that since the end of 
the two Balkan crises there had been a distinct diminution of 
the tension between Germany and England ; that 

the treaties with England as to the delimitation of our spheres 
of interest in the East and in Africa were ready and signed, 
and that the only question was as to their publication. In Africa 
English policy had been surprisingly conciliatory towards us. In 
Turkey it was not merely in the question of the Baghdad Railway 
that liberal allowance was made for the German point of view, 
but also various matters connected therewith, the exploitation 



MILITANT GERMAN SPOKESMEN 445 

of the Mesopotamian petroleum fields and the navigation of the 
Tigris, of which England had previously had exclusive posses- 
sion, were regulated with German participation. France, which 
had made so much stir with regard to the railway concessions in 
Syria and the north of Asia Minor which she had demanded in 
conjunction with Russia, was in reality placed at a disadvantage 
in both places, for, contrary to her most insistent efforts, she had 
to acquiesce in a vacant zone between her Syrian railways and 
the Baghdad railway system, and the Armenian lines, in the opin- 
ion of those who knew the facts, were to a very large extent 
merely window-dressing. . . . 

It was therefore neither joyfully nor cordially, although it was 
with a certain sense of relief, with a mixture of acquiescence and 
of internal restraint, that English policy entered on the settlement 
with Germany. 

These sentences of Rohrbach make hay of the whole Pan- 
German theory of England's grudging attitude, of the com- 
mercial envy and the encirclement which sought to deprive 
us of the air and the light to live and to breathe. Immedi- 
ately before the war a diminution in the tension between Eng- 
land and Germany had replaced the previous tension. Indeed, 
in the agreements relating to Syria and the north of Asia 
Minor we received more favourable treatment from England 
than France did. In view of the facts thus established by 
Rohrbach, what becomes of English malevolence, English 
commercial envy, English opposition to every extension of 
German interests outside Europe? Where is the perfidious 
policy of suppression and of restriction which, according to 
Schiemann, had taken concrete form as far back as 1908 in a 
formal aggressive conspiracy between England, Russia and 
France, against Germany? How is Herr Rohrbach to arrive 
at an agreement on these matters with Herr Schiemann? 

In another passage in the article in question Rohrbach re- 
turns to the already mentioned distinction drawn by him 
regarding the tendencies existing in Russia. He again em- 
phasises the love of peace animating the Tsar and his Gov- 
ernment and their bitter antagonism to Pan-Slavism and its 
pursuit of war. 



446 THE CRIME 

The Tsar personally was afraid of the war-party and of the 
projects of an ambitious Grand Duke, the next heir to the 
throne in the event of the death or removal of the hopelessly in- 
valid child who is at present the successor to the throne. The 
prudent statesmen in the Government feared the fanaticism of 
Pan-Slavism, and the whole of the governmental class feared the 
revolution. 

This last point of view, that of the fear of the revolution, 
which is rightly emphasised by Rohrbach, receives far too lit- 
tle consideration in discussions relating to the alleged war in- 
tentions of Russia. The Russo-Japanese war brought revo- 
lution in its train. The Russian autocrats, and generally speak- 
ing the whole of the governing class of society, feared noth- 
ing so much as a new revolutionary outbreak in consequence 
of a new war, even if it should prove victorious. Moreover — 
a further point which receives too little .attention from Ger- 
man writers — the Russian reaction had from time immemo- 
rial, from the days of the "Holy Alliance," been so intimately 
connected with the Prussian reaction by the bonds of sym- 
pathy and community of interests, that a war against Ger- 
many was the last thing sought by the Russian reactionaries. 
Even in the course of this war, when the Russian danger 
appeared to be particularly menacing, before the victorious 
advance of the allied armies in Poland and Galicia, our Prus- 
sian reactionaries were well-disposed to the idea of a separate 
peace with the "Germanophobe Panslavism" with the object 
of being able to throw our whole military strength against 
the much more dangerous democracies in the West. The fact 
that the separate peace between the three Imperial Powers — a 
prelude to a new "Holy Alliance" — did not come into being 
was certainly due neither to the Prussian nor to the Russian 
reaction. The latter was, as we know, in no way averse from 
the wooing of the former. It was only the liberal and revo- 
lutionary parties in Russia which wrecked the efforts for a 
separate peace made by certain Court and official cliques, inas- 
much as they feared the German Trojans, even when they 
brought theni the gift of freedom. 

If the "unforeseen events" in Russia had not upset the 



MILITANT GERMAN SPOKESMEN U7 

calculation of the reactionaries on both sides, the future would 
have again proved that greater agreement could not exist than 
between Prussia of the Hohenzollerns and Russia of the Tsar, 
that the policy of friendship with Russia pursued by the old 
Emperor and his Chancellor corresponded not only to Ger- 
many's need for security, but also to the inner harmony be- 
tween the systems of government on both sides. It is a highly) 
characteristic fact that, in the second year of the war, the 
question of the future commercial and industrial relations to 
Russia was discussed in a pamphlet issued from a semi-official) 
central office in Berlin. The document in question was writ-( 
ten in the German and Russian languages and dealt with the 
exchange of goods between Russia and Germany as it ex-/ 
isted before the war and as it promises to be in future. It 
emphasised the expediency and indeed the necessity of co-| 
operation between the two States which are in so large meas- 
ure complementary to each other, and it advocated that a more 
intimate form should be given to "the friendly intercourse be- 
tween Russians and Germans which is interrupted exclusively 
by the war." 

For this reason, then, they are robbers and murderers! 
This then is the reason for the slaughter and the mutilation of 
millions of men, the devastation of whole provinces, — it is 
in order that the interrupted friendly intercourse may later 
be refashioned in a more intimate form, and perhaps may even 
be given concrete form in a political alliance, such as was 
formed between Japan and Russia after 1904, and between 
Bulgaria and Turkey after 1912-13. All the phrases and de- 
nunciations about the "Pan-Slav hatred of Germany" whichl 
has provoked this war would have melted like butter in the 
sun, even in the course of the war, if the Prussian and Russian' 
reactionaries had succeeded in interchanging once more a 
brotherly handshake in a separate peace and in sinking in emo- 
tion in each other's arms. True, the millions of dead would 
not have again risen; the many millions of the maimed would 
not have acquired new limbs. But what does that matter? 
The Prussians and the Russians would have brought the mat- 
ter to a satisfactory conclusion on both sides. The Prussians 



448 THE CRIME 

would have had their victory, the Russians would have been 
spared from humiliation, and both peoples alike would have 
been permitted to enjoy for many years to come the agree- 
able rule of their dynasties, once more united in peace and 
friendship. 

All these carefully conceived plans have now been upset by 
the Russian democracy, which — in contradistinction to that 
of Germany — has shown itself a powerful factor in the Em- 
pire of the Tsar. 

The revolution of 19 17 is the continuation and the comple- 
tion of the trial-revolution which broke out after the Jap- 
anese war; it has shown that the apprehensions entertained 
by the Russian despots of a new revolutionary outbreak as a 
result of a new war were well founded. Thus this new cir- 
cumstance, the downfall of the Tsar's Government even dur- 
ing the war, is new circumstantial evidence of the innocence of 
this same Government of the war; the mere anxiety for their 
own existence was bound to restrain the Russian despots, and 
did in fact restrain them, from plunging their own country 
and Europe in a bloody war. The hopes entertained by the 
Prussian reactionaries that a separate peace might be concluded 
with the Empire of the Tsar and that a future alliance of all 
the reactionary Powers in Europe might be established are 
now at any rate dissipated and dissolved. The Russian Re- 
public will not hold the stirrup for Prussian autocracy in 
order to facilitate their entry, as victors and conquerors, 
through the Brandenburg Gate into the capital of "Greater 
Germany." 

The fact that the war of 1914 was not desired by Russia 
and France, but was provoked by Germany as a preventive 
war, is clearly expressed by Rohrbach in the following sen- 
tences from the article mentioned above : 

In this situation of affairs the collision could not but be fore- 
seen, and had events followed the Franco-Russian plans, this 
would have happened in 19 16, or at the earliest in 1915. For 
Russia as well as for France, but especially for the former Power, 
it was a disagreeable necessity to have to decide on war now. . . . 
The further development of events on the Austrian and Russian 



MILITANT GERMAN SPOKESMEN 449 

side is well known, as is also the fact that the trickery of official 
Russia, with the Emperor at its head, compelled Germany before 
it was too late to cut through the threads of the net in which we 
were to be entangled. 

It is impossible to confess the preventive war more dis- 
tinctly than is done in this article. We are told that the Tsar 
and his Ministers wished to avoid war, from fear of Pan- 
Slavism and the Revolution; it was not until 1916 that prac- 
tical effect was to be given to the alleged Franco-Russian 
plans, that they were compelled to strike the blow now was 
for France and Russia a disagreeable necessity; it was, how- 
ever, Germany that cut the net before it was too late. To 
conceal the fact, here openly admitted, that Germany wanted 
this war of 191 4, and that Russia and France did not want 
it, "the trickery of official Russia with the Emperor at its 
head" is of course moved into position; but in saying this 
Rohrbach forgets that in an earlier article he has expressly 
acquitted official Russia and the "personally peace-loving and 
well-meaning Emperor Nicholas II." from the charge of 
having in any way wanted war. 

France also, according to Rohrbach, resolved on the strug- 
gle for arms "without any elan, and without any enthusiasm 
for war." How is this to be reconciled with the uncontrolla^ 
ble thirst for revenge, growing more and more dangerous in 
recent years, which, according to the historical accounts given 
by the Pan-Germans, is represented as having made the 
French the prime instigators of the war. 

With regard to the attitude of England, Rohrbach also 
makes invaluable admissions which overthrow all the oratory 
of the Pan-Germans. In entire agreement with the explana- 
tion in my book, he defines the conditions on which Eng- 
land would have remained neutral, viz., that the coasts and 
shipping of France should be spared, and that the passage 
through Belgium should be renounced. Differing on this 
point from Bethmann, Helfferich, and the German chauvin- 
istic Press, Rohrbach considers that these conditions were not 
pretexts, but constituted a seriously intended demand for a 



450 THE CRIME 

military handicap intended to hamper Germany and either 
deter her from war or, at least, prevent her from crushing! 
France and Belgium: 

We must not deceive ourselves with regard to the fact that 
England was in no way simply concerned with the question of 
being neutral or not neutral, but with the much more far-reach- 
ing question of being confronted in future by a possibly, or even 
a probably, new Germany which would straightway be in a posi- 
tion to gain a position of superiority over England. 

This sentence of Rohrbach's supplies confirmation of the 
English apprehension that the crushing of Belgium and 
France, quite apart from territorial annexations in Europe, 
would procure for Germany a position of power on the Con- 
tinent, and especially on the North Sea coast as far as the 
Channel, which could not but be dangerous to English naval 
supremacy. All this is entirely to the point and represents 
the true motives of England's attitude, which, as I also have 
explained in my book, was dictated not merely by the moral 
interest involved in the protection of the neutrality which she 
had guaranteed, but also by the material interest of her own 
power. The only point of interest in Rohrbach's disserta- 
tions — and it is for this reason that I emphasise them here — i 
is that they completely dispose of the Pan-German thesis of 
English aggressive intentions and of the exploitation of the 
violation of neutrality as a pretext for war. England has 
never thought of annihilating Germany. She merely wished 
that she should not herself be one day annihilated by a Ger- 
many that had become unduly powerful on the Continent. 
This fact Rohrbach expressly recognises in the above sen- 
tences, and therefore I have the right to claim him, in a 
certain sense, as an ally against the Pan-Germans: he is the 
most distinct type of the preventive imperialist, who only oc- 
casionally, in order to conceal his true character, conceals his 
face behind the mask of defence. 

At the conclusion of his essay on Our Opponents Rohrbach 
gives a long and instructive explanation in support of the 



MILITANT GERMAN SPOKESMEN 451 

doctrine: "Least of all need we be anxious about Russia. 
Only he who does not know Russia can fear it." Rohrbach 
conscientiously advances all the considerations which, in his 
view, make Russia a harmless opponent despite, or precisely 
because of, the greatness of the Empire of the Tsar and its 
gigantic population. The lack of order, defective discipline, 
a corrupt officialdom, the enormous distances from one end of 
the Empire to the other, the imperfect railway connections, 
are all carefully enumerated in order to dissolve into noth- 
ingness the fear of Russia as an opponent: 

On the long road which leads from the calling up of the re- 
servists and the militia from their villages on the Volga, in the 
Ural Mountains, in the industrial area of Moscow, in the South 
Russian steppes, in the woods of the North to the constitution of 
the regiments and the army corps for the decisive battle far in the 
West, as things are in Russia, there are such a vast number of 
physical, technical, and moral obstacles to overcome — stupidity 
and resistance of those who are summoned, unscrupulousness, 
brutality, corruption of those in governing and leading positions, 
incompetence in disposing the troops, inefficiency of the railway 
system, rebellious impulses in Poland, etc. — that the effective 
force finally brought into being can no longer be one calculated 
to inspire fear. 

If all this is correct, — and I do not doubt that it is so, — i 
Germany's behaviour on July 31st and August 1st, 19 14, 
appears all the more plainly to prove a preconceived aggres- 
sive intention, and not a defence forced on the country. A 
demobilisation within twelve hours, such as the German Ulti- 
matum demanded, was an impossibility in view of the inters 
nal Russian conditions rightly emphasised by Rohrbach. On 
the other hand, the mobilisation which was ordered on July 
31st could imply no urgent danger for Germany's security, 
in view of "the vast number of physical, technical, and moral; 
obstacles" ; in any case it could constitute no such urgent 
danger that the Emperor William should have been compelled 
— instead of being content to "assure the safety of his east- 
ern frontier where strong Russian forces have already taken 



452 THE CRIME 

up their position" * — forthwith to surprise Russia and the 
world on the afternoon of August ist with the declaration 
of war. What was the meaning of this over-hasty and fatal 
action in beginning the conflict when — as everyone knew, and 
certainly none better than the German General Staff — the 
Russian mobilisation required weeks and months for its com- 
pletion? There can only be one answer: because in Berlin 
war was unconditionally desired. 

* * * * * * 

I propose to give in the following pages a series of quota- 
tions from Rohrbach's pamphlet Zum Weltvolk hindurch; 
I believe, however, that I may refrain from any lengthy com- 
mentary upon them, since the sentences as printed speak suffi- 
ciently clearly for themselves. 

From the essay entitled Three Principles of War (page 
57): 

War should not be waged, until it reveals itself as a national 
necessity. . . . 

War for Agadir, Tarudant and the Sus would have united 
France, England and Russia in arms against us, just as has hap- 
pened to-day. With what conscience should we have taken the 
decision? Where would there have been any idea of the over- 
whelming outburst of the feeling of national unity which we see 
to-day ? Where would the Social Democrats have stood, and not 
merely the Social Democrats, but a large section of the Liberals, 
perhaps also of the Centre, the Poles, etc. ? . . . 

It is thus already made clear that we have not merely the 
strength but also sufficient time to settle matters with the French. 
Until the Russians are ready to strike, if, indeed, they ever get so 
far, will be a matter not of weeks, but presumably of months. 

In the essay High Midday (pages 63 et seq.) : 

The war which we are now waging must be called a "mature" 
war. The friend of peace in the pacifist sense will suspect that 
we desired that the crisis should mature in the direction of war. 
To this it is possible to answer both "yes" and "no." War, 
regarded from the point of view of ethics and religion, is a conse- 

1 Emperor William's telegram to King George, July 31st. 



MILITANT GERMAN SPOKESMEN 453 

quence of human imperfections and shortcomings, and regarded 
from this aspect it can never be desirable. If, however, it is ad- 
mitted that no great people is capable of maintaining its position 
if it resolves on principle not to wage any war, it follows that 
circumstances may arise in which every patriot of insight must 
wish for war, — of course not for war in itself, but war as a means 
of salvation from the danger of national downfall. I admit 
openly that in the days when the decision between peace and war 
hung in the balance I trembled, not lest the balance might sink 
in favour of war, but lest it should sink in favour of peace. As 
far as it is humanly possible to foresee, peace, if preserved for 
the present, would only have saved us for the moment from the 
sacrifices which we are now called upon to make, in order to leave 
us in the lurch a few years later in circumstances of greater grav- 
ity. It would not have been a good peace, but a slothful peace. . . . 

The war which we might yesterday have avoided at the cost 
of sacrificing Austria was still intended to be sprung upon us to- 
morrow by Russia and France, and England would then have been 
no more neutral than she is to-day. Thus the Emperor and the 
Chancellor could only accept peace at the hands of England, 
France, and Russia, if it were really a peace, and not merely a 
postponement of the attack until our opponents were completely 
equipped. . . . 

The essential determining question for an understanding of 
the years from 1912 to 19 14 is whether England during this 
period had no other object in view than to make us insignifi- 
cant, or whether English policy had transiently accepted the idea 
of a real understanding with Germany. To-day it is not yet 
possible to give a definite answer to this question. . . . 

As we know, the answer to this question is given by Schie- 
mann and his companions to the effect that England never 
entertained the idea of a serious understanding with Ger- 
many, but carried on negotiations merely for the purpose of 
deceiving the German Michel and to facilitate the prepara- 
tions for the aggressive war which had already been decided 
upon at Reval in 1908. 

A testimony by Rohrbach to France's love of peace: 

In the end, however, the relation was inverted: in France an 
ever greater part of the nation lost the courage and the desire for 



454 THE CRIME 

the passage of life and death with their powerful neighbour, 
but the rabid Russian Pan-Slavism dragged the French to the 
slaughter-house by the golden chain with which they had bound 
and delivered themselves. Russia forced on France the three 
years' period of service, and it was Russia that squeezed out of 
France the new milliards of francs, in order to bring to perfec- 
tion the conditions of her mobilisation as against Germany. 

While here it is again "rabid Pan-Slavism" that is pro- 
duced as the great criminal, there are, as we know, others, 
e.g., Chamberlain, who are of the opinion that the French 
politicians of revenge were the real inciters to war and that 
they merely dragged peace-loving Russia behind them. The 
familiar lie produced by Schiemann is also repeated by Rohr- 
bach when he states that the three years' period of service 
had already been forced by Russia on the French Govern- 
ment in the summer of 19 12, whereas it was, in fact, — as can 
be historically and chronologically proved — merely the conse- 
quence of the German Army Law. The former Belgian Am- 
bassador in Berlin, Baron Beyens, whom the Berlin Govern- 
ment, in other matters in their publications from the Belgian 
archives, recognise as a classical witness, nails this lie of 
Schiemann' s to the counter, as indeed in various places in his 
book he describes this same noble inquirer after the truth as a 
semi-official menial, a maid of all work, whose duty it was to 
collect all the lying trash which it was proposed to throw on 
the heads of their opponents. 

Another and even stronger testimony by Rohrbach to 
France's love of peace: 

For the French it was all-important not to have to fight now, 
but the Russian war-party deceived and intimidated the poor 
devil of a Tsar and dragged their French slaves behind them 
with threats. When Cambon the Ambassador left Berlin he said : 
"If we were what the Italians are, we would allow Russia to 
enter this war alone." This saying shows the true measure of 
the French feeling for war at the outbreak of the catastrophe. 

What do the Pan-Germans say to this testimonial to 
France's love of peace from the leader of imperialistic Ger- 



MILITANT GERMAN SPOKESMEN 455 

many — what is said by the whole German Yellow Press which 
exploited the insignificant incidents of Luneville and Nancy 
for the purpose of the basest accusations and incitement 
against the French people, and which would have preferred 
to provoke war then, although at the same time it would have 
laid the responsibility at the door of the French people? 

The following confessions by Rohrbach of the preventive 
war are invaluable : 

And now infatuation seized the Serbian murderers and led 
them to strike down the Archduke Francis Ferdinand and in this 
way confront Austria-Hungary with the question of her existence, 
before Russia had prepared her accelerated advance, before 
France had replaced her outworn rifle by a new, before she had 
created a heavy field artillery, modernised her northern fortresses, 
and made good the defects in the clothing of her troops. . . . 

Now let us imagine what it would have meant for us to have 
bought perhaps another two years of so-called peace at the price 
of compelling Austria to a fatal surrender. Then we should have 
had in 1916 a railway system in Poland and West Russia so 
widely developed that the Russians could have marched upon our 
frontier from East Prussia to Silesia, and could have fallen upon 
us with all their strength, before we had disposed of the French. 
Then we should have had to fight against a newly-armed and well- 
equipped French army and reconstructed French fortifications. 
Then finally we would have had as allies, not a unified Austria, 
but a disordered Austria which had already suffered moral de- 
feat. Was it defensible, was it possible in such circumstances 
to recoil from the decision for war ? . . . 

Then at last, since it was already high midday and time to turn 
to the work of salvation of our national future, then the blow fell 
which delivered us from the danger of procrastination. And now 
we are at the work, and we are experiencing that the architect of 
the world encourages and rewards it. 

Commentary on these sentences is superfluous. We de- 
cided on war in the summer of 19 14 because our military sit- 
uation compared with that of Russia and France would at a 
later date have been more unfavourable. It rested with us 
to avoid war, if we had wished to avoid it. We were not at- 



456 THE CRIME 

tacked, but we carried out an attack in order to anticipate a 
later attack from the other side. The German Emperor, the 
German kings and their ministers, may now settle matters 
with Rohrbach and ask him to explain how he comes to 
represent them all as liars in proclaiming the German war of 
defence. 

War — The Father of All Things 

I should not like to withhold from the reader a consoling 
episode in the horrors of war. In an article entitled The 
Father of Things (September ist, 1914) Rohrbach — relying 
on Heraclitus — sings an enthusiastic hymn of praise to war 
as such. Every great advancement in human character is in 
some way to be traced back to war as its origin : 

Without Salamis there would have been no age of Pericles, 
no Socrates, none of Plato's inheritance. What should we have 
known, what should we have possessed of all the fruits of the 
labours of antiquity without the military state of the Romans ? 

Why do you not continue the parable, Herr Rohrbach? 
Without the Thirty Years' War there would have been no 
Johann Sebastian Bach ; without the Seven Years' War there 
would have been no Goethe, Schiller and Lessing ; without the 
War of Liberation there would have been no Theodor Kor- 
ner; without the war of 1870 no Oscar von Redwitz, no 
Lauff, no Anton von Werner; without the war of 1914, there 
would have been no Lissauer! 

Yet war is nevertheless a fearful thing; Herr Rohrbach 
admits so much. Only in this he finds consolation in the 
thought that there are after all so many other terrible things 
to be found in the world, such as suicides, small-pox epidem- 
ics, etc., which are no doubt less striking, but are not for this 
reason less appalling. 

We men are so constituted that massive effects shake us 
more than anything else. In observing the drops which fall 
individually we do not, however, think of the stream which arises 
out of them. And how uselessly destructive are these individual 
occurrences — of how much greater things is war the father ! 



MILITANT GERMAN SPOKESMEN 457 

As if war were to take the place of suicide ! Is it not the 
case that suicides are extraordinarily increased in number 
just because of the horrors and the sufferings of war, the 
loss of dear ones and of the breadwinners of the family, be- 
cause of grief, hunger, and misery? Rohrbach reports that 
an epidemic of small-pox was introduced into Germany in 
1870-71 by French prisoners of war, and that it carried off 
almost twice as many victims as the war itself (80,000). 
What then, asks this man of feeling, is the use of becoming 
so much excited over the sacrifices of war, when diseases 
sweep away even more men? I would recommend that this 
demonstration also should be further elaborated. Why be 
horrified at an earthquake which has cost the life of ten thou- 
sand men ? Have we not in the same year had cholera which 
caused the death of double the number? Why bemoan the 
two thousand human lives sunk with the Lusitaniaf In every 
corner and nook of Europe is there not a daily butchery go- 
ing on, which deprives double or treble the number of men 
of their lives or their healthy limbs? 

With regard to the horrors of war Rohrbach finds con- 
solation in the progress of operative surgery, which is con- 
fronted with the most difficult tasks as a result of the thou- 
sandfold variety of wounds. The introduction of the epi- 
demic of small-pox occasioned compulsory inoculation, and 
in this way in the sequel hundreds of thousands of lives have 
been saved. It will be observed what a wealth of blessings 
flows from war! War, as the father of all things, was also 
the father of the epidemic of small-pox in Germany; this 
epidemic in its turn was the mother of vaccination ; so that a 
direct relationship, that of grandfather and grandson, exists 
between the war of 1870 and vaccination in Germany. Ty- 
phus, phthisis, cholera, diphtheria, syphilis, are still regarded 
by superficial people as the worst afflictions of the human race. 
How far from the truth! They are a blessing to humanity. 
Had they not existed, bacteriology would not have made the 
enormous progress which we have to note in the last genera- 
tion. Hip, hip, hurrah! Long live war! Long live the dis- 
eases of the people ! Long live death ! . . . 



458 THE CRIME 

If only Rohrbach's theory of beatitude were at least ap- 
plied to the disease of war and its phophylactic, which is 
pacifism! Then we pacifists might rest satisfied. Amongst 
us also there are certainly many who are of the opinion that 
the world-evil can only perish by its own horrors. The more 
terrible the effects of this epidemic, the sooner will mankind 
acquiesce in the introduction of inoculation, in the creation 
of protective institutions, which will at any rate protect future 
generations against similar outbreaks of the disease. But of 
course, when applied to war, the theory of these imperialistic 
physicians breaks down. War is only apparently an evil — in 
the eyes of the "vapourers about humanity," the materialists 
of business. How small was the number of German dead in 
the Franco-German War, scarcely 50,000 ! What do the mil- 
lion and a half dead whom we have already bundled into their 
graves on the battlefield of Belgium, France, and Russia come 
to, when weighed against the inestimable national and moral 
advancement which has been conferred on the German people 
as a result of the daily massacring and burning for upwards 
of thirty months. This advancement is an enduring gain 
for the soul of the people (the increase in criminality aftef 
all wars is of course only a chance coincidence). The dead, 
however, are only too easily replaced, and the newly-founded 
"League for the Promotion of the Increase of Population," 
among whose founders are included a number of patriotically 
inflamed young ladies, will contribute its share in this direc- 
tion. "Une nuit d'ete a Paris et tout c,a est bien repare" was 
once the callous remark of a French general when on the 
evening of the conflict his eyes roamed over the battlefield 
strewn with corpses. . . . 

It is the war which has called us back at the right moment 
from the materialism of business to the spirit of national sacrifice. 
Who is there amongst us, even if in the past he may have enter- 
tained pacifist views in his heart, who would not admit that, tak- 
ing all in all, this war has meant for us a bath of moral regenera- 
tion? Who can doubt that over wide areas the hateful dross 
which had already begun to form on the molten mass of our 
national fire which is nourished from within, and which swam 



MILITANT GERMAN SPOKESMEN 459 

like dark stains on the surface, will now again be dragged beneath 
and dissolved? (Rohrbach, page 71). 

War is an end in itself. It is the good in itself. Away 
with the mountebanks who would represent it to us as a dis- 
ease, and recommend prophylactic remedies against it! 

The Fear of Peace 

In an essay The Fear of Peace (September 8th, 1914, page 
72) we read as follows: 

Woe to those who cry "Peace, peace, when there is no peace" ! 
We also could have had peace instead of this war, if we had 
said to the Austrians : "Submit to the Russian threat ! At the 
most take Belgrade, and then accept the European Confer- 
ence. . . ." We could also have peace to-morrow ! We need only 
say to the English, the Russians, and the French: "Everything 
will be forgiven and forgotten ; pay us our costs ; concede us this 
or that scrap of territory, a rectification of the frontier, a strip 
of Africa — and that army of millions and all the crews of the 
ships everywhere will return to their homes." In that case for 
what should we have struggled? For what purpose would the 
great fire have burned in our hearts? For what would it have 
been given to us to experience something that may recur in a 
thousand years in the existence of a people, something that may 
perhaps never occur in the same measure again — to feel God 
moving in our hearts? For nothing, and again I say for noth- 
ing. For a mess of pottage that would cost us our birthright! 
For an increased and improved edition of the forty years 
of so-called "peace" ! If we did not perish under the weight of 
arms of these years, it was merely because we were given greater 
strength than we ourselves knew. Which of our opponents then 
is now ripe for the peace which we must have, if, as a real world- 
people, we are to disseminate the thoughts of our people through- 
out the world? 

We could have had peace if we had accepted the European 
Conference! We are grateful for the admission. In fact, 
we should have had peace if we had submitted to the Euro- 
pean Conference or to the Hague Tribunal the petty points of 
difference which still existed between Austria and Serbia. 



460 THE CRIME 

There was no question of a submission to "Russian threats/* 
since Russia from the beginning to the end had shown a spirit 
of the utmost compliance. 

We could also have peace to-morrow. For this second ad- 
mission also we are grateful! But, according to Rohrbach's 
view, we may not have it because we dare not be satisfied with 
a mess of pottage — as a reward for our attack! — because as 
a world-nation we are called upon to disseminate the thoughts 
of our people throughout the world. Does Herr Rohrbach 
believe that with these ideas of world-power he will be able 
to conclude another and a better peace than the previous so- 
called armed peace? Only if in place of "world-power" he 
substitutes "world-organisation" is it possible to hope for 
any improvement in the future. For him there is only onq 
way of salvation, and that lies in victory over England. Eng- 
land must be compelled to give up her booty from past cen- 
turies. If this does not take place, "the Briton will continue 
to maintain the first place before the German." These are 
the war-aims of the man with whom former Liberals and 
even the Social Democrats of Germany have combined in 
common action on committees and in the publication of com- 
pilations, etc. These are the war-aims of one who is still a 
moderate Imperialist, who in part repudiates the more ex-< 
tensive efforts of the Industrial League in the direction of 
annexations and confiscations. These are the peace condi- 
tions of a "shamefaced" Pan-German; it is easy to imagine 
what the unashamed demand before they are prepared once 
more to sheathe the sword. The most comic feature in this 
tragedy is, however, found in the fact that the article in 
which Rohrbach advances as the aim of the war a victory 
over England and the surrender of the "booty of centuries" 
concludes with the warning to leniency: "Moderation after 
the victory." 

Germany's World-Domination 

I pass over here the various references which Rohrbach 
makes to the "true war of defence" which we are waging. 



MILITANT GERMAN SPOKESMEN 461 

We already know that this constant oscillation between de- 
fence, preventionism, and imperialism is part of the stock-in- 
trade of those gentlemen who according to the needs of the 
moment exchange the homely field-grey of the defender of 
the German Fatherland for the gorgeous purple attire of the 
Roman ruler of the world. Let us hear the bombastic, sonor- 
ous vision of the future as it appears to the German World- 
ruler : 

There lie before us three worlds, in the case of which it has 
not yet been determined which of the great Western nations 
is destined to lead them to participate in the future culture of 
humanity: these are the Orient, Eastern Asia, and Africa. If 
we conquer in the fulness of our strength and not merely be- 
cause we are less exhausted than our enemies, it is we who will 
be in a position to pour the contents of our national thought 
into those expectant regions, which are ready to receive an infinite 
wealth of spiritual impressions. Consequently the outlook of a 
German statesman must to-day reach as far as this. His mind 
must be capable of linking China and India, the mouths of the 
Euphrates, the Cape of Good Hope and the Congo, with the 
course of the German War; he must be capable of hearing the 
vibrations of German thought resounding from the ends of the 
earth, and he must at the same time be able to recognise the 
sharp outline of the next and the most immediate tasks which 
must be solved to-day, if these visions are ever to become a reality. 
(From the essay Where must the War Lead Usf page 89.) 

What boldness, what energy, what a world-comprehending 
width of vision! And yet, this man of force would never 
have drawn the sword from its sheath to realise his plans of 
world-power — God forbid! — if he had not been basely at- 
tacked by his neighbours! What noble self-denial! 

THE STRUGGLE FOR THE "PLACE IN THE SUN" 

In connection with the foregoing quotations from the pre- 
ventive-imperialistic literature of Germany, it may be appro- 
priate to return once more to the cardinal point in the train 
of thought of this category of German spokesmen. I have 



462 THE CRIME 

already dealt in detail with this point in J' accuse (page 36), 
but I should like here to devote to the subject a few supple-i 
mentary observations arising out of certain critical remarks 
of my opponents. 

The point at issue is the celebrated "Place in the sun" 
which the Entente Powers, under the leadership of England, 
are alleged to have denied to the German people (an assertion 
which, as I have observed above, is disowned in passing by 
Rohrbach, the leader of the preventive imperialists), and 
which now, in default of a voluntary cession, must be gained 
with arms in hand. The German Crown Prince has expressed 
this train of thought with a definiteness for which we must} 
be grateful. It is true that this talented prince who is also 
experienced in all other arts and sciences — a universal genius 
like all the Hohenzollerns — has, as befits his high position, 
refrained from adhering exclusively to any one definite group 
of war bards. He is equally at home in all the registers of: 
the lyric of war; he plays with as much virtuosity on the 
dulcet flute of the war of pure defence as on the deafening) 
trumpet of the war of imperialistic expansion. He loves and^ 
celebrates war for war's sake — sitting comfortably in the se- 
curity of headquarters, with his quill drawn valorously from 
its sheath — and another time, when it suits his purpose, hq 
hurls the most annihilating anathemas against the enemies 
who have "forced" on us this blessing which leads to such an 
expenditure of blood. This dashing cavalryman is at his 
ease in all saddles ; to-day he defends, to-morrow he attacks ; 
to-day he loves war, to-morrow he abhors it; but he never 1 
loses sight of one object, that, namely, of representing him- 
self and his followers, the instigators and the abettors of 
the great crime, as innocent victims of the wiles of the enemy. 

Thus one day, when by way of change it appeared expe- 
dient to him to sound the note of preventive-imperialism, he 
coined that sentence which I have already quoted in my book : 

"Only thus, relying on our good sword, can we gain 
the place in the sun which is our due, but which is not 
voluntarily accorded to us." — Crown Prince William. 



MILITANT GERMAN SPOKESMEN 463 



The Three Preliminary Questions 

This sentence of the Crown Prince reproduces with unsur-i 
passable distinctness the quintessence of the doctrine of pre- 
ventive imperialism. In order to test its justification, it is 
necessary in the first place to examine the following ques-i 
tions : 

i. From the standpoint of modern international morality 
is it permissible to attain the "place in the sun," that is to 
say, the extension of the economic power of a country, by 
the sword, that is to say, by a sanguinary struggle, instead of, 
by peaceful labour? 

2. If it is morally permissible, is it physically possible f 

3. If it is possible, is it economically worth while? , 
The answer to these three questions demands little time and 

consideration. To answer the first question in the affirma- 
tive is to adopt the standpoint of the murdering thief, but 
of the murdering thief under aggravating circumstances. 
The poor devil who cuts the throat of the greedy extortioner, 
a la Raskolnikof, to rob her of her paltry few hundred marks 
of savings concealed in her pillow, has in most cases the ex- 
cuse that he is in fact a poor devil, that he is on the point of; 
starvation, perhaps with his wife and children. He commits; 
a single murder, and he has his head chopped off for it. On 
the other hand, it is suggested that the million fold robbery 
and murder is morally permissible and should remain unex- 
piated, more or less on the principle that "The little thieves 
are hanged, but the big are allowed to run" — permissible and 
unexpiated, although it is a million times more criminal than 
the individual action. It is more criminal, not merely on 
account of the gigantic number of those sacrificed, but above 
all because the wholesale murderer is not, like the individual 
murderer, poor and powerless, but is someone who is rich 
and powerful, and merely wishes to become still richer and 
still more powerful as a result of his misdeed. For myself; 
I do not admit the validity of the objection that the standard 
of private morality cannot be applied to political morality- 



464 THE CRIME 

I know of no morality of double applicability. Like Kant, 
I know no political morality, but only moral politics. In- 
deed I go so far as to make the observance of the principles 
of moral politics not dependent — as many Europeans do — on 
the colour of the skin of the objects of this policy, who, after 
all, are all human subjects. He who deprives black, brown, 
and yellow races of their land forcibly and without legal rea- 
son, in order to bless them with the so-called European cul- 
ture — which, in fact, is the worst "unculture" that has ever 
existed in the history of the world — acts in my opinion as 
immorally as does the other person who robs white men of 
their property. I can in no way accept the moral standpoint 
of the missionary, who answered the inquisitive questions of 
the black native who asked why the Christians first of all 
took away their land and then blessed it with Christianity, by 
calmly observing: "The matter is very simple, my friend. 
To begin with, you have the land and we have the Bible; 
now we have the land, and you have the Bible." 

The great difference between the expropriation of the 
blacks and the whites is no doubt to be found in the fact that 
the former in most cases is effected without an excessive ex-i 
penditure of blood, whereas the latter, as is shown by the 
present war, plunges not only Europe but almost the whole 
world in a sea of blood. This difference in the consequences 
which ensue from the action makes it necessary in practice to 
judge the two crimes differently, although morally they are 
on the same level. All the European nations are more or less 
guilty of the smaller misdeed; the great gigantic crime has 
been reserved for the despots of Germany. 

The second question to be investigated in this connection — 
whether, assuming it is morally permissible, it is physically 
possible in the grouping of European States to-day to acquire 
"the place in the sun" by reliance on the sword — and the an- 
swer to be given to it depend on the military strength of the 
opposing parties or groups, and thus eludes further discus- 
sion here. In any case, the course of this war appears to 



MILITANT GERMAN SPOKESMEN 465 

prove that the question of physical possibility must be an- 
swered as negatively as that of moral permissibility. 

The third question, that of the economic advantage which 
may result even from a victorious war of conquest, has al- 
ready been so clearly put by Norman Angell in his book The 
Great Illusion, and so exhaustively answered, that I may re- 
frain from again submitting the matter to a detailed discus- 
sion. Put shortly and concisely the question is as follows : 
Under the present world-wide conditions of intercourse, is 
even a victorious war of conquest worth the sacrifice in 
wealth and life which it imposes on the conquerors and his 
opponents — his opponents to whom he always stands to-day 
in the relation of a buyer and seller, whose loss therefore in- 
volves a Joss to himself also? The answer, expressed with 
equal brevity and conciseness, is as follows : Every war be- 
tween great States to-day means merely ruin and bankruptcy 
for all concerned, including the victor. It is for all the most) 
unfavourable, the most miserable business. 

What Norman Angell proved theoretically has been visibly 
demonstrated to all who are gifted with perspicuity by the 
practical results of two and a half years' world-war. Who- 
ever may emerge as conqueror from the titanic struggle, the 
Titans will all be more or less crushed by their own blocks 
of rock, and economically ruined for generations to come. 

In his most recent book, Problems of Peace Economics 
(Berlin: S. Fischer, 1917), Walther Rathenau estimates 
the German national wealth before the war at 17,500 million 
pounds, of which a fifth, that is to say, 3,500 million pounds 
in capital value, had been destroyed by the war, which till 
then had lasted upwards of two years. This destruction of 
capital value, which as a rule is not included in the losses of 
war, is in addition to all the other losses, the direct war ex- 
penditure, the loss of human life, human productive power, 
etc. 

Rathenau is certainly a witness who is beyond suspicion, 
and at the same time he is an expert of the first rank, having 
played a leading role in arranging our war economics, and 
having again been called to do so in the preparation of our 



466 THE CRIME 

future peace economics. Rathenau already estimates, after 
two years of war, that the amount which Germany will have 
to raise in future by way of interest and redemption of war 
debt, for the re-establishment of our industry and our sys- 
tem of defence, for the wounded and for the widows and 
orphans of our soldiers, is not less than 350 million pounds 
yearly; that is to say, approximately the sum represented by 
the yearly creation of new capital in Germany before the war.; 

In view of all this, the conviction must be borne in upon 
us that from every point of view — from the moral, physical, 
and economic point of view — the "good sword" on which 
the German Crown Prince relies in seeking to gain "the place 
in the sun" is the most inappropriate weapon to attain this 
place; that a well-driven merchant's quill, a well-equipped 
shipbuilding yard, an industry that produces a good and 
cheap article, lead to the desired end more surely than bombs 
and shells. 

The Main Question: Did we Stand in the Sun 
or the Shadow? 

Let us assume that the armed struggle for the place in the 
sun is morally justifiable, that it is physically practicable and 
could be made to pay economically, there still remains for 
investigation the main decisive question, whether this strug- 
gle was not pointless for Germany; whether Germany did 
not already in fact possess what it is alleged she must now 
acquire with the sword in her hand ; whether in fact the Ger- 
man people did not occupy that place in the sun, that is to 
say that economic place in the world, which is due to her 
industrial and commercial efficiency? The presupposition 
of all the military appeals of our preventive imperialists is 
after all that the place in the sun was kept from us by hos-t 
tile Powers, that we could not obtain it by kindness, and that) 
therefore we were obliged to seize the sword. ) 

To cut the ground from under the feet of this reason for 
the necessity of war, I have proved in my book that we pos- 



MILITANT GERMAN SPOKESMEN 467 

sessed not only a place, but a very distinguished place in the 
sun, and, indeed, that we were on the point of placing compet- 
ing countries more and more in the shadow. In the last twen- 
ty-five years, during the reign of the Emperor William II, our 
economic development has experienced an enormous period 
of prosperity, unprecedented in history; it was in a constant 
state of progress. What more can we ask? What was the 
meaning of the war for the place in the sun ? — I already asked 
in J' accuse. We were already standing in the brightest sun- 
light, and no one struggles for the things he already possesses. 

An answer to this ticklish question has never at any time 
been vouchsafed by imperialistic writers. They shyly avoided, 
and still avoid, the inconvenient questioner, because the an- 
swer would have uncovered cards which they wished to keep 
concealed in their hands, because they would have been con- 
strained expressly to acknowledge aims which are not will- 
ingly admitted in the open market-place — aims which they 
only allow to escape from their lips and their pen when they 
believe that they are in private. That such lapsus linguae 
imperialisticae do not remain concealed, that they also reach 
unwelcome ears, is proved by the preceding extracts from 
Pan-German and imperialistic writings. 

The confessed aim of German Imperialism, the sign-post 
which it displays towards the street, is the place in the sun 
which we already possess, — it is the acknowledgment of equal 
privileges which no one disputes. The unconfessed aim, how- 
ever, the goods which are shown inside the warehouse only to 
specially trustworthy customers, is the predominance of Ger- 
many; it is a position of hegemony, of world-power, the re- 
pression of others in the shadow. This exclusive place in 
the sun, it is true, we do not possess, and it will not be volun- 
tarily conceded to us by the others. It is round this that the 
struggle turns; it is for this that we have drawn our "good 
sword" ; it is for this that this world-carnage has been pro- 
voked. 

This, of course, is not said to the people ; it is known only 
to the initiated. The same hypocrisy which the makers of 
war in Germany reveal with regard to the origin of the war 



468 THE CRIME 

is developed by them with regard to their war-aims also. The 
imperialistic reason for war is a web of lies similar to that 
of the war of defence. The people are shown a restricted 
war-aim, but no mention is made of the fact that we already 
possess it. In reality, however, an unrestricted war-aim isi 
being pursued, but the fact that it is being pursued is con-' 
cealed in silence. The confessed struggle is pointless, the un- 
confessed is boundless. Even those classes of the German 
people who are in themselves accessible to imperialistic con- 
siderations would refuse to follow their leaders on such a 
fatal path, if they could perceiye the subtle jugglery. 



"We already possess the place in the sun and therefore we 
do not need to fight for it" — such was the conclusion at which 
I had already arrived in J' accuse on the strength of a wealth 
of statistical material, and my opponents themselves could not 
escape the logic of my demonstration. Since they were not 
in a position to dispute the statistical proof of Germany's 
economic development in the last quarter of a century, for 
which I cited as witnesses those holding their own views, they 
sought convulsively for special reasons which should never- 
theless demonstrate Germany's economic strangulation and 
consequently her right to hack through the Gordian knot. 

It is said that we need colonies on which the excess of our 
population may settle. I have already proved in my book that 
it is impossible to speak of an excess of population in Ger- 
many, that our emigration has fallen to a minimum; that, 
on the other hand, the immigration has constantly increased, 
and indeed, taking account of the Russian Polish seasonal 
labourers, that there is a great excess of immigrants over 
emigrants. Thus there can be no need for colonies for set- 
tlers. 

It is further said that we need naval stations, we need the 
freedom of the seas. Yes, no doubt — if we mean to wage 
war. In peace our former naval stations were and are suffi- 
cient; an increase in their number would merely necessitate 
an unnecessary new expenditure in men, ships, and money. 



MILITANT GERMAN SPOKESMEN 469 

All the seas stood open to our shipping. Our mercantile 
marine surpassed that of all other countries, if not in num- 
ber, at any rate in efficiency, magnitude, up-to-dateness and 
comfort. Our exports and our shipping trade were con- 
stantly increasing. For what purpose do we require new 
naval stations, if we are prepared to live with other nations 
in peaceful commercial competition, and if we do not enter- 
tain the thought of new aggressive wars? 

According to Lloyd's Register for 19 13, the leading sea- 
faring nations possessed in round figures 47,000,000 tons as 
the total tonnage of their mercantile fleets (only steamers of 
over 100 gross registered tons and sailing vessels of over 
100 net tons being included). Of this total tonnage there 
belonged : 

to Germany, 

2,010 steamers with 4,743,046 gross tons; 
to England, 

10,009 steamers with 19,349,107 gross tons; 
to America, 

1,871 steamers with 4,302,294 gross tons. 

The country which followed next in the scale of merchant 
navies is Norway with 1,597 steamers and 1,870,793 gross 
tons. Then only we come to France with 987 steamers and 
1,793,310 gross tons, etc. 

It will be seen that in the statistics relating to the mercan- 
tile marine Germany occupies the second place, before Amer- 
ica, immediately after England. The number of her steamers 
is more than double as great, her tonnage is about two and 
a half times as great as the French mercantile navy, and this 
is the case although the French colonial possessions are many 
times more valuable and extensive than those of Germany. 

The above figures form a valuable supplement to the com- 
parative compilations which I gave in J' accuse (page 53) 
ragarding the development of trade, of industry, and of the 
well-being of the great European States. We see here once 
more that the German people lacked neither "the place in the 



470 THE CRIME 

sun" nor the "freedom of the seas." Moreover we see it! 
confirmed anew, that the economic prosperity of a country, 
its exports and its shipping are in no way dependent on the 
greatness of its territorial or colonial possession. This is 
illustrated not merely by Germany's position in the above 
shipping statistics, but still more by the position of Norway, 
a small country with 2,400,000 inhabitants (approximately 
the same as the population of Berlin) and a superficial area 
of 124,130 square miles. Despite this small population and 
relatively small area, Norway occupies the fourth place in 
the statistics relating to the mercantile marine, immediately 
behind America and before France. 

Just as these lines are going to press the newspapers are 
reporting the sixty years' Jubilee of the North-German Lloyd. 
On June 19th, 1858, "Lloyd" opened its oversea operations 
with the steamer Bremen and a single cabin passenger. Fifty- 
six years later, on the outbreak of the present war, the Lloyd 
fleet comprised, including ships in course of construction, 102 
sea steamers, 40 coastwise steamers, 68 river steamers and 
launches, 1 training ship, as well as 283 lighters and coal 
barges, with a total capacity of 982,951 gross registered tons,, 
apart from 17 special vessels, such as grain elevators, etc. In 
the period from January to July, 19 14, the North-German 
Lloyd conveyed 376,793 persons ; in the whole of the previous 
year 662,385 persons. The number of officials and workmen 
of the North-German Lloyd on the outbreak of war amounted! 
to about 25,000. 

Similar figures could be collected in the case of all Ger- 
man shipping companies. In the face of such figures as these 
can it be asserted that we did not have the freedom of the 
seas, that we were hampered and strangled in a "wet tri- 
angle"? It was we who hampered and strangled ourselves 
when we began this senseless war, and amongst those who are' 
throttled, deprived of their freedom and of the breath of their 
life, we must count in the first place the German shipping 
companies. German shipping, the branch of German national 
industry which was most successful and most full of vitality, 



MILITANT GERMAN SPOKESMEN 471 

is dead — killed by the German sword. It must begin again 
where it began half a century ago; decades at any rate will 
pass before it is re-awakened to new prosperity. 

The "Standard of Life" in Germany 

In the desperate search for reasons to explain why, not- 
withstanding all that has been said, we still lacked the place 
in the sun, one of my opponents has finally alighted upon a 
discovery. True, Germany has indeed experienced a phenom- 
enal industrial development, but — listen and be amazed! — 
"the standard of life of the German people has still remained 
materially behind that of the English as well as the Amer- 
ican and the French peoples." Now at last we have got it; 
now at last we know for what we are fighting. It is for the 
standard of life of the German people. The standard of life 
of the Germans must be raised to a higher level. This is the 
reason why we begin in the first place by having some mil- 
lions of them killed ; this is why, in order to make the remain- 
ing millions buckle their belts tighter, we bestow upon them 
fatless, meatless, butterless, sugarless days, weeks, and 
months by way of introducing them to a better standard of 
life; this is why we reduce their bread, eggs, and potatoes to 
a minimum, which just keeps them from dying of hunger; 
this is why we give them communal feeding, since the indi- 
vidual can no longer get enough for himself, and so on. 
Hunger and death as a means of raising the German level of' 
life, that is the most recent definition of the purpose of the 
war, according to the discovery of the most ingenious of my 
opponents, who accuses me, a poor ignoramus, of my "inabil- 
ity to recognise the true governing reasons of German policy." 

O Thou most benignant God, how we thank Thee that at 
last Thou hast illumined our darkness ! Yes, indeed, now we 
know what we need. Children and fools, as we know, speak 
the truth. It is the "standard of life" that is wrong with us I 
Poor Helfferich! If this illumination had come sooner, you 
would not have collaborated in the joint work in celebration 
of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the reign of William II, 



472 THE CRIME 

in writing on "Social Culture and the Well-being of the Peo^ 
pie during the First Twenty-five Years of the Reign of the 
Emperor William II." Or, at any rate, you would have in- 
sisted on the title being changed into "Social Un-culture and 
the Misery of the People." The standard of life, — did you 
never think of that, O Helfferich? — the standard of life ofi 
the German people has remained so materially behind that of 
other peoples that all the economic and cultural prosperity of 
Germany, which you have supported with such striking fig- 
ures, is on the contrary a thing of naught. Perhaps you be j 
lieve, grave and learned economist that you are, that your 
carefully collected figures on the increase of the income of, 
the people in all ranks of the population, on the diminution 
of unemployment and emigration, on the increasing immigra- 
tion, on the increase of the national income by almost ioo per 
cent. And of the national wealth by at least fifty per 
cent, in the last twenty-five years, — perhaps you believed that 
all these solid figures collected by you to show the "result of 
the powerful industrial work of Germany" also involve a cor- 
responding rise in the standard of life of the German nation. 
Perhaps you believe, being still uninstructed by your young- 
est (clearly a very young) disciple, that the greater remunera- 
tion of all ranks of the people would also have made greater 
expenditure possible, and would thus have led to a better 
standard of life. Far from it! The most recent discoverer 
of reasons for war has decreed — of course without a shadow 
of proof and without producing statistics — that the standard 
of life of the German people has remained in a backward con j 
dition; the amelioration of this condition is the aim of Ger- 
man policy. Since now, as we know, war is the continuation 
of policy by other means, the standard-of -life-man quite log- 
ically invokes war, and in its sequel death, to come to his aid 
as the saver of life. As the first success of his policy for the 
amelioration of life he can already point out, in addition to 
many other tragi-comic phenomena, that soon after the be- 
ginning of his dietary cure (which as a matter of fact devel- 
oped into a banting cure) the German sandwich, at one time 



MILITANT GERMAN SPOKESMEN 473 

so appetising and so nourishing, became a paper "meat-card 
between two bread-cards." 

Bernhardi also, the master, the good, brave Bernhardi, 
must be astonished at the epoch-making discovery of his pu- 
pil. Bernhardi indeed is the very man who devotes an ex- 
tremely detailed chapter to proving statistically the unexam- 
pled brilliant development which Germany has experienced 
since the French war, the growth in wealth and in income 
which is to be found constantly increasing in every grade of 
taxation, the increase in the wages of labour, the progress of 
capital, etc. 1 As we know, this detailed description of our 
place in the sun is only of use to the warlike General in so 
far as it proves our capacity to bear an increase of military 
burdens. At the same time, however, it proves the increased 
possibility of expenditure in consequence of the increasing 
income ; in other words, it proves the rise in the standard of 
life of the German people. The man who earns more will, 
according to his temperament, either spend more or save 
more. In both cases his position in life will be improved; in 
the former case it will be improved in the present, in the 
latter in the future. It is obvious that it can be proved nu- 
merically from the statistics relating to consumption and sav- 
ings that increased expenditure in both these directions is 
constantly proportional to the increased incomes. Anyone 
who fails to grasp this obvious fact may obtain from Helf- 
ferich's books and from other literature on the subject such 
instruction as he may require regarding the relation between 
national income and consumption and savings. 

In order, however, to take away even this last point of 
support from those who cling to this straw of the "backward 
standard of life," I should like, in addition to the figures 
already given in my book, to cite here certain facts bearing 
more particularly on the upward development of the standard 
of life of the German people in the last twenty-five years. 

In Helfferich's book, which has been mentioned on several 
occasions, the author devotes a special section to the increase 

1 See J'accuse, pages 53-71. 



474 THE CRIME 

in the national income and national wealth, to the "yearly 
increase in the well-being of the German people," and in his 
fourth edition (19 14) he has added a further appendix en- 
titled "The Division of the National Income in Prussia, 1896- 
1912." In the prefaces to the third and fourth editions and 
in the introduction he summarises the result of these investi- 
gations in the following words: 

The result of the calculations undertaken is that the great in- . 
crease in the German national income is distributed with almost 
surprising uniformity over the various grades of the population, 
and that in particular the income of the "moneyed classes," not- 
withstanding the great increase of capital wealth, has not risen 
more markedly than the income of those classes who exclusively 
or predominantly rely on the fruits of their labour. . . . 

Above all, let us be on our guard against self-glorification! 
In a time in which we are more prosperous than others are, 
the most modest estimate of our own strength is more than 
ever necessary. . . . Both in a military and political sense Ger- 
many had again gained her position among the nations. To in- 
dustrial and social labour there was, however, left the great task 
of bringing the material conditions of the life of the German peo- 
ple up to the level of its intellectual and political achievements. 

"As all things are woven into a whole, one working and living 
in the other" — this truth is made manifest with wonderful clarity 
in the development which has resulted in the Germany of to-day. 
. . . And again it is the result of our industrial labour, that is 
to say, the increase in the well-being of the people, which for the 
first time has given the great masses of our people the possibility 
of participating in the attainments and the blessings of spiritual 
and artistic culture. . . . 

It is certainly no mean achievement if the perfection of techni- 
cal expedients and the improvement of the organisation of in- 
dustrial labour raise millions out of material misery to a life 
of competence worthy of man. 

A great part of Helfferich's book is devoted to proving 
this rise in the well-being of the people and consequently of 
the standard of life of all ranks without exception. The fig- 
ures given by Helfferich, into which, of course, I cannot here! 
enter in detail, "combine," as the author observes, "to furnish, 



MILITANT GERMAN SPOKESMEN) 475 

a highly gratifying and vigorous picture of healthy progress- 
ive national force and development." The increase in the 
national income is proved by reference to the assessment fig- 
ures for the Prussian income tax, and the figures which are 
thus found to indicate the increase are then correspondingly 
extended to the whole of Germany. The total yearly income, 
according to Helfferich, thus amounts to about 642 marks 
(£32 2s.) per head as against 445 marks (£22 $s.) in 1896. 

In the last seventeen years the increase in the total income is 
accordingly, in round figures, 83 per cent., and the increase in the 
average income per head of the population 44 per cent, in round 
figures. A comparison with other estimates shows how moderate 
is the calculation here made. (Helfferich, page 99.) 

Helfferich compares these figures with the French national 
income which Leroy-Beaulieu had calculated over a series of 
years at a thousand million pounds. "As at that time," ob- 
serves Helfferich on this point, "the German national income 
could already be estimated at about 1,750 million pounds, 
France would stand materially behind Germany in national 
income. Calculated on the basis of the population, the dif- 
ference is of course less. If the year 1908 is taken as the 
standard, the average income per head of the population in 
Germany would then be about 555 marks (£27 15^), in 
France about 514 marks (£25 14s.)." 

Helfferich brings forward another interesting contrast be- 
tween German and English wages, in instituting a compari- 
son between the average yearly wages of the English coal 
miner and the corresponding workman in the German Ruhr 
area. After taking into consideration all charges, insurance 
contributions, etc., he calculates the average English wage for 
1912 at £82 2.s. and the German at £89 10s., whereas in 1900 
the comparison, made on the same principles, yielded a bal- 
ance in favour of the English workman of £13 18^. No re- 
gard is taken in this calculation of the higher cost of living in 
England compared with Germany. If this point is taken into 
consideration, the position of the German workman, com- 



476 THE CRIME 

pared with the English workman, appears even more favour- 
able. To this investigation Helfferich expressly adds the ob- 
servation that this development is not restricted to coal-min- 
ing, but that the same thing recurs in other branches of na-< 
tional industry (pages 104-5). 



The newly added appendix to the fourth edition of Helf- 
ferich's book on the distribution of the national income 
in Prussia has the special object of proving that the lower 
grades of income have had their full share in the increase of 
the national income. For this purpose Helfferich gives a. 
tabular review of the distribution of the population in the 
various grades of income in the years 1 896-1 91 2, and on 
this basis arrives at the following conclusion : 

The part of the population whose income reaches only as much 
as £45 has materially diminished, while there has been at the same 
time a great increase in the whole population. ... In 1896 the 
income grade up to £45 still comprised 75 per cent, of all people 
assessed and 67 per cent, of the population, whereas in 1912 the 
corresponding figures were 52 per cent, and 40 per cent, only 
(pages 130-2). ... In 1896 there was only 1 in 35 persons as- 
sessed who had an income of more than £150; in 1912, on the 
other hand, this was possessed by 1 in 20 (page 133). . . . It may 
therefore be said that the lowest grade of the population whose 
income in 1896 reached to £45 had in 1912 reached a level of in- 
come of about £69 (page 139). 

I imagine that that should be sufficient to dispose com- 
pletely of the most recent discovery that the standard of life 
in Germany had not kept pace with the enormous develop- 
ment of industrial life. Herr Helfferich's eloquent figures 
prove much more than the stammering drivel of political 
ignoramuses. 

It is a self-evident fact that the increase of income in all 
ranks of the people also involves an improvement in the 
standard of life, whether it be by the expenditure of the in- 
creased wages or by the formation of capital. Moreover, the 



MILITANT GERMAN SPOKESMEN 477 

German Secretary of State lays special emphasis on this point 
in his concluding observations : 

Our retrospect causes every heart to beat higher in pride and 
satisfaction. ... In the improvement of the scientific and practi- 
cal aspects of the technical arts, in the advancement of the in- 
dustrial organisation which effectively comprises all our means 
and all our forces, in the increase of the production of goods and 
of intercourse, in the expansion and establishment of our eco- 
nomic world-position, in the betterment of the conditions relating 
to income and wealth, and in the elevation of the whole standard 
of life of our population, which is progressively and healthily ad- 
vancing — in all these lines of progress Germany has worked its 
way to a stage never before reached in its whole history, and 
it has shown itself in the peaceful competition of the nations to 
be a match for the first and the most powerful rivals (page 125). 

As the task for the future Helfrerich advances inter alia 
that of "keeping the moral and intellectual development of the 
German people in harmony with the brilliant progress of our 
industrial development and our advance in well-being." 

The reader who desires to become more intimately ac- 
quainted with the German industrial and social development 
in the last twenty-five years may be referred to the remaining 
sections of the joint work on Social Culture and National 
Well-being, which are written by other authors. All the con- 
tributors to this compilation agree in the final conclusion that 
the material, intellectual, cultural and physical well-being of 
the German people during the twenty-five years of the reign 
of the Emperor William II has shown as marked a develop- 
ment as German industrial life, and has kept equal pace with 
it. Nowhere is there a single word to indicate that the lumi- 
nous picture on the one side must be weighed against a dark 
picture on the other. Where has the most recent novice who 
speaks in Germany's defence really obtained his fatuous dis- 
tinction? It springs from him, the anti-accusator ; it is an 
original growth, grand cru. Here for once he does not quote, 
as he does elsewhere throughout his whole booklet, which, an 
unsurpassed treasury of quotations, might enter into competi- 
tion with Buchmann. Here he has allowed his own intellect 



478 THE CRIME 

free play! It will be observed what results. May he keep 
himself in future from such wanton tricks! 



There is therefore no substance in the argument which 
makes the deficiency in the standard of life the reason for the 
wholesale European carnage. When the discoverer of this 
ingenious idea proceeds to advance as a further justifiable 
reason for striving for "the place in the sun" the necessity 
of a "continual extension and guarantee of markets for our 
industry," this discovery almost surpasses in originality the 
idea of the standard of life. The man who writes this refers, 
ten lines before appealing for an extension of markets, to the 
"prosperity of German economic life which is disputed by 
none, and to the enormous progress which German industrial 
development has made in recent years." In saying this, my 
honoured friend, you admit the continual extension of mar- 
kets which ten lines later you are unable to discover. If our 
industrial life has in recent years made the enormous progress 
which you yourself recognise, this can only mean, since our 
trade and industry are to a large extent concerned with ex- 
ports, that the markets for our goods have constantly ex- 
tended. Thus you yourself admit that we were already richly 
in possession of "the place in the sun" in the sense in which 
you define it. You confirm my appeal to the leaders of the 
German State : "We have, indeed, already got the place in 
the sun. Only leave us alone in peace and quietness to warm 
ourselves in the sunshine and to do our work." (J'accuse, 
page 69.) 

The development of our export industry, the extension of 
the markets for our goods, is further, according to your own 
theory, — which, indeed, is quite correct, — the presupposition 
and condition of a rise in our standard of life. Ergo: our 
standard of life has been constantly improved. That our 
markets and the extent of our sales were constantly increas- 
ing, and that, consequently, as long as peace lasted they were 
bound to yield us an increasingly wealthy source of revenue, 
is the very fact which is proved by the last figures which 



MILITANT GERMAN SPOKESMEN 479 

Helfferich, in his preface to the fourth edition of his work of 
December, 191 3, gives with regard to the development of our 
foreign trade in the first ten months of 1913. From January 
to October, 1913, German exports rose by £54,750,000 com- 
pared with the first ten months of 1912; imports, on the other 
hand, fell by f 1,1 00,000. From this it follows that there 
was for the first ten months of 19 13 an improvement in the 
German balance of trade in round figures of £56,000,000, 
which is equivalent to an improvement in the year of more 
than £67,000,000. 

It will be seen from these figures for the last year of peace 
how correct I was in my concluding observation regarding 
Germany's place in the sun; how, in fact, before the provo- 
cation of this insane and criminal war we were standing in 
the brightest sunshine, and how every year we moved still 
further into the sunlight. Where then, I again ask, is the 
economic encirclement of Germany, which, along with the po- 
litical encirclement, is represented as having been the chief 
aim of the Entente Powers who are said to have hindered 
Germany in her natural commercial and industrial develop- 
ment? Where is the reason for the provocation of this un- 
precedented murder of the nations? 

In the very last year before the war the greatest expert on 
this subject in the German Empire, the former German Secre- 
tary of the Treasury, confirms the enormous increase in Ger- 
man foreign trade, and that, moreover, at a time of general 
economic depression. What more did we want? What did 
we still lack? Who placed obstacles in our way? No one. 
If anyone had asked our great merchants, financiers and 
manufacturers, our shipowners and Hansa traders, whether 
they felt themselves hampered or strangled in their mercan- 
tile or manufacturing activities, they would all have answered 
with a loud and articulate "No." But they were not asked. 
It was the Generals, the courtiers, the Junkers, the Pan-Ger- 
mans, the colonial fanatics, the spokesmen of East Elbe, the 
men of the riding- whip and the top-boot, who were consulted, 
and, of course, these despisers of trade and industry unani- 
mously raised their war-cry, and, thinking only of the profits 



480 THE CRIME 

of agriculture, they passed over the statistics of trade with 
derisive laughter and proceeded to the business of the day. 
It is absolutely certain that Helfferich, if he had been con- 
sulted in the critical days of July, would have advised against 
war and would have done everything to prevent it. His sta- 
tistics themselves prove to us to-day that this war was not 
merely an enormous crime, but also an act Qf abysmal stu- 
pidity. 

CONCLUDING OBSERVATION 

With the collection of opinions given in this chapter 
from the camp of the Pan-Germans, the Chauvinists, the Pre- 
ventionists and Imperialists, I believe I have proved that there 
existed in Germany powerful and influential currents which 
for years, and indeed for decades, had worked in the direc- 
tion of a European war, and had done all that lay in their 
power with a view to its preparation and provocation. I can 
only recommend anyone who is not satisfied with my evi- 
dence to look through the files of the Alldeutsche Blatter, the 
Post, the Deutsche Tageszeitung, the Kreuzzeitung, the T'dg- 
liche Rundschau, the Leipzig er Neueste Nachrichten, the 
Dresdner Nachrichten, the Berliner Neueste Nachrichten, the 
Rheinisch-W estfdlische Zeitung, and the Deutsche Warte for 
the last fifteen years, to study the reports of meetings of the 
Pan-German Union, the German Defence League, the Ger- 
man Navy League, to survey and examine the Pan-German 
imperialistic and militaristic pamphlet and book literature, 
and when he has done so he will arrive with me at the con- 
clusion that in no other country in the world were the in- 
triguers and inciters to war so admirably disciplined, organ- 
ised, and prepared for the decisive blow as in Germany, the 
model land of the art of organisation. A hint from a central 
office and all the orators, journalists, leaders of leagues, writ- 
ers of pamphlets and propagandists swung promptly into the 
firing-line against the peace of Europe. 

As in the case of large movements on the Stock Exchange 
the initiated, the moving forces, are of course aware in ad- 
vance of the development in the price which they wish to give 



MILITANT GERMAN SPOKESMEN 481 

to certain securities, and the public must be content with the 
"second running" (in doing which it nearly always arrives 
too late and is taken in), so the leaders of Pan-Germany al- 
ways knew in advance where the journey would end, since 
they themselves had determined the object and the direction 
of the journey. All Germany was surprised by the war, but 
not Pan-Germany. All Germany, with the exception of the 
few thousand chauvinistic wirepullers and their confederates 
and interested followers, was surprised and horrified by the 
outbreak of the conflagration in July, 19 14, while the secret 
devisers of the holocaust stood by, grinning and rejoicing in 
the success of the work which they had so long prepared. 
The war enthusiasm of the Berlin populace on the evening of 
July 31st when the Emperor and the Chancellor spoke to the 
excited multitude from the Castle and the Palace windows, — 1 
the conviction of the German people that Germany had been 
fallen upon and attacked, — that, as the Emperor said that 
evening from the balcony of the Imperial Palace, "the swordl 
was pressed in our hands in just defence" — all these facts, the 
enthusiasm and the conviction, were the products of the most 
accurate and prolonged calculation of the Pan-German in- 
structors and taskmasters. These coldly-calculating "pa- 
triots" were sufficiently acquainted with the German people to 
know that it could well be inspired to a war of defence, like 
the lioness who protects her cubs, but that it could never be 
inflamed to a war of aggression and conquest, nor even to an 
aggressive war for pretended preventive purposes. "The 
others will some day attack us later" — this argument they 
could successfully make use of with the so-called educated 
classes, the higher strata of society, who in Germany are less 
seriously concerned with politics than is the case elsewhere. 
With the people, however, with the great masses, no bird 
could be wiled from the bush with this preventive argument. 
In their case, in order to make the marionettes dance, it was 
necessary to find arguments which were stronger, more tangi- 
ble, and more obvious to the simple understanding. Here it 
was necessary to speak of the treacherous attack on the East 
and West, of the invasion of the Tartars and Cossacks in 



482 THE CRIME 

East Prussia, of French aviators over Southern Germany, of 
movements of French troops across Belgium against our 
Western provinces. Here it was necessary to speak of an 
acute present danger, and. not of a probable danger in the 
future. 

For years this was known to the wirepullers behind the 
scenes, and on this they had based their calculations. And 
when, at the end of July, 19 14, the correctness of their calcu- 
lations was revealed, they were not surprised and horrified, 
as were ninety-nine hundredths of the German people, but 
they were proudly satisfied at the prompt result of their war- 
plans down to the subtlest psychological note. On that mem- 
orable evening of July 31st, as was then reported in the 
Press, the Crown Prince drove simpering and laughing 
through the acclaiming multitude from the Brandenburg Gate 
to the Royal Palace, while his Imperial father with earnest 
mien received the demonstrations of the populace. In the 
dispositions of the two princes as thus manifested there were 
reflected the undercurrents, the struggles and the oscillations 
of recent years. The laughing son, the leader of the war- 
party at the Prussian Court, had now at last gained the vic- 
tory over his Imperial father, who had long hesitated, con- 
scious of his enormous responsibility towards his country and 
the world. ... 



Anyone who would still venture to dispute the cogency of 
my arguments advanced with the object of proving the exist- 
ence of an extremely powerful German war-party — anyone 
who to-day, when the consequences of this movement di- 
rected to the incitement to war are clear to the whole world, 
when the openly proclaimed war-aims of the German chau- 
vinists furnish the irrefutable proof of their war-intentions, 
should still have the courage to continue the game of lies con- 
ducted for years before the war, and should seek to transfer 
the guilt of the ghastly murder of the nations from the Ger- 
man criminals to others beyond the German frontiers, will at 
any rate be unable to rely on chauvinist or Pan-Slav move- 



MILITANT GERMAN SPOKESMEN 483 

ments in France or Russia. It has been documentarily proved 
that Pan-Germanism and German chauvinism were infinitely 
stronger, but above all infinitely more influential and there- 
fore more dangerous, than any similar movement in any other 
country. 

In contradistinction to similar movements in other coun- 
tries, the spokesmen of militant Germany have alone pos- 
sessed the power to direct the ship of State, with the imperial 
steersman at the rudder, into their dangerous track. They 
alone have possessed the power to transform their desire and 
their will into the decisive act. The crowned rulers commit- 
ted the deed. But it was the German chauvinists who were 
the uncrowned masters of these rulers, and their aiders and 
abettors. 



END OF SECOND VOLUME 



INDEX 



INDEX 



"A couple of Dreadnoughts, more or 

less," 264-266 
Aehrental, Count, 41 
"A first-class lie," Sir E. Grey's 
description of von Beth- 
mann's account of the Bal- 
kan conflict, 239 
Agadir, plan for naval demonstration 

before, 45 
Agadir, Incident, the, 86, 89, 90 
Aggressive conspiracy of Reval, the, 

1908, 36 
Agrarian patriots, the, 435-437 
Alldeutsche Blatter scoffs at confidence 
of German Press on Potsdam 
agreements, quoted, 366; 
1914 warning as to the 
Russian danger, quoted, 369; 
on inevitability of war-like 
settlement, quoted, 372; 
General von Gebsattel on 
Germany's external enemies 
in, 372; on France's alleged 
war intentions, quoted, 376; 
after the outbreak of war, 
377-379; ridicules and at- 
tacks von Bethmann and 
Prince Lichnowsky, 378; on 
war-aims on outbreak of 
war, 382-383; quoted, 387 
Allgemeiner Beobachter, 1913, quoted, 

352 
America enters the war, 314^ 
Analogy of criminal procedure, 156-158 
Angell, Mr. Norman, 27; The Great 
Illusion, Is a victorious war 
worth the sacrifice? 465 

487 



Anglo-German Agreement of Bagh- 
dad line concluded, 43 

Anglo-German negotiations for an 
understanding (1909-19 12), 
259 et seq. 

Anglo-Russian Entente, the, 230 

Anglo-Russian Naval consultations, the, 
58-60 

Anthology from German chauvinistic 
literature before the war, 341 

Archduke Francis Ferdinand, Baron 
Beyens on, 315 

Argyll, Duke of, President of Com- 
mittee for promotion of 
peace between England and 
Germany, 223 

Ascent to a World Nation, The, by Paul 
Rohrbach, quoted, 432 

Asia Minor and the Baghdad Railway 
Agreement, 46 

Asquith, Mr. H. H., 27, 233, 259; 
speech in Parliament on 
Anglo-German negotiations 
on naval construction, 261; 
Bethmann replies to, 262 

Austria, a new self-accusation of, 
244-251 

Austria and Germany guilty of causing 
the war, 15; decline media- 
tory action of third Powers 
at the first Hague Confer- 
ence, 184 

Austria refuses to sign the Bryan 
Treaty of 1913, 212 

Austro-Serbian Harbour dispute, 367, 
368 

Autobiography of Andrew D. White, 
late American Ambassador 
in Berlin, 170 



488 



INDEX 



B 



Baghdad Railway, Russia agrees to 
place no difficulty in Ger- 
many's way with regard to, 
21 ; and Asia Minor Agree- 
ment, 46 

Balfour, Mr. A. J., on Venezuelan 
incident, 1902-3, 73; speech 
on peace at Lord Mayor's 
banquet, 1903, 222 

Balkan conflict, 1912-13, the, England's 
action during, 234 et seq. 

Baltischport, meeting of the Tsar and 
German Emperor in, 365, 366 

Basel, peace manifesto of the Inter- 
national agreed to at, 368 

Bassermann,Herr,leaderoftheNational 
Liberal Party, no "brother- 
hood of nations" after the 
war, 290^., 322 

Beatty, Admiral, visit of English squad- 
ron to Kiel, 1914, 77 

Beck, J. M., his Evidence in the Case, 199 

Belgium, invasion of, cause of the 
Anglo-German war, 67 

Bell, Mr., interview with Sir E. Grey 
in the Chicago Daily News, 
quoted, 235 

Berchtold, Count, 245 

Bergstrasser, Herr Ludwig, 20, 106 

Bernhard, George, 390 

Bernhardi, General von, German Gov- 
ernment's efforts to shield, 
16; his candid views on war, 
17; his school bent on 
conquest, 18; Schiemann's 
efforts to get rid of, 300, 
322; on "Our Future" in 
Die Post, 1912, 363-64; in 
Hannoversches Tageblatt, 
1912, 364; on "Present-day 
War," Konservative Monat- 
schrift, 1913, 364 

Berliner Neueste Nachrichten, the, on 
war as a factor in civilisa- 



Berliner Neueste Nachrichten — cont. 

tion, 191 2, 346, 347; on 
Pan-German Union, 1912, 
357 

Berliner Tageblatt, quoted, 335ft.; on 
the incident of Nancy, 
quoted, 393 

Bethmann, Herr von, German Chan- 
cellor, on the Potsdam inter- 
view, 21; Baron Greindl's 
refutation of his charges 
against the English Govern- 
ment on the Bosnian crisis, 
31; his avowal of pacifist 
ideas, 23 1».; reasons for 
refusing Sir E. Grey's con- 
ference in 1914, 235-236; 
Russian mobilisation reason 
for refusal, 236-239; replies 
to Mr. Asquith's speech in 
Parliament, on Anglo-Ger- 
man negotiations on naval 
construction, 262, 264; pro- 
posal of neutrality to Lord 
Haldane, 269; 279; ridiculed 
and attacked by the All- 
deutsche Blatter, 378; and the 
Pan-Germans, 379-381; a 
tractable pupil of the Pan- 
Germans, 380; correspond- 
ence in Vorwdrts with gen- 
eral committee of Pan- 
German Union, 383-384; 
annexationist, 385; never a 
pacifist, 385 

Bethusy-Huc, Count, conveys Moltke's 
view in favour of war to 
Bismarck, 116 

Beyens, Baron, last Belgian Ambassador 
in Berlin, U allemagne avant 
la guerre, 29; on pernicious 
influence of German Press, 
32; Germany before the War, 

315 
Bieberstein, Freiherr Marschall von, 
173; chief of German dele- 



INDEX 



489 



Bieberstein — cont. 

gates to the second Hague 
Conference, 196; insists on 
unanimity in voting at, 
202, 231 
Bismarck, Junker, back-stair politicians 
and, 27; and the preventive 
war, 110-114; his work, 
Gedanken und Erinnerungen, 
quoted, in; his speech in 
the Prussian Landtag, De- 
cember, 1850, 112; his atti- 
tude against Moltke's desire 
for provocation of war, 112, 
113; Prof. Munroe Smith on, 
114; Field-Marshal Wrangel 
sends calumnious telegrams 
to King Frederick against, 
ibid.; Count Bethusy-Huc 
conveys Moltke's views 
in favour of war to, 116; 
his fatal concession to the 
generals, 116; his " blood and 
iron" policy, 173; his plan 
for breaking up the German 
Union, 213; his remark to 
German students at Fried- 
richsruhe, "The German is 
not made for a policy of 
conquest or of brag," 321; 
his Hamburger Nachrichten 
attack on the Nationalists, 
321 

Boer War, 219 

Borne, Ludwig, quoted, 340 

Bosnia, 29 

Bosnian crisis, 1908-9, 40 et seq.; 
England's action during the, 
234 et seq. 

Boulangism, period of dangerous tension 
between Germany and 
France, 123 

Bourgeois, Leon, president of French 
delegates to the first Hague 
Conference, quoted, 185, 
186; president of arbitration 



Bourgeois, L6on — cont. 

of second Conference, 200, 
223 

Brailsford, Mr., 27 

Breusing, Admiral, speech at the 
Committee meeting of the 
Pan-German Union in Stutt- 
gart, quoted, 371; on Eng- 
land's readiness for hostili- 
ties, quoted, 373-374 

Bryan Treaties of 1913, the, 210-213; 
signatories to, 213 

Bulgaria's entry into the war, M. 
Rizoff states reason for, 283 

Biilow, Prince, Imperial Germany, 171; 
letter sent by Dr. Holls from 
Mr. White as to Germany's 
negative attitude towards 
arbitration, 181; in Deutsche 
Politik, on Sir E. Grey's 
speech prior to outbreak of 
war, quoted, 254-255 

Burian, Herr von, Austrian Minister 
for Foreign Affairs, on Sir 
E. Grey's activity for peace 
at London Conference of 
Ambassadors, 242; reports 
on Bosnian crisis, 243, 248 
Burns, Mr. John, reason for resigning 
from Government, 52 



Cambon, Jules, French Ambassador in 

Berlin, his interview with 

Paul Krause, 298 
Cambon, Paul, correspondence between 

Sir Edward Grey and, 

November, 191 2, 99-105 
Campbell-Bannermann, Sir H., 222, 

226, 227, 233 
Caprivi, Count, speech in the Reichstag 

against preventive war, 

quoted, 117 
Casablanca conflict, England's success 

in settling, 64 



490 



INDEX 



Casement, Roger, German responsi- 
bility for death of, 27 

Casseler Allgemeine Zeitung, 1913, on 
Defence League, 360 

Castro, co-operation of English and 
German fleets against, in 
1902-3, 70 

Chamberlain, Herr Houston Stewart, 
20, 34, 407 el seq.; Who is 
Responsible for the War? 41 1- 
412; as historian, 412-414; 
on the German and English 
peoples, 420-423; on Sir 
Edward Grey, 421; his war- 
aims, 422-423 

Chamberlain, Mr. Joseph, Colonial 
Minister, in favour of regu- 
lation of armaments, 220 

Chancellor of the iron forehead, the, 
257-258 

Chauvinists, German, prepared for this 
war, 322; and the German 
nation, 322 

Chicago Daily News, Sir E. Grey inter- 
viewed by Mr. Bell in, 
quoted, 235 

Choate, Mr. Joseph, former American 
Ambassador in London, 173; 
American delegate to the 
second Hague Conference, 
quoted, 199 

Churchill's two propositions for naval 
holiday, 1912-1913, 92, 205, 
296 

Class, Herr, President of the Pan- 
German Union, on theory of 
preventive war at meeting of 
the Pan-German Union, 367, 
372 

Compulsory service, general, introduced 
into Prussia by Scharnhorst 
and Gneisenau, 321 

Confession of a Preventive War and 
other "discrepancies, " 94-98 

Constant, d'Estournelles de, French 
delegate to the first Hague 



Constant d'Estournelles de — cont. 

Conference, quoted, 187; 
drafts letter (quoted) to 
representatives of Dutch 
Court, 188; leader of French 
peace movement, at meet- 
ing of French and English 
members of Parliament, 
1903, 221 

Constantinople, Russia's supposed de- 
sires against, 37 

Cook, Sir E., How Britain strove for 
Peace, 259 

Correspondence between Sir E. Grey 
and M. Paul Cambon, Nov., 
191 2, 99-106 

Cour permanente d'arbitrage, 164-186 

Criminal procedure, analogy of, 156-158 

Crown Prince, 16; attends coronation 
of King George, 84; his 
boast, "This is war as we 
love it," 160; sends laurel 
wreath to Lieut. Forstner, 
161 ; his longing for war, 314; 
sends telegrams of con- 
gratulation to Lieut. Forst- 
ner and Col. Reuter on 
Zabern incident, 381, 462; 
quoted, 463; leader of the 
war party at the Prussian 
Court, 483 

D 

Danziger Neueste Nachrichten, 1913, on 
Defence League, 361 

Dardanelles, Russia's supposed desires 
against, 37 

Darmstadter Tageblatt, 1913, on Defence 
League, 361 

Defence League, Casseler Allgemeine 
Zeitung, 1913, on, 359; 
Eessische Post on, 359; 
Hannover cher Courier, "Are 
we prepared? " 360; Danziger 
Neueste Nachrichten on, 360; 
Tdgliche Rundschau on, 361; 



INDEX 



491 



Defence League — cont. 

Darmstadter Tageblatt on, 361 

"Degenerate sons" of the Fatherland, 
424-426 

Derailing, Herr, 16 

Delaisi, Francis, his pamphlet, La guerre 
qui vient, 26, 27; his remarks 
on Schiemann, 28 

Delcass6, M., 95; fall of, June, 1905, 
147-150; concludes Anglo- 
French Arbitration Treaty, 
221 

Der Roland von Berlin, 191 2, quoted, 352 

Der Tag, General Keim on the will to 
war in, 1912, 361-362 

Destruction of private property at sea 
peculiar to the German 
nation, 218 

Deutsche Politik, by Prince Biilow, 
quotes Sir E. Grey's speech 
prior to outbreak of war, 

254-255 

Deutsche Tageszeitung, the, 1913, quoted, 
350; on Crown Prince's 
book, 351; on Berne Con- 
ference, 351 

Deutsche Warte, the, 1913, on habitual 
enemies, 351 

Deutsche Welt, the, Karl Tolle on 
Germanism abroad in, 347 

Die Post, Dr. Fuch's articles in, 342- 
345; on Pan-German Union 
meeting in Hanover, 191 2, 

355 

DieWelt am Montag, 1913, H. v. Gerlach 
on "Unreason on both sides" 
and in, quoted, 396; on 
"Hatred," 397 

Dishonest and honest "preventive- 
warriors, " 18 et seq. 

Disraeli, Benjamin, on Gladstone, 33 

Documents relating to the Outbreak of 
War, 98; quoted, 104 

Dresdner Nachrichten, 1913, on "Our 
Foreign Policy and France, " 
353 



Driving Forces, by Kurt Eisner, 341 
Du droit de la force a la force du droit, 

Prof. Edgard Milhaud's 

work, 189 



Easter Message, Imperial, 1917, 340 

Effective peace strength of the Army 
and Navy of the Powers 
compared, 141, 142 

Eichhorn, General, 322; address at 
Saarbriicken, Frankfurter 
Zeitung, 1912, on, 365 

Eisner, Kurt, Driving Forces, 341 

England and France actively work for 
peace, 221 

England consistently progressive, 215 

"England must be the mortal enemy of 
Germany," 387 

England's action during the Bosnian 
crisis and the Balkan con- 
flict, 234 et seq. 

English and French members of Parlia- 
ment meet, 1903, 221 

English and German Press and Parlia- 
ment compared, 224; Fleets 
co-operate against Castro in 
1902-3, 70 

English Cabinet's effort for an under- 
standing with Germany, 19 

English naval practice in the North 
Sea and Baltic, 20 

English pacifism in word and deed, 
233 et seq. 

English, Russian and German Mon- 
archs' meeting in Berlin, 

1913. 43 

English squadron's visit to Kiel under 
Admiral Beatty, 1914, 77 

English trade unionists' Paris demon- 
stration for peace, 221 

Entente, the, an aggressive alliance? 
33 et seq. 

Entente conspiracy invented by Schie- 
mann, the, 60-63 



492 



INDEX 



Entente Powers' unpreparedness for 

war, 146 
Erfurter Allgemeiner Anzeiger, 1912, on 

Pan-German Union, 355 
Esprit d'escalier of the World's History, 

by W. L. Hertslet, 82 
Evidence in the Case, The, by Mr. J. M. 

Beck, 199 



Fall of Delcass6, June, 1905, 129-150 
Fallieres, M., Germany on his reception 

in Petrograd, 7; 20 
Falsification of the Norddeutsche All- 

gemeine Zeitung, a, quoted, 

252-257 
Fashoda, 219 
"Father of the Fatherland" Keim, 

329-330 

Fear of Peace, The, Essay by Rohrbach, 
quoted, 459-460 

First Hague Conference, the, 170 et seq. 

Forstner, Lieut., Crown Prince sends 
laurel wreath to, 161; a 
national hero, 381 

Forum, The, Walter Schucking, on 
"The German Professors 
and the War, " quoted, 165 

Four groups of the defenders of Ger- 
many, 301 et seq. 

France and England actively work 
for peace, 221 

France's responsibility for the war, 
H. S. Chamberlain on, 412 

Francis Ferdinand, Archduke, Baron 
Beyens on, 315 

Francis Ferdinand's Austrian successor, 
tour to Serajevo, 123 

Francis Joseph, Emperor, meeting of, 
with "Einkreisung-King" in 
Schonbrunn, 21; serious ill- 
ness of, 123 

Franco-German War, Bismarck de- 
clines to confiscate purely 
French territories after, 116 



Frankfurter Zeitung, the, on General 
Eichhorn's address at Saar- 
briicken, 191 2, 365; 1913, 
F. Schotthofer on French 
chauvinism in, quoted, 395; 
on meeting of Central Com- 
mittee of the National 
Liberal Party, 1913, quoted, 

399 

Frederick the Great and preventive 
war, quoted, 1 19-120 

"Freedom of the seas," the, 219-220 

Freisinnige Zeitung, organ of the 
Progressive Party, 390 

French and English members of Parlia- 
ment meet, 1903, 221 

French not responsible for the war, 16 

French Republic's "promise" to share 
in attack on Germany, 19 

French Three Years Law, the, and the 
German Military Law, 56- 
58 

French workmen's visit to London as 
peace demonstrators, 221 

Fried, A. H., 119; his "Handbook of the 
Peace Movement, " 169, 1 70; 
article by, in Friedenswarte, 
quoted, 203-204 

Fuch, Dr., his views on psychiatry and 
politics in Die Post, 342-344; 
on the incidents of Lun6ville 
and Nancy, 344; on the 
Army Law and the Inter- 
national position, 344-345 



Gebsattel, General von, correspondence 
of, with German Chancellor, 
327W.; on Germany's ex- 
ternal enemies, Russia, Eng- 
land and France, in All- 
deutsche Blatter, 372-373; 
on preventive war, 427-429 

Gedanken und Erinnerungen, Bismarck's 
work, quoted, 1 11, 113 



INDEX 



493 



General election confirms England's 
peace policy, 266 

Genesis of the Great War, The, by 
Helfferich, quoted, 256 

Gerlach, H. von, on "Unreason on both 
sides" and on "Hatred," 
in Die Welt am Montag, 
quoted, 1913, 396 

German and English Fleets co-operate 
against Castro in 1902-3, 70 

German and English Press and Parlia- 
ment compared, 224 

German and English wages compared, 

475 

German and French national incomes 
compared, 475 

German and Russian Emperors, meet- 
ing at Potsdam of, 22 

German anti-pacifism in theory and 
practice, 204-205 

German Chancellor quotes Bernard 
Shaw, 27 

German Chauvinism, by Prof. Otfried 
Nippold, quoted, 324, 325- 
328, 341 

German chauvinists, the, 312 et seq. 

German Emperor, and first anniversary 
of war, 13; visit to England 
in 1907, 27; in London for 
King Edward's funeral, 43; 
visits London for unveiling 
of memorial to Queen Vic- 
toria, 83; opposes arbi- 
tration at first Hague Con- 
ference, 180; on perpetual 
peace, 221; personal antip- 
athy to restriction of naval 
armaments, 225 ; on decrease 
of naval armaments, 262; his 
decree on Empress's birth, 
day, 316 

German Empress, Baron Beyens' com- 
ment on, 315; and Herr von 
Kiderlen, 316 

German Government responsible for 
Roger Casement's death, 27; 



German Government — cont. 

and reduction of expenditure 
on armaments, 262 

German Imperial Easter message, 191 7, 
34o 

German Military Law, the, and the 
French Three Years Law, 
56-58 

German nation, the, and the chauvin- 
ists, 322 

German people deceived, 16 

German Press, the, its attitude towards 
first Hague Conference, 179 

"German Professors and the War," 
Walter Schiicking's essay 
in the Forum on, 165 

German shipping, growth of the North- 
German Lloyd Company, 470 

German third war loan, German Em- 
peror's congratulatory tele- 
gram to Dr. Helfferich on, 13 

German wealth before the war, esti- 
mation of, by Walther 
Rathenau, 465 

Germania, Die, 1913, on the great 
world- war, 352 

Germanism abroad, Karl Tolle on, in 
the Deutsche Welt, 347 

Germany against Arbitration, White's 
Autobiography, 178-183 

Germany and Austria guilty of causing 
the war, 14; decline media- 
tory action of third Powers 
at the first Hague Confer- 
ence, 184 

Germany and the Hague Conferences, 
165 et seq. 

Germany a retrogressive nation, 215 

Germany Before the War, by Baron 
Beyens, last Belgian Ambas- 
sador in Berlin, 315 

Germany refuses to sign the Bryan 
Treaty, 1913, 212 

Germany surprised by the war, 481 

Germany — the only shield of peace, 
407-411 



494 



INDEX 



Germany's Annexationist Aims, by Herr 
Grumbach, 431^. 

Germany's attitude at the Hague Con- 
ferences, 166 

Germany's increasing trade before the 
war, 478 

Germany's last word: retardation, but 
not reduction of naval con- 
struction, 266-268 

"Germany's policy not one of con- 
quest, " Bismarck to German 
students at Friedrichsruhe, 
321 

Germany's reasons for the war rest on 
falsehood, 15 

Germany's will for war, prima facie case 
for, 158-160 

Germany's world-domination, 460 

Giercke, Prof., 176 

Giolitti, Signor, 75, 80 

Gladstone, Mr. , Disraeli's epigram on, 33 

Gneisenau and Scharnhorst introduce 
general compulsory service 
into Prussia, 321 

"Good services" and mediation, 183- 
184 

Graf du Moulin-Eckart, Prof., 373 

Grand Duke Nicolai Nicolaievitch at 
French manoeuvres, 20; 93 

Greindl and Schiemann, 28 et seq. 

Greindl, Baron, Belgian Ambassador, 
on King Edward's visit to 
Berlin in 1909, 30; his 
credulity, 32 

Grey, Sir Edward, 40, 41; his policy 
during 1912-13 Balkan crisis 
eulogised by Jagow, 49; 
his speech in Parliament for 
improved relations with Ger- 
many, 61; his constant dis- 
appointment, 63-65; on limi- 
tation of armaments, 85; 
interviewed by Mr. Bell in 
the Chicago Daily News, 
quoted, 235; letter of Nov. 
22, 1912, quoted, 256; hands 



Grey, Sir Edward — cont. 

formula to Count Metter- 
nich, 276; his peace message 
of 1914 and H. S. Chamber- 
lain, 417; H. Stewart Cham- 
berlain on, 423 

Grumbach, Herr, his work, Germany's 
Annexationist Aims, 43 in. 



H 



Hague cause — Triple Entente effect, 
203 

Hague Conferences, Germany's atti- 
tude at the, 166 

Hague, problems of the, and Prof. 
Zorn, 189-195 

Haldane visits Berlin, 43; mission to 
Berlin, 46, 86, 91, 266, 365; 
conversation "at a supper a 
deux," 53; his letter to 
Schiemann, ibid.; reports 
failure of his mission to 
Berlin, 91; speech on arma- 
ments at Lord Mayor's 
banquet, 1906, 223; visits to 
German Emperor, 1906 and 
1912, 226, 227; rejects von 
B&thmann's proposal for 
England's neutrality, 269; 
submits modified form to 
Ministry in London, 270; 
text of, 270-271; England's 
counter-proposal, 272; new 
proposition by Germany, 
273-274; England declines, 
275; his speech of July, 
1915, 294 

Hamburger Nachrichten, the, on Bis- 
marck's opposition to pre- 
ventive wars, quoted, 113; 
Bismarck's attack on 
Nationalists in the, 321; 
quoted, 349; on inter- 
national Conference at 



INDEX 



495 



Hamburger Nachrickten — cont. 

Berne, 349-35°; 19*3. on 
Pan-German Union, 346 

Handbook of the Peace Movement, 
Fried, on Liberal English 
Government, 220 

Hannover scher Courier, 19 13, on Defence 
League, "Are we prepared?" 
360 

Harden, Maximilian, 14; on preventive 
war, 430-432 

Hardinge, Sir C., 31; Schiemann on 
Isvolsky's "understanding" 
with, 38; 225 

Helfferich, Secretary to the German 
Treasury, Emperor Wil- 
liam's congratulatory tele- 
gram to, on first anniversary 
of the war, on success of 
third war loan, 13, 23; on 
Entente Powers' resolution 
for war in 19 14, 40, 106; 
The Genesis of the Great War, 
quoted, 256 

Helmolt, Dr. Hans F., 21; and "the 
great Potsdam lie," 21; on 
Balkan and Persian agree- 
ments, 21; The Secret Ante- 
cedents of the World War, 82 

Heroes, 403-406 

Hertslet, W. L., Esprit d'escalier of the 
World's History, 82 

Herzog, Wilhelm, The Prophets, 341'^ 

HessischePost, 1913, on Defence League, 

359 
High Midday, on a "mature" war, 

quoted, 452 
Hickmann, Herr, Universal Pocket Atlas, 

140 
Hindenburg on America's declaration 

of war, 2o6«. 
Hirst and Morel, open letter of, to 

English M.P.'s, 67 
Hislam, P. A., 39 
Historical antecedents, the, and the 

history of the crime, 106-109 



Hohenlohe, Prince, intervenes in favour 
of arbitration, 182 

Holls, Dr., American delegate, and the 
first Hague Conference, 179; 
conveys letter to von Biilow 
on Germany's negative atti- 
tude to arbitration, 181; 183 

Honest and dishonest "preventive- 
warriors, " 18 et seq. 

How Britain strove for Peace, by Sir 
E. Cook, 259 

How England prevented an Understand- 
ing with Germany, Schie- 
mann's pamphlet, 294 



Idealism or egotism? 212-215 

Imperial Easter Message of 1917, 340 

Imperial Germany, by Prince Biilow, 
171 

Imperialists, the, 302-303 

International commissions of inquiry, 
183-184 

International, the, peace-manifesto res- 
olutions of, at Basel, quot- 
ed, 368 

Isvolsky, M., Russian Ambassador, 
Schiemann on Sir C. Har- 
dinge's "understanding" 
with, 38, 41, 243, 248 

Italy's rdle in the war, 74-82 



J' accuse, on an imperialistic war, 13; 
quoted, 14; on Germany's 
war preparations, quoted, 
136 

Jagow, Herr von, eulogises Grey's 
policy during 191 2-13 Bal- 
kan crisis, 49 

Jaur6s, M. Jean, French Socialist 
leader, unqualified pacifist 
views of, 19; death of, 414; 
Viviani's tribute to, 414; 
his work for peace, 414 



496 



INDEX 



Joffre, General, 48 

Journal des Debats, Schiemann, and the 

Hague Conference, 219 
Jury Court of the World, The, 151-156 



K 



Kahl, Prof., 176 

Kastner, Paul, on days of danger, in the 

Magdeburgische Zeituwg, 

I9 I2 > 354 

Keim, Herr, war-general, 17, 322; 
"Father of the Fatherland, " 
329-330; on the will to war, 
in Der Tag, 1912, 361, 362; 
sings praise of the "men of 
force" in Tdgliche Rund- 
schau, quoted, 378 

Kiderlen-Wachter, Herr von, 41; and 
the German Empress, 316 

King Edward, German mention of 
reception accorded to, in 
Paris, 19; his policy of 
"encirclement," 19, 20, 130; 
meeting of, with Tsar at 
Reval, 36, 130; visit to 
Berlin in 1909, 29; Baron 
Greindl on, 30; promotes 
Entente with France in 1904, 
35; his peace policy, 131 

King George, visit to Paris in 1914, 98 

Kolnische Zeitung, the, 1913, on the 
disturber of the peace, 354 

Krause, Paul, interview with Jules 
Cambon in 1914, quoted, 
298 

Kuhn, Max, on What about our world 
policy? in the Leipziger 
Tagblatt, 1913, 353 



Lauzanne, Stephen, on Delcasse's de- 
fence, 148 
Law of adaptation, the, 402-403 
"League of Agriculturalists," 435 
"League for Promoting International 
Understanding, " constitu- 
tion of, 324-325, 331-333 
"League for the Promotion of the In- 
crease of the Population," 

458-459 

League to Enforce Peace, the, 21m. 

Leipzeiger Neueste Nachrichten, 191 2, 
on Pan-German Union, 357 

Leipziger Tagblatt, 1913, Max Kuhn on 
What about our world 
policy? 353 

Leroy-Beaulieu, M., and the French 
national income, 475 

Leyden, Count von, What would Bis- 
marck have Done? 341 

Liberal Government, the, and its work 
for peace, 220, 223 

Liberal Press, the, before the war and 
the chauvinists, 392-399 

Lichnowsky, Prince, 43, 238; ridiculed 
and attacked by the All- 
deutsche Blatter, 378 

Liebknecht, Herr, 336 

Lies have "short legs, " 82-83 

Limitation of naval armaments, nego- 
tiations between Germany 
and England regarding, 84 

Lloyd's Register on leading seafaring 
nations, 469 

Lokalanzeiger, the, Jules Cambon's 
interview with Paul Krause, 
August 2, 1914, quoted in, 
298 

London Conference of Ambassadors, 
Schiemann and the, 47-48, 
96 



La guerre qui vient, Francis Delaisi's 

pamphlet, 26, 27 
UAllemagne avant la guerre, Baron 

Beyens's book, 29 



M 

Macaulay, quoted, 338 
Macdonald, Mr. J. R., 425 



INDEX 



497 



Marz, 1913, Ludwig Thoma on "Poison 
mixers" in, quoted, 395 

Magdeburgische Zeitung, the, 191 2, 
quoted, 366; Paul Kastner 
in, on days of danger, 366 

Matin, the, Delcasse defence appears 
in, 147 

Meeting of members of French and 
English Parliaments, 1903, 
221 

Mercenary Armies, 320 

Metternich, Count, hands formula of 
English proposal on Anglo- 
German negotiations to Sir 
E. Grey, 276; submits addi- 
tional clause to Sir E. Grey, 
280; reports of February- 
March, 1912, 292-294 

Meurer, Christian, work on the first 
Hague Conference, 170 

Meyer, Herr, 20, 176 

Milhaud, Prof. Edgard, Du droit de la 
force d la force du droit, 189 

Military preparations of the Triple 
Entente and the Triple 
Alliance, the, 135-137 

Military Strategy versus Diplomacy in 
Bismarck's Time and After- 
wards, paper by Prof. Mun- 
roe Smith, 114, 115 

Moltke, Count von, desirous of war 
with France in 1867, 115 

Morel, Mr. E. D., 14; article of, in 
New Statesman, 67, 425 

Morel and Hirst, open letter of, to 
English M.P.'s, 67 

Morley, Lord, reasons for resigning 
from Government, 52 

Moroccan Agreement of 191 1, the, 
66-70 

Moulin-Eckart, Prof. Graf du, on the 
"day of destiny," 373 

Mudra, Gen. von, 318 

Minister, Count, and the first Hague 
Conference, White's Auto- 
biography quoted on, 179; 



Munster, Count — cont. 

against arbitration, 180; 
sends Prof. Zorn to Berlin 
for instructions as to arbi- 
tration, 181 



N 



Napoleon's enmity to German unity, 1 1 1 

Nation, The, on Lord Roberts's ideas, 

94; Campbell-Bannerman on 

British naval power in, 225 

National Review and the Venezuelan 

incident of 1902-15, quoted, 

73 
Naval armaments, negotiations between 
English and German Gov- 
ernments as to limitation of, 

. 83 
Negotiations for an Anglo-German 

understanding, 84, 93 

Neueste Nachrichten (Braunschweig), 
i9i2,on Pan-German Union, 
358 

New self-accusation of Austria, a, 
244-251 

New Statesman, Mr. E. D. Morel on 
invasion of Belgium in, 67 

New War Essays, by H. S. Chamberlain, 
quoted, 408, 412, 414, 415, 
421, 423 

Nicolai Nicolaievitch, Grand Duke, at 
French manoeuvres, 20, 93 

Nicolson, Sir Arthur, English Ambassa- 
dor in Petrograd, 241, 242, 
249 

Nigra, Count, Italy's delegate to the 
first Hague Conference, 184, 
185 

Nippold, Prof. Otfried, his work The 
Second Hague Conference, 
170; his work German Chau- 
vinism, quoted, 324, 325- 
329- 332 

Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, Count 
Pourtales's report on the 



INDEX 



Norddeutsche Attgemeine Zeitung — cont. 
Balkan crisis in, 240, 241; a 
falsification of the, quoted, 
252-2 53 ; inaccurately quotes 
Sir E. Grey's Anglo-German 
negotiations proposal to 
Count Metternich, 276ft.; 
Metternich's reports of Feb.- 
March, 191 2, published in, 
292 

Northcliffe, Lord, 19 







Obituary notices, Vorwarts' enormous 

daily lists of, 319 
Obligatory arbitration, world treaty or 

individual treaty, 196-203 
Oncken, Herr, 20 
One "Block, " not "Blocks, " in Europe, 

230-232 
"Our Future," General Bernhardt on, 

in Die Post, 191 2, 362-363; 

in Hannoversches Tageblatt, 

1912, 363; on "Present-day 

war, " in Konservative Monat- 

schrift, 363 



Pams, M., candidate for French Presi- 
dency, 123 

Pan-American Union, the, 209 

Pan-Germans, Liberals, Social-Demo- 
crats, 388-392 

Pan-German Union, meeting in Han- 
over, 191 2, Die Post on, 3SS; 
Erfurter Allgemeiner An- 
zeiger on, 355-356; Berliner 
Neueste Nachrichten on, 357; 
Leipziger Neueste Nachrich- 
ten on, 357; Neueste Nach- 
richten (Braunschweig) on, 
357; Hamburger Nachrichten, 
1913, on, 358; Tagliche 
Rundschau on, 358, 365 et 



Pan-German Union — cont. 

seq.; its criminal longing for 
war, 367; Committee meet- 
ing at Munich, 1913, 369; 
discontented with army pro- 
vision in 1913, 375; resolu- 
tion adopted at Stuttgart in 
1914, quoted, 375, 376 

Pan-German war-aims, 382 et seq. 

Pan-Germany — All Germany, 333-337 

Pan- Germany did not wish for war 
with England at present, 
380 

"Pan-Germany here and everywhere!" 
the call of the German Press, 

389 

Panther, The, a Pan-German review, 
quoted, 428 

Payer, Herr Dr. von, reporter to Com- 
mission on Liebknecht, 337 

Pester Lloyd, Herr von Burian's article 
in, on Bosnian crisis, 243; 
quotations from, 245, 246 

Peters, Karl, founder of the Pan- 
German Union, 337 

Pocket Atlas, 1916, Justus Perthes' 
(Gotha), 140 

Poincar6, M., Germany on his recep- 
tion in Petrograd, 19, 20, 57 

Policy of Force, stages in, 338 

Population, comparison of, of the 
Great Powers, 142 

Potsdam Agreement, Sazonof 's account 
of, described by Schiemann 
as "conscienceless," 21 

Potsdam meeting between German and 
Russian Emperors, 21 

Pourtales, Count, repb-rts on Bosnian 
crisis in Norddeutsche Att- 
gemeine Zeitung, 240, 241 

Powers, how they voted at the second 
Hague Conference, 202 

Press, chauvinistic, jingoistic articles 
in German, 19; Jules Cam- 
bon on mischievous in- 
fluence of, 298 



INDEX 



499 



Preventionists, the, 303-305 
Preventive Imperialists, 306, 426 et seq. 
"Preventive" war, a, 13 et seq. 
Prima facie case, a, for Germany's will 

for war, 158-160 
Problems of Peace Economics, by Walther 

Rathenau, 465 
Prophets, The, by Wilhelm Herzog, 

34i 
Prussian and Russian reaction, 437-439 
Psychology of the free-lance, 406-407 



R 



Rathenau, Walther, his estimation of 
the German national wealth 
in Problems of Peace Econom- 
ics, 465 

Reichsbote, Der, on Germany in England, 
1913, 348; on "Oderint dum 
metuant, " 349 

Reuter, Col., of Zabern incident a 
national hero, 381 

Reval, the aggressive conspiracy of, 
1908, 36 

Reventlow, Count, 322, 390 

Rheinisch-W estfdlische Zeitung, the, on 
the coming war, 191 2, 346 

Ritter, Dr., lecture leader of the Pan- 
German Union, conducts 
intrigue for war, 380 

Rizoff, M., Bulgarian Ambassador, 
states reasons for Bulgaria's 
entry into the war, 283 

Roberts, Lord, 93; The Nation on his 
ideas, 94 

Rohrbach, Herr Paul, 20, 33, 322; The 
Ascent to a World Nation, 
quoted, 432, 452 et seq.; his 
German World- and Colonial 
Policy, quoted, 433; Hard 
Necessity, A, 440; quoted, 
- 441; Guilt and Destiny, 443; 
Our Opponents, quoted, 444, 
445, 447, 450, 451; on the 
war-path, 440-454; Zum 



Rohrbach, Herr Paul — cont. 

Wellvolk hindurch, pamphlet 

quoted, 431, 432; article by, 

on War — the Father of All 

Things, 456, 457 
Rouvier, M., French Prime Minister, 

compels Delcasse to resign 

in 1905, 122 
Russia and possession of Constantinople 

and Dardanelles, Schiemann 

on, 37 
Russia's spirit of compliance, 415-419 
Russian and German Emperors, meeting 

at Potsdam of, 21 
Russians not responsible for the war, 15 



Salisbury, Lord, and the pernicious 
increase of armaments, 216 

Sazonof's accounts of Potsdam Agree- 
ment described by Schie- 
mann as "conscienceless," 
21; accompanies Tsar to 
Potsdam, 43 

Scharnhorst and Gneisenau introduce 
general compulsory service 
into Prussia, 321 

Scherl, Herr, 410 

Schiemann, Prof. Dr. Theodor, 14, 20, 
21; "the German Derou- 
lede, " 21, 23, 26, 27; 
Delaisi's testimony to, 28; 
jingoistic activities of, in 
Moroccan conflict, 29; his 
views on King Edward's 
visit to Berlin in 1909, 30; 
quotes Golos Moskwy on 
King Edward's visit to 
Reval, 37; on "understand- 
ing" between Sir C. Hard- 
inge and Isvolsky, 38; tactics 
of falsification of, 44; ignores 
London Conference of Am- 
bassadors, 47; Lord Hal- 
dane's friendly letter to, 53; 



500 



INDEX 



Schiemann, Prof. Dr. Theodor — cont. 

and the Hague Conferences, 
216-218 

Schiemann and Greindl, 28 et seq. 

Schotthofer, F., on French chauvinism 
in the Frankfurter Zeitung, 
1913, quoted, 395 

Schiicking, Walter, on "German Pro- 
fessors and the War, " in the 
Forum, 165; The Union of 
States of the Hague Con- 
ferences, 170 

Second Hague Conference, the, Otfried 
Nippold's work, 170, 202». 

Second Hague Conference, the, 196 
et seq.; voting at, 202 

Secret Antecedents of the World War, 
by Herr Hans F. Helmolt, 
82; quoted, 147, 148 

Serbian harbour, the, a pretext by the 
Pan-German Union for war, 

367 

Shaw, Bernard, quoted by German 
Chancellor, 27, 425 

Skutari, 95, 367 

Slanderer, A, Notes on the Historical 
Antecedents of the War, 
S chiemann's pamphlet 
against author of J' 1 accuse, 
quoted, 22, 43-44, 46, 67, 
75, 79, 86, 87, 90, 91, 94, 
108-109 

Small-pox introduced into Germany by 
French prisoners of war in 
1870-71, 457 

Smith, Prof. Munroe, Military Strategy 
versus Diplomacy in Bis- 
marck's Time and After- 
wards, 114, 115 

Snowden, Mr. Philip, 425 

Sonnemann, Herr, 390 

"Spiritual regeneration, " 400-401 

Spokesmen of militant Germany, the, 
300 et seq. 

Staal, M. de, President of the first 
Hague Conference, 183 



Stages in the Policy of Force, 338 

"Standard of life" in Germany, the, 
471 et seq. 

Statistical Year-Book of the German 
Empire, the, 1914, 140 

Stehelin, F., on chauvinism, and on 
pernicious efforts, quoted, in 
the Strassburger Neue Zei- 
tung, 1913, 394 

Strassburger Neue Zeitung, The, 19 13, 
on chauvinism, and on 
pernicious efforts, quoted, 
by F. Stehelin, 394 

Strassburger Post, The, 1913, on Ger- 
many, France, and Alsace- 
Lorraine, quoted, 393 

Strategy and diplomacy, n 4-1 18 

Struggle for the "place in the sun," 
461 et seq. 

Suicides increased by war, 457 



Taft's treaties of arbitration, 205- 
209 

Tagliche Rundschau on twenty-fifth 
anniversary of the Pan- 
German Union, quoted, 337- 
338; quoted, 347-348; 19*3. 
on Defence League, 360 

"That is war as we love it," the 
Crown Prince's boast, 160- 
163 

Theory and the practice of the pre- 
ventive war, the, no et seq. 

Thoma, Herr Ludwig, 390; on "Poison 
mixers," in Mdrz, quoted, 

395 

Three preliminary questions, 462 et seq. 

Three presuppositions, the, of a pre- 
ventive war, 125-135 

Times, the, on Delcass6's defence, 
quoted, 149 

Tirpitz, Admiral von, and the new- 
born German navy, 131; 
at meeting of Austrian and 



INDEX 



501 



Tirpitz, Admiral von — cont. 

German Emperors at Knoo- 
pischt, 371 

Tittoni, Signor, Italian Foreign Minis- 
ter, on armaments, 224 

Tolle, Karl, on Germanism abroad, in 
the Deutsche Welt, 347 

Trevelyan, C. P., Mr., 27, 52, 425 

Triple Alliance, the, military prepara- 
tions of, 135-137 

Triple Entente, the, military prepara- 
tions of, 135-137 

True enemies of the German people, 
the, 24 

True traitors, the, 24 

Tsar, the, "supports his two accom- 
plices, England and Ger- 
many, for booty and 
revenge," 19; meeting with 
King Edward at Reval, 20, 
43 ; and his Ministerial Coun- 
cil in 1913, 96 

Turkey refuses to sign the Bryan 
Treaty of 1913, 213 



U 



Ullstein, Herr, 390 

Underlying Feelings, by H. S. Chamber- 
lain, 415 

Understanding pamphlet, quoted, 77, 88 

Union of States of the Hague Conferences, 
the, by Walter Schiicking, 
170 

Unionist Government, its unwearying 
work for peace, 220 

Universal Pocket Atlas, 1915, Hickmann, 
140 

Universal service, 320 

University of Berlin professors' appeal, 
quoted, 176 



Venezuela incident, the, 1902-3, 70-74 
Viviani, M., 27 



Voluntary reduction of naval con- 
struction — Naval holiday, 
296-299 

Vorwarts' enormous daily lists of 
obituary notices, 319; 
quoted, 327W.; correspond- 
ence in, between von Beth- 
mann and the General Com- 
mittee of the Pan-German 
Union, 384-385 

Vossische Zeitung, 19 13, on "The 
Alarmists," quoted, 392 

Voting at the second Hague Conference, 
202 



W 



Wagner, Prof., 176 

War of conquest, an imperialistic, 16 

War of defence, a, still German opinion, 

13 

War of liberation and defence a German 
lie, 17 

War-strength of the opposing Powers, 
144-146 

War — the Father of Things, 456-459; 
article by Rohrbach on, 
quoted, 456, 457 

War, the, not one of defence, 16 

What would Bismarck have Done? by 
Count von Leyden, 341 

When is war inevitable? 121-125 

Where must the War Lead Us? by Rohr- 
bach, quoted, 460 

White, Andrew D., late American 
Ambassador in Berlin, Auto- 
biography of, 170; sends 
letter by Dr. Holls to von 
Biilow as to Germany's 
negative attitude towards 
arbitration, 181 

Who provoked the European War, 22 

Wiemer, Dr., leader of the Progressive 
Popular Party for Greater 
Berlin, speech of, 167W. 

Wilamowitz-Mollendorff, Prof., 176 



502 



INDEX 



Will to war, the, General Keim on, 
in Der Tag, 191 2, 362- 

363 ..... 

"William's first victory, " August, 1914, 
the German Empress and 
Princesses and, 318 

Wilson, President, his Message to 
Congress, quoted, 206-207 

Wolff, Herr Theodor, editor of the 
Berliner Tageblatt, an 
honourable journalist, 391 

Wrangel, Field-Marshal, sends cal- 
umnious telegrams to King 
of Prussia against Bismarck, 
114 

Wrochem, General, 322 



Zorn, Prof. Philipp, and the first 
Hague Conference, 179; sent 
by Count Miinster to Berlin 
to obtain instructions as to 
arbitration, 181$".; replies 
to M. Constant in the 
Neue Ziircher Zeitung, 
quoted, 189; on "shameful" 
attack of the Entente 
Powers, quoted, 191 

Zukunft, the, M. Harden and, quoted, 

43°. 43i 
Zum Weltvolk hindurch, Herr Paul Rohr- 
bach's pamphlet, quoted, 
432, 452 



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